{"id":27132,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/9100-constitution.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","slug":"9100-constitution","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/9100-constitution.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 9100 Constitution"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li> (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992), &#8216;Constitutional Law and Economics&#8217;, <b>12(2)S <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Ackerman, Bruce A. (1989), &#8216;Constitutional Politics\/Constitutional Law&#8217;, <b>99 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 453-547. <\/li>\n<li>Adelstein, Richard P. (1979), &#8216;Informational Paradox and the Pricing of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards in Economic Perspective&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology <\/em>, 281-298. <\/li>\n<li>Alfaro Aguila-Real, Jes\u009cs, &#8216;Autonom\u0092a privada y derechos fundamentales (Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Rights)&#8217;, <b>XLVI-I <\/b> <em>Anuario de Derecho Civil <\/em>, 57-122. <\/li>\n<li>Apolte, Thomas (1997), &#8216;Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels?&#8217;, <b>8 (1) <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 57-76. <\/li>\n<li>Atlas, C. M., Gilligan, Thomas W., Hendershott, R.J. and Zupan, Mark A. (1995), &#8216;Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who wins, and why&#8217;, <b>85(3) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 624-629. <\/li>\n<li>Atlas, C. M., Hendershott, R.J. and Zupan, Mark A. (1996), &#8216;Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size&#8217;, <em>Public Choice <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Backhaus, J\u009frgen G. (1991), &#8216;Een economische analyse van het constitutionele recht (An Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law)&#8217;, in Hondius, E.H., Schippers, J.J. and Siegers, J. (eds.), <em>Rechtseconomie en Recht <\/em>, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 107-148. <\/li>\n<li>Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), <em>Economics of Constitutional Law and Public Choice <\/em>, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Benson, Bruce L (1990), <em>The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State <\/em>, San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy. <\/li>\n<li>Benson, Bruce L. (1990), &#8216;Customary Law With Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Libertarian Studies <\/em>, 25-42. Reprinted in as &#8220;Law and Order Without State Coercion&#8221;, in Veljanovski, Cento (ed.), Regulation, Regulators and the Market, 1991, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 159-179. <\/li>\n<li>Benson, Bruce L. (1992), &#8216;Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 1-27. <\/li>\n<li>Bhalla, Surjit (1994), <em>Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Cycle? <\/em>, Nobel Symposium, Uppsala University, August 1994. <\/li>\n<li>Borner, Silvio (1979), &#8216;Wirtschafts- Sozial- und Eigentumsord nung um Verfassungsentwurf: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag aus \u009akonomi scher Sicht (Economic, Social and Property Structure in the Constitutionial Bill: A Contribution to the Discussion from an Economic Viewpoint)&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Zeitschrift f\u009fr Schweizerisches Recht <\/em>, 463-479. <\/li>\n<li>Boudreaux, Donald J. and Pritchard, A.C. (1993), &#8216;Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>Fordham Law Review <\/em>, 111-162. <\/li>\n<li>Brady, David and Epstein, David (1997), &#8216;Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 26-49. <\/li>\n<li>Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan P. (1994), &#8216;A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powes&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Theoretical Politics <\/em>, 345-368. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan P. (1995), &#8216;Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus?&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Philosophy <\/em>, 280-303. <\/li>\n<li>Brenner, Reuven (1990), <em>Les choix du Qu\u008ebec <\/em>, Commission sur l&#8217;avenir politique et constitutionnel du Qu\u008ebec (Commission B\u008elanger-Campeau), Les avis des sp\u008ecialistes invit\u008es \u0088 r\u008epondre aux huit questions par la Commission (Commission B\u008elanger-Campeau). <\/li>\n<li>Brenner, Reuven (1991), &#8216;Les Choix du Quebec&#8217;, in X (ed.), <em>Les Avis des Specialistes Invites a Repondre aux Huit Questions Posees par la Comission <\/em>, Assembl\u008es Nationale, Documents Parlementaires, 119-156. <\/li>\n<li>Brenner, Reuven (1991), &#8216;Canadian Choices&#8217;, in Boadway, R., Courchene, T. and Purvis, D. (eds.), <em>Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change <\/em>, Kingston, Queen&#8217;s University, John Deutsch Institute, 117-149. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1959), &#8216;Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 124-138. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1975), <em>The Limits of Liberty &#8211; Between Anarchy and Leviathan <\/em>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1977), <em>Freedom in Constitutional Contract &#8211; Perspectives of a Political Economist <\/em>, Texas, A&amp;M University. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1978), &#8216;A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy&#8217;, in Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John W., (eds.), <em>Anarchism <\/em>, New York, 29-42. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1986), &#8216;Political Economy and Social Philosophy&#8217;, in X., (ed.), <em>Liberty, Market and State &#8211; Political Economy in the 1980s <\/em>, New York, 261-274. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1987), &#8216;Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Cato Journal <\/em>, 305-312. Reprinted in Gwartney, James D. and Wagner, Richard E. (eds.), &#8220;Public Choice and Constitutional Economics&#8221;, Chapter 6, (1988), London: JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1987), &#8216;The Constitution of Economic Policy&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 243-250. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1987), &#8216;Constitutional Economics&#8217;, in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.), <em>The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance <\/em>, London , Macmillan, 585-588. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1988), &#8216;Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 135-139. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. (1990), &#8216;The Domain of Constitutional Economics&#8217;, <b>1(1) <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 1-18. <\/li>\n<li>Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon (1962), <em>The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. <\/li>\n<li>Bund, Dorothee (1984), <em>Die \u0085konomische Theorie der Verfassung (The Economic Theory of the Constitution) <\/em>, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 96 p. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E., &#8216;State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>University of Cincinnati Law Review <\/em>, 611 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), &#8216;The Contract Clause and the Corporation&#8217;, <b>55 <\/b> <em>Brooklyn Law Review <\/em>, 767 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1994), &#8216;Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Kansas Law Review <\/em>, 163 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Centner, Terence J. (1985), &#8216;Are FmHA Loans Entitlements Protected by the Due Process Clause?&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Drake Law Review <\/em>, 389-427. <\/li>\n<li>Centner, Terence J. and White, F.C. (1987), &#8216;FmHA&#8217;s Efforts Against Delinquent Borrowers: Property Interests and Transaction Costs.&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Western Journal of Agricultural Economics <\/em>, 35-41. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. (1994), &#8216;Void for Vagueness: Introduction to a Symposium&#8217;, <b>82 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 487-490. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Drexl, Josef (1994), &#8216;The Logic of Power in the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 307-326. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Ginsburg, Tom (1996), &#8216;Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 295-313. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Weingast, Barry R. (1992), &#8216;Editor&#8217;s Introduction: Constitutional Law and Economics&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Courchene, Thomas J. (1991), <em>\u0083loge du f\u008ed\u008eralisme renouvel\u008e (Praise for a Renewed Federalism) <\/em>, Toronto, C.D. Howe Institute. <\/li>\n<li>Crain, W. Mark and Tollison, Robert D. (1979), &#8216;The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of Government&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 555-567. <\/li>\n<li>Culp, Jerome McCristal, Jr. (1992), &#8216;Myth, Democracy, and Legislative Accountability: A Dubitante Opinion: Commentary&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 213-216. <\/li>\n<li>Dye, Thomas R. (1987), &#8216;The Politics of Constitutional Choice&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Cato Journal <\/em>, 337-344. <\/li>\n<li>Elhauge, Einer Richard (1991), &#8216;Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?&#8217;, <b>101 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 31 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Elhauge, Einer Richard (1996), &#8216;Are Term Limits Undemocratic&#8217;, <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Elster, Jon (1991), &#8216;Arguing and Bargaining in two Constituent Assemblies&#8217;, <em> <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Elster, Jon (1993), &#8216;Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Public Administration Review <\/em>, 169-217. <\/li>\n<li>Eskridge, William N., Jr. and Ferejohn, John A. (1992), &#8216;Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 165-189. <\/li>\n<li>Farber, Daniel A. and Frickey, Philip P. (1991), <em>Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction <\/em>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 159 p. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, William A. (1989), &#8216;Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 465-474. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, William A. (1995), &#8216;The Offer\/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 187-203. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, William A. (1996), &#8216;How Serrano Caused Proposition 13&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Politics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, William A. and Shapiro, Perry (1989), &#8216;A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 115-128. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III (1972), &#8216;The Public Choice Theory of Murray N. Rothbard: A Modern Anarchist&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 143-154. <\/li>\n<li>Frey, Bruno S. (1994), &#8216;Direct Democracy: Politico-Economic Lessons from Swiss Experience&#8217;, <b>84 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 338-342. <\/li>\n<li>Frey, Bruno S. and Bohnet, Iris (1994), <em>Democracy by Competition: Referenda and Federalism in Switzerland <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Frickey, Philip P. (1992), &#8216;Constitutional Structure, Public Choice, and Public Law: Commentary&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 163-165. <\/li>\n<li>Friedman, Daniel and Wittman, Donald A. (1995), &#8216;Why Voter Vote for Incumbents but Against Incumbency: A Rational Choice Explanation&#8217;, <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 67-83. <\/li>\n<li>Friedman, Daniel and Wittman, Donald A. (1996), &#8216;Term Limits as Political Redistribution&#8217;, in Grofman, Bernard (ed.), <em>Legislative Term Limits: A Public Choice Perspective <\/em>, Kluwer. <\/li>\n<li>Gifford, Adam, Jr. (1991), &#8216;A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 91-106. <\/li>\n<li>Goldwin, Robert A. and Kaufman, Art (eds.) (1988), <em>Constitution-Makers on Constitution-Making <\/em>, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. <\/li>\n<li>Grofman, Bernard and Wittman, Donald A. (eds.) (1989), <em>The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the Old <\/em>, Agathon Press. <\/li>\n<li>Gwartney, James D. and Wagner, Richard E. (eds.) (1988), <em>Public Choice and Constitutional Economics <\/em>, Greenwood, JAI Press, 422 p. <\/li>\n<li>Gwartney, James D., Lawson, Robert and Block, Walter E. (1996), <em>Economic Freedom of the World: 1975 &#8211; 1995 <\/em>, Vancouver (BC), The Fraser Institute. <\/li>\n<li>Hwang, Chun-Sin and Kan, Steven S. (1994), <em>Principles of Economics, Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) <\/em>, Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei. <\/li>\n<li>Hwang, Chun-Sin and Kan, Steven S. (1995), &#8216;Democracy and the Principle for the Division of Labor in Government Organization (in Chinese)&#8217;, in Chien, Sechin Y.S. and Tai, Terence H. (eds.), <em>Philosophy and Public Norms <\/em>, Taipei, Academia Sinica, Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, 163-200. <\/li>\n<li>Janssen, Martin and Hummler, Konrad (1979), <em>Bundesverfassung und Verfassungsentwurf, Eine \u009akonomisch-rechtliche Analyse (Constitution and Revision of the Constitition, An Economic and Legal Analysis) <\/em>, Schriften des Schweizerischen Aufkl\u008arungs-Dienstes. <\/li>\n<li>Janssen, Martin and Hummler, Konrad (1979), &#8216;Bundesverfassung und Verfassungsentwurf, Eine \u009akonomisch-rechtliche Analyse (Constitution and Revision of the Constitition, An)&#8217;, <em>Schriften des Schweizerischen Aufkl\u008arungs-Dienstes <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Josselin, Jean-Michel and Marciano, Alain (1997), &#8216;The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State ?&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>European Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 5-21. <\/li>\n<li>Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A. (1984), &#8216;Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics&#8217;, <b>74(3) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 279-300. Reprinted in Rowley, C.K. (Ed.), Public Choice Theory, Cheltenham, England, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1993. <\/li>\n<li>Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A. (1990), &#8216;The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions&#8217;, <b>33 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 103-131. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1991), &#8216;Hsun-Tzu&#8217;s Theory of Justice (in Chinese)&#8217;, in Tai, Hua T. and Cheng, Hsiao-Shih, <em>Justice and Related Concepts <\/em>, Taipei, Academia Sinica, Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, 93-130. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1994), <em>Principles of Economics: Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) <\/em>, Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1996), &#8216;A Form of Government Organization from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 197-220. <\/li>\n<li>Keynes, John Neville (1955), <em>The Scope and Method of Political Economy <\/em>, New York, Kelley. <\/li>\n<li>Kitch, Edmund W. and Bowler, Clara Ann (1978), &#8216;The Facts of Munn v. Illinois&#8217;, <em>Supreme Court Review <\/em>, 313 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kiwit, Daniel and Voigt, Stefan (1995), &#8216;\u0086berlegungen zum institutionellen Wandel unter Ber\u009fcksichtigung des Verh\u008altnisses interner und externer Institutionen&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Ordo <\/em>, 117-147. <\/li>\n<li>Knight, Jack (1992), &#8216;Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: Positive Models and Normative Theory&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 190-196. <\/li>\n<li>Lemieux, Pierre (1993), <em>Le droit de porter des armes (The Right to Bear Arms) <\/em>, Paris, Belles Lettres. <\/li>\n<li>Levinson, Sanford (1987), &#8216;Some Reflections on the Posnerian Constitution&#8217;, <b>56 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 39-49. <\/li>\n<li>Levmore, Saul (1992), &#8216;Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 145-162. <\/li>\n<li>Levy, David (1989), &#8216;The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 79-103. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. (1987), &#8216;Competing Economic Views of the Constitution&#8217;, <b>56 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 50-80. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. (1988), &#8216;Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 471-518. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1997), &#8216;The Emergence of Constitutional Rights&#8217;, <b>8 (1) <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 15-36. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1992), &#8216;The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution&#8217;, <b>28(2) <\/b> <em>Stanford Journal of International Law <\/em>, 451-476. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1992), &#8216;The Theory of Secession: How To Apply It To Emerging Democracies&#8217;, in McGee, Robert W. (ed.), <em>The Market Solution To Economic Development in Eastern Europe <\/em>, The Edwin Mellen Press, 103-119. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1992), &#8216;A Third Liberal Theory of Secession&#8217;, <b>14(1) <\/b> <em>Liverpool Law Review <\/em>, 45-66. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1993), &#8216;Secession and Emerging Democracies: The Kendall and Louw Solution&#8217;, <b>252\u00a1 <\/b> <em>Journal of International Law and Practice <\/em>, 321-335. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1994), &#8216;Secession as a Tool for Limiting the Growth of State and Municipal Governments and Making It More Responsive: A Constitutional Proposal&#8217;, <b>21(2) <\/b> <em>Western State University Law Review <\/em>, 499-513. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. (1994), &#8216;Secession Reconsidered&#8217;, <b>11(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Libertarian Studies <\/em>, 11-33. <\/li>\n<li>McGee, Robert W. and Lam, Danny (1992), &#8216;Hong Kong&#8217;s Option To Secede&#8217;, <b>33(2) <\/b> <em>Harvard International Law Journal <\/em>, 427-440. <\/li>\n<li>McGuire, Robert A. 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