{"id":27117,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7400-settlement.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","slug":"7400-settlement","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7400-settlement.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 7400 Settlement"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Anderson, David A. (1994), &#8216;Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 &amp; Beyond&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-246. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. (1996), &#8216;An Introduction to Legal Bargaining&#8217;, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), <em>Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. (ed.) (1996), <em>Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap <\/em>, Greenwood, JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. and Rowe, Thomas D., Jr., &#8216;Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?&#8217;, <b>71(2) <\/b> <em>Chicago-Kent Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. and Rowe, Thomas D., Jr., &#8216;One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes and Offer of Judgement Rules: An Empirical Experiment&#8217;, <b>36 <\/b> <em>Jurimetrics Journal of Law, Science &amp; Technology <\/em>, 255-273. <\/li>\n<li>Babcock, Linda and others (1995), &#8216;Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 289-303. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1984), &#8216;Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 404-415. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1988), &#8216;Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 437-450. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1996), &#8216;A New Theory Concerning the Credibility of Success of Threats to Sue&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 1-26. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), &#8216;An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 371-403. <\/li>\n<li>Bernstein, Lisa and Klerman, Daniel (1995), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 2215-2270. <\/li>\n<li>Blankenburg, E. and Verwoerd, J.R.A. (198), &#8216;Vermijden en benutten van civielrechtelijke procedures in Nederland en omringende landen (The Use and Avoidance of Private Law Proceedings i)&#8217;, <b>7-2 <\/b> <em>Justiti\u0091le Verkenningen <\/em>, 20-35. <\/li>\n<li>Bone, Robert G. (1994), &#8216;The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 595-613. <\/li>\n<li>Bowles, Roger A. (1987), &#8216;Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz&#8217;s Measuring the Demand for Litigation&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 177-184. <\/li>\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1993), &#8216;Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution <\/em>, 279-297. <\/li>\n<li>Bundy, Stephen M. (1989), &#8216;Commentary: Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 335-365. <\/li>\n<li>Che, Yeon-Koo and Yi, Jong Goo (1993), &#8216;The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 399-424. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), &#8216;Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Literature <\/em>, 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1994), &#8216;An Economic Model of Legal Discovery in the U.S.&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 435-463. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D., Marks, Stephen V. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1982), &#8216;Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-251. Reprinted in Coleman, Jules and Lange, Jeffrey (Eds.), Law and Economics, Volume 2, New York, University Press, 1992. <\/li>\n<li>Cornell, Bradford (1990), &#8216;The Incentive to Sue: An Option- Pricing Approach&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 173-187. <\/li>\n<li>Croson, Rachel and Mnookin, Robert H. (1997), &#8216;Does Disputing through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 331-345. <\/li>\n<li>Danzon, Patricia M. (1990), &#8216;On &#8220;Bargaining Behavior by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model&#8221;&#8216;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance <\/em>, 53-54. <\/li>\n<li>Danzon, Patricia M. and Lillard, Lee A. (1983), &#8216;Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 345-377. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), &#8216;Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 314-348. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1994), &#8216;Settlement Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 283-298. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), &#8216;Keeping Society in the Dark: on the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 203-221. <\/li>\n<li>Donohue, John J. III (1994), &#8216;The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate Mathematical Symmetries and Metaissues about Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 543-558. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), &#8216;The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 641-695. <\/li>\n<li>Farber, Henry S. and White, Michelle J. (1991), &#8216;Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 199-217. <\/li>\n<li>Farber, Henry S. and White, Michelle J. (1994), &#8216;A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 777-806. <\/li>\n<li>Farmer, Amy and Pecorino, Paul (1994), &#8216;Pretrial Negotiations with Asymmetric Information on Risk Preferences&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 273-281. <\/li>\n<li>Fenn, Paul T. and Vlachonikolis, Ioannis (1990), &#8216;Bargaining Behaviour by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance <\/em>, 41-52. <\/li>\n<li>Fisch, Jill E. (1991), &#8216;Rewriting History: The Eradication of Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur&#8217;, <b>76 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 589-642. <\/li>\n<li>Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1989), &#8216;Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Review of Economics and Statistics <\/em>, 189-195. <\/li>\n<li>Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1996), &#8216;The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 310-321. <\/li>\n<li>Gertner, Robert H. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1995), &#8216;Settlement Escrows&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 87-122. <\/li>\n<li>Gould, John P. (1973), &#8216;The Economics of Legal Conflicts&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 279-300. <\/li>\n<li>Grossman, Gene M. and Katz, Michael L. (1983), &#8216;Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 749-757. <\/li>\n<li>Haddock, David D. and McChesney, Fred S. (1991), &#8216;Bargaining Costs, Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 334-354. <\/li>\n<li>Harris, Donald and Veljanovski, Cento G. (1983), &#8216;Remedies for Breach Under Contract Law: Designing Rules to Facilitate Out- of-Court Settlements&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Law and Policy Quarterly <\/em>, 97-127. <\/li>\n<li>Hause, John C. (1989), &#8216;Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I&#8217;ll Be Suing You&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 157-179. <\/li>\n<li>Hay, Bruce L. (1995), &#8216;Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 29-62. <\/li>\n<li>Hersch, Philip L. (1990), &#8216;Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 235-241. <\/li>\n<li>Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), &#8216;Emotional Responses in Litigation&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 31-44. <\/li>\n<li>Hughes, James W. and Snyder, Edward A. (1995), &#8216;Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence&#8217;, <b>38 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 225-250. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1993), &#8216;Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 187-210. <\/li>\n<li>Johnson, Ronald N. and Parkman, Allen M. (1991), &#8216;Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 145-162. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel (1996), &#8216;The Incentive Effects of Settlement under Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1995), &#8216;Special Levies on Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency Problems, and Litigation Expenditures&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 175-185. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis (1986), &#8216;Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 371-385. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-27. <\/li>\n<li>King, Allan G. (1982), &#8216;The Economics of Structured Settlements&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Texas Bar Journal <\/em>, 301-304. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Christopher C. (1986), &#8216;Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of the Case Law&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 241-253. <\/li>\n<li>Klerman, Daniel (1996), &#8216;Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 445-462. <\/li>\n<li>Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1992), &#8216;Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation for &#8216;Unfair&#8217; Plea Bargaining&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 507-515. <\/li>\n<li>Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), &#8216;Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial\/Settlement Decision&#8217;, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), <em>Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Koppen, P.J. Van (1990), &#8216;Risk-taking in Civil Law Negotiations&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Law and Human Behavior <\/em>, 151-165. <\/li>\n<li>Koppen, P.J. Van, Richters, H.W. and Ten Kate, J. (1989), &#8216;Schikken of procederen: Psychologische kanttekeningen bij de economie van civielrechtelijke geschillen (Settlement vs. Trial: Psychological Notes on the Economy of Private Law Disputes)&#8217;, <em>Rapport aangeboden aan de Minister van Justitie <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1979), &#8216;Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of Divorce&#8217;, <b>88 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 950 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1993), &#8216;Settlements under Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 427 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), &#8216;Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 517-542. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), &#8216;Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 41-76. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. (1971), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of the Courts&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 61-107. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. (1994), &#8216;Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 235-244. <\/li>\n<li>Langenfeld, James and Rogowsky, Robert A. (1987), &#8216;Settlement vs. Litigation in Antitrust Enforcement&#8217;, in Mackay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Ya (eds.), <em>Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission <\/em>, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 205-219. <\/li>\n<li>Langerwerf, Etienne (1986), &#8216;De sociaal-economische ontwikkeling en de procesvoeringsratio&#8217;s van de burgerlijke rechtbanken tussen 1950 en 1980 (The Social and Economic Development and the Litigation Ratio&#8217;s of the Civil Courts Between 1950 en 1980)&#8217;, <b>40 <\/b> <em>Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift <\/em>, 87-102. <\/li>\n<li>Loewenstein, George and others (1993), &#8216;Self Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 135-159. <\/li>\n<li>Malsch, Marijke (1990), <em>Advocaten voorspellen de uitkomst van hun zaken (Lawyers&#8217; Predictions of Judicial Decisions: A Study on Calibration of Experts) <\/em>, Lisse, Swets &amp; Zeitlinger, 109 p. <\/li>\n<li>Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1991), &#8216;The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Hofstra Law Review <\/em>, 1-71. IRS Computer Modernization and Procurement, Hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, June 25, 1991 and April 2, 1992 <\/li>\n<li>Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1993), &#8216;Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest&#8217;, <em> <\/em> in Leitzel, Jim and Tirole, J. (eds.), <i>Incentives in Procurement Contracting <\/i>, Westview. <\/li>\n<li>Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), &#8216;Multiple Litigants with a Public Good Remedy&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Economics <\/em>, 151-173. <\/li>\n<li>Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), &#8216;Litigation Settlement and Collusion&#8217;, <b>109 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>, 213-239. <\/li>\n<li>Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), &#8216;Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 297-318. <\/li>\n<li>Menell, Peter S. (1983), &#8216;A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 41-52. <\/li>\n<li>Meurer, Michael J. (1989), &#8216;The Settlement of Patent Litigation&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 77-91. <\/li>\n<li>Meurer, Michael J. (1992), &#8216;The Value of Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: The Settlement Conflict between a Liability Insurer and Defendant&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 502-522. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. (1992), &#8216;The Strategic Benefit of In-House Counsel for Product Liability Defendants&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Products Liability <\/em>, 113-119. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. (1993), &#8216;Optimal Deterrence of Nuisance Suits by Repeat Defendants&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 135-144. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. (1994), &#8216;Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 211-224. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), &#8216;Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 381-399. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Rule 68&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 93-125. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), &#8216;Some Agency Problems in Settlement,&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 189-215. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1989), &#8216;Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Boston University Law Review <\/em>, 561-568. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1995), &#8216;Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective (Forthcoming in Reforming the Civil Justice System)&#8217;, in Kramer, Larry (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P., Kessler, Daniel and Meites, Thomas (1996), &#8216;Expanding on the Fifty Percent Hypothesis: A Multimodal Approach To the Selection of Cases for Litigation,&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 233 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Nalebuff, Barry (1987), &#8216;Credible Pretrail Negotiation&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 198-210. <\/li>\n<li>P&#8217;ng, Ivan P.L. (1983), &#8216;Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial&#8217;, <b>14(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 539-550. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1995), &#8216;\u00c0Qu\u008e hacer en los conflictos fiscales? Un an\u0087lisis econ\u0097mico de las propuestas de actas de conformidad (The Resolution of Tax Disputes)&#8217;, <em>Hacienda P\u009cblica Espa\u0096ola <\/em>, 225-244. <\/li>\n<li>Phillips, Jenny and Hawkins, Keith O. (1976), &#8216;Some Economic Aspects of the Settlement Process: A Study of Personal Injury Claims&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Modern Law Review <\/em>, 497-515. <\/li>\n<li>Phillips, Jenny, Hawkins, Keith O. and Fleming, J. (1975), &#8216;Compensation for Personal Injury&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>Economic Journal <\/em>, 129-134. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), &#8216;Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), &#8216;Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 61-85. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), &#8216;Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation&#8217;, <b>22(4) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 562-570. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 109-116. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), &#8216;A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-8. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), &#8216;Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?&#8217;, <b>27(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 141-157. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 109-116. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), &#8216;A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-8. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Richard A. (1973), &#8216;An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 399-458. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Richard A. (1997), &#8216;Explaining the Variance in the Number of tort Suits across U.S. States and between the United States and England&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 477-489. <\/li>\n<li>Priest, George L. and Klein, Benjamin (1984), &#8216;The Selection of Disputes for Litigation&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 1-55. <\/li>\n<li>Ramseyer, J. Mark and Minoru Nakazato (1989), &#8216;The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 263 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ramseyer, J. Mark and Nakazato, Minoru (1989), &#8216;The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 263-290. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1988), &#8216;Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 713-728. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. 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