{"id":27116,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7300-indemnity-of-legal-fees.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","slug":"7300-indemnity-of-legal-fees","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7300-indemnity-of-legal-fees.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 7300 Indemnity of Legal Fees"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Adams, Michael (1983), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Law-Suit Insurance&#8217;, in Finsinger, J\u009arg (ed.), <em>Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets <\/em>, London, MacMillan, 134-151. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1983), &#8216;Eine wohlfahrtstheoretische Analyse des Zivilprozesses und der Rechtsschutzversicherungen (An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure and Legal Aid Insurance)&#8217;, <b>139 <\/b> <em>Zeitschrift f\u009fr Schweizerisches Recht <\/em>, 187-208. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1983), &#8216;Streitgespr\u008ach Adams\/Blankenburg \u009fber den Einfluss der Rechtsschutzversicherungen auf den Gesch\u008aftsanfall der Gerichte&#8217;, <em>Deutsche Richterzeitung <\/em>, 353-362. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. (1994), &#8216;Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 &amp; Beyond&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-246. <\/li>\n<li>Avery, Katz (1988), &#8216;Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation on the Settlement of Litigation&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-27. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Howard, F., Chang (1996), <em>The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement <\/em>, Manuscript, University of Southern California. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), &#8216;An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 371-403. <\/li>\n<li>Beckner, Clinton F., III and Katz, Avery (1995), &#8216;The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal Standards Are Uncertain&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 205-224. <\/li>\n<li>Beier, Martin D. (1990), &#8216;Economics Awry: Using Access Fees for Caseload Diversion&#8217;, <b>138 <\/b> <em>University of Pennsylvania Law Review <\/em>, 1175-1207. <\/li>\n<li>Bernstein, Lisa (1993), &#8216;Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court Annexed Arbitration Programs&#8217;, <b>141 <\/b> <em>University of Pennsylvania Law Review <\/em>, 2169-2259. <\/li>\n<li>Blankenburg, E. (1990), &#8216;Naar een planeconomie voor de rechtshulp (Towards a Planned Economy for Legal Aid)&#8217;, <em>Nederlands Juristen Blad <\/em>, 879-882. <\/li>\n<li>Bowles, Roger A. (1987), &#8216;Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz&#8217;s Measuring the Demand for Litigation&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 177-184. <\/li>\n<li>Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, J. (1984), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 801 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, John C. (1984), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 173-185. <\/li>\n<li>Chung, Tai-Yeong (1996), &#8216;Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 261-286. <\/li>\n<li>Cooper, Edward H. (1994), &#8216;Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 465-480. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), &#8216;Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Literature <\/em>, 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1995), &#8216;Reforming the New Discovery Rules&#8217;, <b>84 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 61-89. <\/li>\n<li>Coursey, Don L. and Stanley, L.R. (1988), &#8216;Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 161-179. <\/li>\n<li>Dewees, Donald N., Prichard, J. Robert S. and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1981), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions,&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 155-185. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. and Neil Rickman (1998), &#8216;Contracts for Legal Aid&#8217;, <b>5(3) <\/b> <em>European Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Donohue, John J. III (1991), &#8216;Opting for the British Rule; or, If Posner and Shavell Can&#8217;t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?&#8217;, <b>104 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1093 ff. Reprinted in Levmore, Saul, Foundations of Tort Law, 1994, 160. <\/li>\n<li>Donohue, John J. III (1991), &#8216;The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observationbs on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees&#8217;, <b>54 <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 194 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), &#8216;The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 641-695. <\/li>\n<li>Engelmann, Kathleen and Cornell, Bradford (1988), &#8216;Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 377-399. <\/li>\n<li>Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1989), &#8216;Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Review of Economics and Statistics <\/em>, 189-195. <\/li>\n<li>Gould, John P. (1973), &#8216;The Economics of Legal Conflicts&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 279-300. <\/li>\n<li>Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1986), &#8216;Default Risk and the Optimal Pricing of Court Enforcement Services&#8217;, in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, G\u009aran (eds.), <em>Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation <\/em>, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 85-112. <\/li>\n<li>Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1990), &#8216;Rationing Trials by Waiting: Welfare Implications&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 255-270. <\/li>\n<li>Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1993), &#8216;The Efficiency Implications of Cost Shifting Rules&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-18. <\/li>\n<li>Gravelle, Hugh S.E. and Waterson, Michael (1993), &#8216;No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees&#8217;, <b>103(420) <\/b> <em>Economic Journal <\/em>, 1205-1220. <\/li>\n<li>Hallauer, Robert Paul (1973), &#8216;The Shreveport Experiment in Prepaid Legal Services&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 223-242. <\/li>\n<li>Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), &#8216;Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-26. <\/li>\n<li>Harsanyi, John C. and Reinhard Selten (1972), &#8216;A Generalized Nash Solution for Two Person Bargaining Games With Incomplete Information&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Management Science <\/em>, 80-106. <\/li>\n<li>Hause, John C. (1989), &#8216;Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I&#8217;ll Be Suing You&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 157-179. <\/li>\n<li>Hersch, Philip L. (1990), &#8216;Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 235-241. <\/li>\n<li>Hughes, James W. and Snyder, Edward A. (1995), &#8216;Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence&#8217;, <b>38 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 225-250. <\/li>\n<li>Hughes, James W. and Woglom, Geoffry R. (1996), &#8216;Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Legal Costs&#8217;, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), <em>Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press, 167-192. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1990), &#8216;The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 161-171. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1993), &#8216;Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 457-476. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1993), &#8216;Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply With the Law&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Vanderbilt Law Review <\/em>, 1069-1128. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1996), &#8216;Fee-Shifting and Predictability of Law&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Chicago-Kent Law Review <\/em>, 427-459. <\/li>\n<li>Kaobayashi, Bruce H. and Parker, Jeffrey S. (1993), &#8216;No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court&#8217;s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Supreme Court Economic Review <\/em>, 92-152. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis (1993), &#8216;Shifting Plaintiffs&#8217; Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 625-630. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1987), &#8216;Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 143-176. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-27. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery and Beckner, Clinton F., III (1995), &#8216;The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards are Uncertain&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 205-224. <\/li>\n<li>Leubsdorf, John (1984), &#8216;Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 9-36. <\/li>\n<li>Mause, Philip (1969), &#8216;Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System&#8217;, <b>55 <\/b> <em>Iowa Law Review <\/em>, 26-55. <\/li>\n<li>Meyerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark, A. (1983), &#8216;Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading&#8217;, <b>29(2) <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Theory <\/em>, 265-281. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. (1994), &#8216;Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 211-224. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), &#8216;Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 381-399. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Rule 68&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 93-125. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), &#8216;Some Agency Problems in Settlement,&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 189-215. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. and Percival, Robert V. (1984), &#8216;(1989)The Public Interest in Attorneys&#8217; Fees Awards for Public Interest Litigation,&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 233 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Mitchell, Daniel J.B. and Schwartz, Murray L. (1972), &#8216;Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees&#8217;, <b>12(1) <\/b> <em>Quarterly Review of Economics and Business <\/em>, 69-76. <\/li>\n<li>Nalebuff, Barry (1987), &#8216;Credible Pretrail Negotiation&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 198-210. <\/li>\n<li>Note (1984), &#8216;State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 321-346. <\/li>\n<li>P&#8217;ng, Ivan P.L. (1983), &#8216;Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial&#8217;, <b>14(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 539-550. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1990), &#8216;El an\u0087lisis econ\u0097mico del acceso a la Justicia (The Economics of Access to Justice)&#8217;, <b>687 <\/b> <em>Informaci\u0097n Comercial Espa\u0096ola <\/em>, 23-42. <\/li>\n<li>Pfennigstorf, Werner (1984), &#8216;The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 37-124. <\/li>\n<li>Plott, Charles R. (1987), &#8216;Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 185-192. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), &#8216;Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), &#8216;Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 61-85. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), &#8216;Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation&#8217;, <b>22(4) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 562-570. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 109-116. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), &#8216;Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>82(2) <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 397-435. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), &#8216;Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs&#8217;, <b>27(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 269-280. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), &#8216;Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?&#8217;, <b>27(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 141-157. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), &#8216;Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs&#8217;, <b>27(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 269-280. <\/li>\n<li>Prasad, Ravi (1995), &#8216;The Use of Costs Litigations Rules to Improve the Efficiency of the Legal System&#8217;, <em>Office of Regulation Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Prichard, J. Robert S. (1988), &#8216;A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 451-475. <\/li>\n<li>Priest, George L. (1982), &#8216;Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>1(1) <\/b> <em>Supreme Court Economic Review <\/em>, 163-183. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), &#8216;Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 557-566. <\/li>\n<li>Rosenberg, David and Shavell, Steven (1985), &#8216;A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-13. <\/li>\n<li>Rowe, Thomas D. (1984), &#8216;Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 139-171. <\/li>\n<li>Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), <em>An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels <\/em>, Oslo, Juridisk Forlag. <\/li>\n<li>Schmalbeck, Richard L. and Myers, Gary (1986), &#8216;A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules under the Internal Revenue Code&#8217;, <em>Duke Law Journal <\/em>, 970-1002. <\/li>\n<li>Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1988), &#8216;Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: the Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government As Defendent&#8217;, <b>73(4) <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 719-784. <\/li>\n<li>Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1989), &#8216;Attorneys, Attorney Fees, and Prisoner Civil Rights Cases&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Forum <\/em>, 6-9. <\/li>\n<li>Shavell, Steven (1982), &#8216;Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 55-81. <\/li>\n<li>Snyder, Edward A. and Hughes, James W. (1990), &#8216;The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 345-380. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), &#8216;Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 197-214. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), &#8216;Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach&#8217;, <em>mimeo, July 1993 <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Symposium (1984), &#8216;Attorney Fees Shifting&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 1-354. <\/li>\n<li>Symposium (1996), &#8216;Fee Shifting&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Chicago-Kent Law Review <\/em>, 415-697. <\/li>\n<li>Talley, Eric (1996), &#8216;Liabiliy-Based Fee Shifting Rules and Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Chicago-Kent Law Review <\/em>, 461-503. <\/li>\n<li>Tomkins, Alan J. and Willging, Thomas E. (1986), <em>Taxation of Attorneys&#8217; Fees: Practices in English, Alaskan, and Federal Courts <\/em>, Federal Judicial Center, Washington. <\/li>\n<li>Wolfram, Charles W. (1984), &#8216;The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 293-320. <\/li>\n<li>Zemans, Frances Kahn (1984), &#8216;Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy&#8217;, <b>47(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 187-1210. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27116","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27116","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27116"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}