{"id":27113,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7000-civil-procedure-general.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:38","slug":"7000-civil-procedure-general","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/7000-civil-procedure-general.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 7000 Civil Procedure: General"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Adams, Michael (1981), <em>Oekonomische Analyse des Zivilprozesses (Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure) <\/em>, Koenigstein, Athenaeum-Verlag. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1981), <em>\u0085konomische Analyse des Zivilprozesses (Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure) <\/em>, K\u009anigstein\/Ts, Athen\u008aum, 130 p. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1983), &#8216;Eine wohlfahrtstheoretische Analyse des Zivilprozesses und der Rechtsschutzversicherungen (An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure and Legal Aid Insurance)&#8217;, <b>139 <\/b> <em>Zeitschrift f\u009fr Schweizerisches Recht <\/em>, 187-208. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1986), &#8216;Der Zivilprozess als Folge strategischen Verhaltens (On Civil Procedure as a Consequence of Strategic Behavior)&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Zeitschrift f\u009fr Rechtssoziologie <\/em>, 212-225. <\/li>\n<li>Alexander, Janet Cooper (1994), &#8216;Judges&#8217; Self Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 647-665. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. (1994), &#8216;Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 &amp; Beyond&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-246. <\/li>\n<li>Anderson, David A. (1996), &#8216;Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap&#8217;, in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.), <em>The Economics of Legal Relationships <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Bone, Robert G. (1994), &#8216;The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 595-613. <\/li>\n<li>Bowles, Roger A. (1981), &#8216;Economic Aspects of Legal Procedure&#8217;, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), <em>The Economic Approach to Law <\/em>, London, Butterworths, 191-209. <\/li>\n<li>Broder, Josef M. (1978), &#8216;Citizen Participation in Michigan District Courts&#8217;, in Randall, Allan (ed.), <em>Citizen Participation in Natural Resource Decision <\/em>, North Central Research Strategy Committee for Natural Resources, Departement of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky. Reprinted in Samuels, Warren J. and Schmid, A. Allen (eds.), Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, Boston, Nijhoff, 1981, 166-178. <\/li>\n<li>Brown, John Prather (1985), &#8216;Alternatives to the Present System of Litigation for Personal Injury&#8217;, in Baily, Mary Ann and Cikins, Warren I. (eds.), <em>The Effects of Litigation on Health Care Costs <\/em>, Washington, Brookings Institution, 69-79. <\/li>\n<li>Bundy, Stephen M. and Elhauge, Einer Richard (1991), &#8216;Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation&#8217;, <b>79 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 313-420. <\/li>\n<li>Buscaglia, Edgardo and Domingo, Pilar (1996), &#8216;Political and Economic Impediments to Judicial Reform in Latin America&#8217;, in Buscaglia, Edgardo, Ratliff, William and Cooter, Robert (eds.), <em>Law and Economics of Development <\/em>, Greenwood, JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Carrington, Paul D. (1979), &#8216;Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 303-317. <\/li>\n<li>Carroll, Sidney L. and Gaston, Robert J. (1981), &#8216;A Note on the Quality of Legal Services: Peer Review and Disciplinary Service&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Economics <\/em>, 251-260. <\/li>\n<li>Che, Yeon-Koo and Yi, Jong Goo (1993), &#8216;The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 399-424. <\/li>\n<li>Chiorazzi, Michael and others (1988), &#8216;Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A Selected Annotated Bibliography&#8217;, <b>51(3) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 87-207. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Cooper, Edward H. (1994), &#8216;Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 465-480. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. (1983), &#8216;The Objectives of Private and Public Judges&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 107-132. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. (1987), &#8216;Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest&#8217;s `Measuring Legal Change&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 85 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), &#8216;Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Literature <\/em>, 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1990), &#8216;Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Law and Society Review <\/em>, 533 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1994), &#8216;An Economic Model of Legal Discovery in the U.S.&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 435-463. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Ulen, Thomas S. (1988), <em>Law and Economics <\/em>, Scott Foresman. Reprinted in Japanese translation by Prof. Shozo Ota, introduction by Prof. Koji Shimdo, published by Shoji-Homu in 1989. <\/li>\n<li>Davis, Otto A. (1979), &#8216;Public and Private Characteristics of a Legal Process: A Comment&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 285-293. <\/li>\n<li>Denzau, Arthur (1979), &#8216;Litigation Expenditures as Private Determinants of Judicial Decisions: A Comment&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 295-302. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H., Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), &#8216;Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 331-370. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Theodore (1990), &#8216;Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 337-358. <\/li>\n<li>Epstein, Richard A. (1986), &#8216;The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 1175-1218. <\/li>\n<li>Estrada, Javier, Pastor, Santos and (1997), <em>The Distribution of Sentences in Tax-Related Cases: Explaining Success Rates <\/em>, Carlos III University Working Paper. <\/li>\n<li>Froeb, Luke M. (1993), &#8216;The Adverse Selection of Cases for Trial&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 317-324. <\/li>\n<li>Froeb, Luke M. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), &#8216;Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Gay, Gerald D., Grace, Martin F., Kale, Jayant R. and Noe, Thomas H. (1989), &#8216;Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 196-213. <\/li>\n<li>Getman, Julius G. (1974), &#8216;A Critique of the Report of the Shreveport Experiment&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 487-497. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.) (1979), &#8216;Discussion by Seminar Participants&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 323-398. <\/li>\n<li>Grady, Mark F., Allen, Ronald J. and Polsby, Daniel (1990), &#8216;A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilige and the Work-Product Doctrine&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 359 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Gross, Samuel R. (1987), &#8216;The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 734 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Hay, Bruce L. (1994), &#8216;Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 481-515. <\/li>\n<li>Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr. (1989), &#8216;Authority in the Dock&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Boston University Law Review <\/em>, 469-476. <\/li>\n<li>Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), &#8216;Emotional Responses in Litigation&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 31-44. <\/li>\n<li>Hylton, Keith N. (1990), &#8216;The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 161-171. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis (1994), &#8216;The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 307-401. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1989), &#8216;Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability&#8217;, <b>102 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 565-615. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1990), &#8216;Legal Advice about Acts Already Committed&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 149-159. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1996), &#8216;Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 191-209. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1988), &#8216;Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 127-143. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-27. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery and Beckner, Clinton F., III (1995), &#8216;The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards are Uncertain&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 205-224. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Christopher C. (1990), &#8216;Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham Litigation Cases&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 29-40. <\/li>\n<li>Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), &#8216;Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial\/Settlement Decision&#8217;, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), <em>Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press. <\/li>\n<li>Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Jeffrey S. Parker (1993), &#8216;No Armistice at 11: A Comment on the Amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Supreme Court Economic Review <\/em>, 93-152. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. (1993), &#8216;Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 99-134. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. (1994), &#8216;Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 235-244. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1979), &#8216;Adjudication as a Private Good&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 235-284. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1994), &#8216;The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 683-719. <\/li>\n<li>Lemley, Mark A. and Jorde, Thomas M. (1991), &#8216;Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases : Understanding Monsanto and Matsushita&#8217;, <b>36 <\/b> <em>Antitrust Bulletin <\/em>, 271 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Linder, Douglas O. (1989), &#8216;Some Doubts Concerning the Selection Hypothesis of George Priest&#8217;, <b>37 <\/b> <em>University of Kansas Law Review <\/em>, 319-347. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. (1994), &#8216;Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 627-646. <\/li>\n<li>McLauchlan, William P. (1973), &#8216;An Empirical Study of Civil Procedure: Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding Verdict&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 459-468. <\/li>\n<li>McLauchlan, William P. (1977), &#8216;An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 427-459. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Arthur R. (1984), &#8216;The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Minnesota Law Review <\/em>, 1-37. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1977), &#8216;Note, Aldinger V. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 127 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Rule 68&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 93-125. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1989), &#8216;Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Boston University Law Review <\/em>, 561-568. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. (1994), &#8216;Introduction: Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 303-306. <\/li>\n<li>Ordover, Janusz A. (1978), &#8216;Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 243-261. <\/li>\n<li>Ordover, Janusz A. (1981), &#8216;On the Consequences of Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents: Some New Results&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 269-291. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1989), &#8216;Econom\u0092a de la Justicia (I) (Economics of Litigation I)&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Revista de Econom\u0092a P\u009cblica <\/em>, 131-169. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1989), &#8216;Fundamentos de pol\u0092tica judicial (Foundations of Judicial Policy)&#8217;, <b>1541 <\/b> <em>Bolet\u0092n de Informaci\u0097n del Ministerio de Justicia <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1990), &#8216;El an\u0087lisis econ\u0097mico del acceso a la Justicia (The Economics of Access to Justice)&#8217;, <b>687 <\/b> <em>Informaci\u0097n Comercial Espa\u0096ola <\/em>, 23-42. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1990), &#8216;Econom\u0092a de la Justicia en Espa\u0096a (Problems in the Spanish Courts)&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Revista de Econom\u0092a <\/em>, 65-69. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1990), &#8216;Econom\u0092a de la Justicia (II) (Economics of Litigation II)&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Revista de Econom\u0092a P\u009cblica <\/em>, 69-86. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1993), &#8216;Composici\u0097n, Estructura y Caracter\u0092sticas de la Litigiosidad Contencioso-Administrativa: Un An\u0087lisis Muestral (Litigation in Contentious-Administrative Courts. An Empirical Analysis)&#8217;, <b>111 <\/b> <em>Bolet\u0092n de Informaci\u0097n del Consejo General del Poder Judicial <\/em>, 205-288. <\/li>\n<li>Pastor, Santos (1996), &#8216;El impacto econ\u0097mico de la reforma (The Economic Impact of Judicial Reform)&#8217;, in X (ed.), <em>Banco Mundial, Reforma Judicial y Desarrollo Econ\u0097mico, en prensa <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), &#8216;Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 61-85. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), &#8216;Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation&#8217;, <b>22(4) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 562-570. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 109-116. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Welfare Effects of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 151-164. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), &#8216;Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>82(2) <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 397-435. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), &#8216;Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs&#8217;, <b>27(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 269-280. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), &#8216;Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?&#8217;, <b>27(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 141-157. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), &#8216;Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation&#8217;, <b>22(4) <\/b> <em>Journal of Economics <\/em>, 562-570. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), &#8216;The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 109-116. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), &#8216;Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>82(2) <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 397-435. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), &#8216;Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs&#8217;, <b>27(2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 269-280. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Richard A. (1988), &#8216;Comment: Responding to Gordon Tullock&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Policy Studies <\/em>, 29-33. <\/li>\n<li>Priest, George L. (1985), &#8216;Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman&#8217;s Mistakes&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 215-243. <\/li>\n<li>Priest, George L. (1987), &#8216;Measuring Legal Change&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 193-225. <\/li>\n<li>Priest, George L. and Klein, Benjamin (1984), &#8216;The Selection of Disputes for Litigation&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 1-55. <\/li>\n<li>Raiteri, Monica (1992), &#8216;La funzione giurisdizionale tra redistribuzione economica e tutela dei diritti (The jurisdictional office between economic redistribution and protection of rights)&#8217;, <em>Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica <\/em>, 475-518. <\/li>\n<li>Ribeiro Mendes, Armindo (1992), &#8216;O Processo Executivo e a Economia&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Sub Judice <\/em>, 51-62. <\/li>\n<li>Rowe, Thomas D., Jr. (1994), &#8216;Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 615-626. <\/li>\n<li>Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), <em>An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels <\/em>, Oslo, Juridisk Forlag. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), &#8216;The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation : A Simple Model of Mechanism Design&#8217;, <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), <em>Enforcement by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production <\/em>, mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), &#8216;Evidence Production, Adversarial Process and the Private Instigation of Suits&#8217;, <em>mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Sarokin, H. Lee (1989), &#8216;A Comment on Geoffrey Hazard&#8217;s&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Authority in the Dock <\/em>, 477-479. <\/li>\n<li>Schwarzer, William W. 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(1994), &#8216;The Cost of Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 73-86. <\/li>\n<li>X (1987), &#8216;Conference : &#8216;Conference on the Law and Economics of Procedure&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 143-372. <\/li>\n<li>Yeazell, Stephen C. (1989), &#8216;The Salience of Salience: A Comment on Professor Hazard&#8217;s Authority in the Dock&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Boston University Law Review <\/em>, 481-486. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27113","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27113","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27113"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}