{"id":27094,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/6020-tax-evasion-and-tax-compliance.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","slug":"6020-tax-evasion-and-tax-compliance","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/6020-tax-evasion-and-tax-compliance.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 6020 Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Aaron, Henry J. and Munnell, Alicia H. (1992), &#8216;Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer Taxes&#8217;, <b>45(3) <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 119-143. <\/li>\n<li>Agapitos, George and Mavraganis, George (1995), &#8216;Tax Evasion: The Case of Greece: Greece&#8217;, <b>49 <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 569-576. <\/li>\n<li>Al Zakari, Ibrahim A. (1994), <em>Corporate Tax Compliance: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia <\/em>, University of New Mexico, Ph.D. 1994. <\/li>\n<li>Alexeev, Michael V., Gaddy, Clifford and Leitzel, Jim (1995), &#8216;Economic Crime and Russian Reform&#8217;, <b>151 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 677-692. <\/li>\n<li>Alford, Robert R. and Feige, Edgar L. (1989), &#8216;Information Distortions in Social Systems: The Underground Economy and Other Observer-Subject-Policymaker Feedbacks&#8217;, in Feige, Edgar L. (ed.), <em>The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion <\/em>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 57-79. <\/li>\n<li>Allingham, Michael G. and Sandmo, Agnar (1972), &#8216;Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 323-338. <\/li>\n<li>Allingham, Michael G. and Sandmo, Agnar (1991), &#8216;Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis&#8217;, in Atkinson, A.B. (ed.), <em>Modern public finance. Volume 1 <\/em>, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 50-65. Previously published: [1972]. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James (1988), &#8216;Compliance Costs and the Tax Avoidance-Tax Evasion Decision&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Public Finance Quarterly <\/em>, 31-66. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James (1991), &#8216;A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting&#8217;, <b>66(3) <\/b> <em>Accounting Review <\/em>, 577-593. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James and Beck, William (1991), &#8216;Wiping the Slate Clean: Individual Response to State Tax Amnesties&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>Southern Economic Journal <\/em>, 1043-1053. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James and Beck, William (1993), &#8216;Tax Amnesties and Compliance in the Long Run: A Time Series Analysis&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 53-60. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James and McCallin, Nancy J. (1990), &#8216;Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion as a Joint Portfolio Choice&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 193-200. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1990), &#8216;Tax Structure and Tax Compliance&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>Review of Economics and Statistics <\/em>, 603-613. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1991), &#8216;Income Tax Evasion&#8217;, in Bahl, Roy (ed.), <em>The Jamaican Tax Reform <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 181-214. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1991), &#8216;Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Economic Development and Cultural Change <\/em>, 849-872. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1993), &#8216;Audit Selection and Income Tax Underreporting in the Tax Compliance Game&#8217;, <b>42(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Development Economics <\/em>, 1-33. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Cronshaw, Mark B. and McKee, Michael (1993), &#8216;Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Kyklos <\/em>, 27-45. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), &#8216;Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 107-114. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), &#8216;Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 311-329. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), &#8216;Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance&#8217;, <b>82 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1018-1026. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1993), &#8216;Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax Compliance&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization <\/em>, 285-303. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, McClelland, Gary H. and Schulze, William D. (1992), &#8216;Why Do People Pay Taxes?&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 21-38. <\/li>\n<li>Alm, James, Sanchez, Isabel and de Juan, Ana (1995), &#8216;Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Kyklos <\/em>, 3-18. <\/li>\n<li>Altshuler, Rosanne and Fulghieri, Paolo (1992), <em>Dynamic Effects of Foreign Tax Credits on Multinational Corporations <\/em>, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper, No. 611. <\/li>\n<li>Altshuler, Rosanne and Newlon, T. Scott (1991), <em>The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations <\/em>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 3925. <\/li>\n<li>Andersen, Per (1977), &#8216;Tax Evasion and Labor Supply&#8217;, <b>79 <\/b> <em>Scandinavian Journal of Economics <\/em>, 375-383. <\/li>\n<li>Andjelkovic Mileva (1995), &#8216;Koncept zloupotrebe prava u poreskoj materiji (Concept of Abuse of Law in Fiscal Matters)&#8217;, <b>5-6 <\/b> <em>Finansije <\/em>, 269-277. <\/li>\n<li>Andreoni, James (1991), &#8216;The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 143-160. <\/li>\n<li>Andreoni, James (1991), &#8216;The Desirability of A Permanent Tax Amnesty&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 161-190. <\/li>\n<li>Andreoni, James (1992), &#8216;IRS as Loan Shark: Tax Compliance with Borrowing Constraints&#8217;, <b>49(3) <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 35-46. <\/li>\n<li>Andreoni, James, Erard, Brian and Feinstein, Jonathan S. (1996), <em>Tax Compliance <\/em>, University of Wisconsin Working Paper, No. 9610. <\/li>\n<li>Antonides, Gerrit and Robben, Henry S. J. (1995), &#8216;True Positives and False Alarms in the Detection of Tax Evasion&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Psychology <\/em>, 617-640. <\/li>\n<li>Asorey, Ruben O. (1991), &#8216;Transfer Pricing and the New Criminal Tax Law: Argentina&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 74-75. <\/li>\n<li>Baldry, Jonathan C. (1987), &#8216;Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental Results&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 357-383. <\/li>\n<li>Baldry, Jonathan C. (1994), &#8216;Economic Analysis and Taxpayer Compliance: Time for a New Agenda&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Australian Tax Forum <\/em>, 45-62. <\/li>\n<li>Banerji, Arup (1991), <em>Tax Evasion Enforcement and Intertemporal Choice <\/em>, University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.. <\/li>\n<li>Bardsley, Peter (1994), &#8216;Tax Compliance Research: An Economic Perspective on the Research Agenda&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Australian Tax Forum <\/em>, 271-290. <\/li>\n<li>Barthelemy, Philippe (1989), &#8216;The Underground Economy in France&#8217;, in Feige, Edgar L. (ed.), <em>The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion <\/em>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 281-294. <\/li>\n<li>Batina, Raymond G. (1992), &#8216;Time-Consistent Income Taxation&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance <\/em>, 68-81. <\/li>\n<li>Bayar, Ali and Frank, Max (1987), &#8216;The Erosion of the Different Tax Bases&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 341-356. <\/li>\n<li>Bazzoni, Stefania and Mori, Antonella (1994), &#8216;Politiche fiscali e crescita endogena in un&#8217;economia con un settore informale (Fiscal Policy and Endogenous Growth in an Economy with an Informal Sector)&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia <\/em>, 219-234. <\/li>\n<li>Beams, Mark K. (1992), &#8216;Obtaining Relief through Competent Authority Procedures and Treaty Exchange of Tax Information: The U.S. Approach&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 119-122. <\/li>\n<li>Beaumont, Marion S. (1991), &#8216;Proposition 13 Winners and Losers: Were First-Time Home Buyers Affected Adversely?&#8217;, in Stocker, Frederick D. (ed.), <em>Proposition 13: A Ten Year Retrospective <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 135-173. <\/li>\n<li>Becker, Winfried, Buchner, Heinz Jurgen and Sleeking, Simon (1987), &#8216;The Impact of Public Transfer Expenditures on Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 243-252. <\/li>\n<li>Benjamini, Yael and Maital, Shlomo (1985), &#8216;Optimal Tax Evasion and Optimal Tax Evasion Policy: Behavioral Aspects&#8217;, in Gaertner, Wulf and Wenig, Alois (eds.), <em>The Economics of the Shadow Economy: Proceedings of th International Conference on the Economics of the Shadow Economy Held at the University of Bielefeld, West Germany, October 10-14, 1983 <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 245-264. <\/li>\n<li>Beron, Kurt, Tauchen, Helen V. and Witte, Ann Dryden (1988), <em>A Structural Equation Model for Tax Compliance and Auditing <\/em>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 2556. <\/li>\n<li>Beron, Kurt, Tauchen, Helen V. and Witte, Ann Dryden (1992), &#8216;The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 67-89. <\/li>\n<li>Besley, T., Preston, Ian and Ridge, Michael (1994), <em>Fiscal Anarchy in the UK <\/em>, University College London Discussion Paper, No. 94-01. <\/li>\n<li>Besley, Timothy and McLaren, John (1990), &#8216;Tax Compliance and Corruption Deterrence: The Role of Wage Incentives&#8217;, <em>XXXJohn M. Olin Program for the Study of Economic Organization and Public Policy: 44 <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Besley, Timothy, Preston, Ian and Ridge, Michael (1993), <em>Fiscal Anarchy in the U.K. Modelling Poll Tax Noncompliance <\/em>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 4498. <\/li>\n<li>Bird, Richard M. (1992), &#8216;Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies: Commentary&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 306-310. <\/li>\n<li>Bird, Richard M. and Miller, Barbara (1991), &#8216;The Incidence of Indirect Taxes on Low-Income Households in Jamaica&#8217;, in Bahl, Roy (ed.), <em>The Jamaican Tax Reform <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 793-811. <\/li>\n<li>Blumenthal, Marsha and Slemrod, Joel B. (1992), &#8216;The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 185-202. <\/li>\n<li>Blumenthal, Marsha and Slemrod, Joel B. (1995), &#8216;The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign-Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>International Tax and Public Finance <\/em>, 37-53. <\/li>\n<li>Boadway, Robin W. and Keen, Michael (1993), &#8216;Evasion and Time Consistency in the Taxation of Capital Income&#8217;, <em>Queen&#8217;s Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Boadway, Robin, Marchand, Maurice and Pestieau, Pierre (1992), &#8216;Towards a Theory of the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix&#8217;, <em>Queen&#8217;s Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Bogetic, Zeljko and llman, Arye L. (eds.) (1995), <em>Financing government in the transition: Bulgaria: The political economy of tax policies, tax bases, and tax evasion <\/em>, Regional and Sectoral Studies. Washington, D.C., World Bank, 254 p. <\/li>\n<li>Boidman, Nathan (1983), &#8216;Tax Evasion: The Present State of Non-Compliance&#8217;, <b>37(9-10) <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 451-479. <\/li>\n<li>Bolderson, Sarah and Huiskes, Theodoor (1994), &#8216;Central and Eastern Europe: Meeting Tax Obligations in Central and Eastern Europe&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 648-654. <\/li>\n<li>Boone, Catherine (1994), &#8216;Trade, Taxes, and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the New Importers in West Africa&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>World Development <\/em>, 453-467. <\/li>\n<li>Bordignon, Massimo (1993), &#8216;A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion&#8217;, <b>52(3) <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 345-362. <\/li>\n<li>Bowles, Roger A. and Jones, Philip (1993), &#8216;Nonpayment of Poll Tax: An Exploratory Analysis of Tax Resistance&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 445-455. <\/li>\n<li>Brenner, Reuven and Brenner, Gabrielle A. (1990), <em>Gambling and Speculation <\/em>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in French edition by Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. <\/li>\n<li>Broesterhuizen, G. A. A. M. (1989), &#8216;The Unrecorded Economy and the National Income Accounts in the Netherlands: A Sensitivity Analysis&#8217;, in Feige, Edgar L. (ed.), <em>The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion <\/em>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 159-174. <\/li>\n<li>Brown, C. V. and others (1984), &#8216;Tax Evasion and Avoidance on Earned Income: Some Survey Evidence&#8217;, <b>5(3) <\/b> <em>Fiscal Studies <\/em>, 1-22. <\/li>\n<li>Burgess, Robin and Stern, Nicholas (1992), <em>Taxation and Development <\/em>, London School of Economics Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines Working Paper, No. DEP 42. <\/li>\n<li>Burgess, Robin and Stern, Nicholas (1993), <em>A VAT in India, Problems and Options <\/em>, London School of Economics Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines Working Paper, No. EF\/4. <\/li>\n<li>Burgess, Robin, Howes, Stephen and Stern, Nicholas (1993), <em>The Reform of Indirect Taxes in India <\/em>, London School of Economics Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines Working Paper, No. EF\/7. <\/li>\n<li>Carroll, John S. (1992), &#8216;How Taxpayers Think about Their Taxes: Frames and Values&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 43-63. <\/li>\n<li>Cassone, Alberto and Marchese, Carla (1995), &#8216;Tax Amnesties as Special Sales Offers: the Italian Experience&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Public Finance\/Finances Publiques <\/em>, 51-66. <\/li>\n<li>Chadha, V. and Singh, Gurjeet (1988), &#8216;An Analysis of Tax Evasion in Punjab&#8217;, in Raikhy, P.S. and Gill, Sucha Singh (eds.), <em>Resource mobilisation and economic development: A regional perspective <\/em>, Amritsar, India, Guru Nanak Dev University, Punjab School of Economics, 140-151. <\/li>\n<li>Chander, P. and L. Wilde (1992), <em>A general characterization of optimal income taxation and enforcement <\/em>, Caltech Social Science Working Paper, No. 796. <\/li>\n<li>Chander, Parkash and Wilde, Louis (1992), &#8216;Corruption in Tax Administration&#8217;, <b>49 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 333-349. <\/li>\n<li>Chelvathurai, S. I. (1990), &#8216;Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and the Underground Economy&#8211;The CATA Experience: International&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation <\/em>, 594-599. <\/li>\n<li>Christiansen, Vidar (1980), &#8216;Two Comments on Tax Evasion&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Empirical Economics <\/em>, 389-393. <\/li>\n<li>Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1990), &#8216;Plea Bargaining with the IRS&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 319-333. <\/li>\n<li>Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1990), &#8216;A Model of Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials: The Case of Taiwan&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 392-408. <\/li>\n<li>Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1992), &#8216;Analyzing Income Tax Evasion Using Amnesty Data with Self-Selection Correction: The Case of the Michigan Tax Amnesty Program: Commentary&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 190-192. <\/li>\n<li>Clotfelter, Charles T. (1983), &#8216;Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Review of Economics and Statistics <\/em>, 363-373. <\/li>\n<li>Cnossen, Sijbren (1991), &#8216;The Future Development of the Sales Tax in Jamaica&#8217;, in Bahl, Roy (ed.), <em>The Jamaican Tax Reform <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 519-535. <\/li>\n<li>Coffey, Sergia (1995), <em>Tax Evasion and the Development of a Financial Sector in LDC&#8217;s <\/em>, New York University, Ph.D.. <\/li>\n<li>Coleman, Cynthia and Freeman, Lynne (1994), &#8216;The Development of Strategic Marketing Options Directed at Improving Compliance Levels in Small Business&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Australian Tax Forum <\/em>, 347-367. <\/li>\n<li>Collins, Julie H. (1992), &#8216;Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS: Commentary&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 330-332. <\/li>\n<li>Collins, Julie H. and Plumlee, R. David (1991), &#8216;The Taxpayer&#8217;s Labor and Reporting Decision: The Effect of Audit Schemes&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>Accounting Review <\/em>, 559-576. <\/li>\n<li>Collins, Julie H., Murphy, Daniel P. and Plumlee, R. David (1992), &#8216;The Taxpayer&#8217;s Dilemma: How Hard to Work and What to Report?&#8217;, in Stern, Jerrold J. (ed.), <em>Advances in Taxation. Volume 4 <\/em>, Greenwich (CT), JAI Press, 31-53. <\/li>\n<li>Commerce Clearing House Tax Law (eds.) (1989), <em>Understanding IRS communications <\/em>, Chicago, Commerce Clearing House, 120 p. <\/li>\n<li>Contini, Bruno (1989), &#8216;The Irregular Economy of Italy: A Survey of Contributions&#8217;, in Feige, Edgar L. (ed.), <em>The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion <\/em>, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 237-250. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, F. A. (1990), &#8216;Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Oxford Economic Papers <\/em>, 231-243. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, F. A. (1992), &#8216;Tax Evasion and Inequity&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Psychology <\/em>, 521-543. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1985), &#8216;Tax Evasion with Labour Income&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 19-34. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1985), &#8216;The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion&#8217;, <b>37 <\/b> <em>Bulletin of Economic Research <\/em>, 163-193. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1985), &#8216;Public Policy and Tax Evasion: Some Problems&#8217;, in Gaertner, Wulf and Wenig, Alois (eds.), <em>The Economics of the Shadow Economy: Proceedings of th International Conference on the Economics of the Shadow Economy Held at the University of Bielefeld, West Germany, October 10-14, 1983 <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 273-284. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1987), &#8216;The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion&#8217;, in Hey, John D. and Lambert, Peter J. (eds.), <em>Surveys in the Economics of Uncertainty <\/em>, Oxford, Blackwell, 173-203. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1990), <em>Cheating the government: The economics of evasion <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 267 p. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. (1991), &#8216;Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion&#8217;, in Sinclair, Peter J. N. and Slater, Martin D. E. (eds.), <em>Taxation, private information and capital. Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue 1990 <\/em>, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 231-243. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. and Gordon, James P. F. (1987), <em>Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public Good Provision <\/em>, Universitat Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich 303 Discussion Paper, No. A-142. <\/li>\n<li>Cowell, Frank A. and Gordon, James P. F. (1988), &#8216;Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public Good Provision&#8217;, <b>36 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 305-321. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1985), &#8216;Time Value of Money and Income Tax Evasion under Risk averse Behavior: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence&#8217;, <b>40 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 481-494. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1986), &#8216;Federal Income Tax Evasion&#8217;, in Lindholm, Richard W. (ed.), <em>Examination of Basic Weaknesses of Income as the M <\/em>, New York, Greenwood Press, 140-162. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1986), &#8216;Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>Review of Economics and Statistics <\/em>, 217-223. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1987), &#8216;On the Treatment of Income Tax Rates in Empirical Analysis of Tax Evasion&#8217;, <b>40 <\/b> <em>Kyklos <\/em>, 338-348. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1990), &#8216;Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from California Amnesty Data&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>National Tax Journal <\/em>, 189-199. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1992), &#8216;Analyzing Income Tax Evasion Using Amnesty Data with Self-Selection Correction: The Case of the Michigan Tax Amnesty Program&#8217;, in Slemrod, Joel (ed.), <em>Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement <\/em>, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 167-189. <\/li>\n<li>Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh (1994), &#8216;An Empirical Analysis of Factors That Distinguish Those Who Evade on Their Tax Return from Those Who Choose Not to File a Return&#8217;, <b>49(Suppl) <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 106-116. <\/li>\n<li>Creedy, John (ed.) (1994), <em>Taxation, poverty and income distribution <\/em>, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 255 p. <\/li>\n<li>Creedy, John and McDonald, Ian M. (1990), &#8216;A Tax Package to Reduce the Marginal Rate of Income Tax and the Wage Demands of Trade Unions&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>Economic Record <\/em>, 195-202. <\/li>\n<li>Cremer, H., Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P. 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