{"id":27073,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/5640-the-market-for-corporate-control-incl-takeovers.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","slug":"5640-the-market-for-corporate-control-incl-takeovers","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/5640-the-market-for-corporate-control-incl-takeovers.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 5640 The Market for Corporate Control (incl. Takeovers)"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Adams, Michael (1989), &#8216;Der Markt f\u009fr Unternehmenskontrolle und sein Missbrauch (The Market of Corporate Control and Its Abuse)&#8217;, <em>Die Aktiengesellschaft <\/em>, 333-338. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1990), &#8216;H\u009achststimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige wundersame Hindernisse auf dem Markt f\u009fr Unternehmenskontrolle (Maximum Voting Right, Multiple Voting Right, and some Wonderfull Obstacles from the Market of Corporate Control)&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Die Aktiengesellschaft <\/em>, 63-78. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1987), &#8216;Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 823-837. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1990), &#8216;Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers : The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis <\/em>, 143-161. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Walkling R. (1994), &#8216;Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding takeover Bids&#8217;, <b>49 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 985-1014. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun, Jaffe, J. and Mandelker, G. N. (1992), &#8216;The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms : A Re-examination of an Anomaly&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 1605-1621. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito, &#8216;Market vs. Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: Interactions Between Takeovers and Industrial Policiy in Spain&#8217;, in Pardolesi, Roberto and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), <em>Law and Economics: Some further Insights <\/em>, Milano, Giuffr\u008f, 71-106. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1988), &#8216;Un an\u0087lisis econ\u0097mico de la regulaci\u0097n de la sociedad an\u0097nima en Espa\u0096a (An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of the Joint-Stock Society in Spain)&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Anales de Estudios Econ\u0097micos y Empresariales <\/em>, 191-224. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1988), &#8216;Tiburones y sanguijuelas en la Plaza de la Lealtad (Sharks and Spongers in the Stockmarket)&#8217;, <b>2123 <\/b> <em>Bolet\u0092n del ICE <\/em>, 771-772. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1990), <em>Control y Regulaci\u0097n de la Sociedad an\u0097nima (Control and Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies) <\/em>, Madrid, Alianza Editorial. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1990), &#8216;Control y propiedad: L\u0092mites al desarrollo de la empresa espa\u0096ola (Corporate Control and Ownership: Limits to it&#8217;s Growth in Spain)&#8217;, <b>687 <\/b> <em>Informaci\u0097n Comercial Espa\u0096ola &#8211; Revista de Economia <\/em>, 67-88. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;Cr\u0092tica a la regulaci\u0097n de las opas (A Critic on the Regulation of Takeovers)&#8217;, <b>203-4 <\/b> <em>Revista de Derecho Mercantil <\/em>, 29-67. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;\u00c0Hacia un &#8216;mercado \u009cnico&#8217; de control societario? (Towards a Common Market of Corporate Control)&#8217;, <b>703 <\/b> <em>Informaci\u0097n Comercial Espa\u0096ola <\/em>, 144-170. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;La conversi\u0097n coactiva de acciones comunes en acciones sin voto para lograr el control de las sociedades an\u0097nimas: De c\u0097mo la ingenuidad legal prefigura el fraude (Mandatory Conversion of Common Shares into Non-Voting Shares to Reach Corporate Control over Joint-Stock Companies: How legal Simplicity Leads to Fraud)&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Revista Espa\u0096ola de Financiaci\u0097n y Contabilidad <\/em>, 283-314. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;Tiburones s\u0097lo en el diccionario (Sharks only in the Dictionary)&#8217;, <b>56 <\/b> <em>Bolet\u0092n del C\u0092rculo de Empresarios <\/em>, 15-30. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito and Paz Ares, C\u0087ndido (1995), &#8216;Conversion of Ordinary Shares into Non-Voting Shares&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Asquith, P. (1983), &#8216;Merger Bids, Uncertainty and Stockholder Returns&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 51-83. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Auerbach, Alan J. (ed.) (1991), <em>Corporate Takeovers <\/em>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 354 p. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1986), &#8216;State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts&#8217;, <b>90 <\/b> <em>Dickinson Law Review <\/em>, 731 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1990), &#8216;Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>Minnesota Law Review <\/em>, 239 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1991), &#8216;The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Washington University Law Quarterly <\/em>, 565 ff. Reprinted in 1992 Securities Law Review 377. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1992), &#8216;Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 1071 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1992), &#8216;Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Pepperdine Law Review <\/em>, 971 ff. Reprinted in 34 Corporate Practice Commentator 641, 1993. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1994), &#8216;Revisiting the One-Share\/One-Vote Controversy: The Exchanges&#8217; Uniform Voting Rights Policy&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Securities Regulation Law Journal <\/em>, 175 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Baysinger, Barry D. and Butler, Henry N. (1985), &#8216;Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 1257-1303. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuck, Lucian Arye (1986), &#8216;The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 253-271. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1988), &#8216;The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 197-229. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Kahan, Marcel (1990), &#8216;A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contest&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1071-1135. <\/li>\n<li>Berkovitch, Elazar, Bradley, Michael D. and Khanna, Naveen (1989), &#8216;Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 395-412. <\/li>\n<li>Bittlingmayer, George (1989), &#8216;Shareholder Heterogeneity and the Gains from Merger&#8217;, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 49-70. <\/li>\n<li>Black, Bernard and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1996), &#8216;A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>109 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1911-1979. <\/li>\n<li>Booth, Richard A. (1989), &#8216;State Takeovers Statutes Revisited&#8217;, <b>88 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 120 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Booth, Richard A. (1989), &#8216;The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 707-776. <\/li>\n<li>Boukema, C.A. (1991), &#8216;Economische en juridische aspecten van Hoofdstuk I Fusiecode (Economic and Legal Aspects of Chapter I Dutch Merger Rules)&#8217;, in Coljee, P.D., Franken, H., Heertje, A. and Kanning, W. (eds.), <em>Law and Welfare Economics <\/em>, Amsterdam, VU Amsterdam. <\/li>\n<li>Braakman, A.J. (1988), &#8216;Europees kartelrecht als strijdmiddel bij overnames (European Anti-trust Law as Takeover Combat Mechanism)&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>Economisch-Statistische Berichten <\/em>, 854-858. <\/li>\n<li>Bradford, C. Steven (1990), &#8216;Stampeding Shareholders and Other Myths: Target Shareholders and Hostile Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Corporation Law <\/em>, 417-464. <\/li>\n<li>Bradley, Michael D. (1980), &#8216;Interfirm Tender Offers, and the Market for Corporate Control&#8217;, <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 1-55. <\/li>\n<li>Brickley, James A. and James, Christopher M. (1987), &#8216;The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking&#8217;, <b>30 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 161-180. <\/li>\n<li>Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (1987), &#8216;Are Hostile Takeovers Different?&#8217;, in Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (ed.), <em>The Merger Boom: Proceedings of a Conference Held at Melvin Village, New Hampshire, October 1987 <\/em>, Boston, Federal Bank of Boston, 199-229. <\/li>\n<li>Buckley, Francis H. (1990), &#8216;When the Medium is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Indiana Law Journal <\/em>, 493-547. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E., &#8216;State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>University of Cincinnati Law Review <\/em>, 611 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), &#8216;The Contract Clause and the Corporation&#8217;, <b>55 <\/b> <em>Brooklyn Law Review <\/em>, 767 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Buxbaum, Hertig and Hirsch, Hopt (eds.), <em>European Economic and Business Law, Legal and Economic Analyses on Integration and Harmonization <\/em>, Berlin, 401 p. <\/li>\n<li>Byttebier, Koen (1995), &#8216;Hostile Take-Overs: Economic (Dis)Functions and Legal Policy Questions&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 77-134. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1990), &#8216;Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Anglo-American Law Review <\/em>, 185-208. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1980), &#8216;Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders and Business Purposes&#8217;, <em>American Bar Foundation Research Journal <\/em>, 69 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1983), &#8216;Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties&#8217;, <em>American Bar Foundation Research Journal <\/em>, 341 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1984), &#8216;Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Delaware Journal of Corporate Law <\/em>, 593 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1986), &#8216;Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents&#8217;, <b>4(2) <\/b> <em>Midland Corporate Finance Journal <\/em>, 48 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1988), &#8216;Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 383 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Caves, Richard E. (1989), &#8216;Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs. Hindsight&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>International Journal of Industrial Organization <\/em>, 151-174. <\/li>\n<li>Chapman, Bruce (1993), &#8216;Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Journal <\/em>, 547-588. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1984), &#8216;Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer&#8217;s Role in Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>84 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1145-1296. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1987), &#8216;Are Hostile Takeovers Different? Discussion&#8217;, in Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (ed.), <em>The Merger Boom: Proceedings of a Conference Held <\/em>, Boston, Federal Bank of Boston, 230-242. <\/li>\n<li>Cohen, Lloyd R. (1990), &#8216;Why Tender Offers? the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Supply of Stock, and Signaling&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 113-143. <\/li>\n<li>Cohen, Lloyd R. (1991), &#8216;Holdouts and Free Riders&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 351-362. <\/li>\n<li>Craig, Lee A. and Knoeber, Charles R. (1992), &#8216;Manager Shareholding, the Market for Managers, and the End Period Problem: Evidence from the U.S. Whaling Industry&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 607-627. <\/li>\n<li>Cramton, Peter and Schwartz, Alan (1991), &#8216;Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 27-53. <\/li>\n<li>Deangelo, Harry, Deangelo, Linda and Rice, Edward M. (1984), &#8216;Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 367-401. <\/li>\n<li>Denis, Debra K. and McConnell, John J. (1986), &#8216;Corporate Mergers and Security Returns&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 143-187. <\/li>\n<li>Dodd, Peter (1986), &#8216;The Market for Corporate Control: A Review of the Evidence&#8217;, in Stern, Joel M. and Chew, Donald H. (eds.), <em>The Revolution in Corporate Finance <\/em>, Oxford, Blackwell. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1981), &#8216;The Proper Role of a Target&#8217;s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1161-1201. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fishel, Daniel R. (1982), &#8216;Corporate Control Transactions&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 698-737. <\/li>\n<li>Elhauge, Einer Richard (1992), &#8216;The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 1465 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Elhauge, Einer Richard (1993), &#8216;Toward a European Sale of Control Doctrine&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>American Journal of Comparative Law <\/em>, 627 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Epstein, Richard A. (1985), &#8216;The Pirates of Pennzoil: A Comic Opera Made Possible by a Grant from the Texaco Corporation&#8217;, <b>9(6) <\/b> <em>Regulation <\/em>, 18-2442. <\/li>\n<li>Ferguson, Michael F. (1994), &#8216;Ownership Structure, Potential Competition, and the Free Rider Problem in Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 35-62. <\/li>\n<li>Filer, John E., Kenny, Lawrence W. and Morton, Rebecca B. (1991), &#8216;Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority Turnout&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 371-393. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, Daniel R. (1978), &#8216;Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 1-46. <\/li>\n<li>Fishman, Michael J. (1988), &#8216;A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 88-101. <\/li>\n<li>Fitzsimons, Peter G. (1997), &#8216;Takeovers and Efficiency in the Context of Concentrated Shareholdings: The Case of New Zealand&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Companies and Securities Law Journal <\/em>, 4-15. <\/li>\n<li>Franks, Julian and Mayer, Colin (1990), &#8216;Takeovers: Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the UK&#8217;, <b>0(10) <\/b> <em>Economic Policy: A European Forum <\/em>, 189-231. <\/li>\n<li>Garcia De Enterria, Javier, &#8216;El control del poder societario en la gran empresa y la funci\u0097n disciplinar de las OPAS (Corporate Control of Large Companies and the Disciplinary Role of Takeovers)&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>Revista de Derecho bancario y bursatil <\/em>, 665-689. <\/li>\n<li>Garcia De Enterria, Javier (1996), <em>La Opa Obligatoria (Mandatory Takeovers) <\/em>, Madrid, Editorial C\u0092vitas, 324 p. <\/li>\n<li>Geddes, R. Richard (1997), &#8216;Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry&#8217;, <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1989), &#8216;Delaware&#8217;s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality Rule?&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>The Business Lawyer <\/em>, 247-274. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1990), &#8216;What Triggers Revlon?&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Wake Forest Law Review <\/em>, 37-59. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), &#8216;Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 863-906. <\/li>\n<li>Gordon, Jeffrey N. and Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1986), &#8216;Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models&#8217;, <b>96 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 295-321. <\/li>\n<li>Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D. (1980), &#8216;Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 42-64. <\/li>\n<li>Guerin-Calvert, Margaret E., McGuckin, Robert H. and Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. (1987), &#8216;State and Federal Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Antitrust Bulletin <\/em>, 661-691. <\/li>\n<li>Hackl, Jo Watson and Testani, Rosa Anna (1988), &#8216;Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study&#8217;, <b>97 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1193-1231. <\/li>\n<li>Haddock, David D., Macey, Jonathan R. and McChesney, Fred (1987), &#8216;Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 701-746. <\/li>\n<li>Hahn, Dieter (1990), &#8216;Takeover Rules in the European Community: An Economic Analysis of Proposed Takeover Guidelines and Already Issued Disclosure Rules&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 131-148. <\/li>\n<li>Hill, Alfred (1957), &#8216;The Sale of Controlling Shares&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 986-1039. <\/li>\n<li>Hirschey, Mark (1986), &#8216;Mergers, Buyouts and Takeouts&#8217;, <b>76 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 317-322. <\/li>\n<li>Hirschleifer, David and Titman, Sheridan (1990), &#8216;Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 295-324. <\/li>\n<li>H\u009agholm, Kenneth (1994), <em>Essays in the Market for Corporate Control <\/em>, Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration. <\/li>\n<li>Holl, Peter (1973), &#8216;Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U.S. Corporations&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Industrial Economics <\/em>, 259-273. <\/li>\n<li>Husson, B. (1987), <em>Le prise de contr\u0099le d&#8217;entreprises (Takeovers) <\/em>, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF). <\/li>\n<li>Jahera, John S., Jr. and Pugh, William N. (1991), &#8216;State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 410-428. <\/li>\n<li>James, Christopher M. (1984), &#8216;An Analysis of the Effect of State Acquisition Laws on Managerial Efficiency: The Case of the Bank Holding Company Acquisitions&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 211-226. <\/li>\n<li>Jarrell, Gregg A. (1985), &#8216;The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge ?&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 151-179. <\/li>\n<li>Jarrell, Gregg A. and Bradley, Michael D. (1980), &#8216;The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 371-407. <\/li>\n<li>Jarrell, Gregg A. and Poulsen, Annette B. (1987), &#8216;Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendements since 1980&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 127-168. <\/li>\n<li>Jarrell, Gregg A., Brickley, James A. and Netter, Jeffrey M. 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(1989), &#8216;The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence&#8217;, in Coffee, John, Lowenstein, Louis and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.), <em>Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control <\/em>, Oxford, Oxford University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. and Ruback, Richard S. (1983), &#8216;The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 5-50. <\/li>\n<li>Johnson, Lyman and Mylon, David (1989), &#8216;Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes&#8217;, <b>87 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 846-857. <\/li>\n<li>Kabir, R., Cantrijn, D. and Jeunink, A. 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