{"id":27072,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/5630-the-separation-of-ownership-and-control.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:24","slug":"5630-the-separation-of-ownership-and-control","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/5630-the-separation-of-ownership-and-control.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 5630 The Separation of Ownership and Control"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Adams, Walter and Brock, James W. (1990), &#8216;Efficiency, Corporate Power, and the Bigness Complex&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Education <\/em>, 30-50. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Knoeber, Charles R. (1996), &#8216;Firm Performance and Mechanisms To Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis <\/em>, 377-397. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1987), &#8216;Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 823-837. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1990), &#8216;Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers : The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis <\/em>, 143-161. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Nagarajan, N. J. (1990), &#8216;Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control : The Case of All-equity Firms&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 1325-1331. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun and Walkling R. (1994), &#8216;Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding takeover Bids&#8217;, <b>49 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 985-1014. <\/li>\n<li>Agrawal, Arun, Makhija, A. K. and Mandelker, G. N (1991), &#8216;Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas Utilities : Some Empirical Evidence&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Financial Management <\/em>, 113-124. <\/li>\n<li>Akerlof, George A. (1970), &#8216;The Markets for &#8220;Lemons&#8221;: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism&#8217;, <b>84 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>, 488-500. <\/li>\n<li>Alchian, Armand A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972), &#8216;Production, information costs, and economic organization&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 777-795. <\/li>\n<li>Alchian, Armen A. (1965), &#8216;The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Industrial Economics <\/em>, 30-41. <\/li>\n<li>Alchian, Armen A. (1969), &#8216;Corporate Management and Property Rights&#8217;, in Manne, Henry G. (ed.), <em>Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities <\/em>, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. <\/li>\n<li>Alfaro Aguila-Real, Jes\u009cs (1995), <em>Inter\u008es social y derecho de suscripci\u0097n preferente. Una aproximaci\u0097n econ\u0097mica (Economic Efficiency of a strict construction of the &#8220;interest of the corporation&#8221; clause in Corporate Law) <\/em>, Madrid, Ed. C\u0092vitas, 160 p. <\/li>\n<li>Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. (1981), &#8216;Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 605-617. <\/li>\n<li>Andre, Thomas J., Jr. (1990), &#8216;A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>63 <\/b> <em>Southern California University Law Review <\/em>, 533 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Aoki, Masahiko (1984), <em>The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Arlen, Jennifer H. (1994), &#8216;The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 833 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Arlen, Jennifer H. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1997), &#8216;Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 687-779. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Arlen, Jennifer H. and Weiss, Deborah (1995), &#8216;A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation&#8217;, <b>105 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 325 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Arrow, Kenneth J. (1974), <em>The Limits of Organization <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito, &#8216;Market vs. Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: Interactions Between Takeovers and Industrial Policiy in Spain&#8217;, in Pardolesi, Roberto and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), <em>Law and Economics: Some further Insights <\/em>, Milano, Giuffr\u008f, 71-106. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1988), &#8216;Un an\u0087lisis econ\u0097mico de la regulaci\u0097n de la sociedad an\u0097nima en Espa\u0096a (An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of the Joint-Stock Society in Spain)&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Anales de Estudios Econ\u0097micos y Empresariales <\/em>, 191-224. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1990), <em>Control y Regulaci\u0097n de la Sociedad an\u0097nima (Control and Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies) <\/em>, Madrid, Alianza Editorial. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1990), &#8216;Control y propiedad: L\u0092mites al desarrollo de la empresa espa\u0096ola (Corporate Control and Ownership: Limits to it&#8217;s Growth in Spain)&#8217;, <b>687 <\/b> <em>Informaci\u0097n Comercial Espa\u0096ola &#8211; Revista de Economia <\/em>, 67-88. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;Cr\u0092tica a la regulaci\u0097n de las opas (A Critic on the Regulation of Takeovers)&#8217;, <b>203-4 <\/b> <em>Revista de Derecho Mercantil <\/em>, 29-67. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito (1992), &#8216;La conversi\u0097n coactiva de acciones comunes en acciones sin voto para lograr el control de las sociedades an\u0097nimas: De c\u0097mo la ingenuidad legal prefigura el fraude (Mandatory Conversion of Common Shares into Non-Voting Shares to Reach Corporate Control over Joint-Stock Companies: How legal Simplicity Leads to Fraud)&#8217;, <b>71 <\/b> <em>Revista Espa\u0096ola de Financiaci\u0097n y Contabilidad <\/em>, 283-314. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito and Paz Ares, C\u0087ndido (1995), &#8216;Conversion of Ordinary Shares into Non-Voting Shares&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Arru\u0096ada, Benito and Paz Ares, C\u0087ndido (1997), &#8216;Mandatory Rotation of Company Auditors: A Critical Examination&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 31-61. <\/li>\n<li>Ayres, Ian (1991), &#8216;Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 945 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ayres, Ian (1995), &#8216;Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons From Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>Kan. L. Rev. <\/em>, 541 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ayres, Ian and Crampton, Peter (1994), &#8216;Relational Investing and Agency Theory&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Cardozo Law Review <\/em>, 1033 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bab, Andrew Laurance (1991), &#8216;Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 846-890. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1993), &#8216;In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Washington and Lee Law Review <\/em>, 1423 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1993), &#8216;Independant Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project&#8217;, <b>61 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 1034 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1995), &#8216;The Politics of Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy <\/em>, 671 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bajt, Aleksander (1968), &#8216;Property in Capital and in the Means of Production in Socialist Economics&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-4. <\/li>\n<li>Bargman, Diedre A. and Cox, Paul N. (1984), &#8216;Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern Public Corporation: Weinberger&#8217;s Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts&#8217;, <b>1984 <\/b> <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 593 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Baysinger, Barry D. and Butler, Henry N. (1985), &#8216;Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 101-124. <\/li>\n<li>Baysinger, Barry D. and Zardkoohi, Asghar (1986), &#8216;Technology, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 339-349. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuck, Lucian Arye (1989), &#8216;Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments&#8217;, <b>102 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1820-1860. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuck, Lucian Arye (1992), &#8216;Federalsim and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>105 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1435 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Kahan, Marcel (1990), &#8216;A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contest&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1071-1135. <\/li>\n<li>Berle, A.A., Jr. and Means, Gardiner C. (1932), <em>The Modern Corporation and Private Property <\/em>, New York. <\/li>\n<li>Bernstein, Seldon E. and Fischer, Henry G. (1940), &#8216;The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: some Reflections on Corporate Democracy&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 226 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bhagat, Sanjai and Brickley, James A. (1984), &#8216;Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 339-365. <\/li>\n<li>Biancala, Joseph (1990), &#8216;Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking The Wrong Question&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>University of Cincinnati Law Review <\/em>, 425 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bjuggren, Per-Olof (1989), &#8216;Ownership and Efficiency in Companies Listed on Stockhold Stock Exchange 1985&#8217;, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 71-79. <\/li>\n<li>Black, Bernard (1992), &#8216;Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 811 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Black, Bernard (1992), &#8216;The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 895 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Black, Bernard and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1996), &#8216;A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>109 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1911-1979. <\/li>\n<li>Black, Fisher (1986), &#8216;Noise&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 529 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Boardman, Anthony E. and Vining, Aidan R. (1989), &#8216;Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-owned Enterprises&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-33. <\/li>\n<li>Boyer, Allen, &#8216;Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Washington and Lee Law Review <\/em>, 977 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Boyer, Allen (1988), &#8216;When It Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce Clause and Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>Cincinatti Law Review <\/em>, 539 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bradley, Michael D. and Rosenzweig, Michael (1986), &#8216;Defensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy&#8217;, <b>96 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 322-338. <\/li>\n<li>Bradley, Michael D. and Rosenzweig, Michael (1986), &#8216;Defensive Stock Repurchases&#8217;, <b>99 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1377-1430. <\/li>\n<li>Bratton, William W., Jr. (1993), &#8216;Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Washington &amp; Lee Law Review <\/em>, 1449 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Bratton, William W., Jr. (1994), &#8216;Corporate Law&#8217;s Race to Nowhere in Particular&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Review <\/em>, 401 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C. (1991), <em>Principles of Corporate Finance <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Brickley, James A., Bhagat, Sanjai and Lease, Ronald C. (1985), &#8216;The Impact of Long-range Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Accounting and Economics <\/em>, 115-130. <\/li>\n<li>Brudney, Victor (1966), &#8216;Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting cororate Control&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 259 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Brudney, Victor (1985), &#8216;Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1403-1444. <\/li>\n<li>Bundy, Stephen M. (1989), &#8216;Commentary: Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 335-365. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. (1989), &#8216;The Contractual Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>George Mason Law Review <\/em>, 99 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), &#8216;Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Washington Law Review <\/em>, 1 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1994), &#8216;Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Kansas Law Review <\/em>, 163 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas (1972), &#8216;Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1089-1128. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A., Economic Foundations of Property Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 31-48. <\/li>\n<li>Calio, Joseph Evan and Zahralddin, Rafael Xavier (1994), &#8216;The Securities and Exchange Commission\u0092s 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountabilitya&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Pace International Law Review <\/em>, 459 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1990), &#8216;Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Anglo-American Law Review <\/em>, 185-208. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1995), &#8216;Review of R. Tomasic and S. Bottomley, Directing the Top 500&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Social and Legal Studies <\/em>, 428-432. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1996), &#8216;Review of B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Social and Legal Studies <\/em>, 549-554. <\/li>\n<li>Caplin, Mortimer M. (1953), &#8216;Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 141 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carlton, Denis and Fischel, Daniel R. (1983), &#8216;The Regulation of Insider Trading&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 857 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Carney, William J. (1988), &#8216;Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 385-433. <\/li>\n<li>Cary, William L. (1974), &#8216;Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 663 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Chandler, Alfred (1977), <em>The Visible Hand <\/em>, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Charensky, Steven S. (1994), &#8216;Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate R&amp;D Spending: An Agency Cost Model&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Santa Clara Computer and High Tech. Law Journal <\/em>, 299-346. <\/li>\n<li>Cheung, Steven N.S. (1983), &#8216;The Contractual Nature of the Firm&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-21. <\/li>\n<li>Choi, Dosoung, Kamma, Sreenivas and Weintrop, Joseph (1989), &#8216;The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder Wealth&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 375-393. <\/li>\n<li>Clarckson, Kenneth W. and Martin, Donald L. (eds.) (1979), <em>The Economics of Nonproprietary Institutions (Supplement 1 to Research in Law and Economics) <\/em>, Greenwood, JAI Press, 330 p. <\/li>\n<li>Clark, William A.V. (1988), &#8216;Production Costs and Output Qualities in Public and Private Employment Agencies&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 379-393. <\/li>\n<li>Coase, Ronald H. (1937), &#8216;The Nature of the Firm&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Economica <\/em>, 386-405. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 31-32. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., <em>Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones? <\/em>, Working Paper Based on a lecture given on 10\/28\/94. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1984), &#8216;Market Failure and the Economic Case for A Mandatory Disclosure System&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 717-754. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1986), &#8216;Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 1-109. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1988), &#8216;No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>Brooklyn Law Review <\/em>, 919 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1989), &#8216;The Mandatory\/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Coffee, John C., Jr. (1993), &#8216;New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Journal of Business Law <\/em>, 1407 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Conard, A.F. (1988), &#8216;Beyond Managerial Capitalism: Investor Capitalism?&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform <\/em>, 117-178. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert (1984), &#8216;Prices and Sanctions&#8217;, <b>84 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1523 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubin, Edward L. (1988), &#8216;Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 1115-1186. <\/li>\n<li>Cox, James D. (1984), &#8216;Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market As Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures\u00d3&#8217;, <b>52 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 745-788. <\/li>\n<li>Cutler, David M. and Summers, Lawrence H. (1988), &#8216;The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 157-172. <\/li>\n<li>Daines, Robert M. and Hanson, Jon D. (1992), &#8216;The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, a Review Essay on The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, by Easterbrook and Fischel&#8217;, <b>102 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 577-637. <\/li>\n<li>Dallas, Lynne L. (1988), &#8216;Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform <\/em>, 19-116. <\/li>\n<li>Dallas, Lynne L. (1988), &#8216;Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform <\/em>, 19 ff. <\/li>\n<li>De Alessi, Louis (1973), &#8216;Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in Large Corporations&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 839-851. <\/li>\n<li>Demsetz, Harold and Lehn, Kenneth (1985), &#8216;The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences&#8217;, <b>93 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 1155-1177. <\/li>\n<li>Dennis, Roger J. (1987), &#8216;Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Maryland Law Review <\/em>, 1197 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Dent, George W., Jr. (1989), &#8216;Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 881-924. <\/li>\n<li>Dodd, E. Merrick (1932), &#8216;For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1145 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Dodd, Peter and Leftwich, Richard (1980), &#8216;The Market for Corporate Charters: &#8220;Unhealthy Competition&#8221; vs. Federal Regulation&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 1-41. <\/li>\n<li>Dunbar, Frederick C., Juneja, Vinita M. and Martin, Denise N., <em>Shareholder Litigation: Deterrent Value, Merit, and Litigants\u0092 Options <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), &#8216;Managers&#8217; Discretion and Investors&#8217; Welfare: Theories and Evidence&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Delaware Journal of Corporate Law <\/em>, 540-571. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), &#8216;Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 650-659. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1982), &#8216;Corporate Control Transactions&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 698 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1983), &#8216;Voting in Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 395-427. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1984), &#8216;Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 669-715. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1989), &#8216;The Corporate Contract&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1416 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1991), <em>The Economic Structure of Corporate Law <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Eckel, Catherine C. and Vermaelen, Theo (1986), &#8216;Internal Regulation: The Effects of Government Ownership on the Value of the Firm&#8217;, <b>29 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 381-403. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1970), &#8216;Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 1489 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1989), &#8216;The Structure of Corporation Law&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1461 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Fama, Eugene F. (1980), &#8216;Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm&#8217;, <b>88 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 288 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C. (1983), &#8216;Separation of Ownership and Control&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 301-325. <\/li>\n<li>Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C. (1983), &#8216;Agency Problems and Residual Claims&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 327-349. <\/li>\n<li>Fisch, Jill E. (1994), &#8216;Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?&#8217;, <b>55 <\/b> <em>Ohio State Law Journal <\/em>, 1009-1048. <\/li>\n<li>Fischel, Daniel R. (1978), &#8216;Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 1-46. <\/li>\n<li>Friedman, Milton (1970), &#8216;The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits&#8217;, <b>13\/9\/1970 <\/b> <em>The New York Times <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Frost, Christopher (1992), &#8216;Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Arizona Law Review <\/em>, 89 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1986), &#8216;A &#8216;Signal-Jamming&#8217; Theory of Predation&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 366 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Garten, Helen A. (1992), &#8216;Institutional Investors and the New Financial Order&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>Rutgers Law Review <\/em>, 585 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Garth, Bryant G., Nagel, Ilene H. and Plager, Sheldon J. (1985), &#8216;Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better Informed Debate&#8217;, <b>48(3) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 137-159. <\/li>\n<li>Geddes, R. Richard (1997), &#8216;Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry&#8217;, <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Geddes, R. Richard and Crowley, Peter T. (1994), &#8216;Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service&#8217;, in Sidak, Gregory J. (ed.), <em>Governing the Postal Service <\/em>, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. (1992), &#8216;Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance, An Academic Perspective&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Annual Institute On Securities Regulation <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1984), &#8216;The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 549-644. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), &#8216;Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 863-906. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Portfolio Performance: An Agenda for Institutional Investors&#8217;, <em>Director&#8217;s Monthly <\/em>, 1-4. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1993), &#8216;Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 985-1010. <\/li>\n<li>Gilson, Ronald J. and Roe, Mark J. (1993), &#8216;Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization&#8217;, <b>102 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 871 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Goforth, Carol (1994), &#8216;Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>American University Law Review <\/em>, 379-465. <\/li>\n<li>Gordon, Jeffrey N. (1989), &#8216;The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law&#8217;, <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1549-1598. <\/li>\n<li>Green, Ronald M. (1993), &#8216;Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Washington &amp; Lee Law Review <\/em>, 1409-1421. <\/li>\n<li>Greenwood, Daniel J.H. (1996), &#8216;Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>University of Southern California Law Review <\/em>, 1021-1104. <\/li>\n<li>Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D. (1980), &#8216;Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 42-64. <\/li>\n<li>Gy\u0099rffy, Gabor (1995), &#8216;The Structure of Fiduciary Relationship: Its Relevance to Nonprofit Governances and Regulation&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 193-216. <\/li>\n<li>Hansmann, Henry B. (1988), &#8216;Ownership of the Firm&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 267-304. <\/li>\n<li>Hansmann, Henry B. (1990), &#8216;When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy&#8217;, <b>99 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1749-1816. <\/li>\n<li>Hindley, Brian (1970), &#8216;Separation of Ownership and Control in the Modern Corporation&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 185-221. <\/li>\n<li>Holderness, Clifford G. (1990), &#8216;Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 115-129. <\/li>\n<li>Hovenkamp Herbert J. (1988), &#8216;The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought&#8217;, <b>76 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 1593-1688. <\/li>\n<li>Hu, Henry T.C. (1990), &#8216;Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment&#8217;, <b>38 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 277-390. <\/li>\n<li>Hwang, Chun-Sin and Kan, Steven S. (1994), <em>Principles of Economics, Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) <\/em>, Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei. <\/li>\n<li>Hwang, Chun-Sin and Kan, Steven S. (1995), &#8216;Democracy and the Principle for the Division of Labor in Government Organization (in Chinese)&#8217;, in Chien, Sechin Y.S. and Tai, Terence H. (eds.), <em>Philosophy and Public Norms <\/em>, Taipei, Academia Sinica, Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, 163-200. <\/li>\n<li>Ippolito, Richard A. and James, William H. (1992), &#8216;LBOs Reversions and Implicit Contracts&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 139 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Itoh, Hideshi (1992), &#8216;Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 321-345. <\/li>\n<li>Janjigian, Vahan and Bolster, Paul J. (1990), &#8216;The Elimination of Director Liability and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Investigation&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Research <\/em>, 53-60. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, M and Meckling, W. (1979), &#8216;Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Co-determination&#8217;, <b>52 <\/b> <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 469 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. (1986), &#8216;Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers&#8217;, <b>76 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 323-329. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. (1993), &#8216;The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 831 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H. (1976), &#8216;Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 305-360. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. and Murphy, Kevein M. (1990), &#8216;Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 225 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Jensen, Michael C. and Murphy, Kevin J. (1990), &#8216;CEO Incentives &#8211; It&#8217;s Not How Much You Pay, But How&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>Harvard Business Review <\/em>, 138 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Johnson, K., C. (1985), &#8216;Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review&#8217;, <b>94 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 909-928. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1988), &#8216;Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationship: Empirical Evidence&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 95-117. <\/li>\n<li>Kabir, R., Cantrijn, D. and Jeunink, A. (1997), &#8216;Takeover Defenses, Ownership Structure and Stock Returns in the Netherlands : An Empirical Analysis&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Strategic Management Journal <\/em>, 97-109. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1994), <em>Principles of Economics: Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) <\/em>, Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1996), &#8216;A Form of Government Organization from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 197-220. <\/li>\n<li>Kaplan, Steven E. (1989), &#8216;The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 217 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Klausner, Michael and Kahan, Marcel (1995), &#8216;Corporate Contracting: Standardization, Innovation and the Role Contracting Agents&#8217;,. <\/li>\n<li>Klein (1982), &#8216;The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1521 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin (1983), &#8216;Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 367-374. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin (1988), &#8216;Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 199-213. <\/li>\n<li>Knight, Frank H. (1921), <em>Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit <\/em>, New York, Houghton Mifflin Co.. <\/li>\n<li>Knoeber, Charles R. and Flath, David J. (1985), &#8216;On Managerial Shareholding&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Industrial Economics <\/em>, 93-99. <\/li>\n<li>Knoeber, Charles R. and Thurman, Walter N. (1994), &#8216;Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Labor Economics <\/em>, 155-179. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), &#8216;Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 517-542. <\/li>\n<li>Kraakman, Reinier H. (1984), &#8216;Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls&#8217;, <b>93 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 857-898. <\/li>\n<li>Kraakman, Reinier H., Park Hyun and Shavell Steven (1994), &#8216;When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholders&#8217; Interests?&#8217;, <b>82 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 1733-1775. <\/li>\n<li>La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andre and Vishny, Robert W. (1996), <em>Law and Finance <\/em>, National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 5661. <\/li>\n<li>Lambert, Richard A. and Larcker, D. (1985), &#8216;Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-making and Shareholder Wealth&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Accounting and Economics <\/em>, 179-204. <\/li>\n<li>Lashbrooke, E.C., Jr. (1995), &#8216;The Divergence of Corporate Finance and Law in Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>South Carolina Law Review <\/em>, 449-469. <\/li>\n<li>Lee, D. Scott (1992), &#8216;Management Buyout Proposals and Inside Information&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Journal of Finance <\/em>, 106 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Lehn, Kenneth (1988), &#8216;Majority-Minority Relationships &#8211; An Economic View&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Canada-United States Law Journal <\/em>, 135-141. <\/li>\n<li>Levin, William R. (1985), &#8216;The False Promise of Worker Capita lism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan&#8217;, <b>95 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 148-173. <\/li>\n<li>Levin, William R. (1985), &#8216;The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan&#8217;, <b>95 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 144-173. <\/li>\n<li>Lien, Da Hsiang Donald (1990), &#8216;Competition, Regulation and Bribery: A Note&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Managerial and Decision Economics <\/em>, 127-130. <\/li>\n<li>Lin, Laura (1996), &#8216;The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence&#8217;, <b>90 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Lipton, Martin (1987), &#8216;Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism&#8217;, <b>136 <\/b> <em>University of Pennsylvania Law Review <\/em>, 1-72. <\/li>\n<li>Lipton, Martin and Rosenblum, Steven A. (1991), &#8216;A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors&#8217;, <b>58 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 187-253. <\/li>\n<li>Llebot Majo, Jos\u008e Oriol (1996), &#8216;El Sistema de la responsabilidad de los administradores, doctrina y jurisprudencia (Manager&#8217;s Liability System, Doctrine and Jurisprudence)&#8217;, <em>Revista de Derecho de Sociedades <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Lynk, William J. (1981), &#8216;Regulatory Control of the Membership of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Blue Shield Case&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 159-173. <\/li>\n<li>Lynk, William J. (1994), &#8216;Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Antitrust Bulletin <\/em>, 363 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Macavoy, Paul W. and others (1989), <em>Privatization and State- Owned Enterprises: Lesson <\/em>, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 360 p. <\/li>\n<li>Mace, Myles L. (1971), <em>Directors, Myth and Reality <\/em>, Boston, Harvard Business School. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. (1984), &#8216;From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Hofstra Law Review <\/em>, 9-64. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. (1991), &#8216;An Economic analysis of the Various Rationales for Making shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Stetson Law Review <\/em>, 23 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. and McChesney Fred S. (1985), &#8216;A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail&#8217;, <b>95 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 13-61. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), &#8216;Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 469-523. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1991), &#8216;The Plaintiffs&#8217; Attorney&#8217;s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform&#8217;, <b>58 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1991), &#8216;The Fraud- on-the-Market Theory Revisited&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 1001-1016. <\/li>\n<li>Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1995), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 73-112. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1991), &#8216;Double risque moral et delegation (Double Moral Hazzard and Delegation)&#8217;, <b>57(3) <\/b> <em>Recherches Economiques de Louvain <\/em>, 277-296. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1992), &#8216;Le regle de la derogation dans une relation d&#8217;agence (Derogation Rule in an Agent-Principal Relationship)&#8217;, <b>102-103 <\/b> <em>Economie et Pr\u008evision <\/em>, 67-77. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1993), &#8216;\u00c0Delegar o Centralizar? Qu\u008e dice la Econom\u0092a de la Informaci\u0097n? (What Economics of Information Say about Delegation and Decentralization?)&#8217;, <b>52 <\/b> <em>Cuadernos Econ\u0097micos de ICE <\/em>, 25-46. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and Verdier, T. (1989), &#8216;Aspectos estrategicos de la separaci\u0097n accionista-gestor (Strategic Aspects between Corporate Ownership and Control)&#8217;, <b>2(3) <\/b> <em>De Econom\u0092a P\u009cblica <\/em>, 25-44. <\/li>\n<li>Mahoney, Paul G. (1987), &#8216;Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems&#8217;, <b>54 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 1441-1483. <\/li>\n<li>Malatesta, Paul H. and Walkling, Ralph A. (1989), &#8216;Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability and Ownership Structure&#8217;, <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Manne, Henry G. (1964), &#8216;Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of MERLE, Adolf A.&#8217;, <b>64 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1427-1444. <\/li>\n<li>Manne, Henry G. (1965), &#8216;Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 110-120. <\/li>\n<li>Manne, Henry G. (1966), &#8216;In Defence of Insider Trading&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>Harvard Business Review <\/em>, 113-122. <\/li>\n<li>Mark, Gregory A. (1995), &#8216;Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance. A review essay on Mark J. Roe\u0092s Strong Managers, Weak Owners&#8217;, <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 969-999. <\/li>\n<li>Marris, R. (1964), <em>The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism <\/em>, New York, Free Press. <\/li>\n<li>Maug, Ernst, <em>Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade Off Between Liquidity and Control? <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Maug, Ernst (1996), <em>Boards of Directors and Capital Structure: Alternative Forms of Corporate Restructuring <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>McChesney Fred S. (1989), &#8216;Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg&#8217;, <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1530-1548. <\/li>\n<li>Mercuro, Nicholas, Sourbis, Haralambos and Whitney, Gerald (1992), &#8216;Ownership Structure, Value of the Firm and the Bargaining Power of the Manager&#8217;, <b>59(2) <\/b> <em>Southern Economic Journal <\/em>, 273-283. <\/li>\n<li>Milgrom, Paul R. (1988), &#8216;Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design&#8217;, <b>96 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 517 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Milgrom, Paul R. and Roberts, John (1990), &#8216;Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity&#8217;, in Alt, J. and Shepsle, K., (eds.), <em>Perspectives on Politive Political Economy <\/em>, Cambridge University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Milgrom, Paul R. and Roberts, John (1992), <em>Economics, Organization and Management <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. and Macey, Jonathan R. (1993), &#8216;Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective,&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Journal <\/em>, 401 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Miller, Geoffrey P. and Macey, Jonathan R. (1995), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States, 1995&#8217;, <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 73 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Mitchell, Lawrence E. (1992), &#8216;A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 579-644. <\/li>\n<li>Mofsky, James and Rubin, Robert D. (1983), &#8216;Introduction: A Symposium on the ALI Corporate Governance Project&#8217;, <b>97 <\/b> <em>University of Miami Law Review <\/em>, 169-185. <\/li>\n<li>Moore, Andrew G.T., II (1994), &#8216;Shareholder Rights Still Alive and Well in Delaware: The Derivative Suit: A Death Greatly Exaggerated&#8217;, <b>38 <\/b> <em>Saint Louis University Law Journal <\/em>, 947-965. <\/li>\n<li>Murdock, Charles W. (1990), &#8216;The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Minority Shares&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Notre Dame Law Review <\/em>, 425-489. <\/li>\n<li>Murphy, Kevin J. (1985), &#8216;Corporate Performance and Managerial Renumeration: An Empirical Analysis&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Accounting and Economics <\/em>, 11-42. <\/li>\n<li>Newcomb, R. Link (1987), &#8216;The Limitation of Directory Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 411-452. <\/li>\n<li>O&#8217;Connor, Marleen A. (1993), &#8216;How Should We Talk about Fiduciary Duty? Director&#8217;s Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI&#8217;s Principles of Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>61 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 954-983. <\/li>\n<li>Olivella, O. (1990), &#8216;Una Introdcuccion a la Delegacion como Mecanismo de Compromiso (An introduction to Delagation as a Commitment Device)&#8217;, <b>7(2) <\/b> <em>Econom\u0092a P\u009cblica <\/em>, 37-52. <\/li>\n<li>Olivella, O. (1995), &#8216;Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Annales d&#8217;Economie et de Statistique <\/em>, 1-32. <\/li>\n<li>Olivella, P. (1990), &#8216;Una introducci\u0097n a la delegaci\u0097n como mecanismo de compromiso (An Introduction to Delegation to force Commitment)&#8217;, <b>7-2 <\/b> <em>Econom\u0092a P\u009cblica <\/em>, 37-52. <\/li>\n<li>Olivella, P. (1995), &#8216;Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Annales d&#8217;Economie et de Statistique <\/em>, 1-32. <\/li>\n<li>Painter, Richard W. (1994), &#8216;The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Southern California Law Review <\/em>, 507-584. <\/li>\n<li>Palmiter, Alan R. (1989), &#8216;Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director\u0092s Duty of Independence&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 1351-1464. <\/li>\n<li>Portellano, Pedro (1996), <em>Deber de fidelidad de los administradores de sociedades mercantiles y oportunidades de negocio (Fidelity Commitment of Corporation Managers and Bussiness Oportunities) <\/em>, Madrid, Editorial C\u0092vitas. <\/li>\n<li>Porter, Philip K. and Scully, Gerald W. (1987), &#8216;Economic Efficiency in Cooperatives&#8217;, <b>30 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 489-512. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Richard A. (1976), &#8216;The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 499-526. <\/li>\n<li>Pound, John (1989), &#8216;Shareholder Activisme and Share Values: The Causes and Consequences of Countersolicitations against Management Antitakeover Proposals&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 357-379. <\/li>\n<li>Preite, Disiano (1988), <em>La destinazione dei risultati nei contratti associativi (The Destination of the Results in Partnership Contracts) <\/em>, Milano, Giuffr\u008f, 456 p. <\/li>\n<li>Qi, Jianping, <em>Shareholder Suits, Dual Agencies, and Implications for Legal Framework <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Radner, Roy (1974), &#8216;A Note of Unanimity of Stockholders&#8217; Preferences among Alternative Production Plans a Reformulation of the Ekern-Wilson Model&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 181-184. <\/li>\n<li>Repetti, James R. (1992), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Notre Dame Law Review <\/em>, 971-1035. <\/li>\n<li>Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), &#8216;Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 71 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), &#8216;Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 17 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ribstein, Larry E. (1992), &#8216;Corporate Political Speech&#8217;, <b>49 <\/b> <em>Washington and Lee Law Review <\/em>, 109 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ribstein, Larry E. (1992), &#8216;Efficiency, Regulation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook &amp; Fischel&#8217;, <b>87 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 254 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ribstein, Larry E. (1993), &#8216;The Mandatory Rules of the ALI Code&#8217;, <b>61 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 984 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Rock, Edward B., <em>Saints and Sinners: The Peculiar Mechanisms of Delaware Corporate Law <\/em>, Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, No. 193. <\/li>\n<li>Rock, Edward B. (1991), <em>The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Roe, Mark J. (1991), &#8216;A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance&#8217;, <b>91 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 10-67. <\/li>\n<li>Romano, Roberta (1985), &#8216;Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 225-283. <\/li>\n<li>Romano, Roberta (1991), &#8216;The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 55-87. <\/li>\n<li>Romano, Roberta (1992), &#8216;A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Yale Journal of Regulation <\/em>, 119 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Romano, Roberta (1993), &#8216;Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered&#8217;, <b>93 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 795 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Romano, Roberta (1994), <em>The Genius Of American Corporate Law <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1991), &#8216;Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 277-310. <\/li>\n<li>Ross, Stephen A. (1977), &#8216;The Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive-Signalling Approach&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 23-40. <\/li>\n<li>Ross, Stephen A. and et al. (1993), <em>Corporate Finance <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Ruder, David S. (1983), &#8216;Protections for Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?&#8217;, <b>37 <\/b> <em>University of Miami Law Review <\/em>, 243 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ryan, Patrick J. (1991), &#8216;Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute&#8217;s Principle of Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>Washington Law Review <\/em>, 413-502. <\/li>\n<li>Sadat-Keeling, Leila (1984), &#8216;The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14A-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>Tulane Law Review <\/em>, 161-198. <\/li>\n<li>Schleifer, A. and Vishny, Robert W., <em>A Survey of Corporate Governance <\/em>, NBER, Working Paper, april 1996, No. 5554. <\/li>\n<li>Schott, Kenneth E. (1983), &#8216;Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 927-948. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Alan (1985), &#8216;Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 689-736. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Alan (1988), &#8216;The Sole Owner Standard Reviewed&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 231-235. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Donald E. (1984), &#8216;Federalism and Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>Ohio State Law Journal <\/em>, 545-590. <\/li>\n<li>Seligman, Joel, Stock (1986), &#8216;Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy&#8217;, <b>54 <\/b> <em>George Washington Law Review <\/em>, 687 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Shavell Steven (1982), &#8216;The Social Versus The Private Incentive to Bring suit in a Costly Legal System&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 333 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1986), &#8216;Large Sharehol ders and Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>94 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 461-488. <\/li>\n<li>Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1986), &#8216;Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders&#8217; Interest&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 293-309. <\/li>\n<li>Sidak, J. Gregory and Woodward, Susan (1991), &#8216;Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights, and the Price Elasticity of a Firm\u0092s Publicly Traded Stock&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Georgia Law Review <\/em>, 783 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Slagter, Wiek J. (1988), <em>Macht en onmacht van de aandeelhouder (Shareholders Lack of Power) <\/em>, Deventer, Kluwer, 47 p. <\/li>\n<li>Slagter, Wiek J. (1989), <em>Schaarse rechten. Afscheidscollege Rotterdam (Scarce Rights) <\/em>, Deventer, Kluwer, 42 p. <\/li>\n<li>Smart, Christopher J. (1988), &#8216;Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers\u0092 Keeper?&#8217;, <em>Columbia Business Law Review <\/em>, 301-339. <\/li>\n<li>Smith, Adam (1980), &#8216;The Wealth of Nations, Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>American Journal of Comparative Law <\/em>, 367 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Smith, D. Gordon (1996), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons From Kmart&#8217;,, 1037 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Smith, Gordon G. (1996), &#8216;Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons From Kmart&#8217;, <em>North Carolina Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>St\u008chl, Ingemar (1976), &#8216;\u0080gande och makt i f\u009aretagen &#8211; en debattinledning, Nationalek onomiska F\u009areningens F\u009arhandlingar&#8217; [Ownership and Power in the Firms &#8211; An Introduction to Debate, the Economics Association&#8217;s Negotiations],&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Ekonomisk Debatt <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Stano, Miron (1976), &#8216;Monopoly Power, Ownership Control, and Corporate Performance&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 672-679. <\/li>\n<li>Stano, Miron (1978), &#8216;Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>Southern Economic Journal <\/em>, 272-278. <\/li>\n<li>Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1989), <em>Principal and Agent, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics <\/em>,. <\/li>\n<li>Stout, Lynn A. (1988), &#8216;The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation&#8217;, <b>87 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 613-709. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, Alexander J. and George G. (1994), &#8216;Conversion Rights and the Design of Financial Contracts&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>Washington University Law Quarterly <\/em>, 1231-1255. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1992), &#8216;Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-258. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1993), &#8216;A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Vanderbilt Law Review <\/em>, 901-935. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1994), &#8216;A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities&#8217;, <b>80 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 2155-2168. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1995), &#8216;Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making and Security Design&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Canadian Business Journal <\/em>, 93-105. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1996), &#8216;The Interplay between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The role of screens, gatekeepers and guillotines&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 101-119. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. and Ronald J. Daniels (1995), &#8216;The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1073-1113. <\/li>\n<li>Turnbull, Shann (1997), <em>Evolution of Business and the Corporate Structure <\/em>, Corporate Directors&#8217; Diploma Course, University of New England, Armidale, Australia, Topic 1.1. <\/li>\n<li>Utset, Manuel (1995), &#8216;Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm&#8217;, <b>80 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 540 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Vanecko, Robert G. (1992), &#8216;Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>87 <\/b> <em>Northwestern Law Review <\/em>, 376-421. <\/li>\n<li>Watts, Ross L. and Zimmerman, Jerold L. (1983), &#8216;Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 613-633. <\/li>\n<li>Weisbach, Michael S. (1988), &#8216;Outside Directors and CEO Turnover&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Financial Economics <\/em>, 431 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Weiss, Elliott J. and White, Lawrence J. (1987), &#8216;Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors&#8217; Reactions to &#8220;Changes&#8221; in Corporate Law&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 551-607. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1963), &#8216;Managerial Discretion and Business Behaviour&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1032-1057. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &#8216;The Economics of Internal Organization: Exit and Voice in Relation to Markets and Hierarchies&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 369-377. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1979), &#8216;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 233-261. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1983), &#8216;Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 351-366. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1984), &#8216;Corporate Governance&#8217;, <b>93 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1197-1230. <\/li>\n<li>Winter, Ralph A. (1981), &#8216;Majority Choice and the Objective Func tion of the Firm under Uncertainty: Note&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 335-337. <\/li>\n<li>Winter, Ralph K., Jr. (1977), &#8216;State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 251-292. <\/li>\n<li>Winter, Ralph K., Jr. (1977), &#8216;State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 271 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Winter, Ralph K., Jr. (1988), &#8216;On Protecting The Ordinary Investor&#8217;, <b>63 <\/b> <em>Washington Law Review <\/em>, 881-902. <\/li>\n<li>X. (1996), &#8216;Symposium: The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law 76&#8217;, <em>Boston University Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Yablon, Charles M. (1992), &#8216;Book Review of The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay: In Search of Excess, by Graef Crystal&#8217;, <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 1867-1906. <\/li>\n<li>Zalecki, Paul H. (1993), &#8216;The Corporate Governance Roles of the Inside and Outside Directors&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>University of Toledo Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27072","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27072","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27072"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}