{"id":27046,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4300-contract-formation.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","slug":"4300-contract-formation","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4300-contract-formation.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 4300 Contract Formation"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Adams, Michael (1984), &#8216;\u0085konomische Analyse des Gesetzes zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Gesch\u008aftsbedingungen&#8217;, in Neumann, M. (ed.), <em>Ansprache, Eigentums- und Verf\u009fgungsrechte <\/em>, Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 655-680. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1986), &#8216;Zur Behandlung von Irrt\u009fmern und Offenbarungspflichten im Vertragsrecht (On Mistake and Information Revelation Duties in Contract Law)&#8217;, <b>186 <\/b> <em>Archiv f\u009fr die civilistische Praxis <\/em>, 453-489. <\/li>\n<li>Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), <em>Economics of Contract Law <\/em>, Minneapolis, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Barnett, Randy E. and Becker, Mary E. (1987), &#8216;Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresenta tion&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Hofstra Law Review <\/em>, 443 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Baudenbacher, Carl (1983), &#8216;echtliche Grundprobleme der Allgemeinen Gesch\u008aftsbedingungen (Standard Term Clauses: Basic Problems of Economic, Liability and Procedural Law)&#8217;, in Zurich, Schulthess (ed.), <em>Wirtschafts- schuld- und verfahrens <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Bessone, Mario (1984), &#8216;Gli standards&#8221; dei contratti di impresa e l&#8217;analisi economica del diritto (The &#8220;Standards&#8221; in Contracts and Economic Analysis)&#8217;, <em>Giurisprudenza di merito <\/em>, 982-987. <\/li>\n<li>Birmingham, Robert L. (1988), &#8216;The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner&#8217;s Dilemma:&#8217;, <em>William &amp; Mary Law Review <\/em>, 249-283. <\/li>\n<li>Bishop, William (1980), &#8216;Negligent Misrepresentation through the Economists&#8217; Eyes&#8217;, <b>96 <\/b> <em>Law Quarterly Review <\/em>, 360-379. <\/li>\n<li>Bishop, William (1981), &#8216;Negligent Misrepresentation: An Economic Reformulation&#8217;, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), <em>The Economic Approach to Law <\/em>, London, Butterworths, 167-186. <\/li>\n<li>Bouckaert, Boudewijn and Sch\u008afer, Hans-Bernd (1995), &#8216;Mistake of Law and the Economics of Legal Information&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 217-245. <\/li>\n<li>Braunstein, Michael (1989), &#8216;Remedy, Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis&#8217;, <em>Utah Law Review <\/em>, 383-431. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1997), &#8216;The Relational Constitution of Contract and the Limits of Economics: Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets&#8217;, in Deakin, Simon and Michie, Jonathan (eds.), <em>Contracts, Co-operation and Competition: Studies in Economics, Management and Law <\/em>, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 529-596. <\/li>\n<li>Caruso, Daniela (1991), &#8216;Relazioni precontrattuali e teoria dei giochi (Precontractual relations and game theory)&#8217;, <em>Quadrimestre <\/em>, 810-832. <\/li>\n<li>Caruso, Daniela (1991), &#8216;Note in tema di danni precontrattuali, (Nota a Cass., 11 maggio 1990, n. 4051, Bellucci c. Min. difesa) (Notes about precontractual damages)&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Il Foro Italiano <\/em>, 188-200. <\/li>\n<li>Caruso, Daniela (1993), <em>La culpa in contrahendo &#8211; L&#8217;esperienza statunitense e quella italiana (Culpa in contrahendo &#8211; The American and Italian experience) <\/em>, Milano, Giuffr\u008f. <\/li>\n<li>Caruso, Daniela (1993), <em>La culpa in contrahendo &#8211; L&#8217;esperienza statunitense e quella italiana (Culpa in contrahendo &#8211; The American and Italian experience) <\/em>, Milano, Giuffr\u008f. <\/li>\n<li>Castermans, A.G. (1989), &#8216;Schadevergoeding bij dwaling (Damages for Misrepresentation)&#8217;, <em>Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis <\/em>, 136-146. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Castermans, A.G. and Notermans, R. (1985), &#8216;Naar een economische analyse van de mededelingsplicht bij dwaling (Towards an Economic Analysis of the Duty to Inform in Misrepresentation Law)&#8217;,, 141-155. <\/li>\n<li>Chisholm, Darlene C. (1996), &#8216;Continuous Degrees of Residual Claimancy: Some Contractual Evidence&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Applied Economics Letters <\/em>, 739-741. <\/li>\n<li>Coleman, Jules, Heckathorn, Douglas D. and Maser,Steven M. (1989), &#8216;A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy <\/em>, 639-709. <\/li>\n<li>Craswell, Richard (1988), &#8216;Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 401-436. <\/li>\n<li>Craswell, Richard (1996), &#8216;Offer , Acceptance and Efficient Reliance&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Stanford Law Review <\/em>, 481-553. <\/li>\n<li>Curnes, Ellen J. (1987), &#8216;Protecting the Virginia Homebuyer: A Duty to Disclose Defects&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 459-481. <\/li>\n<li>Daintith, Terence C. (1987), &#8216;Oprettelse og anvendelse af langfristede kontrakter (The Creation and Use of Longterm Contracts)&#8217;, in Blegvad, Britt-Mari &amp; Collin, Finn (eds.), <em>Virksomheden mellem \u00a2konomi og jura <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Dalzell, John (1942), &#8216;Duress by Economic Pressure&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>North Carolina Law Review <\/em>, 237-277. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 67-72. Reprinted in in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, 1989, 188-193. <\/li>\n<li>De Geest, Gerrit (1995), &#8216;Contracting by Way of Non-Simultaneous Assent: An Economic Analysis of Irrevocable Offers, Clauses for the Benefit of a Third Party, Assignments and Testaments&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 9-27. <\/li>\n<li>Diamond, Peter A. and Maskin, Eric (1979), &#8216;An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 282-316. <\/li>\n<li>Diamond, Peter A. and Maskin, Eric (1981), &#8216;An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract II: A Nonsteady State Example&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Theory <\/em>, 165-195. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Anthony W. and Williams, V. Roffey (1995), &#8216;The Law and Economics of Contract Modifications: The Case of&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 225-240. <\/li>\n<li>Duggan, A.J. (1982), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Standard Form Contracts&#8217;, in Cranston, Ross and Schick, Anne (eds.), <em>Law and Economics <\/em>, Canberra, Australian National University, 145-162. <\/li>\n<li>Duggan, A.J. (1995), &#8216;Silence as Misleading Conduct: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, in Richardson, Megan and Williams, Philip (eds.), <em>The Law and the Market: Essays in Honour of Maureen Brunt <\/em>, Melbourne, The Federation Press, 195-223. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1979), &#8216;Donative Promises&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 1-33. <\/li>\n<li>Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1982), &#8216;The Bargain Principle and Its Limits&#8217;, <b>95 <\/b> <em>Harvard Law Review <\/em>, 741-801. <\/li>\n<li>Epstein, Richard A. (1975), &#8216;Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 293-315. <\/li>\n<li>Feeny, David, Berkes, Fikret, McCay, Bonnie J. and Acheson, James M. (1990), &#8216;The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later&#8217;, <b>18(1) <\/b> <em>Human Ecology <\/em>, 1-19. <\/li>\n<li>Fishman, Michael J. and Hagerty, Kathleen M. (1990), &#8216;The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure&#8217;, <b>104 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>, 427-444. <\/li>\n<li>Fuller, Lon L. (1941), &#8216;Consideration and Form&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>Columbia Law Review <\/em>, 799 ff. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 40-45. <\/li>\n<li>Gallo, Paolo (1992), &#8216;Errore sul valore, giustizia contrattuale e trasferimenti ingiustificati di ricchezza alla luce dell&#8217;analisi economica del diritto (Mistake on value, contractual justice and unjust enrichment)&#8217;, <em>Quadrimestre <\/em>, 656-703. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), &#8216;Competitive Bidding and the Production of Pre-contract Information&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 250-261. <\/li>\n<li>Holm, Hakan J. (1995), &#8216;Computational Cost of Verifying Enforceable Contracts&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 127-140. <\/li>\n<li>Johnston, Jason Scott (1990), &#8216;Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules&#8217;, <b>100 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 615-664. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 518-537. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 215-295. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1993), &#8216;Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 77-97. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1996), &#8216;The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations&#8217;, <b>105 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1249-1309. <\/li>\n<li>Koboldt, Christian (1991), &#8216;Kommentar on Schanze, Stellvertretung und \u009akonomische Agentur-Theorie&#8217;, in Ott, Claus and Sch\u008afer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), <em>\u0085konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 76-86. <\/li>\n<li>Koch, Harald (1981), &#8216;Die \u0085konomie der Gestaltungsrechte. M\u009aglichkeiten und Grenzen der \u009akonomische Analyse des Rechts am Beispiel von K\u009fndiging und Anfechtung (The Economics of Dispositive Right. Possibilities)&#8217;, in Bernstein, H., Drobnig, U. and K\u009atz, H. (eds.), <em>Festschrift f\u009fr Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburtstag <\/em>, T\u009fbingen, Mohr, 851-877. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1976), &#8216;Unconscionability in Standard Forms&#8217;, <b>64 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1151 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kostritsky, Juliet P. (1989), &#8216;Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>Iowa Law Review <\/em>, 115-163. <\/li>\n<li>Krauss, Michael I. (1986), &#8216;L&#8217;affaire Lapierre: vers une th\u008eorie \u008economique de l&#8217;obligation quasi-contractuelle (The Lapierre Case: Toward an Economic Theory of the Quasi-Contractual Obligation)&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>McGill Law Journal <\/em>, 683-721. <\/li>\n<li>Kronman, Anthony T. (1978), &#8216;Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 1-34. <\/li>\n<li>Kull, Andrew (1992), &#8216;Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 39-65. <\/li>\n<li>Lehmann, Michael (1980), &#8216;Die Untersuchungs- und R\u009fgepflicht des K\u008aufers in BGB und HGB. Rechtsvergleichender \u0086berblick &#8211; \u009akonomische Analyse (The Duty to Examine and Notify a Defect in the German Civil and Commercial Code. A Comparitive Survey &#8211; Economic Analysis)&#8217;, <em>Wertpapiermitteilungen <\/em>, 1162-1169. <\/li>\n<li>Lehmann, Michael (1981), <em>Vertragsanbahnung durch Werbung (Contract Formation by Advertising) <\/em>, Muenchen, Beck. <\/li>\n<li>Lehmann, Michael (1981), <em>Vertragsanbahnung durch Werbung (Contract Preparing through Promotion) <\/em>, M\u009fnchen, C.H. Beck. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1984), &#8216;Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Osgoode Hall Law Journal <\/em>, 5-28. <\/li>\n<li>Mather, Henry (1982), &#8216;Contract Modification under Duress&#8217;, <b>33 <\/b> <em>North Carolina Law Review <\/em>, 615-658. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. (1995), &#8216;Contract Modification When Litigating for Damages Is Costly&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 87-99. <\/li>\n<li>Orlic, V. Miodrag (1993), <em>Zakljucivanje ugovora (Conclusion of Contracts) <\/em>, Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd. <\/li>\n<li>Ott, Claus (1991), &#8216;Vorvertragliche Aufkl\u008arungspflichten im Recht des G\u009fter- und Leistungsaustausches (Precontractual Obligation to Provide Information i)&#8217;, in Ott, Claus and Sch\u008afer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), <em>\u0085konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 142-162. <\/li>\n<li>Ott, Claus (1995), &#8216;Comment: Contracting by Way of Non-Simultaneous Assent in the German Civil Code&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 29 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Pacces, Alessio and Pardolesi, Roberto (1997), &#8216;Clausole vessatorie in crisi d&#8217;identit\u0088. Appunti di analisi economica del diritto (The identity crisis of unfair terms. Remarks of economic analysis of law)&#8217;, in Furgiuele (ed.), <em>Diritto privato <\/em>, Padova. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang and Lee T.K. (1990), &#8216;The Role of Instalment Payments in Contracts for Services&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 83-99. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Eric A. (1995), &#8216;Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 283-319. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Eric A. (1996), &#8216;Norms, Formalitiies, and the Statute of Frauds : A comment on &#8220;Discovering Contract&#8221;&#8216;, <b>145 <\/b> <em>University of Pennsylvania Law Review <\/em>, 1971-1986. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Richard A. (1977), &#8216;Gratuitous Promises in Economic and Law&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 411-426. <\/li>\n<li>Rasmusen, Eric and Ayres, Ian (1993), &#8216;Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 309-343. <\/li>\n<li>Robinson, Thorton (1983), &#8216;Enforcing Extorted Contract Modifications&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>Iowa Law Review <\/em>, 699-707. <\/li>\n<li>Roth, Gabriel (1977), &#8216;Der Schutzzweck richterlicher Kontrolle von AGB&#8217; (The Protection Goal of the Judicial Control of Standard Term Clauses)&#8217;, <b>4(2) <\/b> <em>\u0085sterreichische Zeitschrift f\u009fr Wirtschaftsrecht <\/em>, 32-37. <\/li>\n<li>Rottenberg, Simon (1985), &#8216;Mistaken Judicial Activism: Proposed Constraints on Creditor Remedies&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Cato Journal <\/em>, 335-350. Reprinted in Dorn, James A. and Manne, Henry G. (eds.), Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, Fairfax, George Mason University Press, 1987, 335-349. <\/li>\n<li>Schanze, Erich (1991), &#8216;Stellvertretung und \u009akonomische Agentur-Theorie &#8211; Probleme und Wechselbez\u009fge (The Law of Agency and Agency Theory &#8211; Problems and Relations)&#8217;, in Ott, Claus and Sch\u008afer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), <em>\u0085konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 60-75. <\/li>\n<li>Scheppele, Kim Lane (1988), <em>Legal Secrets, Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law <\/em>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 363 p. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Alan (1977), &#8216;A Re-examination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability&#8217;, <b>63 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 1053-1083. <\/li>\n<li>Shavell, Steven (1991), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Altriusm and Deferred Gifts&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 401-421. <\/li>\n<li>Smith, Janet Kiholm and Smith, Richard L. (1990), &#8216;Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 467-488. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), &#8216;Incomplete Contracts and Signalling&#8217;, <b>23 (3) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 432-443. <\/li>\n<li>Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), <em>Economics of Contract Law <\/em>, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Trebilcock, Michael J. (1976), &#8216;The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Journal <\/em>, 359-385. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 78-92. <\/li>\n<li>Trebilcock, Michael J. (1980), &#8216;An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability&#8217;, in Reiter, Barry J. and Swan, John (eds.), <em>Studies in Contract Law <\/em>, Toronto, Butterworths. <\/li>\n<li>Trebilcock, Michael J. (1988), &#8216;The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 243-265. <\/li>\n<li>Trebilcock, Michael J. and Dewees, Donald N. (1981), &#8216;Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts&#8217;, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), <em>The Economic Approach to Law <\/em>, London, Butterworths, 93-119. <\/li>\n<li>Villa, Gianroberto (1988), &#8216;Errore riconosciuto, annullamento del contratto ed incentivi alla ricerca di informazioni (Known Mistake, Contract Avoidance and Incentives T)&#8217;, <em>Quadrimestre <\/em>, 286-300. <\/li>\n<li>Wils, Wouter P.J. (1993), &#8216;Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A Functional Inquiry into Precontractual Liability&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines <\/em>, 93-134. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27046","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27046","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27046"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}