{"id":27045,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4200-longterm-contracts-and-relational-contracts.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","slug":"4200-longterm-contracts-and-relational-contracts","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4200-longterm-contracts-and-relational-contracts.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 4200 Long-Term Contracts &#038; Relational Contracts"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Acheson, James M. (1985), &#8216;The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 385-398. <\/li>\n<li>Adams, Michael (1988), &#8216;Franchising &#8211; A Case of Long-Term Contracts: Comment&#8217;, <b>144 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 145-148. <\/li>\n<li>Adelstein, Richard P. (1991), &#8216;Deciding for Bigness: Constitutional Choice and the Growth of Firms&#8217;, <b>2(1) <\/b> <em>Constitutional Political Economy <\/em>, 7-30. <\/li>\n<li>Aivazian, Varouj A., Trebilcock, Michael J. and Penny, Michael (1984), &#8216;The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Osgoode Hall Law Journal <\/em>, 173-212. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 207. <\/li>\n<li>Arvan, Lanny and Leite, A.P.N. (1990), &#8216;Cost Overruns in Long Term Projects&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Journal of Industrial Organization <\/em>, 443-467. <\/li>\n<li>Azariadis, Costas (1988), &#8216;Human Capital and Self-Enforcing Contracts&#8217;, <b>90 <\/b> <em>Scandinavian Journal of Economics <\/em>, 507-528. <\/li>\n<li>Baird, Douglas G. (1990), &#8216;Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 583-596. <\/li>\n<li>Bendor, Jonathan and Mookherjee, Dilip (1990), &#8216;Norms, Third- Party Sanctions, and Cooperation&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 33-63. <\/li>\n<li>Bester, Helmut (1989), &#8216;Incentive-Compatible Long-Term Contracts and Job Rationing&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Labor Economics <\/em>, 238-255. <\/li>\n<li>Bishop, William and Prentice, D.D. (1983), &#8216;Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Fiduciary Remuneration&#8217;, <b>46 <\/b> <em>Modern Law Review <\/em>, 289 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Blair, Roger D. and Kaserman, David L. (1987), &#8216;A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 460-463. <\/li>\n<li>Boudreaux, Donald J. and Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. (1987), &#8216;Regulation as an Exogenous Response to Market Failure: A Neo-Schumpeterian Response&#8217;, <b>143 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 537-554. <\/li>\n<li>Bowers, James W. and Bigelow, John P. (1996), <em>The Economics of Relationships and the Limits of the Law <\/em>, Louisiana State University, Law and Economics Working Group. <\/li>\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), &#8216;Status, Contract and Covenant&#8217;, <b>79 <\/b> <em>Cornell Law Review <\/em>, 1573-1602. <\/li>\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), &#8216;Comment (on Jana Singer&#8217;s Alimony and Efficiency)&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 2461-2479. <\/li>\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. (1996), &#8216;The Family Franchise, Elderly Parents and their Adult Siblings&#8217;, <em>Utah Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. and Carbone, June R. (1988), &#8216;The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>Tulane Law Review <\/em>, 855-905. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Brinig, Margaret F. and Crafton, Steven M. (1994), &#8216;Marriage and Opportunism&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 869-894. <\/li>\n<li>Broadman, Harry G. and Toman, Michael A. (1986), &#8216;Non-Price Provisions in Long-Term Natural Gas Contracts&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>Land Economics <\/em>, 111-118. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. and Baysinger, Barry D. (1983), &#8216;Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: a Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics and Organization Theory&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Emory Law Journal <\/em>, 1009-1109. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1990), &#8216;The Social Theory of Relational Contract: Macneil as the Modern Proudhon&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>International Journal of the Sociology of Law <\/em>, 75-95. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1992), &#8216;The Undeath of Contract: A Study in the Degeneration of a Research Programme&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>The Hong Kong Law Journal <\/em>, 20-47. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1996), &#8216;The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract&#8217;, in Campbell, David and Vincent-Jones, Peter (eds.), <em>Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives <\/em>, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 40-66. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1997), &#8216;Law and Economics and Its Relationship to Sociology&#8217;, <em> <\/em> in Tomasic, Roman (ed.), <i>The Sociology of Law, second edition <\/i>, London, Sage. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1997), &#8216;The Relational Constitution of Contract and the Limits of &#8216;Economics&#8217;: Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets&#8217;, in Deakin, Simon and Michie, Jonathan (eds.), <em>Contracts, Co-operation and Competition: Studies in Economics, Management and Law <\/em>, Oxford, Oxford University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David (1997), &#8216;Socio-legal Analysis of the Law of Contract&#8217;, in Thomas, Philip A. (ed.), <em>Socio-legal Studies <\/em>, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 239-278. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David and Clay, Susan, <em>Long-Term Contracting: A Research Bibliography and Review of the Literature <\/em>, Oxford, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David and Harris, Donald R. (1993), &#8216;Flexibility in Long-term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-operation&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Society <\/em>, 166-191. <\/li>\n<li>Campbell, David and Vincent-Jones, Peter (eds.) (1997), <em>Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives <\/em>, Aldershot, Dartmouth. <\/li>\n<li>Canes, Michael E. and Norman, Donald A. (1984), &#8216;Long-term Contracts and Market Forces in the Natural Gas Market&#8217;, <b>10(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Energy and Development <\/em>, 73-96. <\/li>\n<li>Carbone, June R. and Brinig, Margaret F. (1991), &#8216;Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Tulane Law Review <\/em>, 954-1010. <\/li>\n<li>Chiappori, P.A. and Macho-Stadler, I. (1990), &#8216;Contrats de travail repetes: la memoire (Repeated Labour Contracts:The Memory)&#8217;, <b>17(1) <\/b> <em>Annales d&#8217;Economie et de Statistique <\/em>, 47-70. <\/li>\n<li>Chiappori, P.A., Macho-Stadler, I., Rey, P. and Salanie, B. (1994), &#8216;Repeated Moral Hazard: the Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets&#8217;, <b>38 <\/b> <em>European Economic Review <\/em>, 1527-1553. <\/li>\n<li>Chisholm, Darlene C. (1993), &#8216;Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures Industry&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Eastern Economic Journal <\/em>, 143-155. <\/li>\n<li>Crawford, Vincent P. (1988), &#8216;Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 485-499. <\/li>\n<li>Cr\u008emer, Jacques (1984), &#8216;On the Economics of Repeat Buying&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 396-403. <\/li>\n<li>Crew, Michael A. (1988), &#8216;Equity, Opportunism and the Design of Contractual Relations: Comment&#8217;, <b>144 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 196-199. <\/li>\n<li>Crocker, Keith J. and Masten, Scott E. (1988), &#8216;Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 327-343. <\/li>\n<li>Crocker, Keith J. and Masten, Scott E. (1991), &#8216;Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 69-99. <\/li>\n<li>Crystal, Nathan M. (1988), &#8216;An Empirical View of Relational Contracts under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code&#8217;, <em>Annual Survey of American Law <\/em>, 293-306. <\/li>\n<li>Cukierman, Alex and Shiffer, Zalman F. (1976), &#8216;Contracting for Optimal Delivery Time in Long-Term Projects&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 132-149. <\/li>\n<li>Daintith, Terence C. (1987), &#8216;Oprettelse og anvendelse af langfristede kontrakter (The Creation and Use of Longterm Contracts)&#8217;, in Blegvad, Britt-Mari &amp; Collin, Finn (eds.), <em>Virksomheden mellem \u00a2konomi og jura <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Dewatripont, Mathias (1989), &#8216;Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts&#8217;, <b>103 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>, 589-619. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. (1992), &#8216;Franchising&#8217;, in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.), <em>The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance <\/em>, London , Macmillan. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. (1992), &#8221;Unfair&#8217; Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts&#8217;, <b>148 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 484-504. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. (1993), &#8216;A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 367-393. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. (1995), &#8216;The Law and Economics of Contract Modifications : the Case of Williams v. Roffey&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 225-240. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. (1996), &#8216;The Economic Analysis of Franchise Contracts&#8217;, <b>152 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 297-324. <\/li>\n<li>Dnes, Antony W. and Popovic, M. (1988), &#8216;Some Case-Study Results on Contracting Practices among Yugoslavian Self-managed firms&#8217;, <b>15 <\/b> <em>Journal of Industrial Affairs <\/em>, 23-27. <\/li>\n<li>Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. and Higgins, Richard S. (1982), &#8216;Capital Fixity, Innovations, and Long-Term Contracting: An Intertemporal Economic Theory&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 32-46. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1985), &#8216;The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements&#8217;, <b>75(3) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 539-546. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints of Antitrust Law and Economics, vol. 10 (1). <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1987), &#8216;The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Reply&#8217;, <b>77(5) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1069-1072. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Decanio, Stephen J. (1993), &#8216;Vertical Contracts: A Natural Experiment in Gas Pipeline Regulation&#8217;, <b>149 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 370-392. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Springer, Robert F. (1986), &#8216;Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance&#8217;, <b>59(3) <\/b> <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 433-450. <\/li>\n<li>Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf (eds.) (1991), <em>The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, College Station (TX), Texas A &amp; M University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988), <em>Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations <\/em>, Oxford, Blackwell, 246 p. <\/li>\n<li>Geddes, R. Richard (1994), &#8216;Privatization and Contracts in U.S. Electric Utilities&#8217;, in X (ed.), <em>Private Power in the Pacific <\/em>, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Minerals and Energy Forum, 11-24. <\/li>\n<li>Geddes, R. Richard and Crowley, Peter T. (1994), &#8216;Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service&#8217;, in Sidak, Gregory J. (ed.), <em>Governing the Postal Service <\/em>, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. <\/li>\n<li>Gillette, Clayton P. (1985), &#8216;Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <b>69 <\/b> <em>Minnesota Law Review <\/em>, 521 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Goetz, Charles J. and Scott, Robert E. (1981), &#8216;Principles of Relational Contracts&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 1089-1150. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), &#8216;Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Issues <\/em>, 45-61. Reprinted in Samuels, Warren J. (Ed.), The Chicago School of Political Reprinted inEconomy, East Lansing, Michigan: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University, l976, p. 259-75. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), &#8216;Regulation and Administered Contracts&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 426-448. Reprinted in Pierce, Richard (Ed.),The Economics of Regulation: Cases and Materials, Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1994. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), &#8216;Competitive Bidding and the Production of Pre-contract Information&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 250-261. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1979), &#8216;Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective&#8217;, <b>58 <\/b> <em>Texas Law Review <\/em>, 91-129. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), &#8216;Bridges Over Contested Terrain: Exploring the Radical Account of the Employment Relationship&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization <\/em>, 249-274. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), &#8216;Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>American Behavioral Scientist <\/em>, 337-352. Reprinted in Putterman (Ed.), The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1981), &#8216;Pigou on Complex Contracts and Welfare Economics&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Research in Law and Economics <\/em>, 39-51. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), &#8216;A Relational Exchange Perspective on the Employment Relationship&#8217;, in Stephen, Frank H. (ed.), <em>Firms, Organization and Labour: Approaches to the Economics of Work Organization <\/em>, London, MacMillan, 127-145. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), &#8216;Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 527-543. Reprinted in Speidel, Summers and White, Commercial Law: Teaching Materials, fourth edition, 1987. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), &#8216;Relational Exchange, Contract Law, and the Boomer Problem&#8217;, <b>141 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 570-575. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. and Erickson, John R. (1987), &#8216;Quantity and Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke&#8217;, <b>30 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 369-398. <\/li>\n<li>Gordon, Robert W. (1985), &#8216;Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 565-579. <\/li>\n<li>Grandy, Christopher (1989), &#8216;Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 249-269. <\/li>\n<li>Hackett, Steven C. (1994), &#8216;Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contract?&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 360-389. <\/li>\n<li>Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), &#8216;Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt&#8217;, <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 628-655. <\/li>\n<li>Harris, Milton and Holmstr\u009am, Bengt (1987), &#8216;On the Duration of Agreements&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>International Economic Review <\/em>, 389-406. <\/li>\n<li>Hart, Oliver D. (1987), &#8216;Incomplete Contracts&#8217;, in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.), <em>The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics <\/em>, London, MacMillan, 752-759. <\/li>\n<li>Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John (1988), &#8216;Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>56 <\/b> <em>Econometrica <\/em>, 755-785. <\/li>\n<li>Hellwig, Martin F. (1988), &#8216;Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations: Comment&#8217;, <b>144 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 200-207. <\/li>\n<li>Helper, Susan and Levine, David I. (1992), &#8216;Long Term Supplier Relations and Product Market Structure&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 561-581. <\/li>\n<li>Hubbard, R. Glenn and Weiner, Robert J. (1986), &#8216;Regulation and Long-term Contracting in U.S. Natural Gas Markets&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Journal of Industrial Economics <\/em>, 71-79. <\/li>\n<li>Hubbard, R. Glenn and Weiner, Robert J. (1991), &#8216;Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 25-67. <\/li>\n<li>Huberman, Gur and Kahn, Charles M. (1988), &#8216;Strategic Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>Economic Letters <\/em>, 117-121. <\/li>\n<li>Huberman, Gur and Kahn, Charles W. (1988), &#8216;Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 471-484. <\/li>\n<li>J. Mark Ramseyer (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991) (1991), &#8216;Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 91 ff. <\/li>\n<li>John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Eric Rasmusen and Ramseyer, Mark J. (1990), &#8216;The Leasing Monopolist&#8217;, <b>37 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 693 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Johnson, Alex M., Jr. (1988), &#8216;Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 751-808. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1985), &#8216;Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 33-80. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1985), &#8216;Long Term Vertical Relationships and the Study of Industrial Organization and Government Regulati on&#8217;, <b>141 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 586-593. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1987), &#8216;Contract Duration and Relationship- Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 168-185. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1988), &#8216;Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 47-83. <\/li>\n<li>Joskow, Paul L. (1990), &#8216;The Performance of Long-term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 251-274. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman (1996), &#8216;Private versus Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants&#8217;, in Finnerty, John D. and Martin, S. Fridson (eds.), <em>The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 1995 <\/em>, 253-274. <\/li>\n<li>Kaufmann, Patrick J. and Stern, Louis W. (1988), &#8216;Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>Journal of Conflict Resolution <\/em>, 534-552. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G. and Alchian, Armen A. (1978), &#8216;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 297-326. <\/li>\n<li>Koboldt, Christian (1991), &#8216;Kommentar on Schanze, Stellvertretung und \u009akonomische Agentur-Theorie&#8217;, in Ott, Claus and Sch\u008afer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), <em>\u0085konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts <\/em>, Berlin, Springer, 76-86. <\/li>\n<li>Lambert, Richard A. (1983), &#8216;Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 441-451. <\/li>\n<li>Lawrence, William H. (1989), &#8216;Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>Southern California Law Review <\/em>, 1387-1447. <\/li>\n<li>Levmore, Saul and Kanda, Hideki (1994), &#8216;Explaining Creditor Priorities&#8217;, <b>80 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 2103-2154. <\/li>\n<li>Lewis, Tab, Lindsey, R. and Ware, R. (1986), &#8216;Long-Term Bilateral Monopoly: The Case of an Exhaustible Resource&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 89-104. <\/li>\n<li>Lewis, Tracy R. (1986), &#8216;Reputation and Contractual Performance in Long-Term Projects&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 141-157. <\/li>\n<li>Lindenberg, Siegwart and De Vos, Henk (1985), &#8216;The Limits of Solidarity: Relational Contracting in Perspective and Some Criticism of Traditional Sociology&#8217;, <b>141 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 558-569. <\/li>\n<li>Linzer, Peter (1988), &#8216;Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach&#8217;, <em>Annual Survey of American Law <\/em>, 139-198. <\/li>\n<li>Macario, Francesco (1996), <em>Adempimento e rinegoziazione nei contratti a lungo termine (Performance and rinegotiation in long-term contracts) <\/em>, Napoli, Jovene. <\/li>\n<li>Macario, Francesco (1996), <em>Adempimento e rinegoziazione nei contratti a lungo termine (Performance and rinegotiation in long-term contracts) <\/em>, Napoli, Jovene. <\/li>\n<li>Macaulay, Stewart (1963), &#8216;Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>American Sociological Review <\/em>, 55-70. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 4-15. <\/li>\n<li>Macaulay, Stewart (1977), &#8216;Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of Contract&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Law and Society Review <\/em>, 507-528. <\/li>\n<li>Macaulay, Stewart (1985), &#8216;An Empirical View of Contract&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 465-482. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1988), &#8216;Sobre los compromisos multiper\u0092odo en los modelos de riesgo moral repetido (Multiple period Commitments in Repeated Moral Hazzard Models)&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Revista Espa\u0096ola de Econom\u0092a <\/em>, 143-158. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1974), &#8216;The Many Futures of Contracts&#8217;, <b>47 <\/b> <em>Southern California Law Review <\/em>, 691-816. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1975), &#8216;A Primer of Contract Planning&#8217;, <b>48 <\/b> <em>Southern California Law Review <\/em>, 627-704. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1978), &#8216;Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law&#8217;, <b>72 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 854-905. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1980), &#8216;Power, Contract and the Economic Model&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Issues <\/em>, 909-923. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1980), <em>The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations <\/em>, New Haven, Yale University Press, 164 p. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1981), &#8216;Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations&#8217;, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), <em>The Economic Approach to Law <\/em>, London, Butterworths, 61-92. <\/li>\n<li>macneil, ian r. (1981), &#8216;economic analysis of contractual relations: its shortfalls and the need for a &gt;Rich Classificatory Apparatus&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 1018-1063. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1983), &#8216;Values in Contract: Internal and External&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 340-418. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1985), &#8216;Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 483-525. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1985), &#8216;Reflections on Relational Contract&#8217;, <b>141 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 541-546. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1986), &#8216;Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity&#8217;, <b>96 <\/b> <em>Ethics <\/em>, 567-593. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1987), &#8216;Barriers to the Idea of Relational Contracts (The Complex Long-Term Contract. Structures and International Arbitration)&#8217;, in Nicklisch, Fritz (ed.), <em>Der Komplexe Langzeitvertrag. Strukturen und Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. <\/em>, Heidelberg, M\u009fller Juristischer Verlag, 31-46. <\/li>\n<li>MacNeil, Ian R. (1987), &#8216;Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply&#8217;, <b>143 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 272-290. <\/li>\n<li>Masten, Scott E. and Crocker, Keith J. (1985), &#8216;Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1083-1093. <\/li>\n<li>Mulherin, J. Harold (1986), &#8216;Complexity in Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 105-117. <\/li>\n<li>Muller Graff, Peter Christian (1988), &#8216;Franchising: A Case of Long-term Contracts&#8217;, <b>144 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 122-144. <\/li>\n<li>Mullock, Philip (1983), &#8216;The New Paradigm of Contract: A Hermeneutical Approach&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Valparaiso University Law Review <\/em>, 677-704. <\/li>\n<li>Narasimhan, Subha (1986), &#8216;Of Expectations, Incomplete Contrac ting, and the Bargain Principle&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1123-1202. <\/li>\n<li>Narasimhan, Subha (1989), &#8216;Relationship or Boundary? Handling Successive Contracts&#8217;, <b>77 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 1077-1122. <\/li>\n<li>Nicklisch, Fritz (ed.) (1987), <em>Der Komplexe Langzeitvertrag. Strukturen und Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. (The Complex Long-Term Contract. Structures and International Arbitration) <\/em>, Heidelberg, M\u009fller Juristischer Verlag, 597 p. <\/li>\n<li>Pauly, Mark V. (1986), &#8216;Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics and the Governance of HMOs&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>Temp. Law Quarterly <\/em>, 927 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Pauly, Mark V. (1990), &#8216;The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term Insurance&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 153-168. <\/li>\n<li>Pittman, Russell (1992), &#8216;Specific Investments, Contracts, and Opportunism: The Evolution of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 565-589. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1987), &#8216;Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation&#8217;, <b>3(1) <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 27-46. <\/li>\n<li>Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1987), &#8216;Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 27-46. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Eric A. (1997), &#8216;Altruism, Trust, and Status in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises&#8217;, <b>(forth.) <\/b> <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Ramseyer, J. Mark, &#8216;Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic To the Japanese Main Bank System&#8217;, in Masahiko, Aoki, &amp; Patrick, Hugh T. (ed.), <em>The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance For Developing and Transforming Economies <\/em>, Oxford, 231 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ramseyer, J. Mark (1991), &#8216;Indentured Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 89-116. <\/li>\n<li>Ramseyer, J. Mark (1991), &#8216;Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 91-117. <\/li>\n<li>Schanze, Erich (1991), &#8216;Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract and Corporation&#8217;, in Joerges, Christian (ed.), <em>Regulating the Franchise Relationship: Comparative and European Aspects <\/em>, Baden-Baden, Nomos. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Alan (1992), &#8216;Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 271-318. <\/li>\n<li>Scott, Robert E. (1987), &#8216;Risk Distribution and Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts (The Complex Long-Term Contract. Structures and International Arbitration)&#8217;, in Nicklisch, Fritz (ed.), <em>Der Komplexe Langzeitvertrag. Strukturen und Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. <\/em>, Heidelberg, M\u009fller Juristischer Verlag, 51-100. <\/li>\n<li>Scott, Robert E. (1987), &#8216;Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>California Law Review <\/em>, 2005-2054. <\/li>\n<li>Scott, Robert E. (1990), &#8216;A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 597-616. <\/li>\n<li>Speidel, Richard E. (1981), &#8216;Court-Imposed Price Adjustements Under Long-Term Supply Contracts&#8217;, <b>76 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 369-422. <\/li>\n<li>Strasser, Kurt A. (1981), &#8216;Contract&#8217;s &#8220;Many Features&#8221; after Death: Unanswered Questions of Scope and Purpose&#8217;, <b>32 <\/b> <em>South Carolina Law Review <\/em>, 501-546. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1992), &#8216;Contractual Allocation of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability&#8217;, <b>42 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Journal <\/em>, 450-483. <\/li>\n<li>Triantis, George G. (1993), &#8216;The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and Adjustment&#8217;, <b>43 <\/b> <em>University of Toronto Law Journal <\/em>, 679-710. <\/li>\n<li>Van Pelt, Mark H. (1985), &#8216;Introduction&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 461-463. <\/li>\n<li>Verkerke, J. Hoult (1995), &#8216;An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 837-918. <\/li>\n<li>Vincent-Jones, Peter (1994), &#8216;The Limits of Contractual Order in Public Scetor Transacting&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Legal Studies <\/em>, 364 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Whincop, Michael J. (1997), &#8216;A Relational and Doctrinal Critique of Shareholders&#8217; Special Contracts&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Sydney Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Whitford, William C. (1985), &#8216;Ian Macneil&#8217;s Contribution to Contracts Scholarship&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 545-560. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1983), &#8216;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 519-540. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1984), &#8216;Credible Commitments: Further Remarks&#8217;, <b>74 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 488-490. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), <em>The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting <\/em>, New York, Free Press, 450 p. <\/li>\n<li>Williamson, Oliver E. (1989), <em>Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting and Strategic Behavior <\/em>, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 363 p. <\/li>\n<li>Zolt, Eric M. and Berkowitz, Jeffrey I. (1978), &#8216;An Economic Perspective on the Law of Excessive Profit Recovery&#8217;, <b>45 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 882-905. <\/li>\n<li>Zupan, Mark A. (1990), &#8216;Why Nice Guys Finish Last: A Comment on Robert Axelrod&#8217;s the Evolution of Cooperation&#8217;, <b>65(3) <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 291-293. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27045","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27045","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27045"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}