{"id":27044,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4100-contractual-choice.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","slug":"4100-contractual-choice","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/4100-contractual-choice.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 4100 Contractual Choice"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Aivazian, Varouj A., Trebilcock, Michael J. and Penny, Michael (1984), &#8216;The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Osgoode Hall Law Journal <\/em>, 173-212. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 207. <\/li>\n<li>Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972), &#8216;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&#8217;, <b>62 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 777-795. <\/li>\n<li>Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, Dean (1992), &#8216;Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 397-426. <\/li>\n<li>Backhaus, J\u009frgen G. (1989), &#8216;A Transaction Cost Approach to Explaining Historical Contract Structures&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 223-226. <\/li>\n<li>Balbien, J. and Wilde, L.L. (1982), &#8216;A Dynamic Model of Research Contracting&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 107-119. <\/li>\n<li>Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), <em>Economics of Contract Law <\/em>, Minneapolis, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Baron, David P. and Besanko, David A. (1987), &#8216;Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 509-532. <\/li>\n<li>Beale, H. and Dugdale, T. (1975), &#8216;Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>British Journal of Law and Society <\/em>, 45-60. <\/li>\n<li>Bjuggren, Per-Olof (1992), &#8216;The Effects of Contractual Restrictions on Industrial Organization: The Case of Swedish Pulpwood Transactions&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 517-532. <\/li>\n<li>Bowles, Roger A. and Skogh, G\u009aran (1989), &#8216;Reputation, Monitoring and the Organisation of the Law Firm&#8217;, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 33-47. <\/li>\n<li>Brown, Donald J. and Atkinson, J. H. (1981), &#8216;Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 296-299. <\/li>\n<li>Bucovetsky, Sam and Chilton, John (1986), &#8216;Concurrent Renting and Selling in a Durable-Goods Monopoly under Threat of Entry&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 261-278. <\/li>\n<li>Buscaglia, Edgardo and Guerrero, Jose Luis (1995), &#8216;Quantitative Analysis of Counterfeiting Activities in Developing Countries in the Pre-GATT Period&#8217;, <b>35 <\/b> <em>Jurimetrics Journal <\/em>, 221-241. <\/li>\n<li>Butler, Henry N. (1983), &#8216;Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic Pursuit of Treble Damages&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>Washington Law Review <\/em>, 27-60. <\/li>\n<li>Cantor, Richard (1990), &#8216;Firm Specific Training and Contract Length&#8217;, <b>57 <\/b> <em>Economica <\/em>, 1-14. <\/li>\n<li>Cheung, Steven N.S. (1969), &#8216;Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 23-42. <\/li>\n<li>Cheung, Steven N.S. (1983), &#8216;The Contractual Nature of the Firm&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 1-21. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Chisholm, Darlene C. (1993), &#8216;Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures Industry&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Eastern Economic Journal <\/em>, 143-155. <\/li>\n<li>Chisholm, Darlene C. (1996), &#8216;Continuous Degrees of Residual Claimancy: Some Contractual Evidence&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Applied Economics Letters <\/em>, 739-741. <\/li>\n<li>Chisholm, Darlene C. (1997), &#8216;Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-Payment Contracts: Evidence From the Motion Pictures Industry&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 169-201. <\/li>\n<li>Coase, Ronald H. (1992), &#8216;Contracts and the Activities of Firms&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 451-452. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Landa, Janet T. (1984), &#8216;Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 15-22. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Rubin, Edward L. (1987), &#8216;A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>University of Texas Law Review <\/em>, 63-130. <\/li>\n<li>Cosentino, Fabrizio (1993), &#8216;Il paternalismo del legislatore nelle norme di limitazione dell&#8217;autonomia dei privati (The paternalism of the legislator in the rules limiting private autonomy)&#8217;, <em>Quadrimestre <\/em>, 119-139. <\/li>\n<li>Craswell, Richard (1993), &#8216;Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines&#8217;, <b>60 <\/b> <em>University of Chicago Law Review <\/em>, 1-65. <\/li>\n<li>Craswell, Richard (1995), &#8216;Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence&#8217;, <b>33 <\/b> <em>Osgoode Hall Law Journal <\/em>, 209-235. <\/li>\n<li>Cr\u008emer, Jacques and Riordan, Michael H. (1987), &#8216;On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts&#8217;, <b>18 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 436-451. <\/li>\n<li>Crew, Michael A. (1984), &#8216;Royalty Contracts: An Efficient Form of Contracting?&#8217;, <b>50 <\/b> <em>Southern Economic Journal <\/em>, 724-733. <\/li>\n<li>Crocker, Thomas D. (1973), &#8216;Contractual Choice&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>Natural Resources Journal <\/em>, 561-577. <\/li>\n<li>Cummins, J. Michael (1977), &#8216;Incentive Contracting for National Defense: a Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 168-185. <\/li>\n<li>De Lorenzi, Valeria (1993), &#8216;Il mandato alla luce dell&#8217;analisi economica del diritto (Agency law in the light of economic analysis of law)&#8217;, <em>Contratto e impresa <\/em>, 965-1013. <\/li>\n<li>De Lorenzi, Valeria (1997), &#8216;La rappresentanza diretta volontaria. Problemi e soluzioni alla luce dell&#8217;analisi economica del diritto (Agency law. Problems and solutions in the light of economic analysis of law)&#8217;, <em>Contratto e impresa <\/em>, 595-669. <\/li>\n<li>Demougin, Dominique M. (1989), &#8216;A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 256-267. <\/li>\n<li>Demsetz, Harold (1968), &#8216;The Cost of Transacting&#8217;, <b>82 <\/b> <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>, 33-53. <\/li>\n<li>Domberger, Simon and Sherr, Avrom (1981), &#8216;Economic Efficiency in the Provision of Legal Services: The Private Practitioner and the Law Centre&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 29-49. <\/li>\n<li>Dye, Ronald A. (1985), &#8216;Costly Contract Contingencies&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>International Economic Review <\/em>, 233-250. <\/li>\n<li>Dye, Ronald A. (1986), &#8216;Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 339-350. <\/li>\n<li>Faith, Roger L. and Tollison, Robert D. (1980), &#8216;Contractual Exchange and the Timing of Payment&#8217;, <b>1 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization <\/em>, 325-342. <\/li>\n<li>Feldman, Roger, Sloan, Frank A. and Paringer, L. (1983), &#8216;Compensa tion Arrangements between Hospitals and Physicians&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 155-170. <\/li>\n<li>Fishback, Price V. (1992), &#8216;The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 346-365. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1985), &#8216;The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements&#8217;, <b>75(3) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 539-546. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints of Antitrust Law and Economics, vol. 10 (1). <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1987), &#8216;The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Reply&#8217;, <b>77(5) <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1069-1072. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Decanio, Stephen J. (1993), &#8216;Vertical Contracts: A Natural Experiment in Gas Pipeline Regulation&#8217;, <b>149 <\/b> <em>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/em>, 370-392. <\/li>\n<li>Frech, H. Edward III and Springer, Robert F. (1986), &#8216;Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance&#8217;, <b>59(3) <\/b> <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 433-450. <\/li>\n<li>Garvey, Gerald T. (1994), &#8216;Money Transfers versus Hostages as Guarantors of Contractual Performance&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 245-259. <\/li>\n<li>Gemmell, Norman (1989), &#8216;Is There a Conflict between Authors and Publishers over Royalty Terms?&#8217;, <b>29 <\/b> <em>Economic Letters <\/em>, 7-11. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), &#8216;The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services&#8217;, <b>79 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 736-757. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, 1990. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), &#8216;Television and the Quest for Gold: The Unofficial Paper of the 1984 Olympics&#8217;, <b>79 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 1172-1182. <\/li>\n<li>Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), &#8216;Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts&#8217;, <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>, 527-543. Reprinted in Speidel, Summers and White, Commercial Law: Teaching Materials, fourth edition, 1987. <\/li>\n<li>Hall, Edward C. and Parsons, John E. (1990), &#8216;The Efficient Design of Contracts to Purchase Cogenerated Power&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Energy Journal <\/em>, 105-116. <\/li>\n<li>Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), &#8216;Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 3-26. <\/li>\n<li>Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), &#8216;Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt&#8217;, <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 628-655. <\/li>\n<li>Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur (1978), &#8216;Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 20-30. <\/li>\n<li>Hart, Oliver D. and Holmstr\u009am, Bengt (1987), &#8216;The Theory of Contracts&#8217;, in Bewley, T. (ed.), <em>Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress <\/em>, 71 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Henderson, J. Vernon. and Ionnides, Y.M. (1983), &#8216;A Model of Housing Tenure Choice&#8217;, <b>73 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 98-113. <\/li>\n<li>Hennart, Jean-Fran\u008dois (1989), &#8216;The Transaction-Cost Rationale for Countertrade&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 127-153. <\/li>\n<li>Hennart, Jean-Fran\u008dois, Anderson, E. and Anderson, Erin (1993), &#8216;Countertrade and the Minimization of Transaction Costs: An Empirical Examination&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 290-313. <\/li>\n<li>Hiller, John R. and Tollison, Robert D. (1974), &#8216;An Economic Model of Performance Contracting in Education&#8217;, <b>29 <\/b> <em>Public Finance <\/em>, 36-48. <\/li>\n<li>Holmstr\u009am, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul R. (1991), &#8216;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 24-52. <\/li>\n<li>Holmstr\u009am, Bengt and Tirole, Jean (1991), &#8216;Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 201-228. <\/li>\n<li>Jacob, Nancy L. and Page, Alfred N. (1980), &#8216;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization: The Buyer Monitoring Case&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 476-478. <\/li>\n<li>Jesse, Edward V. and Johnson, Aaron C., Jr. (1970), &#8216;An Analysis of Vegetable Contracts&#8217;, <b>52 <\/b> <em>American Journal of Agricultural Economics <\/em>, 545-554. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel (1995), &#8216;Anti Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance <\/em>, 147 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel (1995), &#8216;The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Northwestern University Law Review <\/em>, 565-622. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman (1996), &#8216;Private versus Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants&#8217;, in Finnerty, John D. and Martin, S. Fridson (eds.), <em>The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 1995 <\/em>, 253-274. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael (1993), &#8216;Anti-Takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment&#8217;, <b>40 <\/b> <em>UCLA Law Review <\/em>, 931 ff. Reprinted in 35 Corporate Practice Commentator 575, 1994. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Yermack, David (1996), &#8216;Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities&#8217;,. <\/li>\n<li>Kahn, Charles and Huberman, Gur (1988), &#8216;Two-sided Uncertainty and &#8220;Up-or-Out&#8221; Contracts,&#8217;, <b>6 <\/b> <em>Journal of Labor Economics <\/em>, 423-444. <\/li>\n<li>Kahn, Charles and Huberman, Guy (1989), &#8216;Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>52(1) <\/b> <em>Law and Contemporary Problems <\/em>, 49-61. <\/li>\n<li>Kan, Steven S. and Hsiao, Ding-Way (1996), &#8216;Contracts in Tsing Dynasty to Build Irrigation System at Lan-Yang Plain : A Transaction Cost Analysis&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>Journal of Agricultural Economics (Chinese) <\/em>, 111-157. <\/li>\n<li>Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu and MacLeod, W. Bentley (1989), &#8216;Optimal Labor Contracts with Non contractible Human Capital&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of the Japanese and International Economy <\/em>, 385-3402. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin (1980), &#8216;Transaction Cost Determinants of &#8220;Unfair&#8221; Contractual Arrangements&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 356-362. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 139-146. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin and Leffler, Keith B. (1981), &#8216;The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Journal of Political Economy <\/em>, 615-641. <\/li>\n<li>Klein, Benjamin and Murphy, Kevin M. (1988), &#8216;Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 265-297. <\/li>\n<li>Knapp, Charles L. (1988), &#8216;Judgment Call: Theoretical Approaches to Contract Decision-Making&#8217;, <em>Annual Survey of American Law <\/em>, 307-351. <\/li>\n<li>Knoeber, Charles R. (1983), &#8216;An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 333-343. <\/li>\n<li>Knoeber, Charles R. (1989), &#8216;A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 271-292. <\/li>\n<li>Knoll, Michael S. (1988), &#8216;Uncertainty, Efficiency, and the Brokerage Industry&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 249-263. <\/li>\n<li>Koller, Ingo (1979), <em>Die Risikozurechnung bei Vertragsst\u009arungen in Austauschvertr\u008agen (The Risk Allocation of Contract Disturbances in Bilateral Contracts) <\/em>, M\u009fnchen, C.H. Beck, 474 p. <\/li>\n<li>Laffont, Jean- Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1991), &#8216;Privatization and Incentives&#8217;, <b>7(S) <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 84-105. <\/li>\n<li>Landa, Janet T. (1976), &#8216;An Exchange Economy with Legally Binding Contracts: A Public Choice Approach&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Issues <\/em>, 905-922. <\/li>\n<li>Landa, Janet T. (1981), &#8216;A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 349-362. <\/li>\n<li>Landa, Janet T. (1983), &#8216;The Enigma of the Kula Ring &#8230; Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 137-160. <\/li>\n<li>Leffler, Keith B. (1985), &#8216;Toward a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments&#8217;, <b>28 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 381-386. <\/li>\n<li>Lehmann, Michael (1990), &#8216;Just in time: Handels- und ABG- rechtliche Probleme (Just in Time: Problems in the Law of Commerce and of Unfair Contract Terms)&#8217;, <b>27 <\/b> <em>Der Betriebs-Berater <\/em>, 1849-1855. <\/li>\n<li>Leitzel, Jim (1989), &#8216;The New Institutional Economics and a Model of Contract&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization <\/em>, 75-89. <\/li>\n<li>Leitzel, Jim (1989), &#8216;Damage Measures and Incomplete Contracts&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 92-101. <\/li>\n<li>Leonard, Herman B. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. (1985), &#8216;Financial Risk and the Burdens of Contracts&#8217;, <b>75 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings <\/em>, 375-380. <\/li>\n<li>Lewis, Tracy R. (1980), &#8216;Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 292-301. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean (1993), &#8216;Contracting into the Commons&#8217;, in Anderson, Terry L. and Simmons, Randy T., (eds.), <em>The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem <\/em>, Lanham, (MD), Rowman and Littlefield. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean (1994), &#8216;Common Property as an Egalitarian Share Contract&#8217;, <b>25(2) <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization <\/em>, 93-108. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1992), &#8216;Farmland Leasing in Modern Agriculture&#8217;, <em>Choices <\/em>, 30-31. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1993), &#8216;Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts&#8217;, <b>24(1) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 78-100. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1995), &#8216;Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 447-451. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1996), &#8216;The Transaction Cost Approach to Agricultural Contracts&#8217;, in Martimort, David (ed.), <em>Agricultural Markets: Mechanisms, Failures, Regulations <\/em>, Amsterdam, North Holland Press, 31-64. <\/li>\n<li>Lueck, Dean and Caputo, Michael R. (1994), &#8216;Modeling Common Property Ownership as a Dynamic Contract&#8217;, <b>8(3) <\/b> <em>Natural Resources Modeling <\/em>, 225-245. <\/li>\n<li>Lyon, Thomas P. and Hackett, Steven C. (1993), &#8216;Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long Term Contracting in Natural Gas&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 380-398. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. (1991), &#8216;Riesgo moral con varios agentes: contratos \u0097ptimos y dise\u0096o organizativo de la relaci\u0097n (Moral Hazzard with Multiple Agents: Optimal Contract Design)&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>Revista Espa\u0096ola de Econom\u0092a <\/em>, 255-283. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1991), &#8216;Moral Hazard and Cooperation&#8217;, <b>35(1) <\/b> <em>Economics Letters <\/em>, 17-20. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1993), &#8216;Moral Hazard with Several Agents: the Gains from Cooperation&#8217;, <b>11(1) <\/b> <em>International Journal of Industrial Organization <\/em>, 73-100. <\/li>\n<li>Macho-Stadler, I. and P\u008erez-Castrillo, J.David (1997), <em>An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts <\/em>, Oxford, Oxford University Press. <\/li>\n<li>Manne, Henry G. 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