{"id":27035,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/3200-victim-fault-and-joint-tortfeasors.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:23","slug":"3200-victim-fault-and-joint-tortfeasors","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/3200-victim-fault-and-joint-tortfeasors.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 3200 Victim Fault &#038; Joint Tortfeasors"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Barnes, David W. and Baerverstad, Mark (1982), &#8216;Social Choices and Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>31 <\/b> <em>DePaul Law Review <\/em>, 273-306. <\/li>\n<li>Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), <em>Economic Analysis of Tort Law <\/em>, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Ben-Shahar, Omri and Harel, Alon (1995), &#8221;Blaming the Victim&#8217;: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 434-455. <\/li>\n<li>Bernstein, Lisa and Klerman, Daniel (1995), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements&#8217;, <b>83 <\/b> <em>Georgetown Law Journal <\/em>, 2215-2270. <\/li>\n<li>Chung, Tai-Yeong (1993), &#8216;Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 395-404. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D. and Ulen, Thomas S. (1986), &#8216;An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>81 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 1067-1110. <\/li>\n<li>Curran, Christopher (1992), &#8216;The Spread of Comparative Negligence in the United States&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 317-332. <\/li>\n<li>Curran, Christopher and Haddock, David D. (1985), &#8216;An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 49-72. <\/li>\n<li>Donohue, John J. III (1994), &#8216;The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate Mathematical Symmetries and Metaissues about Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 543-558. <\/li>\n<li>Edlin, Aaron S. (1994), &#8216;Efficient Standards of Due Care: Should Courts Find More Parties Negligent under Comparative Negligence?&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 21-34. <\/li>\n<li>Flanigan, George B. and others (1989), &#8216;Experience from Early Tort Reforms: Comparative Negligence Since 1974&#8217;, <b>56 <\/b> <em>Journal of Risk and Insurance <\/em>, 525-534. <\/li>\n<li>Grady, Mark F. (1988), &#8216;Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: The Railroad and the Farmer&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 15-42. <\/li>\n<li>Grady, Mark F. (1990), &#8216;Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy Prevention&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 653 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Haddock, David and Curran, Christopher (1985), &#8216;An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 49-72. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel (1996), &#8216;The Incentive Effects of Settlement under Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Klerman, Daniel (1996), &#8216;Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 445-462. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1989), &#8216;Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 831-884. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1990), &#8216;Apportioning Damages among Potentially Insolvent Actors&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 617-651. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1993), &#8216;Settlements under Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 427 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), &#8216;Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 41-76. <\/li>\n<li>Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), &#8216;Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 517-542. <\/li>\n<li>Kraakman, Reinier H. (1988), &#8216;Auditor Liability and Information Disclosure: Discussion&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Journal of Accounting Auditing, and Finance <\/em>, 341-348. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. (1990), &#8216;Insolvency and Joint Torts: A Comment&#8217;, <b>19 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 679-690. <\/li>\n<li>Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), &#8216;Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 517-555. <\/li>\n<li>Leong, A.K. (1989), &#8216;Liability Rules When Injurers as well as Victims Suffer Losses&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 105-111. <\/li>\n<li>Low, Stuart and Smith, Janet Kiholm (1992), &#8216;The Relationship of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules to Ligitation Behavior and Tort Claim Disposition&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Law and Social Inquiry <\/em>, 63-87. <\/li>\n<li>Low, Stuart and Smith, Janet Kiholm (1995), &#8216;Decisions to Retain Attorneys and File Lawsuits: An Examination of the Comparative Negligence Rule in Accident Law&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 535-557. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), &#8216;Joint Liability in Torts: Marginal and Infra-Marginal Efficiency&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 235-249. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1995), &#8216;Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 189-208. <\/li>\n<li>Miceli, Thomas J., Pancak, Katherine A. and Sirmans, C.F. (1996), &#8216;An Economic Analysis of Lead Paint Laws&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics <\/em>, 59-75. <\/li>\n<li>Orr, Daniel (1991), &#8216;The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 119-129. <\/li>\n<li>Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1987), &#8216;The Economics of Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>7 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 149-162. <\/li>\n<li>Revesz, Richard L. and Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1989), &#8216;Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors&#8217;, <b>98 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 831 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Revesz, Richard L. and Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1993), &#8216;Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>68 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 427 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1987), &#8216;The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence&#8217;, <b>16 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 375-394. <\/li>\n<li>Schwartz, Gary T. (1978), &#8216;Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal&#8217;, <b>87 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 697-727. <\/li>\n<li>Shavell, Steven (1983), &#8216;Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 589-612. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), &#8216;A Note on Joint and Several Liability : Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 559-568. <\/li>\n<li>Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), <em>Economic Analysis of Tort Law <\/em>, West Publishing. <\/li>\n<li>Sullivan, Arthur M. (1990), &#8216;Victim Compensation Revisited: Efficiency versus Equity in the Siting of Noxious Facilities&#8217;, <b>41 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 211-225. <\/li>\n<li>Thomas, Ewart A. C. (1985), &#8216;On Calculating Optimal Contributory Negligence Rules&#8217;, <b>2 <\/b> <em>Social Choice and Welfare <\/em>, 65-85. <\/li>\n<li>Tietenberg, Tom H. (1989), &#8216;Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Land Economics <\/em>, 305-319. <\/li>\n<li>White, Michelle J. (1989), &#8216;An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law&#8217;, <b>20 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 308-330. <\/li>\n<li>Winter, Harold (1994), &#8216;Sequential Torts with Imperfect Information&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 35-40. <\/li>\n<li>Wittman, Donald A., Friedman, Daniel, Crevier, S. and Braskin A. (1997), &#8216;Learning Liability Rules&#8217;, <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-27035","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/27035","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27035"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}