{"id":26982,"date":"2017-01-09T13:45:22","date_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.findlaw-admin.com\/ability-legal\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/0550-game-theory-applied-to-law.html"},"modified":"2017-01-09T13:45:22","modified_gmt":"2017-01-09T13:45:22","slug":"0550-game-theory-applied-to-law","status":"publish","type":"law_economics","link":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/lawandeconomics\/bibliographies\/0550-game-theory-applied-to-law.html","title":{"rendered":"Encyclopedia of Law &#038; Economics \u2013 0550 Game Theory Applied to Law"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, Jeffrey L. (1981), &#8216;The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core&#8217;, <b>24 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law and Economics <\/em>, 175-181. <\/li>\n<li>Aivazian, Varouj A., Callen, Jeffrey L. and Lipnowski, Irwin F. (1988), &#8216;The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability&#8217;, <b>54 <\/b> <em>Economica <\/em>, 517-520. <\/li>\n<li>Ben-Shahar, Omri (1992), <em>Strategic Behavior in Judicial Panels <\/em>, Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, No. 107. <\/li>\n<li>Chang, Howard F. (1997), &#8216;Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 309-324. <\/li>\n<li>Cooter, Robert D., Marks, Stephen V. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1982), &#8216;Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior&#8217;, <b>11 <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>, 225-251. Reprinted in Coleman, Jules and Lange, Jeffrey (Eds.), Law and Economics, Volume 2, New York, University Press, 1992. <\/li>\n<li>Curran, Christopher (1994), &#8216;The Burden of Proof and the Liability Rule for Suppliers of Services in the EEC&#8217;, <b>70 <\/b> <em>Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance <\/em>, 85-98. <\/li>\n<li>Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1993), &#8216;Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 349-367. <\/li>\n<li>Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), &#8216;Designing a Private Industry : Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 127-147. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), &#8216;Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 314-348. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1994), &#8216;Settlement Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 283-298. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), &#8216;Keeping Society in the Dark: on the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 203-221. <\/li>\n<li>Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), &#8216;Product Safety: Liability, R&amp;D, and Signaling&#8217;, <b>85 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1187-1206. <\/li>\n<li>Davis, Lee N. (1991), <em>Patenter og innovationer: Mod et strategisk Perspektiv (Patenter og innovationer: Mod et strategisk Perspektiv. (Patents and innovations: Aiming for a Strategic Perspective)) <\/em>, K\u00a2benhavn, Blytmanns forlag. <\/li>\n<li>Dawid, H. and Feichtinger, G. (1995), <em>On the Persistence of Corruption\/ Forschungsbericht <\/em>, Research Memorandum, Vienna, Institute for Econometrics, Operation Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, No. 186. <\/li>\n<li>De Geest, Gerrit (1995), &#8216;Comment: Game Theory versus Law &amp; Economics?&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 287-293. <\/li>\n<li>Garcimartin Alf\u008erez and Francisco Javier (1996), &#8216;El coste de la ley Helms-Burton para las empresas espa\u0096olas (The Costs of Helms-Burton Rule for Spanish Companies)&#8217;, <em>Revista Derecho de los Negocios <\/em>, 1 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1992), &#8216;An Auction &#8211; Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneer&#8217;s Liability Regimes&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Wisconsin Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div data-readmore=\"true\">\n<ul class=\"links\">\n<li>Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1993), &#8216;Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis&#8217;, <em>Northwestern Law Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Hay, Bruce L. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), &#8216;Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation : An Economic Perspective&#8217;, <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Huang, Peter H. (1995), &#8216;Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal Scholars to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts&#8217;, <b>36 <\/b> <em>Jurimetrics Journal of Law, Science &amp; Technology <\/em>, 99-114. <\/li>\n<li>Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), &#8216;Emotional Responses in Litigation&#8217;, <b>12 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 31-44. <\/li>\n<li>Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1994), &#8216;More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 390-406. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel (1992), &#8216;Games, Lies and Securities Laws&#8217;, <b>67 <\/b> <em>New York University Law Review <\/em>, 750 ff. Reprinted in 26 Securities Law Review 127, 1994. <\/li>\n<li>Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1993), &#8216;Do Bondholders Lose From Junk Bond Covenant Changes&#8217;, <b>66 <\/b> <em>Journal of Business <\/em>, 499 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1988), &#8216;Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure&#8217;, <b>8 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 127-143. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation&#8217;, <b>89 <\/b> <em>Michigan Law Review <\/em>, 215-295. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1990), &#8216;Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,&#8217;, <b>21 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 518-537. <\/li>\n<li>Katz, Avery (1996), &#8216;The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations&#8217;, <b>105 <\/b> <em>Yale Law Journal <\/em>, 1249-1309. <\/li>\n<li>Kerkmeester, Heico (1995), &#8216;Game Theory as a Method in Law and Economics&#8217;, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), <em>Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law &amp; Economics <\/em>, Antwerpen, Maklu, 267-285. <\/li>\n<li>Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1992), &#8216;Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation for &#8216;Unfair&#8217; Plea Bargaining&#8217;, <b>23 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 507-515. <\/li>\n<li>Kort, P.M., Feichtinger G., Hartl, R.F. and Haundschmied, J.L. (1995), <em>Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) On a Drug Market <\/em>, Working Paper, Maastricht, Tilburg University, Department of Economietrics and CentER. <\/li>\n<li>Krauss, Michael I. (1994), &#8216;La r\u008eglementation contre le march\u008e dans le d\u008eveloppement de normes (Regulation against the Market in Norms Formation)&#8217;, <b>5 <\/b> <em>Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines <\/em>, 573-599. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1988), &#8216;L&#8217;ordre spontan\u008e comme fondement du droit &#8211; un survol des mod\u008fles de l&#8217;\u008emergence des r\u008fgles dans une soci\u008et\u008e civile (Spontaneous Order as Foundation of Law &#8211; A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)&#8217;, <b>22 <\/b> <em>Revue Juridique Themis <\/em>, 347-383. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1989), &#8216;L ordre spontan\u008e comme fondement du droit &#8211; un survol des mod\u008fles de l&#8217;\u008emergence des r\u008fgles dans la soci\u008et\u008e civile (Spontaneous Order as the Foundation of Law &#8211; A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)&#8217;, <b>3 <\/b> <em>Revue internationale de Droit Economique <\/em>, 247-287. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1991), &#8216;Le droit saisi par le jeu (Game-Theory Applied to Law)&#8217;, <em>Droit et Soci\u008et\u008e <\/em>, 57-81. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1992), &#8216;Le droit saisi par le jeu ([Game-Theory Applied to Law)&#8217;, in Ost, Fran\u008dois and Van De Kerkhove, Michel (eds.), <em>Le jeu: un paradigme pour le droit <\/em>, Paris, Librairie G\u008en\u008erale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 81-110. <\/li>\n<li>MacKaay, Ejan (1992), &#8216;R\u008fgle et d\u008ecision en droit (Rule and Decision in Law)&#8217;, in Bourcier, Dani\u008fle and Mackay, Pierre (eds.), <em>Lire le droit &#8211; Langue, texte, cognition <\/em>, Paris, Librairie G\u008en\u008erale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 41-69. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), &#8216;Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial&#8217;, <b>14 <\/b> <em>Bell Journal of Economics <\/em>, 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar. <\/li>\n<li>Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), &#8216;Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care&#8217;, <b>34 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 61-85. <\/li>\n<li>Posner, Eric A. (1998), &#8216;Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law&#8217;, <b>(forth.) <\/b> <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Rasmusen, Eric and Ramseyer, Mark J. (1994), &#8216;Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 305 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Rasmusen, Eric B., Ramseyer, Mark J. and Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1991), &#8216;Naked Exclusion&#8217;, <b>81 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 1137 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1988), &#8216;Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion&#8217;, <b>78 <\/b> <em>American Economic Review <\/em>, 713-728. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), &#8216;The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice&#8217;, <b>13 <\/b> <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>, 115-134. <\/li>\n<li>Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), &#8216;Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs&#8217;, <b>17 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 557-566. <\/li>\n<li>Roin, Julie, A. (1995), &#8216;Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems&#8217;, <b>81 <\/b> <em>Virginia Law Review <\/em>, 1753 ff. <\/li>\n<li>Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), <em>An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels <\/em>, Oslo, Juridisk Forlag. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), &#8216;The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation : A Simple Model of Mechanism Design&#8217;, <em>International Review of Law and Economics <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), <em>Enforcement by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production <\/em>, mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department. <\/li>\n<li>Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), &#8216;Evidence Production, Adversarial Process and the Private Instigation of Suits&#8217;, <em>mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David (1986), &#8216;Executive Veto and Informational Strategy: A Structure-Induced Equilibrium Analysis&#8217;, <b>30 <\/b> <em>American Journal of Political Science <\/em>, 755-770. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David (1988), &#8216;In Search of Efficacious Executive Veto Authority&#8217;, <b>58 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 247-257. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David (1990), &#8216;Executing Veto and Spending Limitation: Positive Political Economy with Implications for Institutional Choice&#8217;, <b>65 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 239-256. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1987), &#8216;Executive Veto, Legislative Override and Structure-Induced Equilibrium&#8217;, <b>52 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 227-244. Reprinted in Rowley, Charles (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Edward Elgar, 1993, vol. 3, pp. 47-64. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1990), &#8216;Line-Item Veto: Where is Thy Sting?&#8217;, <b>4 <\/b> <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives <\/em>, 103-118. <\/li>\n<li>Schap, David and Daerden, James A. (1994), &#8216;The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities&#8217;, <b>80 <\/b> <em>Public Choice <\/em>, 35-53. <\/li>\n<li>Schavell, Steven and Spier, Kathryn E. (1996), &#8216;Threats Without Binding Commitment&#8217;, <b>5461 <\/b> <em>National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E., &#8216;A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Stettle Under a Negligence Rule&#8217;, <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), &#8216;The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation&#8217;, <b>59 <\/b> <em>Review of Economic Studies <\/em>, 93-108. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), &#8216;Incomplete Contracts and Signalling&#8217;, <b>23 (3) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 432-443. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), &#8216;Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules&#8217;, <b>25 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 197-214. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), &#8216;Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards&#8217;, <b>10 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 84-95. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), &#8216;A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule&#8217;, <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1993), &#8216;Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation&#8217;, <b>9 <\/b> <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization <\/em>, 349-367. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1994), &#8216;Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure&#8217;, <b>53 <\/b> <em>Journal of Public Economics <\/em>, 127-147. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), &#8216;Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach&#8217;, <em>mimeo, July 1993 <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and David E. Weinstein (1995), &#8216;Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs GATT Cooperation&#8217;, in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), <em>Imperfect Competition in International Trade <\/em>, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Hay, Bruce L. (1996), &#8216;Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective&#8217;, <em>Journal of Legal Studies <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael Whinston (1995), &#8216;On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, an Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>26 (2) <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 180-202. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Shavell, Steven (1996), &#8216;Threats Without Binding Commitment&#8217;, <em>National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Sykes, Alan O. (1996), <em>Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims <\/em>, Mimeo, August 1996. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Weinstein, David E., &#8216;Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation&#8217;, in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), <em>Imperfect Competition in International Trade <\/em>, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers. <\/li>\n<li>Spier, Kathryn E. and Whinston, Michael D. (1995), &#8216;On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation&#8217;, <b>26 <\/b> <em>Rand Journal of Economics <\/em>, 180-202. <\/li>\n<li>Stout, Lynn A. (1996), &#8216;Insurance Or Gambling? Derivatives Trading in A World of Risk and Uncertainty&#8217;, <b>39 <\/b> <em>Brookings Review <\/em>. <\/li>\n<li>Vracar K. Stevan (1994), <em>Preispitivanja pravne metodologije: Nagovestaji drzavno-pravnog integralizma (Reexamination of the Legal Methodology: Indications of State-Legal Integralism) <\/em>, Naucna knjiga, Belgrade. <\/li>\n<li>Williams, Stephen F. (1973), &#8216;Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue&#8217;, <b>44 <\/b> <em>University of Colorado Law Review <\/em>, 301-321. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"parent":26944,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_cloudinary_featured_overwrite":false},"class_list":["post-26982","law_economics","type-law_economics","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26982","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/law_economics"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law_economics\/26944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reference.findlaw.com\/legal-api\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26982"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}