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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 9700 Economics of Federalism

  • Antoniolli Deflorian, Luisa (1996), La struttura istituzionale del nuovo diritto comune europeo: competizione e circolazione dei modelli giuridici (The institutional structure of the new European common law: competion and transplants of legal models) , Trento, Dipartimento di Scienze guiridiche.
  • Antoniolli Deflorian, Luisa (1996), La struttura istituzionale del nuovo diritto comune europeo: competizione e circolazione dei modelli giuridici (The Institutional Structure of the New European Common Lw: Competition and Transplants of Legal Models) , Trento, Dipartimento di Scienze guiridiche.
  • Apolte, Thomas (1997), ‘Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels?’, 8 (1) Constitutional Political Economy , 57-76.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1997), ‘Christian Wolff on Subsidiarity, the Division of Labor, and Social Welfare’, 4 (2-3) European Journal of Law and Economics , 129-146.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1990), ‘Interstate Tax Competition, Incentives to Collude, and Federal Influences’, 10 Cato Journal , 75-90.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1990), Les choix du QuŽbec , Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du QuŽbec (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau), Les avis des spŽcialistes invitŽs ˆ rŽpondre aux huit questions par la Commission (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau).
  • Brenner, Reuven (1991), ‘Canadian Choices’, in Boadway, R., Courchene, T. and Purvis, D. (eds.), Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change , Kingston, Queen’s University, John Deutsch Institute, 117-149.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1991), ‘Les Choix du Quebec’, in X (ed.), Les Avis des Specialistes Invites a Repondre aux Huit Questions Posees par la Comission , AssemblŽs Nationale, Documents Parlementaires, 119-156.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1994), ‘Referenda and Initiatives: the Cure for Democracy’s Spending Problem’, 7(2) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , 108-116.
  • Breton, Albert (1978), Le bilinguisme: une approche Žconomique (Bilingualism: An Economic Approach) , MontrŽal, Institut de recherche C.D. Howe.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, 65 Washington Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Buxbaum, Hertig and Hirsch, Hopt (eds.), European Economic and Business Law, Legal and Economic Analyses on Integration and Harmonization , Berlin, 401 p.
  • Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Rogers, Carol Ann (1990), ‘Is the European Community an Optimal Currency Area? Optimal Taxation Versus the Cost of Multiple Currencies’, 80 American Economic Review , 419-433.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 215-231. Reprinted under the title, “The Structural Approach to Decentralizing Law: A Theory of Games and Norms,” in a book edited by Gerard Hertig.
  • Courchene, Thomas J. (1986), La gestion Žconomique et le partage des pouvoirs (Management and the Separation of Powers) , Ottawa, Commission royale sur l’union Žconomique et les perspectives de dŽveloppement du Canada.
  • Courchene, Thomas J. (1991), ƒloge du fŽdŽralisme renouvelŽ (Praise for a Renewed Federalism) , Toronto, C.D. Howe Institute.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1994), ‘Federalism and European Business Law’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 125-132.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1994), ‘Federalism and European Business Law: Erratum’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 376 ff.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1991), ‘The Scope of Antitrust Process’, 104 Harvard International Law Journal , 667 ff.
  • Fischel, William A. (1975), ‘Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities’, in Mills, Edwin S. and Oates, Wallace E. (eds.), Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books.
  • Fischel, William A. (1976), ‘An Evaluation of Proposals for Metropolitan Sharing of Commercial and Industrial Property Tax Base’, 3 Journal of Urban Economics , 253-263.
  • Fischel, William A. (1981), ‘Is Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized Areas Monopolistic or Competitive?’, 34 National Tax Journal , 95-104.
  • Fischel, William A. (1995), Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Gantner, Manfred (1995), ‘Energieabgaben als LŠndersteuern? Wirkungsanalyse und finanzverfassungsrechtliche †berlegungen am Beispiel des Feldversuch Vorarlbergs (Duties on Energy as Provincial Taxes?)’, 21 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 47-76.
  • Grofman, Bernard and Wittman, Donald A. (eds.) (1989), The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the Old , Agathon Press.
  • Hertig, Gerard (1994), ‘Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 177-186.
  • Inman, Robert P. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1994), ‘The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issue for Economic Federalism’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 147-161.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1997), ‘Competence Catalogues and the Principle of Subsidiarity in a European Constitution’, 8 (1) Constitutional Political Economy , 71-87.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1982), ‘Regulation, the American Common Market and Public Choice’, 6 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 119 ff.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1987), ‘Law and the Economic Order’, in Lipson, Leon and Wheeler, Stanton (eds.), Law and the Social Sciences , New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 109-149.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1996), ‘Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company’, 34 Economic Inquiry .
  • Lemley, Mark A. and McGowan, David (1994), ‘Antitrust Immunity : State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment’, 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 293 ff.
  • Levmore, Saul (1983), ‘Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention’, 69 Virginia Law Review , 563-631.
  • MiguŽ, Jean-Luc (1970), ‘Le nationalisme, l’unitŽ nationale et la thŽorie Žconomique de l’information (Nationalism, National Unity and the Economic Theory of Information)’, 3 Canadian Journal of Economics , 183-198.
  • MiguŽ, Jean-Luc (1979), Les nationalismes au Canada: perspective Žconomique (Nationalisms in Canada: An Economic Perspective) , MontrŽal, Institut de recherche C.D. Howe.
  • MiguŽ, Jean-Luc (1990), Retour au vrai fŽdŽralisme: institutionnalisation de la concurrence entre gouvernments (Return to a True Federalism: The Institutionalization of Competition Between Governments) , Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du QuŽbec (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau), Les avis des spŽcialistes invitŽs ˆ rŽpondre aux huit questions par la Commission (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau).
  • MiguŽ, Jean-Luc (1994), Une sociŽtŽ sclŽrosŽe – Quand le mal europŽen gagne le Canada (An Ossified Society – When the European Illness Wins Over Canada) , MontrŽal-Paris, L’ƒtincelle.
  • Neumann, Manfred J.M. and others (1989), ‘The Appropriate Level of Regulation in Europe: Local, National or Community Wide? A Roundtable Discussion’, 0(9) Economic Policy: A European Forum , 467-481.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1997), Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared , George Mason University Law and Economics Working Paper Series, No. 97-09.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1984), ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’, 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 181-210.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1985), ‘An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting’, Sept. American Economic Review .
  • Peltzman, Sam (1987), ‘Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections’, May American Economic Review .
  • Peltzman, Sam (1990), ‘How Efficient is the Voting Market?’, Journal of Law and Economics .
  • Peltzman, Sam (1992), ‘Voters as Fiscal Conservatives”‘, Quarterly Journal of Economics .
  • Rasmussen, David W. and Benson, Bruce L. (eds.) (1994), The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons , Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield..
  • Revesz, Richard L. (1996), ‘Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities’, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review .
  • Revesz, Richard L. and Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1995), ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition. Rethinking the ‘Race To the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation: The Effects of Alternative Superfund Liability Rules’, 67 New York University Law Review , 1210 ff. Reprinted in 25 Land Use & Environment Law.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1992), ‘Efficiency, Regulation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook & Fischel’, 87 Northwestern University Law Review , 254 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1993), ‘Choosing Law By Contract’, 18 Journal of Corporation Law , 245 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1993), ‘The Mandatory Rules of the ALI Code’, 61 George Washington Law Review , 984 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1994), ‘Delaware, Lawyers and Choice of Law’, 19 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law , 999 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1995), ‘The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation’, 4 Supreme Court Economic Review , 95 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1995), ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs’, 73 Washington University Law Quarterly , 369 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1995), ‘Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability Companies’, 66 University of Colorado Law Review , 947-999.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 131-199.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1980), ‘Risk-Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?’, 89 Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1980), ‘Risktaking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?’, 89 Journal of Legal Studies , 593-616.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter?: Political Choice in A Federal Republic’, 89 Journal of Political Economy , 152-165.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter: Political Choice in a Federal Republic’, 89 Journal of Political Economy , 347 ff.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1994), ‘Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany (A shorter version in Spanish has been published)’, 47 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1587-1622.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Jerry Mashaw (1984), ‘Federalism and Regulation’, in Eads, G. and Fix, M. (eds.), The Reagan Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment , Urban Institute Press, 111-152.
  • Shaviro, Daniel N. (1992), ‘An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,’, 90 Michigan Law Review , 895-991.
  • Shaviro, Daniel N. (1993), Federalism in Taxation: The Case for Greater Uniformity , Washington, AEI Press.
  • Turnbull, Shann (1979), ‘Beyond federalism: self-financed local government’, 17(1) Royal Australian Planning Institute Journal (RAPIJ) , 85-87.
  • Ulen, Thomas S. (1996), The Comparative Law and Economics of Federalism , Paper Presented at the Comparative Law and Economics Meeting in Siena, Italy May 13-14.
  • Vaillancourt, Franois (1991), RŽponses aux questions posŽes par la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du QuŽbec (Answers to the Questions Asked by the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec) , Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du QuŽbec (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau), Les avis des spŽcialistes invitŽs ˆ rŽpondre aux huit questions par la Commission (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau).
  • Weingast, Barry R. (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 1-31.
  • Williams, Stephen F. (1982), ‘Severance Taxes: The Supreme Court’s Role in Preserving A National Common Market for Energy Supplies’, 53 Colorado Law Review , 281 ff.
  • Wils, Wouter P.J. (1993), ‘The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much Ado About Nothing?’, 18 European Law Review , 475-492.
  • Wils, Wouter P.J. (1994), ‘Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People’s Concerns Seriously’, 6 Journal of Environmental Law , 81-91.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1991), ‘Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce’, 81 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 126-129.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1995), The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why political Institutions are Efficient , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
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