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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 9300 Production of Legal Rules By Agencies & Bureaucracies

  • Arvan, Lanny (1992), ‘Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comments’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 159-164.
  • Bagnoli, Mark and McKee, Michael (1991), ‘Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 229-247.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1991), ‘The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4’, 69 Washington University Law Quarterly , 565 ff. Reprinted in 1992 Securities Law Review 377.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1994), ‘Revisiting the One-Share/One-Vote Controversy: The Exchanges’ Uniform Voting Rights Policy’, 22 Securities Regulation Law Journal , 175 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1995), ‘Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition’, 52 Washington and Lee Law Review , 1189 ff. Reprinted in Corporate Practice Commentator, 38, 1996, 1.
  • Benson, Bruce L (1990), The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State , San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), ‘Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by `High Demand’ Legislators?’, 48 Southern Economic Journal , 68-77.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘High Demand Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output’, 11 Public Finance Quarterly , 259-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions’, 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 839-862.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1989), ‘Further Thoughts on Rent Seeking, Bureaucratic Output, and the Price of Complements’, 63 Public Choice , 279-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Third Thoughts on Contracting Out’, 11 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 44-78.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Greenhut, Melvin L. (1986), ‘Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox’, in Grieson, Ronald E. (ed.), Antitrust and Regulation , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 53-90.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Mitchell, Jean (1988), ‘Rent Seekers Who Demand Government Production: Bureaucratic Output and the Price of Complements’, 56 Public Choice , 3-16.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Greenhut, Melvin L. and Holcombe, Randall (1987), ‘Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox’, 6 Cato Journal , 801-817.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Rasmussen, David W. and Sollars, David L. (1995), ‘Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs’, 83 Public Choice , 21-45.
  • Breyer, Stephen G. (1985), ‘Economists and Economic Regulation’, 47 University of Pittsburgh Law Review , 205-218.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1995), ‘Organically-Produced Food Products: Regulations from the European Union and the United States Set the Stage for Imports’, 7(4) Journal of International Food and Agribusiness Marketing , 41-58.
  • Centner, Terence J. and Lathrop, K.W. (1996), ‘Differentiating Food Products: Organic Labeling Provisions Facilitate Consumer Choice’, 1 Drake Agricultural Law Review , 30-50.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 215-231. Reprinted under the title, “The Structural Approach to Decentralizing Law: A Theory of Games and Norms,” in a book edited by Gerard Hertig.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Decentralized Law for A Complex Economy’, 23 Southwestern Law Review, Hayek Symposium , 443-451.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1996), ‘Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review .
  • Eckert, Ross D. (1981), ‘The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 113-120.
  • Ferejohn, John A. and Shipan, Charles (1990), ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’, 6(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 1-20.
  • Fiorina, Morris P. (1982), ‘Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?’, 39 Public Choice , 33-66.
  • Fiorina, Morris P. (1986), ‘Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power,’, 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 33-51.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1987), ‘Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics, and Rashomon’, 50(4) Law and Contemporary Problems , 33-55.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Samprone, Joseph C., Jr. (1980), ‘The Walfare Loss of Excess Nonprice Competition: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance Regulation’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 429-440.
  • Fuchs, Edward Paul and Anderson, James E. (1987), ‘Institutinalizing Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Agencies’, in Nagel, Stuart S. (ed.), Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 4 , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press, 187-211.
  • Gely, Rafael and Spiller, Pablo T. (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the … State Farm … Grove City Cases’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 263-300.
  • Greenhut, Melvin L. and Benson, Bruce L. (1989), American Antitrust Law in Theory and in Practice , Aldershot, Avebury.
  • Horn, Murray J. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1989), ‘Commentary: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 499-508.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1992), ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’, 42 Duke Law Journal , 557-629.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1995), ‘A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 150-163.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1996), ‘Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company’, 34 Economic Inquiry .
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1990), ‘The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 1-31.
  • Landy, Marc K., Roberts, Mark J. and Thomas, Stephen R. (1990), The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 309 p.
  • Lemieux, Vincent (1991), Les relations de pouvoir dans les lois – Comparaison entre les gouvernements du QuŽbec de 1944 ˆ 1985 (Power Relations in Laws – Comparison Between Quebec Governments from 1944 to 1985) , Sainte-Foy, Presses de l’UniversitŽ Laval.
  • Levine, Michael E. (1992), ‘Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: Comment’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 119-125.
  • Lewis, Tracy and Poitevin, Michel (1997), ‘Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 50-73.
  • Macey, Jonathan R. (1992), ‘Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 93-110.
  • MacKay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Yandle, Bruce (1987), ‘Public Choice and Regulation: An Overview’, in Mackay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Ya (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission , Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 3-12.
  • Magat, Wesley A., Krupnick, A. and Harrington, W. (1986), Rules in the Making: A Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior , Washington, Resources for the Future.
  • Mashaw, Jerry L. (1985), ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 81-100.
  • McCubbins, Mathew D. and Page, T. (1986), ‘The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance’, 51 Public Choice , 173-190.
  • McCubbins, Mathew D., Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R. (1989), ‘Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admini strative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 431-482.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1976), ‘The New Imputed Interest Rules: How They Work’, The Practical Accountant , 63-67.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1982), ‘Education Accreditation’, The Internal Auditor , 4 ff.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1982), ‘Into the Accountants Hands’, Management Accounting , 83 ff.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1983), ‘Accounting for Income Taxes: A Progress Report’, Management Accounting , 22 ff.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), The Effects of Software Accounting Policies on Bank Lending Decisions and Stock Price , National Association of Accountants, 176 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘The Growth of the Deferred Tax Account’, Management Accounting , 18 ff.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘Software Accounting, Bank Lending Decisions and Stock Price’, Management Accounting , 20-23.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘Reporting Post-Retirement Benefits: an NAA Survey’, Management Accounting , 20 ff.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘Accounting for Income Taxes’, Management Accounting , 62-68.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), Accounting for Income Taxes , National Association of Accountants, 273 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), Financial Accounting for Computer Software , Occasional Paper, Deakin University, Australia, No. 70.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘FASB Hearings on Software Accounting’, Management Accounting , 61-63. Reprinted in Accounting and Tax Aspects of Computer Software Manufacturing, Praeger Publishing Company, 1987.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘Software Accounting Policy – Does it Matter?’, 7 Western New England Law Review , 705-751. Reprinted in Accounting and Tax Aspects of Computer Software Manufacturing, Praeger Publishing Company, 1987.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘Financial Accounting for Computer Software’, 3 Cooley Law Review , 97-117. Reprinted in Accounting and Tax Aspects of Computer Software Manufacturing, Praeger Publishing Company, 1987.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘Is This Software Company a Good Lending Risk’, ABA Banking Journal , 46-47.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘New IRS Regs on Company Cars Raise Taxes … And Tempers’, 1 Controllers Quarterly , 25-27.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), A Summary of Deferred Income Tax Studies Conducted in the United States and Canada , Occasional Paper, Deakin University, Australia, No. 74.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), Accounting for Software , Dow Jones Irwin, 168 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), A Guide To VEBAs and Funded Welfare Benefite Plans , Prentice Hall, 32 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A guide te ESOPs Under The Latest Rules , Prentice Hall, 44 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1985), ‘Financial and Tax Accounting for Computer Software’, 7 Western New England Law Review , 651-704. Reprinted in Accounting for Data Processing Department Costs, Greenwood Press, 1988.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1986), How the New Tax Law Affects Business , National Association of Accountants.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1986), Capital Gains and Losses, Alternative Minimum Tax, Accounting Provisions, Prentice-Hall’s Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 , Prentice Hall, 500 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1986), The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax , National Association of Accountants.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1987), A model Program for Schools of Professional Accountancy , University Press of America, 162 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1987), Accounting and Tax Aspects of Computer Software Manufacturing , Praeger Publishing Company, 162 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1988), Accounting for Data Processing Costs , Greenwood, Greenwood Press, 200 p.
  • McGee, Robert W., Gilder, Scott P., Levine, Marc L. and Krueger, Charles A. (1989), The practical Account Digest , Waren Gorham & Lamont, 440 p.
  • Miller, James C., III (1989), The Economist as Reformer: Revamping the FTC, 1981 , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 110 p.
  • Muris, Timothy J. (1986), ‘Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control’, 94 Journal of Political Economy , 884-889.
  • Ogus, Anthony I. (1995), ‘Economics and Law Reform: Thirty years of Law Commission Endeavor’, 11 Law Quarterly Review , 407-420.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1972), ‘The Behavior of Administrative Agencies’, 1 Journal of Legal Studies , 305-347.
  • Rasmussen, David W. and Benson, Bruce L. (eds.) (1994), The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons , Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield..
  • Ribstein, Larry E. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 131-199.
  • Robinson, Glen O. (1989), ‘Commentary: Political Uses of Structure and Process’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 483-498.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1985), ‘Nonlawyer Practice before Federal Administrative Agencies Should Be Encouraged’, 37 Administrative Law Review , 363-373.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1985), ‘Executive Oversight of Rulemaking in Arizona: The Govenor’s Regulatory Review Counsel – the First Three Years’, Arizona State Law Journal , 425-491.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1990), ‘Comment (on Ferejohn and Shipan’s “Congressional Influence (on Bureaucracy”)’, 6(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 21-27.
  • Ross, Stephen F. (1992), ‘Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comment’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 155-158.
  • Rubin, Paul H. and Cohen, Mark A. (1985), ‘Private Enforcement of Public Policy’, 3, No.1 Yale Journal on Regulation , 167-193.
  • Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1992), ‘Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: A Comment: Bureaucratic Drift, Coalition Drift, and Time Consistency’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 111-118.
  • Smith, Janet Kiholm (1982), ‘An Analysis of State Regulations Governing Liquor Store Licensees’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 301-320.
  • Smith, Janet Kiholm (1982), ‘Production of Licensing Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Interstate Differences’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 117-137.
  • Spiller, Pablo T. and Tiller, Emerson H. (1997), ‘Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 347-370.
  • Spitzer, Matthew L. (1988), ‘Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory’, 61 Southern California Law Review , 1293-1326.
  • Spitzer, Matthew L. (1990), ‘Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan’s Model of Administrative Agency Behavior’, 6(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 29-43.
  • Spulber, Daniel F. and Besanko, David A. (1992), ‘Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 126-154.
  • Stalon, Charles G. (1986), ‘Analysis and Synthesis in Quasi- Judical Multimember Regulatory Agencies’, in Saltzman, Sidney and Schuler, Richard E. (eds.), The Future of Electrical Energy: A Regional Perspective , New York, Greenwood Press, 330-339.
  • Steunenberg, Bernard (1992), ‘Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy Making’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 673-694.
  • Weingast, Barry R. (1981), ‘Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships’, 44 Law and Contemporary Problems , 147-177.
  • Weingast, Barry R. and Moran, Mark J. (1983), ‘Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission’, 91 Journal of Political Economy , 765-800. Reprinted in Mackay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Yandle, Bruce (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View form Inside the Federal Trade Commission, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, 30-62.
  • Weingast, Barry R. and Moran, Mark J. (1986), ‘Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply’, 94 Journal of Political Economy , 890-894.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1986), ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism’, 99 Harvard Law Review , 713-789.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1988), ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer’, 61 Southern California Law Review , 1327-1341.
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