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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 9100 Constitution

  • (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1992), ‘Constitutional Law and Economics’, 12(2)S International Review of Law and Economics .
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  • Fischel, William A. (1995), ‘The Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 187-203.
  • Fischel, William A. (1996), ‘How Serrano Caused Proposition 13’, 12 Journal of Law and Politics .
  • Fischel, William A. and Shapiro, Perry (1989), ‘A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-128.
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