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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 9000 General Characteristics of Rules

  • Abrams, Howard E. (1985), ‘Rethinking Tax Transitions: A Reply to Dr. Shachar’, 98 Harvard Law Review , 1809-1889.
  • Adams, James D. and Kenny, Lawrence W. (1986), ‘Optimal Tenure of Elected Public Officials’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 303-328.
  • Adams, Michael (1991), ‘Normen, Standards, Rechte’, Juristenzeitung , 941-955.
  • Adams, Michael (1993), ‘Norms, Standards, Rights’, 17(2) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice , 43-55.
  • Adams, Michael (1994), ‘Rechte und Normen als Standards (Rights and Norms as Standards)’, 11(3) Homo Oeconomicus, …konomik der Standardisierung , 501-553.
  • Alm, James (1988), ‘Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare’, 78 American Economic Review , 237-245.
  • Anderson, Gary M., Rowley, Charles K. and Tollison, Robert D. (1988), ‘Rent Seeking and the Restriction of Human Exchange’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 83-100.
  • Aranson, Peter H. (1987), ‘Judicial Control of the Political Branches: Public Purpose and Public Law’, in Dorn, James A. and Manne, Henry G. (eds.), Economic Liberties and the Judiciary , Fairfax, George Mason University Press, 47-110.
  • Ashenfelter, Orley, Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1995), ‘Politics & the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes’, 24 Journal of Legal Studies , 257-281.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Weisberg, Robert (1982), ‘Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of ¤2-207’, 68 Virginia Law Review , 1217-1262.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Constitutional Law and Public Choice , West Publishing.
  • Baron, David P. (1988), ‘Regulation and Legislative Choice’, 19 Rand Journal of Economics , 467-477.
  • Baxter, William F. and Altree, Lillian R. (1972), ‘Legal Aspects of Airport Noise’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-113.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1985), ‘Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs’, 28 Journal of Public Economics , 329-347.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri (1995), ‘Informed Courts, Uninformed Individual and the Economics of Judicial Hindsight’, 151 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 613-630.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), ‘Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by `High Demand’ Legislators?’, 48 Southern Economic Journal , 68-77.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), ‘Land Use Regulation: A Supply and Demand Analysis of Changing Property Rights’, 5 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 435-451.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘High Demand Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output’, 11 Public Finance Quarterly , 259-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘Logrolling and High Demand Committee Review’, 41 Public Choice , 427-434.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions’, 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 839-862.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), ‘Rent Seeking as a Justification for Privatization’, 7 Journal of Contemporary Studies , 5-12.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), ‘Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective’, 51 Southern Economic Journal , 388-400.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), ‘Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies’, 144 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 772-788.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1989), ‘Further Thoughts on Rent Seeking, Bureaucratic Output, and the Price of Complements’, 63 Public Choice , 279-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1990), ‘Customary Law With Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion’, 9 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 25-42. Reprinted in as “Law and Order Without State Coercion”, in Veljanovski, Cento (ed.), Regulation, Regulators and the Market, 1991, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 159-179.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law’, 2 Constitutional Political Economy , 1-27.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘The Development of Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers’, 3 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 79-108.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Market Failure Versus Government Failure in the Production of Adjudication’, in Bowman, Gary W., Hakim, Simon. and Seidenstat, Paul (eds.), Privatizing the United States Justice System: Police, Adjudication, and Corrections Services from the Private Sector , Jefferson (NC), McFarland & Co., 203-225.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘The Evolution of Values and Institutions in a Free Society: The Under-Pinnings of a Market Economy’, 5 International Journal on the Unity of Sciences , 411-442. Reprinted in Radnitzky, Gerard and Bouillon, Hardy (eds.), Values and the Social Order Vol.I, 1995, Aldershot, Avebury, 87-125.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1993), ‘The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-Interest’, 6 Review of Austrian Economics , 43-80.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Third Thoughts on Contracting Out’, 11 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 44-78.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Emerging From the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights’, 5 Constitutional Political Economy , 129-158. Reprinted inTranslated into Spanish and republished (1995) Las Instituciones y Los Derechos de Propiedad al Emerger de la Jungla Hobbesiana: La Fuerza Quita los Reprinted Derechos y los Crea Libertas, 12, 35-75.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Legal Philosophy’, in Boettke, Peter J. (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics , London, Edward Elgar, 270-275.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Toxic Torts by Government , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘Competition Among Legal Institutions: Implications for the Evolution of Law’, in Gerken, Luden (ed.), Competition Among Institutions , London, MacMillan, 153-175.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 479-501.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Uncertainty, the Race for Property Rights, and Rent Dissipation due to Judicial Changes in Product Liability Tort Law’, Cultural Dynamics .
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Engen, Eric M. (1988), ‘The Market for Laws: An Economic Analysis of Legislation’, 54 Southern Economic Journal , 732-745.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Faminow, Merle D. (1984), ‘Rent Seeking and Supply Management in Canada’, 32 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics , 548-558.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Faminow, Merle D. (1986), ‘Regulatory Transfers in Canadian-American Agriculture: The Case of Supply Management’, 6 Cato Journal , 271-294.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Faminow, Merle D. (1986), ‘The Incentives to Organize and Demand Regulation: Two Ends against the Middle’, 24 Economic Inquiry , 473-484.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Greenhut, Melvin L. (1986), ‘Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox’, in Grieson, Ronald E. (ed.), Antitrust and Regulation , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 53-90.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Johnson, Ronald N. (1986), ‘The Lagged Impact of State and Local Taxes on Economic Activity and Political Behavior’, 24 Economic Inquiry , 389-402.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Johnson, Ronald N. (1986), ‘Capital Formation and Interstate Tax Competition’, in Lee, Dwight (ed.), Taxation and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States , Cambridge (MA), Ballinger, 407-436.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Mitchell, Jean (1988), ‘Rent Seekers Who Demand Government Production: Bureaucratic Output and the Price of Complements’, 56 Public Choice , 3-16.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1989), ‘Prison Overcrowding and Judicial Incentives’, 3 Madison Paper Series , 1-22.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1991), ‘Increasing Judicial Responsibility Can Reduce Prison Overcrowding in America’s Prisons: Opposing Viewpoints’, in Tipp, Stacey L. (ed.), San Diego, Greenhaven Press, 139-144.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Greenhut, Melvin L. and Holcombe, Randall (1987), ‘Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox’, 6 Cato Journal , 801-817.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Rasmussen, David W. and Sollars, David L. (1995), ‘Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs’, 83 Public Choice , 21-45.
  • Bizer, David S. and Judd, Kenneth L. (1989), ‘Taxation and Uncertainty’, 79 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 331-336.
  • Blume, Lawrence and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1984), ‘Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis’, 72 California Law Review , 569-628.
  • Blume, Lawrence E. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1982), ‘The Dynamics of Legal Process’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 405-419.
  • Blume, Lawrence, Rubinfeld, Daniel L. and Shapiro, Perry (1984), ‘The Taking of Land. When Should Compensation be Paid?’, 99 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 71-92.
  • Blumenthal, Marsha and Slemrod, Joel B. (1992), ‘The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform’, 45 National Tax Journal , 185-202.
  • Bouckaert, Boudewijn and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (1995), ‘Mistake of Law and the Economics of Legal Information’, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 217-245.
  • Bradford, C. Steven (1990), ‘Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling’, 59 Fordham Law Review , 39-90.
  • Bradford, David F. (1996), ‘Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues’, in Boskin, Michael J. (ed.), Frontiers of Tax Reform , Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1990), ‘Pays de L’est: d’abord les rŽformes lŽgales, ensuite les politiques monŽtaires et macroŽconomiques (Eastern European Countries: First the Legal Reforms, Then the Monetary and Macroeconomic Policies)’, 1 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines: Bilingual Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies , 253-277.
  • Brinig, Margaret F., Holcombe, Randall G. and Schwartzstein, Linda A. (1993), ‘Public Choice and Lobbying Regulation’, 74 Public Choice , 377-384.
  • Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon (1962), The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, 65 Washington Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Calfee, John E. and Craswell, Richard (1984), ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards’, 70 Virginia Law Review , 965-1003.
  • Capelletti, Mauro (1989), The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Cassone, Alberto and Marchese, Carla (1994), ‘Indulgenze religiose: un’analisi economica’, 2-3 Economia delle scelte pubbliche , 191-209.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1993), ‘Against Legal Centrism: Review of Robert C. Ellickson’s Order Without Law’, California Law Review , 417 ff.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Decentralized Law for A Complex Economy’, 23 Southwestern Law Review, Hayek Symposium , 443-451.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Void for Vagueness: Introduction to a Symposium’, 82 California Law Review , 487-490.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 215-231. Reprinted under the title, “The Structural Approach to Decentralizing Law: A Theory of Games and Norms,” in a book edited by Gerard Hertig.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1996), ‘Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review .
  • Cordes, Joseph J. and Weisbrod, Burton A. (1979), ‘Governmental Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements’, 11 Journal of Public Economics , 47-58.
  • Coulange, Pierre (1990), Analyse Žconomique de la production de droit (Economic Analysis od the Production of Legal Rules], Ph.D., Aix-en-Provence, UniversitŽ d’Aix-Marseille III, FacultŽ d’Economie AppliquŽe,) ,.
  • Coulange, Pierre (1990), ‘La production de droit (The Production of Legal Rules)’, 3 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 277-302.
  • Crain, W. Mark (1979), ‘Cost and Output in the Legislative Firm’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 607-621.
  • Craswell, Richard and Calfee, John E. (1986), ‘Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards’, 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 279-303.
  • Culp, Jerome M. (1987), ‘Foreword’, 50(4) Law and Contemporary Problems , 1-16.
  • Curran, Christopher (1992), ‘The Spread of Comparative Negligence in the United States’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 317-332.
  • Curran, Christopher and Dwyer, Gerald P., Jr. (1989), ‘The Effect of the Double Nickel Speed Limit on Death Rates’, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses , Antwerpen, Maklu, 117-156.
  • David, RenŽ and Brierley, John E.C. (1985), Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 3rd Edition , New York, Free Press.
  • Diver, Colin S. (1983), ‘The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules’, 93 Yale Law Journal , 65-109.
  • Doernberg, Richard L. and McChesney, Fred S. (1987), ‘On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform’, 71 Minnesota Law Review , 913-962.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1983), ‘Statutes’ Domains’, 50 University of Chicago Law Review , 533-552.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1985), ‘Method, Result and Authority: A Reply’, 98 Harvard Law Review , 622-629.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac and Posner, Richard A. (1974), ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking’, 3 Journal of Legal Studies , 257-286.
  • Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1988), The Nature of the Common Law , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 204 p.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard and Bundy Stephen M. (1993), ‘Knowledge About Legal Sanctions’, 92 Michigan Law Review , 201 ff.
  • Epstein, Richard (1995), Simple Rules for a Complex World , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Feldstein, Martin (1976), ‘Compensation in Tax Reform’, 29 National Tax Journal , 123-130.
  • Fisch, Jill E. (1997), ‘Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach’, 110 Harvard Law Review , 1055-1123.
  • Fishel, William A. and Shapiro, Perry (1989), ‘A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-128.
  • Geelhoed, L.A. (1983), De interveni‘rende staat (The Intervening State) , s-Gravenhage, Staatsuitgeverij.
  • Gould, John P. (1973), ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 279-300.
  • Grabenwarter, Christoph (1992), Ladenschlu§recht (Regulation of Shopping Hours) , Vienna – New York.
  • Grabenwarter, Christoph (1994), Rechtliche und škonomische †berlegungen zur Erwerbsfreiheit (Legal and Economic Considerations on the Freedom of Enterprise) , Vienna.
  • Graetz, Michael J. (1977), ‘Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision’, 126 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 47-87.
  • Graetz, Michael J. (1979), ‘Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax’, 92 Harvard Law Review , 1575-1661.
  • Graetz, Michael J. (1985), ‘Retroactivity Revisited’, 98 Harvard Law Review , 1820-1841.
  • Greenhut, Melvin L. and Benson, Bruce L. (1989), American Antitrust Law in Theory and in Practice , Aldershot, Avebury.
  • Hale, Robert L. (1927), ‘Value and Vested Rights’, 27 Columbia Law Review , 523-529.
  • Heiner, Ronald A. (1990), ‘Rule-Governed Behavior in Evolution and Human Society’, 1(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 19-46.
  • Hermalin, Benjamin E. (1995), ‘An Economic Analysis of Takings’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 64-86.
  • Hutter, Michael (1989), Die Produktion von Recht. Eine selb streferentielle Theorie der Wirtschaft, angewandt auf den Fall des Arzneimittelpatentrechts (The Production of Law. A Selfreferential Theory of the Economy, applied to the Case of Pharmaceutical Patent Law) , TŸbingen, Mohr, 213 p.
  • Johnston, Jason Scott (1995), ‘Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 256-281.
  • Jones, Carol Adaire (1989), ‘Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Reviewed’, 8 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management , 72-87.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1989), ‘Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 427-447.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions’, 99 Harvard Law Review , 509-617.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1987), Optimal Transition Policy: Replacing Horizontal Equity With an Ex Ante Incentives Perspective , dissertation accepted by Harvard University Department of Economics.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1990), ‘Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 93-128.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1992), ‘Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action’, 94 Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 525-541.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1992), ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’, 42 Duke Law Journal , 557-629.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1993), ‘An Ex Ante Perspective on Deregulation, Viewed Ex Post’, 15(2) Resource and Energy Economics , 153-173.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1994), ‘The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 307-401.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1994), Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax , Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 463.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1994), ‘The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax’, 50 Tax Law Review , 1-31.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1995), ‘A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 150-163.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1995), ‘Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis Under a Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System’, 68 Tax Notes , 1109-1118.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1996), ‘How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax’, 49 National Tax Journal , 135-150.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1992), ‘Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 306-320.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1994), ‘Accuracy in the Determination of Liability’, 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-15.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1996), ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’, 39 Journal of Law and Economics , 191-209.
  • Karst, Kenneth L. (1966), Latin American Legal Institutions: Problems for Comparative Study , Los Angeles, UCLA Latin American Center.
  • Kennedy, Duncan (1973), ‘Legal Formality’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 351-398.
  • Kerkmeester, Heico O. (1989), Recht en speltheorie (Law and Game Theory) , diss. Rotterdam, 212 p.
  • Kessler, Daniel and McClellan, Mark (1996), ‘Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?’, 111 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 352-390.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1977), ‘Can We Buy Our Way Out of Harmful Regulation?’, in Martin, Donald L. and Schwartz, Warren F. (eds.), Deregulating American Industry: Legal and Economic Problems , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books.
  • Kolbe, A. Lawrence, Tye, William B. and Myers, Stewart C. (1993), Regulatory Risk: Economic Principles and Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines and Other Industries , Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Komesar, Neil K. (1980), ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction: A Comment’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies , 387-397.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1976), ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 249-307.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies , 367-386.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1994), ‘The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 683-719.
  • Levmore, Saul (1993), ‘The Case for Retroactive Taxation’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 265-307.
  • Lewisch, Peter (1995), Punishment, Public Law Enforcement and the Protective State , New York, Springer.
  • Little, Arthur D. (1988), Development of Methodology for Estimating the Taxpayer Paperwork Burden , Final Report to the Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C., Internal Revenue Service.
  • Logue, Kyle D. (1996), ‘Tax Treatments, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment’, 94 Michigan Law Review , 1129-1196.
  • Long, Susan B. and Swingen, Judyth A. (1987), ‘An Approach to the Measurement of Tax Law Complexity’, 8 Journal of the American Tax Association , 22-36.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1979), ‘Les notions floues ou l’Žconomie de l’imprŽcision (Fuzzy Concepts or the Economics of Imprecision)’, 12 Langages , 33-50.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1980), ‘Le Nozione “Fluide” Ovvero l’Economia Dell’Imprecisione (Fuzzy Concepts or the Economics of Imprecision)’, Informatica e Diritto , 253-274.
  • Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (1990), ‘Modelli competitivi, regole giuridiche ed analisi economica (Competitive models, legal norms and economic analysis)’, Quadrimestre , 77-120.
  • Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (1990), ‘Modelli competitivi, regole giuridiche ed analisi economica (Competitive models, legal norms and economic analysis)’, Quadrimestre , 77-102.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1983), ‘Accounting for Software: A Progress Report’, Management Accounting , 38-66.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘Accounting for Software Costs’, Management Accounting , 38-39.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1984), ‘Accounting for Software’, Bibliography, National Association of Accountants .
  • McGee, Robert W. (1987), A model Program for Schools of Professional Accountancy , University Press of America, 162 p.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1992), The market solution to economic development in Eastern Europe , The Edwin Mellen Press, 320 p.
  • McGee, Robert W., Gilder, Scott P., Levine, Marc L. and Krueger, Charles A. (1989), The practical Account Digest , Waren Gorham & Lamont, 440 p.
  • McKenzie, Richard B. (1986), ‘Tax/Compensation Schemes: Misleading Advice in a Rent-Seeking Society’, 48 Public Choice , 189-194.
  • Merryman, John Henry (1985), The Civil Law Tradition , Stanford, Stanford University Press.
  • Merryman, John Henry and Clark, David (1978), Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems-Cases and Meterials , Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill.
  • Michelman, Frank I. (1967), ‘Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law’, 80 Harvard Law Review , 1165-1258. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A. (ed.), Economic Foundations of Property a Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 100 ff.
  • Miller, Jeremy M. (198), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Method and Law: The Danger in Valueless Values’, 21 Gonzaga Law Review , 425-455.
  • Munzer, Stephen R. (1977), ‘Retroactive Law’, 6 Journal of Legal Studies , 373-397.
  • Neumann, Manfred J.M. and others (1989), ‘The Appropriate Level of Regulation in Europe: Local, National or Community Wide? A Roundtable Discussion’, 0(9) Economic Policy: A European Forum , 467-481.
  • O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. and Rizzo, Mario J. (1986), ‘Subjectivism, Uncertainty, and Rules’, in Kirzner, Israel M. (ed.), Subjectivism, Intelligibility and Economic Understanding. Essays in Honor of Ludwig M. Lachmann on his Eightieth Birthday , London, MacMillan, 252-267.
  • Ogus, Anthony I. (1981), ‘Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making’, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), The Economic Approach to Law , London, Butterworths, 210-225.
  • Ogus, Anthony I. (1983), ‘Social Costs in a Private Law Setting’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 27-44.
  • Ogus, Anthony I. (1991), ‘Comment (on Staaf and Yandle, Collective and Private Choice; Constitutions, Statutes and the Common Law)’, in Weigel, Wolfgang (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law – A Collection of Applications , Vienna, …sterreichischer Wirtschaftsverlag, 267-269.
  • Ogus, Anthony I. (1992), ‘Information, Error Costs and Regulation’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 411-421.
  • Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 186 p.
  • Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (1993), ‘Emergence and Construction of Efficient Rules in the Legal System of German Civil Law’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 285-302.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1995), ‘Public Choice Theory and International Institutions: One More Comment on Richard Falk’, 1 International Legal Theory , 45-48.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1997), ‘Teorema di Arrow’, 16 Digesto Italiano (Diritto Civile) .
  • Parisi, Francesco (1998), ‘Customary Law’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , London, MacMillan.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1998), ‘Votes and Outcomes: A Property-Based Theory of Political Decision-Making’, in Samuels, W. J. and Mercuro, N. (ed.), The Fundamental Interrelationship Between Government and Property , JAI Press Inc..
  • Parisi, Francesco and O’Hara, Erin (1998), ‘Conflict of Laws’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , London, MacMillan.
  • Parisi, Francesco and Ribstein, Larry E. (1998), ‘Choice of Law’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , London, MacMillan.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1979), ‘Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-48.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1980), ‘Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies’, 33 Stanford Law Review , 1075-1112.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1988), ‘Comment: Responding to Gordon Tullock’, 2 Research in Law and Policy Studies , 29-33.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1992), Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Priest, George L. (1987), ‘Measuring Legal Change’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 193-225.
  • Quinn, John and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1982), ‘Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change’, 32 University of Toronto Law Journal , 117-175.
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark and Nakazato, Minoru (1989), ‘Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 1155-1175.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), ‘Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract’, 78 Georgetown Law Journal , 71 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1991), ‘Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships’, 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Ribstein, Larry E. (1994), ‘Form and Substance in the Definition of a “Security”: The Case of Limited Liability Companies’, 51 Washington and Lee Law Review , 807 ff.
  • Romano, Roberta (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 225-283.
  • Romano, Roberta (1992), ‘Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines: Comment’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 47-58.
  • Ru, H.J. De (1987), Staat, markt en recht (The State, the Market and the Law) , Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 93 p.
  • Rubin, Paul H. and Cohen, Mark A. (1985), ‘Private Enforcement of Public Policy’, 3, No.1 Yale Journal on Regulation , 167-193.
  • Russell, A.M. and Rickard, J.A. (1987), ‘A Model of Tax Evasion Incorporating Income Variation and Retroactive Penalities’, 26 Australian Economic Papers , 254-264.
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