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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 8000 Optimal Enforcement

  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1981), ‘Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process’, 76 Northwestern University Law Review , 1-99.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. and Miceli, Thomas J. (1997), Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining , Manuscript.
  • Akins, Nancy (1989), ‘New Direction in Sacred Lands Claims: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association’, 29 Natural Resources Journal , 593-605.
  • Altrogge, Phyllis and Shughart, William F., II (1984), ‘The Regressive Nature of Civil Penalties’, 4 International Review of Law and Economics , 55-66.
  • Anden¾s, Johannes (1966), ‘The General Preventive Effects of Punishment’, 114 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 949-983.
  • Anden¾s, Johannes (1971), ‘Deterrence and Specific Offenses’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 537-553.
  • Anden¾s, Johannes (1974), Punishment and Deterrence , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Anderson, Lee G. and Lee, Dwight R. (1986), ‘Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery’, 68 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 678-690.
  • Andreoni, James (1991), ‘Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?’, 22(3) Rand Journal of Economics , 385-395.
  • Andreoni, James (1995), ‘Criminal Deterrence in the Reduced Form: A New Perspective on Ehrlich’s Seminal Study’, 33 Economic Inquiry , 476-483.
  • Andreoni, James, Erard, Brian and Feinstein, Jonathan S., ‘Tax Compliance’, Journal of Economic Literature .
  • Arlen, Jennifer H., Corporate Crime and Its Control , U.S.C. Law School Working Paper Series, No. 97-2.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1994), ‘The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 832-867.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1997), ‘Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes’, 72 New York University Law Review , 687-779.
  • Avio, Kenneth L. (1975), ‘Recidivism in the Economic Model of Crime’, 13 Economic Inquiry , 450-456.
  • Avio, Kenneth L. (1987), ‘Clemency in Economic and Retributive Models of Punishment’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 79-88.
  • Avio, Kenneth L. and Clark, C. Scott (1976), Property Crime in Canada: An Econometric Study , Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
  • Avio, Kenneth L. and Clark, C. Scott (1978), ‘The Supply of Property Offences in Canada: Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Punishment’, 11 Canadian Journal of Economics , 1-19.
  • Ayres, Ian and Levitt, Steven D., ‘Measuring the Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack’, Quarterly Journal of Economics .
  • Baldry, Jonathan C. (1980), ‘Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment: A Note’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies , 617-619.
  • Baldry, Jonathan C. (1984), ‘The Enforcement of Income Tax Laws: Efficiency Implications’, 60 Economic Record , 156-159.
  • Basu, Kaushik, Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Mishra, Ajit (1992), ‘Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption’, 48(3) Journal of Public Economics , 349-359.
  • Baudenbacher, Carl (1985), Rechtsverwirklichung als škonomisches Problem? Zur †berlastung der Zivilgerichte (Enforcement of Law as an Economic Problem? On the Overload of the Civil Courts], Zurich, Schulthess,) ,.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Kaplow, Louis (1992), ‘Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 365-370.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Kaplow, Louis (1993), ‘Optimal Sanctions and Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 217-224.
  • Beccaria, Cesare (1770), On Crimes and Punishments, and Other Writings ,. Reprinted by Bellamy, Richard (ed.); Davies, Richard, et al. (trans.), New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995
  • Becker, Gary S. (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, 76 Journal of Political Economy , 169-217.
  • Becker, Gary S. and Landes, William M. (eds.) (1974), Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment , New York, Columbia University Press, 268 p.
  • Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J. (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’, 3 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-18.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri (1993), Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Sanction Under Incomplete Information , Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, No. 134.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri (1997), ‘Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When Individuals Learn the Penalty Only by Committing the Crime’, 17 International Review of Law and Economics , 409-421.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri and Harel, Alon (1995), ”Blaming the Victim’: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 434-455.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri and Harel, Alon (1996), ‘The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: a Victim-Centered Perspective’, 145(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 299-351.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), ‘A Note on Corruption of Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights’, 5 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 305-311.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), ‘Guns for Protection and Other Private Sector Responses to the Fear of Violent Crime’, in Kates, Don, Jr. (ed.), Firearms and Violence: Issues of Regulation , Cambridge (MA), Ballinger, 329-356.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1986), ‘Guns for Protection and Other Private Sector Responses to Government’s Failure to Control Increasing Violent Crime’, 8 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 75-109.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1986), ‘The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment’, 9 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 399-427.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), ‘An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials’, 8(1) Cato Journal , 139-163.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), ‘Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of “The Tragedy of the Commons” Arising with Public Allocation Processes’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 73-84.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘The Development of Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers’, 3 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 79-108.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Are Public Goods Really Common Pools: Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England’, 39 Economic Inquiry , 249-271.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Restitution in Theory and in Practice’, 12 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 75-98.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Baden, John A. (1985), ‘The Political Economy of Government Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 391-410.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Rasmussen, David W. (1991), ‘The Relationship Between Illicit Drug Enforcement Policy and Property Crimes’, 9 Contemporary Policy Issues , 106-115.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Rasmussen, David W. (1992), Illinois’ War on Drugs: Some Unintended Consequences , Heartland Policy Study, Chicago, Heartland Institute, No. 48.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Rasmussen, David W. (1995), ‘Crime and Punishment’, in Denslow, David A., Scoggins, J.F. and Shermyen, Anne (eds.), The Economy of Florida , Gainesville (FL), Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 99-116.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Rasmussen, David W. (1995), Illicit Drugs and Crime , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Kim, Iljoong and Rasmussen, David W. (1994), ‘Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Prospective on the Economics of Crime Literature’, 61 Southern Economic Journal , 161-168.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Kim, Iljoong, Rasmussen, David W. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1992), ‘Is Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or Drug Enforcement Policy?’, 24 Applied Economics , 679-692.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Kim, Iljoong, Rasmussen, David W. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1993), ‘An Economic Analysis of Recidivism Among Drug Offenders’, 60 Southern Economic Journal , 169-183.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Rasmussen, David W. and Sollars, David L. (1995), ‘Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs’, 83 Public Choice , 21-45.
  • Bentham, Jeremy (1973), ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’, in X. (ed.), The Utilitarians , Rept. Garden City (N.Y.), Anchor Books.
  • Besanko, David A. and Spulber, Daniel F. (1989), ‘Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior’, 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 25-52.
  • Black, Bernard and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1996), ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’, 109 Harvard Law Review , 1911-1979.
  • Blades, Derek W. (1985), ‘Crime: What Should Be Recorded in the National Accounts; and What Difference Would It Make’, in Gaertner, Wulf and Wenig, Alois (eds.), The Economics of the Shadow Economy: Proceedings of th International Conference on the Economics of the Shadow Economy Held at the University of Bielefeld, West Germany, October 10-14, 1983 , Berlin, Springer, 45-58.
  • Block, Michael K. (1991), ‘Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior’, 71 Boston University Law Review , 395-419.
  • Block, Michael K. and Feinstein, Jonathan S. (1986), ‘The Spillover Effect of Antitrust Enforcement’, 68 Review of Economics and Statistics , 122-131.
  • Block, Michael K. and Lind, Robert C. (1975), ‘An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies , 479-492.
  • Block, Michael K. and Lind, Robert C. (1975), ‘Crime and Punishment Reconsidered’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies , 241-247.
  • Block, Michael K. and Sidak, Joseph Gergory (1980), ‘The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1131-1139.
  • Block, Michael K., Nold, Frederik Carl and Sidak, J. Gregory (1981), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement’, 89 Journal of Political Economy , 429-445.
  • Blumstein, A. (1971), ‘Cost-Effectiviness Analysis in the Allocation of Police Resources’, in Kendall, M.G. (ed.), Cost-benefit Analysis , London, English Universities Press.
  • Bone, J. (1985), ‘On Substituting a Socially Costless Penalty for Costly Crime’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 239-246.
  • Bose, Pinaki (1995), ‘Anticipatory Compliance and Effective Regulatory Activity’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 151-159.
  • Bose, Pinaki (1995), ‘Regulatory Errors, Optimal Fines, and the Level of Compliance’, 56 Journal of Public Economics , 475-484.
  • Bourbeau, Robert (1983), Les accidents de la route au QuŽbec 1926-1978: Žtude dŽmographique et ŽpidŽmiologique (Road Accidents in Quebec, 1926-1978: A Demographic and Epidemiologic Study) , MontrŽal, Presses de l’UniversitŽ de MontrŽal.
  • Bowles, Roger A. (1982), Law and the Economy , Oxford, Martin Robertson, 239 p.
  • Bowles, Roger A. and Garoupa, Nuno (1997), ‘Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime’, 17 International Review of Law and Economics , 75-87.
  • Boyer, Marcel, Dionne, Georges and Vanasse, Charles (1991), ‘Infractions au code de la sŽcuritŽ routire, infractions au code criminel et gestion optimale de la sŽcuritŽ routire (Infractions to the Road Safety Code, Infractions to the Criminal Code and Optimal Management of Road Safety)’, 67 L’actualitŽ Economique , 279-305.
  • Braden, John B. and others (1987), ‘A Displacement Model of Regulatory Compliance and Costs’, 63 Land Economics , 323-336.
  • Brotman, B.A. and Fox, P. (1988), ‘The Impact of Economic Conditions on the Incidence of Arson: Comment’, 55 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 751-754.
  • Brown, William W. and Reynolds, Morgan O. (1973), ‘Crime and “Punishment”: Risk Implications’, 6 Journal of Economic Theory , 508-514.
  • Buck, Andrew J. and others (1983), ‘The Deterrence Hypothesis Revisited’, 13 Regional Science and Urban Economics , 471-486.
  • Burnovski, Moshe and Safra, Zvi (1994), ‘Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders Be More Severely Punished?’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 341-350.
  • Cadot, Olivier (1987), ‘Corruption as a Gamble’, 33(2) Journal of Public Economics , 223-244.
  • Calfee, John E. and Craswell, Richard (1984), ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards’, 70 Virginia Law Review , 965-1003.
  • Calfee, John E. and Rubin, Paul H. (1992), ‘Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-411.
  • Cameron, Samuel (1988), ‘The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence’, 41 Kyklos , 301-323.
  • Cameron, Samuel (1989), ‘On the Welfare Economics of Capital Punishment’, 28 Australian Economic Papers , 253-266.
  • Campbell, Donald T. and Ross, H. Laurence (1988), ‘The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time-Series Data in Quasi-experimental Analysis’, in Overman, E. Samuel (ed.), Methodology and Epistemology of Social Science: Selected Papers , Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 222-237.
  • Carlin, Paul and Sandy, Robert (1990), ‘The Value of Time and the Effect of Fines on Child Car Safety Seat Usage’, 22 Applied Economics , 463-476.
  • Carr-Hill, R. A. and Stern, N. H. (1979), Crime, the Police and Criminal Statistics: An Analysis of Official Statistics for England and Wales Using Econometric Methods , London, Academic Press.
  • Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1979), ‘Crime and Punishment with Possible Post-Offense Compromise’, 17 Academia Economic Papers , 131-167.
  • Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1991), ‘Note: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Proceedings in Civil-Law Countries’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 111-116.
  • Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1993), ‘Oscillatory vs. Stationary Enforcement of Law’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 303-315.
  • Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Jiang, Neville (1993), ‘Are Fines More Efficient than Imprisonment?’, 51 Journal of Public Economics , 391-413.
  • Chu, C. Y. Cyrus, Hu, Sheng Cheng and Huang, Ting-Yuan (1997), Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely , Manuscript.
  • Chwe, Michael Suk-Young (1990), ‘Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model’, 100 Economic Journal , 1109-1121.
  • Clotfelter, Charles T. (1977), ‘Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for Protection Against Crime’, 67 American Economic Review , 867-877.
  • Clotfelter, Charles T. (1983), ‘Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns’, 65 Review of Economics and Statistics , 363-373.
  • Coffee, John C., Jr. (1980), ‘Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions’, 17 American Criminal Law Review , 419-476.
  • Coffee, John C., Jr. (1986), ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: the Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions’, 86 Columbia Law Review , 669-727.
  • Cohen, Mark A (1996), ‘Theories of Punishment and Empirical Trends in Corporate Criminal Sanctions’, 17 Managerial and Decision Economics , 399-411.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement’, 13 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 167-188.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1987), ‘Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard’, 30 Journal of Law and Economics , 23-51.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1989), ‘Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm and Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1984-1987’, 26(3) American Criminal Law Review , 605-660.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1989), ‘The Role of Criminal Sanctions in Antitrust Enforcement’, 7(4) Contemporary Policy Issues , 36-46.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1991), ‘Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990’, 71(2) Boston University Law Review , 247-280.
  • Cohen, Mark A. (1992), ‘Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes’, 82 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology , 1054-1108.
  • Cohen, Mark A. and Scheffman, David T. (1989), ‘The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is the Punishment Worth the Costs?’, 27(2) American Criminal Law Review , 331-366.
  • Cohen, Mark A., Chih-Chin Ho, Edward D. Jones, III. and Laura M. Schleich (1988), ‘Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A Preliminary Analysis of Prosecutions, Convictions and Sanctions, 1984-1987’, 10(1) Whittier Law Review , 103-124.
  • Cook, Philip J. (1977), ‘Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventative Effects of Punishment’, 41(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 164-209.
  • Cook, Philip J. (1980), ‘Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade’, in Morris, Norval and Tonry, Michael (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research , University of Chicago Press, 211-268.
  • Cook, Philip J. (1983), ‘Costs of Crime’, in Kadisch, Sanford H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice , New York, Free Press, 373-378.
  • Cook, Philip J. (1986), ‘The Relationship Between Victim Resistance and Injury in Noncommercial Robbery’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 405-416.
  • Cook, Philip J. (1987), ‘The Economics of Criminal Sanctions’, in Friedland, M. L. (ed.), Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System: A Multidisciplinary Approach , Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 50-78.
  • Cook, Philip J. and Tauchen, George (1984), ‘The Effect of Minimum Drinking Age Legislation on Youthful Auto Fatalities, 1970-1977’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 169-190.
  • Cook, Philip J., Molliconi, Stephanie and Cole, Thomas B. (1995), ‘Regulating Gun Markets’, 86 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology , 59-92.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1985), ‘Prices and Sanctions’, 84 Columbia Law Review , 1523-1560.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1991), ‘Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards An Economic Theory of the Will’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 149-164.
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  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, 27 Journal of Economic Literature , 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming.
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  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1992), ‘An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions’, 25 U.C. Davis Law Review , 659 ff.
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  • Dye, Ronald A. (1986), ‘Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 339-350.
  • Earnhart, Dietrich (1997), ‘Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws Under Communism and Democracy’, 40 Journal of Law and Economics , 377-402.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1972), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement’, 1 Journal of Legal Studies , 259-276.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1972), ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’, 80 Journal of Political Economy , 521-565.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1975), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’, 65 American Economic Review , 397-417.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1981), ‘On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence’, 71 American Economic Review , 307-332.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1982), ‘On Positive Methodology, Ethics, and Polemics in Deterrence Research’, 22 British Journal of Criminology , 124-139.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1982), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice: A Positive Analysis’, 2 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac (1996), ‘Crime, Punishment and the Market for Offenses’, 10 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 43-67.
  • Ehrlich, Isaac and Brower, George D. (1987), ‘On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model of Crime and the Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental Evidence’, 77 AEA Papers and Proceedings , 99-110.
  • Eide, Erling (1994), Economics of Crime: Deterrence and the Rational Offender , Amsterdam, Elsevier.
  • Eide, Erling (1995), RDEU Models of Crime , Instituto for privatrett, University of Oslo, Working Paper Law and Economics, No. C1.
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  • Epstein, Richard A. (1975), ‘Intentional Harms’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies , 391-442.
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  • Faith, Roger L. and Tollison, Robert D. (1983), ‘The Pricing of Surrogate Crime and Law Enforcement’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 401-411.
  • Faure, Michael G. (1990), ‘De verzekering van geldboeten bij zeewaterverontreiniging door olie (The Insurance of Fines with Respect to the Oil-Pol)’, in X (ed.), Grensoverschrijdend strafrecht. Opstellen , Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 203-221.
  • Feinstein, Jonathan S. (1990), ‘Detection Controlled Estimation’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 233-276.
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  • Finsinger, Jšrg, Hoehn, T. and Pototschnig, A. (1991), ‘The Enforcement of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 133-148.
  • Fischer, Charles C. (1987), ‘Forensic Economics and the Wrongful Death of a Household Producer: Current Practices, Methodological Biases and Alternative Solutions of Losses’, 46 American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 219-228.
  • Fleisher, Arthur A. III and others (1988), ‘Crime or Punishment? Enforcement of the NCAA Football Cartel’, 10 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 433-451.
  • Fletcher, George P. (1985), ‘A Transaction Cost Theory of Crime?’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 921-930.
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  • Frank, JŸrgen (1987), ‘…konomische Modelle der Abschreckung (Economic Models of Deterrence)’, 1 Kriminologisches Journal , 55-65.
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  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1995), Negotiated Enforcement and Criminal Deterrence , University of Bologna, Manuscript.
  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1997), Amnesties, Settlements and Optimal Tax Enforcement , University of Bologna, Manuscript.
  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1997), ‘Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance’, in X., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics , Edward Elgar and University of Gent.
  • Friedman, David D. (1979), ‘Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 399-415.
  • Friedman, David D. (1981), ‘Reflections on Optimal Punishment or: Should the Rich Pay Higher Fines ?’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 185-205.
  • Friedman, David D. (1991), ‘Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishments for Attempts’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 179-186.
  • Friedman, David D. and Sjostrom, William (1993), ‘Hanged for a Sheep: The Economics of Marginal Deterrence’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 345-366.
  • Furlong, William J. (1987), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention’, 34 Journal of Public Economics , 87-103.
  • Gander, James P. (1986), ‘Highway Speed and Uncertainty of Enforcement: The Traveling Salesman(or Trucker) Case’, 22 Logistics and Transportation Review , 43-55.
  • Garoupa, Nuno (1995), Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information , University of York, Discussion Paper, No. 95/96.
  • Garoupa, Nuno (1996), ‘Prison, Parole and the Criminal Justice Act 1991’, 18 Research in Law and Economics .
  • Garoupa, Nuno (1997), The Role of Moral Values in the Economic Analysis of Crime: A General Equilibrium Approach , Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Manuscript.
  • Garoupa, Nuno (1997), The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement: the Urge for a Tougher Policy , Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Manuscript.
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