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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 7400 Settlement

  • Anderson, David A. (1994), ‘Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 & Beyond’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-246.
  • Anderson, David A. (1996), ‘An Introduction to Legal Bargaining’, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press.
  • Anderson, David A. (ed.) (1996), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwood, JAI Press.
  • Anderson, David A. and Rowe, Thomas D., Jr., ‘Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?’, 71(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review .
  • Anderson, David A. and Rowe, Thomas D., Jr., ‘One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes and Offer of Judgement Rules: An Empirical Experiment’, 36 Jurimetrics Journal of Law, Science & Technology , 255-273.
  • Babcock, Linda and others (1995), ‘Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 289-303.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1984), ‘Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information’, 15 Rand Journal of Economics , 404-415.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1988), ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 437-450.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility of Success of Threats to Sue’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-26.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), ‘An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-403.
  • Bernstein, Lisa and Klerman, Daniel (1995), ‘An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements’, 83 Georgetown Law Journal , 2215-2270.
  • Blankenburg, E. and Verwoerd, J.R.A. (198), ‘Vermijden en benutten van civielrechtelijke procedures in Nederland en omringende landen (The Use and Avoidance of Private Law Proceedings i)’, 7-2 Justiti‘le Verkenningen , 20-35.
  • Bone, Robert G. (1994), ‘The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 595-613.
  • Bowles, Roger A. (1987), ‘Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz’s Measuring the Demand for Litigation’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 177-184.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1993), ‘Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs’, 8 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution , 279-297.
  • Bundy, Stephen M. (1989), ‘Commentary: Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 335-365.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo and Yi, Jong Goo (1993), ‘The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 399-424.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, 27 Journal of Economic Literature , 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1994), ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery in the U.S.’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 435-463.
  • Cooter, Robert D., Marks, Stephen V. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1982), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-251. Reprinted in Coleman, Jules and Lange, Jeffrey (Eds.), Law and Economics, Volume 2, New York, University Press, 1992.
  • Cornell, Bradford (1990), ‘The Incentive to Sue: An Option- Pricing Approach’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 173-187.
  • Croson, Rachel and Mnookin, Robert H. (1997), ‘Does Disputing through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 331-345.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1990), ‘On “Bargaining Behavior by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model”‘, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 53-54.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. and Lillard, Lee A. (1983), ‘Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 345-377.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), ‘Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 314-348.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1994), ‘Settlement Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 283-298.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), ‘Keeping Society in the Dark: on the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court’, 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 203-221.
  • Donohue, John J. III (1994), ‘The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate Mathematical Symmetries and Metaissues about Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 543-558.
  • Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), ‘The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation’, 72 Cornell Law Review , 641-695.
  • Farber, Henry S. and White, Michelle J. (1991), ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process’, 22 Rand Journal of Economics , 199-217.
  • Farber, Henry S. and White, Michelle J. (1994), ‘A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 777-806.
  • Farmer, Amy and Pecorino, Paul (1994), ‘Pretrial Negotiations with Asymmetric Information on Risk Preferences’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 273-281.
  • Fenn, Paul T. and Vlachonikolis, Ioannis (1990), ‘Bargaining Behaviour by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 41-52.
  • Fisch, Jill E. (1991), ‘Rewriting History: The Eradication of Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur’, 76 Cornell Law Review , 589-642.
  • Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1989), ‘Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach’, 71 Review of Economics and Statistics , 189-195.
  • Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1996), ‘The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements’, 27 Rand Journal of Economics , 310-321.
  • Gertner, Robert H. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1995), ‘Settlement Escrows’, 24 Journal of Legal Studies , 87-122.
  • Gould, John P. (1973), ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 279-300.
  • Grossman, Gene M. and Katz, Michael L. (1983), ‘Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare’, 73 American Economic Review , 749-757.
  • Haddock, David D. and McChesney, Fred S. (1991), ‘Bargaining Costs, Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 334-354.
  • Harris, Donald and Veljanovski, Cento G. (1983), ‘Remedies for Breach Under Contract Law: Designing Rules to Facilitate Out- of-Court Settlements’, 5 Law and Policy Quarterly , 97-127.
  • Hause, John C. (1989), ‘Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll Be Suing You’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 157-179.
  • Hay, Bruce L. (1995), ‘Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial’, 24 Journal of Legal Studies , 29-62.
  • Hersch, Philip L. (1990), ‘Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 235-241.
  • Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), ‘Emotional Responses in Litigation’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 31-44.
  • Hughes, James W. and Snyder, Edward A. (1995), ‘Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence’, 38 Journal of Law and Economics , 225-250.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1993), ‘Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 187-210.
  • Johnson, Ronald N. and Parkman, Allen M. (1991), ‘Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 145-162.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1996), ‘The Incentive Effects of Settlement under Joint and Several Liability’, International Review of Law and Economics .
  • Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1995), ‘Special Levies on Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency Problems, and Litigation Expenditures’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 175-185.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1986), ‘Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-385.
  • Katz, Avery (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.
  • King, Allan G. (1982), ‘The Economics of Structured Settlements’, 45 Texas Bar Journal , 301-304.
  • Klein, Christopher C. (1986), ‘Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of the Case Law’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 241-253.
  • Klerman, Daniel (1996), ‘Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 445-462.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1992), ‘Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation for ‘Unfair’ Plea Bargaining’, 23 Rand Journal of Economics , 507-515.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement Decision’, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press.
  • Koppen, P.J. Van (1990), ‘Risk-taking in Civil Law Negotiations’, 14 Law and Human Behavior , 151-165.
  • Koppen, P.J. Van, Richters, H.W. and Ten Kate, J. (1989), ‘Schikken of procederen: Psychologische kanttekeningen bij de economie van civielrechtelijke geschillen (Settlement vs. Trial: Psychological Notes on the Economy of Private Law Disputes)’, Rapport aangeboden aan de Minister van Justitie .
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1979), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of Divorce’, 88 Yale Law Journal , 950 ff.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1993), ‘Settlements under Joint and Several Liability’, 68 New York University Law Review , 427 ff.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), ‘Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 517-542.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Revesz, Richard L. (1994), ‘Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 41-76.
  • Landes, William M. (1971), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 61-107.
  • Landes, William M. (1994), ‘Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 235-244.
  • Langenfeld, James and Rogowsky, Robert A. (1987), ‘Settlement vs. Litigation in Antitrust Enforcement’, in Mackay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Ya (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission , Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 205-219.
  • Langerwerf, Etienne (1986), ‘De sociaal-economische ontwikkeling en de procesvoeringsratio’s van de burgerlijke rechtbanken tussen 1950 en 1980 (The Social and Economic Development and the Litigation Ratio’s of the Civil Courts Between 1950 en 1980)’, 40 Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift , 87-102.
  • Loewenstein, George and others (1993), ‘Self Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 135-159.
  • Malsch, Marijke (1990), Advocaten voorspellen de uitkomst van hun zaken (Lawyers’ Predictions of Judicial Decisions: A Study on Calibration of Experts) , Lisse, Swets & Zeitlinger, 109 p.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1991), ‘The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest’, 20 Hofstra Law Review , 1-71. IRS Computer Modernization and Procurement, Hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, June 25, 1991 and April 2, 1992
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1993), ‘Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest’, in Leitzel, Jim and Tirole, J. (eds.), Incentives in Procurement Contracting , Westview.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Multiple Litigants with a Public Good Remedy’, 16 Research in Law and Economics , 151-173.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Litigation Settlement and Collusion’, 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 213-239.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process’, 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 297-318.
  • Menell, Peter S. (1983), ‘A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 41-52.
  • Meurer, Michael J. (1989), ‘The Settlement of Patent Litigation’, 20 Rand Journal of Economics , 77-91.
  • Meurer, Michael J. (1992), ‘The Value of Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: The Settlement Conflict between a Liability Insurer and Defendant’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 502-522.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. (1992), ‘The Strategic Benefit of In-House Counsel for Product Liability Defendants’, 14 Journal of Products Liability , 113-119.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. (1993), ‘Optimal Deterrence of Nuisance Suits by Repeat Defendants’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 135-144.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. (1994), ‘Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 211-224.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), ‘Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 381-399.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 93-125.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), ‘Some Agency Problems in Settlement,’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 189-215.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1989), ‘Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis’, 69 Boston University Law Review , 561-568.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1995), ‘Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective (Forthcoming in Reforming the Civil Justice System)’, in Kramer, Larry (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P., Kessler, Daniel and Meites, Thomas (1996), ‘Expanding on the Fifty Percent Hypothesis: A Multimodal Approach To the Selection of Cases for Litigation,’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 233 ff.
  • Nalebuff, Barry (1987), ‘Credible Pretrail Negotiation’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 198-210.
  • P’ng, Ivan P.L. (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’, 14(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 539-550.
  • Pastor, Santos (1995), ‘ÀQuŽ hacer en los conflictos fiscales? Un an‡lisis econ—mico de las propuestas de actas de conformidad (The Resolution of Tax Disputes)’, Hacienda Pœblica Espa–ola , 225-244.
  • Phillips, Jenny and Hawkins, Keith O. (1976), ‘Some Economic Aspects of the Settlement Process: A Study of Personal Injury Claims’, 39 Modern Law Review , 497-515.
  • Phillips, Jenny, Hawkins, Keith O. and Fleming, J. (1975), ‘Compensation for Personal Injury’, 85 Economic Journal , 129-134.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), ‘Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care’, 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, 22(4) Rand Journal of Economics , 562-570.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 1-8.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), ‘Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?’, 27(1) Journal of Legal Studies , 141-157.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 1-8.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1973), ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 399-458.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1997), ‘Explaining the Variance in the Number of tort Suits across U.S. States and between the United States and England’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 477-489.
  • Priest, George L. and Klein, Benjamin (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-55.
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark and Minoru Nakazato (1989), ‘The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 263 ff.
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark and Nakazato, Minoru (1989), ‘The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 263-290.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’, 78 American Economic Review , 713-728.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), ‘The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-134.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 557-566.
  • Richters, H.W. (1991), Schikkingen en Proceskansen (Settlements and Expected Proceeding Outcome) , diss. Rotterdam, 171 p.
  • Rob, Rafael (1989), ‘Pollution Claim Settlements under Private Information’, 47 Journal of Economic Theory , 307-333.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Geistfeld, Mark (1987), ‘The Divergence between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 483-491.
  • Rosenberg, David and Shavell, Steven (1985), ‘A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-13.
  • Rowe, Thomas D., Jr. (1994), ‘Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 615-626.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
  • Schlicher, John W. (1985), Judicial Regulation of Patent Licensing, Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Policies Created in Lear v. Adkins , Selected Legal Papers, American Intellectual Property Law Association.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1988), ‘Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: the Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government As Defendent’, 73(4) Cornell Law Review , 719-784.
  • Schweizer, Urs (1989), ‘Litigation and Settlement under Two Sided Incomplete Information’, 56 Review of Economic Studies , 163-177.
  • Shavell, Steven (1982), ‘Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 55-81.
  • Shavell, Steven (1982), ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 333-339.
  • Shavell, Steven (1989), ‘Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation’, 20 Rand Journal of Economics , 183-195.
  • Shavell, Steven (1993), ‘Suit versus Settlement when Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgments’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-13.
  • Shavell, Steven (1997), ‘The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 575-612.
  • Sobel, Joel (1989), ‘An Analysis of Discovery Rules’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 133-160.
  • Spier, Kathryn E., ‘A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Stettle Under a Negligence Rule’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), ‘Incomplete Contracts and Signalling’, 23 (3) Rand Journal of Economics , 432-443.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’, 59 Review of Economic Studies , 93-108.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 84-95.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules’, 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 197-214.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘A Note on Joint and Several Liability : Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 559-568.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), ‘A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), ‘A Note on the Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 613-621.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach’, mimeo, July 1993 .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Sykes, Alan O. (1996), Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims , Mimeo, August 1996.
  • Stanley, Linda R. and Coursey, Don L. (1990), ‘Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 145-172.
  • Sykes, Alan O. (1994), ‘”Bad Faith” Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment Proof Problem’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 77-110.
  • Ten Kate, J. (1989), ‘Schikkingen tijdens civielrechtelijke geschillen (Settlements in Private Law Disputes)’, Recht der Werkelijkheid , 63-79.
  • Thomason, Terry (1991), ‘Are Attorneys Paid What They’re Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 187-223.
  • Thorpe, Jeremy (1996), ‘Determining the Appropriate Role for Charge Bargaining in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act’, 4 Competitiona and Consumer Law Journal , 69 ff.
  • Tullock, Gordon (1986), ‘Negotiated Settlement’, in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, Gšran (eds.), Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 39-50.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (1988), ‘Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 101-121.
  • Walker, Laurens (1994), ‘Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 569-593.
  • Wang, Gyu Ho, Kim, Jeong Yoo and Yi, Jong Goo (1994), ‘Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 187-200.
  • Watts, Alison (1994), ‘Bargaining through an Expert Attorney’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 168-186.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1985), ‘Is the Selection of Case for Trial Biased?’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 185-214.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1988), ‘Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 313-352.
  • Yang, Bill (1996), ‘Litigation, Experimentation and Reputation’, 16 International Review of Law and Economics .
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