Encyclopedia of Law & Economics - 7300 Indemnity of Legal Fees

Adams, Michael (1983), 'An Economic Analysis of Law-Suit Insurance', in Finsinger, Jšrg (ed.), Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets , London, MacMillan, 134-151.

Adams, Michael (1983), 'Eine wohlfahrtstheoretische Analyse des Zivilprozesses und der Rechtsschutzversicherungen (An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure and Legal Aid Insurance)', 139 Zeitschrift fŸr Schweizerisches Recht , 187-208.

Adams, Michael (1983), 'StreitgesprŠch Adams/Blankenburg Ÿber den Einfluss der Rechtsschutzversicherungen auf den GeschŠftsanfall der Gerichte', Deutsche Richterzeitung , 353-362.

Anderson, David A. (1994), 'Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 & Beyond', 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-246.

Avery, Katz (1988), 'Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation on the Settlement of Litigation', 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Howard, F., Chang (1996), The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement , Manuscript, University of Southern California.

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), 'An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11', 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-403.

Beckner, Clinton F., III and Katz, Avery (1995), 'The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal Standards Are Uncertain', 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 205-224.

Beier, Martin D. (1990), 'Economics Awry: Using Access Fees for Caseload Diversion', 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1175-1207.

Bernstein, Lisa (1993), 'Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court Annexed Arbitration Programs', 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 2169-2259.

Blankenburg, E. (1990), 'Naar een planeconomie voor de rechtshulp (Towards a Planned Economy for Legal Aid)', Nederlands Juristen Blad , 879-882.

Bowles, Roger A. (1987), 'Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the Demand for Litigation', 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 177-184.

Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, J. (1984), 'An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems', 47 Law and Contemporary Problems , 801 ff.

Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, John C. (1984), 'An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 173-185.

Chung, Tai-Yeong (1996), 'Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis', 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 261-286.

Cooper, Edward H. (1994), 'Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment', 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 465-480.

Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), 'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution', 27 Journal of Economic Literature , 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming.

Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1995), 'Reforming the New Discovery Rules', 84 Georgetown Law Journal , 61-89.

Coursey, Don L. and Stanley, L.R. (1988), 'Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence', 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 161-179.

Dewees, Donald N., Prichard, J. Robert S. and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1981), 'An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions,', 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 155-185.

Dnes, Antony W. and Neil Rickman (1998), 'Contracts for Legal Aid', 5(3) European Journal of Law and Economics .

Donohue, John J. III (1991), 'Opting for the British Rule; or, If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?', 104 Harvard Law Review , 1093 ff. Reprinted in Levmore, Saul, Foundations of Tort Law, 1994, 160.

Donohue, John J. III (1991), 'The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observationbs on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees', 54 Law and Contemporary Problems , 194 ff.

Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), 'The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation', 72 Cornell Law Review , 641-695.

Engelmann, Kathleen and Cornell, Bradford (1988), 'Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies', 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 377-399.

Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1989), 'Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach', 71 Review of Economics and Statistics , 189-195.

Gould, John P. (1973), 'The Economics of Legal Conflicts', 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 279-300.

Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1986), 'Default Risk and the Optimal Pricing of Court Enforcement Services', in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, Gšran (eds.), Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 85-112.

Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1990), 'Rationing Trials by Waiting: Welfare Implications', 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 255-270.

Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1993), 'The Efficiency Implications of Cost Shifting Rules', 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-18.

Gravelle, Hugh S.E. and Waterson, Michael (1993), 'No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees', 103(420) Economic Journal , 1205-1220.

Hallauer, Robert Paul (1973), 'The Shreveport Experiment in Prepaid Legal Services', 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 223-242.

Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), 'Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis', 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-26.

Harsanyi, John C. and Reinhard Selten (1972), 'A Generalized Nash Solution for Two Person Bargaining Games With Incomplete Information', 18 Management Science , 80-106.

Hause, John C. (1989), 'Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You', 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 157-179.

Hersch, Philip L. (1990), 'Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension', 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 235-241.

Hughes, James W. and Snyder, Edward A. (1995), 'Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence', 38 Journal of Law and Economics , 225-250.

Hughes, James W. and Woglom, Geoffry R. (1996), 'Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Legal Costs', in Anderson, David A. (ed.), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press, 167-192.

Hylton, Keith N. (1990), 'The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence', 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 161-171.

Hylton, Keith N. (1993), 'Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard', 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 457-476.

Hylton, Keith N. (1993), 'Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply With the Law', 46 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1069-1128.

Hylton, Keith N. (1996), 'Fee-Shifting and Predictability of Law', 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 427-459.

Kaobayashi, Bruce H. and Parker, Jeffrey S. (1993), 'No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures', 3 Supreme Court Economic Review , 92-152.

Kaplow, Louis (1993), 'Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards', 24 Rand Journal of Economics , 625-630.

Katz, Avery (1987), 'Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?', 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 143-176.

Katz, Avery (1990), 'The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation', 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.

Katz, Avery and Beckner, Clinton F., III (1995), 'The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards are Uncertain', 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 205-224.

Leubsdorf, John (1984), 'Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 9-36.

Mause, Philip (1969), 'Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System', 55 Iowa Law Review , 26-55.

Meyerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark, A. (1983), 'Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading', 29(2) Journal of Economic Theory , 265-281.

Miceli, Thomas J. (1994), 'Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?', 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 211-224.

Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), 'Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention', 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 381-399.

Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), 'An Economic Analysis of Rule 68', 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 93-125.

Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), 'Some Agency Problems in Settlement,', 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 189-215.

Miller, Geoffrey P. and Percival, Robert V. (1984), '(1989)The Public Interest in Attorneys' Fees Awards for Public Interest Litigation,', 47 Law and Contemporary Problems , 233 ff.

Mitchell, Daniel J.B. and Schwartz, Murray L. (1972), 'Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees', 12(1) Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , 69-76.

Nalebuff, Barry (1987), 'Credible Pretrail Negotiation', 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 198-210.

Note (1984), 'State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 321-346.

P'ng, Ivan P.L. (1983), 'Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial', 14(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 539-550.

Pastor, Santos (1990), 'El an‡lisis econ—mico del acceso a la Justicia (The Economics of Access to Justice)', 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 23-42.

Pfennigstorf, Werner (1984), 'The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 37-124.

Plott, Charles R. (1987), 'Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules', 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 185-192.

Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), 'Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial', 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar.

Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), 'Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care', 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), 'Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation', 22(4) Rand Journal of Economics , 562-570.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), 'The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials', 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), 'Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis', 82(2) Georgetown Law Journal , 397-435.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), 'Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs', 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), 'Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?', 27(1) Journal of Legal Studies , 141-157.

Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), 'Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs', 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.

Prasad, Ravi (1995), 'The Use of Costs Litigations Rules to Improve the Efficiency of the Legal System', Office of Regulation Review .

Prichard, J. Robert S. (1988), 'A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law', 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 451-475.

Priest, George L. (1982), 'Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis', 1(1) Supreme Court Economic Review , 163-183.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), 'Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs', 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 557-566.

Rosenberg, David and Shavell, Steven (1985), 'A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value', 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-13.

Rowe, Thomas D. (1984), 'Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 139-171.

Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.

Schmalbeck, Richard L. and Myers, Gary (1986), 'A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules under the Internal Revenue Code', Duke Law Journal , 970-1002.

Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1988), 'Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: the Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government As Defendent', 73(4) Cornell Law Review , 719-784.

Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1989), 'Attorneys, Attorney Fees, and Prisoner Civil Rights Cases', 16 Cornell Law Forum , 6-9.

Shavell, Steven (1982), 'Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs', 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 55-81.

Snyder, Edward A. and Hughes, James W. (1990), 'The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory', 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 345-380.

Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), 'Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules', 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 197-214.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), 'Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach', mimeo, July 1993 .

Symposium (1984), 'Attorney Fees Shifting', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 1-354.

Symposium (1996), 'Fee Shifting', 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 415-697.

Talley, Eric (1996), 'Liabiliy-Based Fee Shifting Rules and Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information', 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 461-503.

Tomkins, Alan J. and Willging, Thomas E. (1986), Taxation of Attorneys' Fees: Practices in English, Alaskan, and Federal Courts , Federal Judicial Center, Washington.

Wolfram, Charles W. (1984), 'The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 293-320.

Zemans, Frances Kahn (1984), 'Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy', 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 187-1210.