Skip to main content
Find a Lawyer

Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 7300 Indemnity of Legal Fees

  • Adams, Michael (1983), ‘An Economic Analysis of Law-Suit Insurance’, in Finsinger, Jšrg (ed.), Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets , London, MacMillan, 134-151.
  • Adams, Michael (1983), ‘Eine wohlfahrtstheoretische Analyse des Zivilprozesses und der Rechtsschutzversicherungen (An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure and Legal Aid Insurance)’, 139 Zeitschrift fŸr Schweizerisches Recht , 187-208.
  • Adams, Michael (1983), ‘StreitgesprŠch Adams/Blankenburg Ÿber den Einfluss der Rechtsschutzversicherungen auf den GeschŠftsanfall der Gerichte’, Deutsche Richterzeitung , 353-362.
  • Anderson, David A. (1994), ‘Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 & Beyond’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-246.
  • Avery, Katz (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation on the Settlement of Litigation’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Howard, F., Chang (1996), The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement , Manuscript, University of Southern California.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), ‘An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-403.
  • Beckner, Clinton F., III and Katz, Avery (1995), ‘The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal Standards Are Uncertain’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 205-224.
  • Beier, Martin D. (1990), ‘Economics Awry: Using Access Fees for Caseload Diversion’, 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1175-1207.
  • Bernstein, Lisa (1993), ‘Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court Annexed Arbitration Programs’, 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 2169-2259.
  • Blankenburg, E. (1990), ‘Naar een planeconomie voor de rechtshulp (Towards a Planned Economy for Legal Aid)’, Nederlands Juristen Blad , 879-882.
  • Bowles, Roger A. (1987), ‘Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz’s Measuring the Demand for Litigation’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 177-184.
  • Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, J. (1984), ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’, 47 Law and Contemporary Problems , 801 ff.
  • Braeutigam, Ronald R., Owen, Bruce M. and Panzar, John C. (1984), ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 173-185.
  • Chung, Tai-Yeong (1996), ‘Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 261-286.
  • Cooper, Edward H. (1994), ‘Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 465-480.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, 27 Journal of Economic Literature , 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1995), ‘Reforming the New Discovery Rules’, 84 Georgetown Law Journal , 61-89.
  • Coursey, Don L. and Stanley, L.R. (1988), ‘Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 161-179.
  • Dewees, Donald N., Prichard, J. Robert S. and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1981), ‘An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions,’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 155-185.
  • Dnes, Antony W. and Neil Rickman (1998), ‘Contracts for Legal Aid’, 5(3) European Journal of Law and Economics .
  • Donohue, John J. III (1991), ‘Opting for the British Rule; or, If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?’, 104 Harvard Law Review , 1093 ff. Reprinted in Levmore, Saul, Foundations of Tort Law, 1994, 160.
  • Donohue, John J. III (1991), ‘The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observationbs on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees’, 54 Law and Contemporary Problems , 194 ff.
  • Eisenberg, Theodore and Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), ‘The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation’, 72 Cornell Law Review , 641-695.
  • Engelmann, Kathleen and Cornell, Bradford (1988), ‘Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 377-399.
  • Fournier, Gary M. and Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1989), ‘Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach’, 71 Review of Economics and Statistics , 189-195.
  • Gould, John P. (1973), ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 279-300.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1986), ‘Default Risk and the Optimal Pricing of Court Enforcement Services’, in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, Gšran (eds.), Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 85-112.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1990), ‘Rationing Trials by Waiting: Welfare Implications’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 255-270.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1993), ‘The Efficiency Implications of Cost Shifting Rules’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-18.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. and Waterson, Michael (1993), ‘No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees’, 103(420) Economic Journal , 1205-1220.
  • Hallauer, Robert Paul (1973), ‘The Shreveport Experiment in Prepaid Legal Services’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 223-242.
  • Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), ‘Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-26.
  • Harsanyi, John C. and Reinhard Selten (1972), ‘A Generalized Nash Solution for Two Person Bargaining Games With Incomplete Information’, 18 Management Science , 80-106.
  • Hause, John C. (1989), ‘Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll Be Suing You’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 157-179.
  • Hersch, Philip L. (1990), ‘Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 235-241.
  • Hughes, James W. and Snyder, Edward A. (1995), ‘Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence’, 38 Journal of Law and Economics , 225-250.
  • Hughes, James W. and Woglom, Geoffry R. (1996), ‘Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Legal Costs’, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press, 167-192.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 161-171.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1993), ‘Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 457-476.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1993), ‘Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply With the Law’, 46 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1069-1128.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1996), ‘Fee-Shifting and Predictability of Law’, 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 427-459.
  • Kaobayashi, Bruce H. and Parker, Jeffrey S. (1993), ‘No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures’, 3 Supreme Court Economic Review , 92-152.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1993), ‘Shifting Plaintiffs’ Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards’, 24 Rand Journal of Economics , 625-630.
  • Katz, Avery (1987), ‘Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 143-176.
  • Katz, Avery (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.
  • Katz, Avery and Beckner, Clinton F., III (1995), ‘The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards are Uncertain’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 205-224.
  • Leubsdorf, John (1984), ‘Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 9-36.
  • Mause, Philip (1969), ‘Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System’, 55 Iowa Law Review , 26-55.
  • Meyerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark, A. (1983), ‘Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading’, 29(2) Journal of Economic Theory , 265-281.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. (1994), ‘Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 211-224.
  • Miceli, Thomas J. and Segerson, Kathleen (1991), ‘Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 381-399.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 93-125.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), ‘Some Agency Problems in Settlement,’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 189-215.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. and Percival, Robert V. (1984), ‘(1989)The Public Interest in Attorneys’ Fees Awards for Public Interest Litigation,’, 47 Law and Contemporary Problems , 233 ff.
  • Mitchell, Daniel J.B. and Schwartz, Murray L. (1972), ‘Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees’, 12(1) Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , 69-76.
  • Nalebuff, Barry (1987), ‘Credible Pretrail Negotiation’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 198-210.
  • Note (1984), ‘State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 321-346.
  • P’ng, Ivan P.L. (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’, 14(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 539-550.
  • Pastor, Santos (1990), ‘El an‡lisis econ—mico del acceso a la Justicia (The Economics of Access to Justice)’, 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 23-42.
  • Pfennigstorf, Werner (1984), ‘The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 37-124.
  • Plott, Charles R. (1987), ‘Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 185-192.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), ‘Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care’, 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, 22(4) Rand Journal of Economics , 562-570.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), ‘Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis’, 82(2) Georgetown Law Journal , 397-435.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), ‘Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs’, 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), ‘Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?’, 27(1) Journal of Legal Studies , 141-157.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), ‘Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs’, 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.
  • Prasad, Ravi (1995), ‘The Use of Costs Litigations Rules to Improve the Efficiency of the Legal System’, Office of Regulation Review .
  • Prichard, J. Robert S. (1988), ‘A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 451-475.
  • Priest, George L. (1982), ‘Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis’, 1(1) Supreme Court Economic Review , 163-183.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 557-566.
  • Rosenberg, David and Shavell, Steven (1985), ‘A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-13.
  • Rowe, Thomas D. (1984), ‘Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 139-171.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
  • Schmalbeck, Richard L. and Myers, Gary (1986), ‘A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules under the Internal Revenue Code’, Duke Law Journal , 970-1002.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1988), ‘Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: the Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government As Defendent’, 73(4) Cornell Law Review , 719-784.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. and Eisenberg, Theodore (1989), ‘Attorneys, Attorney Fees, and Prisoner Civil Rights Cases’, 16 Cornell Law Forum , 6-9.
  • Shavell, Steven (1982), ‘Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 55-81.
  • Snyder, Edward A. and Hughes, James W. (1990), ‘The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 345-380.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules’, 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 197-214.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach’, mimeo, July 1993 .
  • Symposium (1984), ‘Attorney Fees Shifting’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 1-354.
  • Symposium (1996), ‘Fee Shifting’, 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 415-697.
  • Talley, Eric (1996), ‘Liabiliy-Based Fee Shifting Rules and Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information’, 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 461-503.
  • Tomkins, Alan J. and Willging, Thomas E. (1986), Taxation of Attorneys’ Fees: Practices in English, Alaskan, and Federal Courts , Federal Judicial Center, Washington.
  • Wolfram, Charles W. (1984), ‘The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 293-320.
  • Zemans, Frances Kahn (1984), ‘Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy’, 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 187-1210.
Copied to clipboard