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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 7000 Civil Procedure: General

  • Adams, Michael (1981), Oekonomische Analyse des Zivilprozesses (Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure) , Koenigstein, Athenaeum-Verlag.
  • Adams, Michael (1981), …konomische Analyse des Zivilprozesses (Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure) , Kšnigstein/Ts, AthenŠum, 130 p.
  • Adams, Michael (1983), ‘Eine wohlfahrtstheoretische Analyse des Zivilprozesses und der Rechtsschutzversicherungen (An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure and Legal Aid Insurance)’, 139 Zeitschrift fŸr Schweizerisches Recht , 187-208.
  • Adams, Michael (1986), ‘Der Zivilprozess als Folge strategischen Verhaltens (On Civil Procedure as a Consequence of Strategic Behavior)’, 7 Zeitschrift fŸr Rechtssoziologie , 212-225.
  • Alexander, Janet Cooper (1994), ‘Judges’ Self Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 647-665.
  • Anderson, David A. (1994), ‘Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 & Beyond’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-246.
  • Anderson, David A. (1996), ‘Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap’, in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.), The Economics of Legal Relationships , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press.
  • Bone, Robert G. (1994), ‘The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 595-613.
  • Bowles, Roger A. (1981), ‘Economic Aspects of Legal Procedure’, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), The Economic Approach to Law , London, Butterworths, 191-209.
  • Broder, Josef M. (1978), ‘Citizen Participation in Michigan District Courts’, in Randall, Allan (ed.), Citizen Participation in Natural Resource Decision , North Central Research Strategy Committee for Natural Resources, Departement of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky. Reprinted in Samuels, Warren J. and Schmid, A. Allen (eds.), Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, Boston, Nijhoff, 1981, 166-178.
  • Brown, John Prather (1985), ‘Alternatives to the Present System of Litigation for Personal Injury’, in Baily, Mary Ann and Cikins, Warren I. (eds.), The Effects of Litigation on Health Care Costs , Washington, Brookings Institution, 69-79.
  • Bundy, Stephen M. and Elhauge, Einer Richard (1991), ‘Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation’, 79 California Law Review , 313-420.
  • Buscaglia, Edgardo and Domingo, Pilar (1996), ‘Political and Economic Impediments to Judicial Reform in Latin America’, in Buscaglia, Edgardo, Ratliff, William and Cooter, Robert (eds.), Law and Economics of Development , Greenwood, JAI Press.
  • Carrington, Paul D. (1979), ‘Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 303-317.
  • Carroll, Sidney L. and Gaston, Robert J. (1981), ‘A Note on the Quality of Legal Services: Peer Review and Disciplinary Service’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 251-260.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo and Yi, Jong Goo (1993), ‘The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 399-424.
  • Chiorazzi, Michael and others (1988), ‘Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A Selected Annotated Bibliography’, 51(3) Law and Contemporary Problems , 87-207.
  • Cooper, Edward H. (1994), ‘Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 465-480.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1983), ‘The Objectives of Private and Public Judges’, 41 Public Choice , 107-132.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1987), ‘Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest’s `Measuring Legal Change’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 85 ff.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, 27 Journal of Economic Literature , 1067-1097. Reprinted in Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (Eds.), Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 1996 forthcoming.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1990), ‘Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective’, 24 Law and Society Review , 533 ff.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1994), ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery in the U.S.’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 435-463.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Ulen, Thomas S. (1988), Law and Economics , Scott Foresman. Reprinted in Japanese translation by Prof. Shozo Ota, introduction by Prof. Koji Shimdo, published by Shoji-Homu in 1989.
  • Davis, Otto A. (1979), ‘Public and Private Characteristics of a Legal Process: A Comment’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 285-293.
  • Denzau, Arthur (1979), ‘Litigation Expenditures as Private Determinants of Judicial Decisions: A Comment’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 295-302.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H., Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 331-370.
  • Eisenberg, Theodore (1990), ‘Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 337-358.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1986), ‘The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law’, 53 University of Chicago Law Review , 1175-1218.
  • Estrada, Javier, Pastor, Santos and (1997), The Distribution of Sentences in Tax-Related Cases: Explaining Success Rates , Carlos III University Working Paper.
  • Froeb, Luke M. (1993), ‘The Adverse Selection of Cases for Trial’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 317-324.
  • Froeb, Luke M. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?’, 12 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization .
  • Gay, Gerald D., Grace, Martin F., Kale, Jayant R. and Noe, Thomas H. (1989), ‘Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence’, 20 Rand Journal of Economics , 196-213.
  • Getman, Julius G. (1974), ‘A Critique of the Report of the Shreveport Experiment’, 3 Journal of Legal Studies , 487-497.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.) (1979), ‘Discussion by Seminar Participants’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 323-398.
  • Grady, Mark F., Allen, Ronald J. and Polsby, Daniel (1990), ‘A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilige and the Work-Product Doctrine’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 359 ff.
  • Gross, Samuel R. (1987), ‘The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation’, 85 Michigan Law Review , 734 ff.
  • Hay, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 481-515.
  • Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr. (1989), ‘Authority in the Dock’, 69 Boston University Law Review , 469-476.
  • Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), ‘Emotional Responses in Litigation’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 31-44.
  • Hylton, Keith N. (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 161-171.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1994), ‘The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 307-401.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1989), ‘Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability’, 102 Harvard Law Review , 565-615.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1990), ‘Legal Advice about Acts Already Committed’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 149-159.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1996), ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’, 39 Journal of Law and Economics , 191-209.
  • Katz, Avery (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 127-143.
  • Katz, Avery (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-27.
  • Katz, Avery and Beckner, Clinton F., III (1995), ‘The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards are Uncertain’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 205-224.
  • Klein, Christopher C. (1990), ‘Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham Litigation Cases’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 29-40.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement Decision’, in Anderson, David A. (ed.), Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Jeffrey S. Parker (1993), ‘No Armistice at 11: A Comment on the Amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’, 3 Supreme Court Economic Review , 93-152.
  • Landes, William M. (1993), ‘Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 99-134.
  • Landes, William M. (1994), ‘Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 235-244.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1979), ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 235-284.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1994), ‘The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 683-719.
  • Lemley, Mark A. and Jorde, Thomas M. (1991), ‘Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases : Understanding Monsanto and Matsushita’, 36 Antitrust Bulletin , 271 ff.
  • Linder, Douglas O. (1989), ‘Some Doubts Concerning the Selection Hypothesis of George Priest’, 37 University of Kansas Law Review , 319-347.
  • Macey, Jonathan R. (1994), ‘Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 627-646.
  • McLauchlan, William P. (1973), ‘An Empirical Study of Civil Procedure: Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding Verdict’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 459-468.
  • McLauchlan, William P. (1977), ‘An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule’, 6 Journal of Legal Studies , 427-459.
  • Miller, Arthur R. (1984), ‘The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix’, 69 Minnesota Law Review , 1-37.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1977), ‘Note, Aldinger V. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction’, 77 Columbia Law Review , 127 ff.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1986), ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 93-125.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1989), ‘Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis’, 69 Boston University Law Review , 561-568.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1994), ‘Introduction: Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 303-306.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. (1978), ‘Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents’, 7 Journal of Legal Studies , 243-261.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. (1981), ‘On the Consequences of Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents: Some New Results’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 269-291.
  • Pastor, Santos (1989), ‘Econom’a de la Justicia (I) (Economics of Litigation I)’, 5 Revista de Econom’a Pœblica , 131-169.
  • Pastor, Santos (1989), ‘Fundamentos de pol’tica judicial (Foundations of Judicial Policy)’, 1541 Bolet’n de Informaci—n del Ministerio de Justicia .
  • Pastor, Santos (1990), ‘El an‡lisis econ—mico del acceso a la Justicia (The Economics of Access to Justice)’, 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 23-42.
  • Pastor, Santos (1990), ‘Econom’a de la Justicia en Espa–a (Problems in the Spanish Courts)’, 4 Revista de Econom’a , 65-69.
  • Pastor, Santos (1990), ‘Econom’a de la Justicia (II) (Economics of Litigation II)’, 6 Revista de Econom’a Pœblica , 69-86.
  • Pastor, Santos (1993), ‘Composici—n, Estructura y Caracter’sticas de la Litigiosidad Contencioso-Administrativa: Un An‡lisis Muestral (Litigation in Contentious-Administrative Courts. An Empirical Analysis)’, 111 Bolet’n de Informaci—n del Consejo General del Poder Judicial , 205-288.
  • Pastor, Santos (1996), ‘El impacto econ—mico de la reforma (The Economic Impact of Judicial Reform)’, in X (ed.), Banco Mundial, Reforma Judicial y Desarrollo Econ—mico, en prensa .
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), ‘Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care’, 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, 22(4) Rand Journal of Economics , 562-570.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Welfare Effects of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 151-164.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), ‘Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis’, 82(2) Georgetown Law Journal , 397-435.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), ‘Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs’, 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1998), ‘Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?’, 27(1) Journal of Legal Studies , 141-157.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Che, Yeon-Koo (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, 22(4) Journal of Economics , 562-570.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 109-116.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), ‘Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis’, 82(2) Georgetown Law Journal , 397-435.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1996), ‘Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs’, 27(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 269-280.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1988), ‘Comment: Responding to Gordon Tullock’, 2 Research in Law and Policy Studies , 29-33.
  • Priest, George L. (1985), ‘Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 215-243.
  • Priest, George L. (1987), ‘Measuring Legal Change’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 193-225.
  • Priest, George L. and Klein, Benjamin (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-55.
  • Raiteri, Monica (1992), ‘La funzione giurisdizionale tra redistribuzione economica e tutela dei diritti (The jurisdictional office between economic redistribution and protection of rights)’, Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica , 475-518.
  • Ribeiro Mendes, Armindo (1992), ‘O Processo Executivo e a Economia’, 2 Sub Judice , 51-62.
  • Rowe, Thomas D., Jr. (1994), ‘Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Comment’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 615-626.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), ‘The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation : A Simple Model of Mechanism Design’, International Review of Law and Economics .
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), Enforcement by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production , mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department.
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), ‘Evidence Production, Adversarial Process and the Private Instigation of Suits’, mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department .
  • Sarokin, H. Lee (1989), ‘A Comment on Geoffrey Hazard’s’, 69 Authority in the Dock , 477-479.
  • Schwarzer, William W. (1988), ‘Rule 11 Revisited’, 101 Harvard Law Review , 1013-1025.
  • Shavell, Steven (1997), ‘The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 575-612.
  • Spurr, Stephen J. (1991), ‘An Economic Analysis of Collateral Estoppel’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 47-61.
  • Symposium (1987), ‘Conference on the Law and Economics of Procedure’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 143-447.
  • Symposium (1989), ‘Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue’, 69 Boston University Law Review , 467-779.
  • Thomas, Robert E. (1995), ‘The Trial Selection Hypothesis without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence’, 24 Journal of Legal Studies , 209-228.
  • Tribe, Laurence H. (1971), ‘Trial by Mathematics Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’, 84 Harvard Law Review , 1329-1393.
  • Trubeck, David M., Sarat, Austin, Felstiner, William L.F., Kritzer, Herbert M. and Grossman, Joel B. (1983), ‘The Cost of Ordinary Litigation’, 31 UCLA Law Review , 72 ff.
  • Tullock, Gordon (1975), ‘On Effective Organization of Trials’, 28 Kyklos , 745-762.
  • Tullock, Gordon (1980), Trials on Trial – The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure , New York, Columbia University Press, 255 p.
  • Tullock, Gordon (1988), ‘Defending the Napoleontic Code over the Common Law’, 2 Research in Law and Policy Studies , 3-27.
  • Walker, Laurens (1994), ‘Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 569-593.
  • White, Lawrence J. (1988), ‘Litigation and Economic Incentives’, 11 Research in Law and Economics , 73-90.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Williams, Ross A. (1994), ‘The Cost of Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 73-86.
  • X (1987), ‘Conference : ‘Conference on the Law and Economics of Procedure’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 143-372.
  • Yeazell, Stephen C. (1989), ‘The Salience of Salience: A Comment on Professor Hazard’s Authority in the Dock’, 69 Boston University Law Review , 481-486.
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