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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 6310 Substantive Administrative Law and Economics

  • Bardach, Eugene and Kagan, Robert A. (1982), Going By The Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness , Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 375 p.
  • Breyer, Stephen G. (1993), Breaking The Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation , Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 127 p.
  • Buxbaum, Hertig and Hirsch, Hopt (eds.), European Economic and Business Law, Legal and Economic Analyses on Integration and Harmonization , Berlin, 401 p.
  • Cranor, Carl F. and (1993), Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and The Law , New York, Oxford Press, 252 p.
  • Graham, John D. and Wiener, Jonathan Baert (eds.) (1995), Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Howard, Philip K. (1994), The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America , New York, Random House, 202 p.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1991), ‘The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest’, 20 Hofstra Law Review , 1-71. IRS Computer Modernization and Procurement, Hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, June 25, 1991 and April 2, 1992
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1993), ‘Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest’, in Leitzel, Jim and Tirole, J. (eds.), Incentives in Procurement Contracting , Westview.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Litigation Settlement and Collusion’, 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 213-239.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Multiple Litigants with a Public Good Remedy’, 16 Research in Law and Economics , 151-173.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process’, 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 297-318.
  • Martin, Dolores Tremewan and Wagner, Richard E. (1978), ‘The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics , 409-425.
  • Mashaw, Jerry L. (1985), ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 81-100.
  • McGarity, Thomas O. (1991), Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy , New York, Cambridge University Press, 384 p.
  • Peeters, Bruno (1989), De continu•teit van het overheidsondernemen: een begrippenanalyse en een kritiek op de uitvoeringsimmuniteit (The Continuity Principle of Governmental Activities: A Concept Analysis and a Critique on the Execution Immunity) , Antwerpen, Maklu, 559 p.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1988), ‘Progressive Law and Economics – and the New Administrative Law’, 98 Yale Law Journal , 341-368.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1993), Antitrust Enforcement – An Inquiry into Policy Analysis of Competition Law , Working Paper, Centre for Research in Economics & Business Administration, Bergen, No. 89.
  • Sagoff, Mark (1988), The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment , New York, Cambridge University Press, 271 p.
  • Salvador Coderch, Pablo, Lloveras Y., Ferrer, M.R. Y, Seuba Y. and Torreblanca, J.C (1995), ‘Del servicio pœblico al servicio a la comunidad (From Public Service to Service for the Community)’, 136 Revista de Administraci—n Pœblica , 69 ff.
  • Shaviro, Daniel N. (1997), Do Deficits Matter? , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Spence, David B. (1997), ‘Modeling Away the Delegation Problem’, 7 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 199-219.
  • Spence, David B. (1997), ‘Administrative Law and Agency Policymaking: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control’, 14(2) Yale Journal on Regulation .
  • Sunstein, Cass R. (1990), After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State , Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 284 p.
  • Sunstein, Cass R. (1991), ‘Administrative Substance’, 1991 Duke Law Journal , 607-646.
  • Sunstein, Cass R. (1996), ‘Legislative Forward: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State’, 48 Stanford Law Review , 247-309.
  • Sunstein, Cass R. (1997), Free Markets and Social Justice , New York, Oxford Press, 407 p.
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