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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5810 Marriage Contracts

  • Allen, Douglas W. (1990), ‘In Inquiry Into the State’s Role in Marriage’, 13 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 171-191.
  • Bayles, Michael D. (1989), ‘Marriage as a Bad Business Deal: Distribution of Property on Divorce’, 17 Florida State University Law Review , 95-106.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1973), ‘A Theory of Marriage: Part 1’, 81 Journal of Political Economy , 813-846.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1974), ‘On the Relevance of the New Economics of the Family’, 64 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 317-319.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1974), ‘A Theory of Social Interactions’, 82 Journal of Political Economy , 1063-1093.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1976), The Economic Approach to Human Behavior , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 314 p.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1985), ‘Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor’, 3(S) Journal of Labor Economics , 33 ff.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1988), ‘Family Economics and Macro Behavior’, 78 American Economic Review , 1-13.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1991), A Treatise on the Family , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 288 p.
  • Becker, Gary S. and Murphy, Kevin M. (1988), ‘The Family and the State’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-18.
  • Becker, Gary S., Landes, Elisabeth M. and Michael, Robert T. (1977), ‘An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability’, 85 Journal of Political Economy , 1141-1187.
  • Ben-Porath, Y. (1980), ‘The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange’, 6 Population Development Review , 1-30.
  • Bennett, Belinda (1991), ‘The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and Economics on the Family’, 18 Journal of Law and Society , 206-218.
  • Bishop, William, ‘”Is He Married?” Marriage as a Market Signal’, in Knetsch, Jack L. (ed.), Economic Aspects of Family Law , Toronto, Butterworths.
  • Bolin, Kristian (1994), ‘The Marriage Contract and Efficient Rules for Spousal Support’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 493-502.
  • Borenstein, Severin and Courant, Paul N. (1989), ‘How To Carve a Medical Degree: Human Capital Assets in Divorce Settlements’, 79 American Economic Review , 992-1009.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1990), ‘Rings and Promises’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 203-215.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1993), ‘The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce’, 27 Family Law Quarterly , 453-470.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), ‘Comment (on Jana Singer’s Alimony and Efficiency)’, 83 Georgetown Law Journal , 2461-2479.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), ‘Status, Contract and Covenant’, 79 Cornell Law Review , 1573-1602.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1991), ‘Legal Rules, Bargaining and Transactions Costs: The Case of Divorce’, in Nagel, Stuart and Mills, Miriam K. (eds.), Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution , New York, Quorum Books, 91-105.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1993), ‘Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs’, 8 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution , 279-297.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1995), ‘Fraud in Courtship: Annulment and Divorce’, 2 European Journal of Law and Economics , 45-63.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Carbone, June R. (1988), ‘The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce’, 62 Tulane Law Review , 855-905.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Crafton, Steven M. (1994), ‘Marriage and Opportunism’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 869-894.
  • Broude, Donna L. (1986), ‘The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 on Divorce Financial Planning’, 21 Journal of Family Law , 283-300.
  • Cabrillo, Francisco (1996), Matrimonio, Familia y Econom’a (Marriage, Family and Economics) , Madrid, Minerva Ediciones.
  • Cabrillo, Francisco (1996), Matrimonio, Familia y Economia , Madrid, Minerva Ediciones.
  • Carbone, June R. (1990), ‘Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman’, 43 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1463-1501.
  • Carbone, June R. and Brinig, Margaret F. (1991), ‘Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform’, 65 Tulane Law Review , 954-1010.
  • Cass, Ronald A. (1987), ‘Coping With Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate’, 67 Boston University Law Review , 73-97.
  • Chami, Ralph and Fischer, Jeffrey (1996), ‘Altruism, Matching and Nonmarket Insurance’, 34 Economic Inquiry , 630-647.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1972), ‘The Enforcement of Property Rights in Children, and the Marriage Contract’, 82 Economic Journal , 641-657.
  • Cohen, Jane Maslow (1987), ‘Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism’, 67 Boston University Law Review , 105-175.
  • Cohen, Lloyd R. (1987), ‘Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life”‘, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 267-303.
  • Fair, R.C. (1978), ‘A Theory of Extramarital Affairs’, 86 Journal of Political Economy , 45-61.
  • Freiden, A. (1974), ‘The United States Marriage Market’, 82(S) Journal of Political Economy , 34-53.
  • Friedman, Lawrence M. and Percival, Robert V. (1976), ‘Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault through Fiction to Freedom’, 5 Journal of Legal Studies , 61-82.
  • Fuchs, Maximilian (1979), ‘Die Behandlung von Ehe und Scheidung in der “…konomischen Analyse des Rechts” (The Treatment of Marriage and Divorce in the “Economic Analysis of Law”)’, 7 Zeitschrift fŸr das gesamte Familienrecht , 553-557.
  • Grossbard, Amyra (1978), ‘Towards a Marriage between Economics and Anthropology and a General Theory of Marriage’, 68 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 33-37.
  • Grossbard-Shechtman, Amyra (1984), ‘A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage’, 94 Economic Journal , 863-882.
  • Horton, Paul and Alexander, Lawrence (1986), ‘Freedom of Contract and the Family: A Skeptical Appraisal’, in Peden, Joseph R. and Glahe, Fred R. (eds.), The American Family and the State , San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 229-255.
  • Hutchens, Robert M. (1979), ‘Welfare, Remarriage and Market Search’, 69 American Economic Review , 369-379.
  • Keeley, Michael C. (1977), ‘The Economics of Family Formation’, 15 Economic Inquiry , 238-250.
  • King, Allan G. (1982), ‘Human Capital and the Risk of Divorce: An Asset in Search of a Property Right’, 49 Southern Journal of Economics , 536-541.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1979), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of Divorce’, 88 Yale Law Journal , 950 ff.
  • Landes, Elisabeth M. (1978), ‘Economics of Alimony’, 7 Journal of Legal Studies , 35-63.
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand (1980), ‘La spŽcialisation des r™les conjugaux, les gains du mariage et la perspective du divorce’, Consommation .
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand (1982), ‘Les dŽterminants de la mobilitŽ matrimoniale (The Determinants of Matrimonial Mobility)’, Consommation .
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand (1988), Le MarchŽ du Mariage et de la Famille (The Marriage Market and the Family) , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), Collection Libre Echange.
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand (1990), ‘BioŽthique et libertŽ (Bio-Ethics and Liberty)’, 13 Droits: Revue franaise de thŽorie juridique , 111-122.
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand Et Levy-Garboua (1981), ‘L’arbitrage autarcie-marchŽ: une explication du travail fŽminin (Arbitration Autarchy-Market: An Explanation of Female Work)’, Consommation .
  • Lichtenstein, Norman B. (1985), ‘Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of Financial Resources at Divorce: A Farewell to Fault’, 51 UMRC Law Review , 1-18.
  • Manser, Marilyn and Brown, Murray (1980), ‘Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis’, 21 International Economic Review , 31-44.
  • McGee, Robert W. (1998), ‘Polygamy’, in X. (ed.), Magill’s Legal Guide , Pasadena, CA: Salem Press.
  • Michael, R. (1979), ‘Determinants of Divorce’, in Garboua, Levy (ed.), Sociological Economics , London, Sage.
  • Olsen, Frances E. (1983), ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’, 96 Harvard Law Review , 1497-1578.
  • Papps, Ivy (1980), For Love or Money? A Preliminary Economic Analysis , London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 63 p. (Hobart Paperback No.86).
  • Pask, E. Diane, McCall, M.L., Brown C.L., Bruce, Christopher J., Hass, C.A. and Vallance, D.P. (1989), How Much and Why? , Calgary, Canadian Research Unit for Law and the Family, 202 p.
  • Pennington, Joan (1989), ‘The Economic Implications of Divorce for Older Women’, 23 Clearinghouse Review , 488-493.
  • Peters, H. Elizabeth (1986), ‘Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting’, 76 American Economic Review , 437-454.
  • Pollak, Robert A. (1985), ‘A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households’, 23 Journal of Economic Literature .
  • Polsby, Daniel D. and Zelder, Martin (1994), ‘Risk-Adjusted Valuation of Professional Degrees in Divorce’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 273-285.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1989), ‘The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood’, 6 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy , 21-31.
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark (1996), Odd Markets In Japanese History: Law and Economic Growth , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Riboud, M. (1988), ‘Altruisme au sein de la famille, croissance Žconomique et dŽmographie (Altruism in the Family, Economic Growth and Demography)’, Revue Žconomique .
  • Schultz, Theodore W. (ed.) (1974), Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children and Human Capital , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 584 p.
  • Smith, Vernon L. (1974), ‘Economic Theory and Its Discontents’, 64 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 320 ff.
  • Sofer, C. (1985), La Division du Travail entre Hommes et Femmes (The Division of Labour Between Men and Women) , Paris, Economica.
  • Stake, Jeffrey E. (1992), ‘Mandatory Planning for Divorce’, 45 Vanderbilt Law Review , 397-454.
  • Stout, Lynn A. (1981), ‘Note: The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing By Married Persons’, 91 Yale Law Journal , 363-382.
  • Weiss, Yoram and Willis, Robert J. (1985), ‘Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements’, 3 Journal of Labor Economics , 268-292.
  • Weitzman, Lenore J. (1981), The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers and the Law , New York, Free Press, 536 p.
  • Weitzman, Lenore J. (1981), ‘The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards’, 28 UCLA Law Review , 1181-1268.
  • Wishik, Heather Ruth (1986), ‘Economics of Divorce: An Explanatory Study’, 20 Family Law Quarterly , 79-107.
  • Zelder, Martin (1993), ‘Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 503-520.
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