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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5700 Insurance Regulation

  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1985), ‘Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification’, 71 Virginia Law Review , 403-451.
  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1986), Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy , New Haven, Yale University Press, 254 p.
  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1990), ‘Products Liability Law and Insurance Profitability’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 837-844.
  • Adams, Michael (1983), ‘An Economic Analysis of Law-Suit Insurance’, in Finsinger, Jšrg (ed.), Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets , London, MacMillan, 134-151.
  • Angoff, Jay (1988), ‘Insurance against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry’, 5 Yale Journal on Regulation , 397-415.
  • Arnott, Richard J. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1990), ‘The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard’, in LoubergŽ, Henri (ed.), Risk, Information and Insurance. Essays in the Memory of Karl H. Borch , Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 91-121.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1974), ‘Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles’, Scandinavian Actuarial Journal , 1-42.
  • Atiyah, Patrick S. (1977), Accidents, Compensation and the Law , London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
  • Becker, Gary S. and Ehrlich, Isaac (1972), ‘Market Insurance, Self-insurance, and Self-protection’, 80 Journal of Political Economy , 623-648.
  • Beenstock, Michael and Brasse, Valerie (1986), Insurance for Unemployment , London, Allen and Unwin, 107 p.
  • Benston, George J. and Smith, C.W., Jr. (1976), ‘A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation’, 31 Journal of Finance , 215-231.
  • Blackmon, B. Glenn, Jr. and Zeckhauser, Richard (1991), ‘Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts’, 81 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 65-69.
  • Bolkestein, Frits (1985), Freedom and Regulation: A Liberal View on Competition Policy (Vrijheid en regeling: Een liberale visie op de mededingingspolitiek) , s-Gravenhage, 35 p.
  • Bongaerts, Jan C. and De Bivre, Aline (1987), ‘Insurance for Civil Liability for Marine Oil Pollution Damages’, 12 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 145-157.
  • Borenstein, Severin (1989), ‘The Economics of Costly Risk Sorting in Competitive Insurance Markets’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 25-39.
  • Breyer, F. and Schulenburg, J. Matthias Graf Von Der (1987), ‘Voting on Social Security: The Family as Decision-Making Unit’, 40 Kyklos , 529-547.
  • Breyer, F. and Schulenburg, J. Matthias Graf Von Der (1990), ‘Family Ties and Social Security in a Democracy’, 67 Public Choice , 155-167.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1992), ‘Politics, Economics and the McCarren Ferguson Act’, 73 Public Choice , 371-383.
  • Brown, Craig (1989), ‘A Choice of Choice: Adding Postaccident Choice to the Menu of No-Fault Models’, 26 San Diego Law Review , 1095-1108.
  • Brown, John Prather (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies , 323-350.
  • Bruce, Christopher J. (1984), ‘The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature’, 6 Law and Policy , 67-100.
  • Brueckner, Jan K. and Spiller, Pablo T. (1994), ‘Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline Industry’, 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 379-415.
  • Butler, Richard J. and Worrall, John D. (1986), ‘The Costs of Workers’ Compensation Insurance: Private versus Public’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 329-356.
  • Calabresi, Guido (1961), ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’, 70 Yale Law Journal , 499-553.
  • Calabresi, Guido (1970), The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis , New Haven, Yale University Press, 340 p.
  • Camerer, Colin F. (1987), ‘Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets: Experimental Evidence’, 77 American Economic Review , 981-997.
  • Cane, Peter (1989), ‘Liability Rules and the Cost of Professi onal Indemnity Insurance’, 14 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 347-359.
  • Chamberlin, John R. (1985), ‘Assessing the Fairness of Insurance Classifications’, 7 Research in Law and Economics , 65-87.
  • Chapman, C.B. and Cooper, Dale F. (1985), ‘Contract Risk Analysis for Turnkey Project Bid: a Case Study’, 10 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 293-305.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1974), ‘The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 493-496.
  • Cummins, J. David and Vanderhei, J. (1979), ‘A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 709-719.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1984), ‘Tort Reform and the Role of Governement in Private Insurance Markets’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 517-549.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1985), ‘Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice’, 4 Journal of Health Economics , 309-331.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1986), ‘The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence’, 49(2) Law and Contemporary Problems .
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Workers’ Compensation: Lessons for Product Liability’, 78 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 305-310.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1990), ‘Alternative Liability Regimes for Medical Injuries’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 3-21.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1990), ‘On “Bargaining Behavior by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model”‘, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 53-54.
  • Danzon, Patricia M., Pauly, Mark V. and Kingston, Raynard S. (1990), ‘The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physicians’ Fees and Income’, 80 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 122-127.
  • Deere, Donald R. (1989), ‘On the Potential for Private Insurers to Reduce the Inefficiencies of Moral Hazard’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 219-222.
  • Devlin, Rose Anne (1990), ‘Some Welfare Implications of No- Fault Automobile Insurance’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 193-205.
  • Diamond, D.W. and Dybvig, P.H. (1986), ‘Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation’, 59 Journal of Business , 55-68.
  • Doherty, Neil A. and Garven, James R. (1986), ‘Price Regulation in Property Liability Insurance: A Contingent Claims Approach’, 41 Journal of Finance , 1031-1050.
  • Drukarczyk, Jochen (1987), Unternehmen und Insolvenz – Zur effizienten Gestaltung des Kredisicherungs- und Insolvenzrechts (Entrepreneurship and Insolvency – On the Efficient Shape of Safeguarding of Credits Law and Insolvency Law) , Wiesbaden, Gabler, 424 p.
  • Eggerstedt, Harald (1987), ‘Wettbewerb and Regulierung auf Versicherungsmarkten (Competition and Regulation in Insurance Markets)’, 107 Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften , 397-416.
  • Eggerstedt, Harald (1988), ‘Uber Regulierung und Deregulierung von Versicherungsmarkten. Eine Replik (On Regulation and Deregulation of Insurance Markets. A Reply)’, 58 Zeitschrift fŸr Betriebswirtschaft , 704-707.
  • Eisen, Roland (1986), ‘Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Versicherung Die Rolle asymmetrischer Information (Competition and Regulation in Insurance: The Role of Asymmetrical Information)’, 122 Schweizerische Zeitschrift fŸr Volkswirtschaft und Statistik , 339-358.
  • Eisenach, Jeffrey A., Higgins, Richard S. and Shughart, William F., II (1984), ‘Warranties, Tie-ins, and Efficient Insurance Contracts: A Theory and Three Case Studies’, 6 Research in Law and Economics , 167-185.
  • Endres, Alfred and Gafgen, Gerard (1988), ‘Wettbewerb und Regulierung auf dem bundesdeutschen Lebensversicherungsmarkt (Competition and Regulation in the W. German Life Insurance Market)’, 205 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 11-29.
  • Endres, Alfred and GŠfgen, Gerard (1989), ‘Regulierung und Versicherungswirtschaft – Die škonomische Perspektive in Forschungsgesellschaft fŸr Wettbewerb und Unternehmensorganisation (Regulation and the Insurance Industry – The Economic Perspective)’, in Fwu (eds.), VersicherungsmŠrkte im Wettbewerb , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 11-42.
  • Endres, Alfred and Schwarze, Reimund (1991), ‘Allokationswirkungen einer Umwelt-Haftpflichtversicherung (Allocative Effects of an Environmental Liability Insurance)’, 14 Zeitschrift fŸr Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht , 1-25.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1984), ‘The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 475-506.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1986), ‘Shooting the Messenger’, 47 Insurance Review , 46-47.
  • Fairley, William B. (1979), ‘Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance – Theory and Empirical Results’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 192-210.
  • Fama, Eugene F. (1990), ‘Contract Costs and Financing decision’, 1:2S Journal of Business , 75-91.
  • Farny, Dieter (1987), ‘Uber Regulierung und Deregulierung von Versicherungsmarkten (On Regulating and Deregulating Insurance Markets)’, 57 Zeitschrift fŸr Betriebswirtschaft , 1001-1023.
  • Faure, Michael G. (1990), ‘De verzekering van geldboeten bij zeewaterverontreiniging door olie (The Insurance of Fines with Respect to the Oil-Pol)’, in X (ed.), Grensoverschrijdend strafrecht. Opstellen , Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 203-221.
  • Faure, Michael G. and Heine, GŸnter (1991), ‘The insurance of fines: the case of oil pollution’, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 39-54.
  • Faure, Michael G. and Heine, GŸnter (1991), ‘The Insurance of Fines: the Case of Oil Pollution’, 16 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 39-58.
  • Faure, Michael G. and Van den Bergh, Roger (1995), ‘Restrictions of Competition on Insurance Markets and the Applicability of EC antitrust Law’, Kyklos , 65-85.
  • Faure, Michael G., Van den Bergh, Roger, Hartlief, T. and Tjittes, R. (1990), De invloed van verzekering op de civiele aansprakelijkheid, Preadviezen uitgebracht voor de vereniging voor burgerlijk recht , Lelystad, Vermande, 118 p.
  • Feldman, P.H. (1980), ‘The Impact of Third-Party Payment on Professional Practice: Lessons from the Medical Profession’, in Blair, Roger D. and Rubin, Stephen (eds.), Regulating the Professions: A Public-Policy Symposium , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books.
  • Fenn, Paul T. (1987), ‘Evaluating Irreplaceable Loss: Some Implications for Insurance and Liability Rules’, 12 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 158-167.
  • Fenn, Paul T. and Vlachonikolis, Ioannis (1990), ‘Bargaining Behaviour by Defendant Insurers: An Economic Model’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 41-52.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg (1988), Verbraucherschutz auf Versicherungs mŠrkten (Consumer Protection in Insurance Markets) , MŸnchen, Florentz, 219 p.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg (1988), ‘Zur Deregulierung von Versicherungsmarkten (On the Deregulation of Insurance Markets)’, 58 Zeitschrift fŸr Betriebswirtschaft , 698-703.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg and Pauly, Mark V. (1990), ‘The Double Liability Rule’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 159-170.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg and Pauly, Mark V. (eds.) (1986), The Economics of Insurance Regulation: A Cross-National Study , New York, St. Martin’s Press, 300 p.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg, Hammond, Elizabeth and Trapp, Julian (1985), Insurance: Competition or Regulation? , London, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  • Fleming, John G. (1990), ‘The Insurance Crisis’, 24 University of British Columbia Law Review , 1-18.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1976), ‘The Demand for Health Insurance: Comment’, in Nosett, Richard N. (ed.), The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector , Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, National Bureau of Economic Research, 156-160.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1976), ‘Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment’, 84(1) Journal of Political Economy , 143-152.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Health Care Costs: A Review of the Economic Evidence’, in Paul, Mark V. (ed.), National Health Insurance: What Now, What Later, What Never , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 250-263.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Market Power in Health Insurance: Effects on Insurance and Medical Markets’, 18(1) Journal of Industrial Economics , 55-72.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Health Insurance: Private, Mutual or Government’, S.1 Research in Law and Economics , 61-73.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1985), ‘Le systme amŽricain de SecuritŽ Sociale (The United States Health Care System)’, in X (ed.), O Vont les Systmes de SantŽ? Les Carrefours de l’Industrie Pharmaceutique , Paris, Publications Essentielles, 25-30.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1990), ‘The United States (Health Care System)’, in Rosa, Jean-Jacques (ed.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research , 43-76.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1992), ‘Idees Fausses sur le Systm de SantŽ’, 14-10 Le Figaro .
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1992), ‘Research Yields Surprises About Uninsured’, 14-9 Detroit News .
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1992), ‘Die Gesundheitsversorgung der nichtversichen Bevšlkerung in den USA’, 73(5) Scheizerische €rztezeitung , 1961-1962.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1992), ‘Review of Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America’s Health Care, by Henry J. Aaron’, 30 Journal of Economic Literature , 2165-2166.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1993), ‘What Can Reform Achieve in Health Care Cost-Containment: Commentary’, in Helms, Robert B. (ed.), American Health Policy: Critical Issues for Reform , Wadhington, American Enterprise Institute, 298-302.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1993), ‘Health Insurance: Designing Products to Reduce Costs’, in Duetsch, Larry L. and Cliffs, Englewood (eds.), Indusrty Studies , New York, Prentice Hall, 307-323.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1993), ‘Economie de la SantŽ’, 103(2) Revue d’Economie Politique , 609-611.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (ed.) (1991), Health Economics Worldwide , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul B. (1981), ‘Property Rights and Competition in Health Insurance: Multiple Objectives for Nonprofit Firms’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 155-171.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Samprone, Joseph C., Jr. (1980), ‘The Walfare Loss of Excess Nonprice Competition: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance Regulation’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 429-440.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Zweifel, Peter (1991), ‘Preface’, in Frech, H.E., III and Zweifel, Peter (eds.), Health Economics Worldwide: Proceeding of the Second World Congres on Health Economics , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 7-8.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1975), ‘Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets, A Theoretical Analysis’, 13(1) Economic Inquiry , 55-70.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1978), Public Insurance in Private Medical Markets: Some Problems of National Health Insurance , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1978), ‘Competition Among Health Insurers’, in Greenberg, Warren (ed.), Competition in the Health Care Sector: Past, Presence and Future , Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 210-237. Reprinted by Aspen Systems, Germantown, MD.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1981), ‘Property Rights and Competition in Health Insurance: Multiple Objectives for Nonprofit Firms’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 155-172.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1988), ‘Competition Among Health Insurers, Revisited’, 13(2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law , 279-291. Reprinted Greenberg, Warren, Competition in the Health Care Sector: Ten Years Later, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, pp. 57-70.
  • Friedman, David D. (1982), ‘What is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death or Injury ?’, 2 International Review of Law and Economics , 81-93.
  • Fršlich, P. (1975), Marktabgrenzung in der Wettbewerbspolitik: Die parametrisch Interdependenz als Kriterium der Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes (Market Definition in Competition Policy: The Parameter Interdepence as Criterion for the Definition of the Relevant Markets) , Gšttingen.
  • Gately, D. and Geehan, R. (1977), ‘Returns to Scale in the Life Insurance Industry’, 8 Bell Journal of Economics , 497-514.
  • Geehan, Randall (1986), ‘Economies of Scale in Insurance: Implications for Regulation’, in Wasow, Bernard and Hill, Raymond D. (ed.), The Insurance Industry in Economic Development , New York, New York University Press, 137-159.
  • George, William C. (1989), ‘Whither No-Fault in California: Is There Salvation After Proposition 103?’, 26 San Diego Law Review , 1065-1085.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1974), ‘Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 461-492. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1989, 169-173.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), ‘Tort Liability for Negligent Inspection by Insurers’, 2 Research in Law and Economics , 65-81.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1988), ‘Accountable Accountants: Is Third- Party Liability Necessary ?’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 295-312.
  • Gomez-Pomar, Fernando (1996), ‘Insurance Benefits, Insurance Subrogation, and Imperfects Liability Rules’, International Review of Law and Economics .
  • Grabowski, Henry G., Viscusi, W. Kip and Evans, William N. (1989), ‘Price and Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation’, 56 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 275-299.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1986), ‘Insurance and Corrective Taxes in the Health Care Market’, S.5 Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fŸr Nationalškonomie) , 114-130.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1987), ‘Accidents, Taxes, Liability Rules and Insurance’, 12 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 115-131.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1989), ‘Accidents and the Allocation of Legal Costs with an Uninformed Court’, 14 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 11-25.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1990), ‘Medical Negligence: Evaluating Alternative Regimes’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 22-26.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1991), ‘The Welfare Implications of Controls on Brokers’ Commissions’, 16 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 3 ff.
  • Gravelle, Hugh S.E. (1991), ‘Insurance Law and Adverse Selecti on’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 23-45.
  • Gron, Anne (1994), ‘Evidence of Capacity Constraints in Insurance Markets’, 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 349-377.
  • Halpern, Paul J. and Carr, Jack L. (1981), Liability Rules and Insurance Markets , Ottawa, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada.
  • Hansen, Ronald W., Macavoy, Paul W. and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1989), ‘Compensation Alternatives for Occupational Disease and Disability’, 56 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 252-274.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. (1985), ‘The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 125-153.
  • Hansson, Ingemar and Skogh, Gšran (1987), ‘Moral Hazard and Safety Regulation’, 43 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 132-144.
  • Hansson, Ingemar, Lyttkens, C.H. and Skogh, Gšran (1984), ‘The Excess Burden of Public Insurance: Some Results from Swedish Data’, 4 International Review of Law and Economics , 23-28.
  • Harrington, Scott E. (1990), ‘The Relationship Between Voluntary and Involuntary Market Rates and Rate Regulation in Automobile Insurance’, 57 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 9-27.
  • Herdzina, Klaus (1987), Wettbewerbspolitik (Competition Policy) , Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 237 p.
  • Higgins, Richard S. (1981), ‘Products Liability Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Contributory Negligence’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 111-130.
  • Hill, Raymond D. (1979), ‘Profit Regulation in Property- Liability Insurance’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 172-191.
  • Holderness, Clifford G. (1990), ‘Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-129.
  • Holmstršm, Bengt (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 74-91.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1988), Wirtschaftsordnung und Wettbewerb (Economic Order and Competition) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 566 p.
  • Huberman, Gur, Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W. (1983), ‘Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 415-426.
  • Huerta De Soto, Jesœs (1994), ‘Ahorro y previsi—n en el seguro de vida’, in X (ed.), Estudios de Econom’a Pol’tica , Madrid, Uni—n Editorial, 334-338.
  • Hulst, W.G.J. Van and Willems, J.G.L.M. (1989), Externe organisatie: Een kennismaking met het ondernemingsgedrag in markteconomische stelsels (External Organisation: An Introduction to Firm Behaviour in Market Systems) , Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 284 p.
  • Jones-Lee, Michael (1984), ‘Natural Disaster: A Comparison of Alternative Methods for Evaluating Preventive Measures’, 9 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 188-205.
  • Jones-Lee, Michael (1985), ‘The Value of Life and Safety: A Survey of Recent Developments’, 10 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 141-173.
  • Joost, Robert H. (1989), ‘Choosing the Best Auto Insurance Choice System’, 26 San Diego Law Review , 1033-1064.
  • Kalb, Paul E. (1990), ‘Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private Contractual Approach’, 99 Yale Law Journal , 1109-1126.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1991), ‘The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums’, 79 California Law Review , 1485-1510.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1991), ‘Incentives and Government Relief for Risk’, 4 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 167-175.
  • Karrer, H. (1957), Elements of Credit Insurance. An Interna tional Su , London, Sir Isaac Pitman.
  • Karten, Walter (1990), ‘Do Shares in Other Insurance Companies Reduce the Solvency Margin of an Insurer?’, in LoubergŽ, Henri (ed.), Risk, Information and Insurance. Essays in the Memory of Karl H. Borch , Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 257-267.
  • Keeton, William R. and Kwerel, Evan (1984), ‘Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured Driver Problem’, 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 149-179.
  • KlingmŸller, E. (1990), ‘Liability Insurance in the Federal Republic of Germany’, 15 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 330-336.
  • Kochanowski, Paul S. and Young, Madelyn V. (1985), ‘Deterrent Aspects of No Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings’, 52 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 269-288.
  • Kraft, K. and Schulenburg, J. Matthias Graf Von Der (1986), ‘Co-Insurance and Supplier-induced Demand in Medical Care: What do we Have to Expect as the Physicians’ Response to Increased Out-of-Pocket Payments?’, 142 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 360-379.
  • Kunreuther, Howard, Kleindorfer, Paul H. and Pauly, Mark V. (1983), ‘Insurance Regulation and Consumer Behavior in the United States: The Property and Liability Industry’, 139 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 452-472.
  • Lacey, N.J. (1988), ‘Recent Evidence on the Liability Crisis’, 55 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 499-508.
  • Lampe, Hanes-Eckhard (1979), Wettbewerb. Wettbewerbsbeziehungen. WettbewerbsintensitŠt (Competition. Competition Relations, Competition Intensity) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 317 p.
  • Landes, Elisabeth M. (1982), ‘Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 49-65.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1987), The Economic Structure of Tort Law , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 330 p.
  • Lefkin, Peter A. (1988), ‘Shattering Some Myths on the Insurance Liability: A Comment’, 5 Yale Journal on Regulation , 417-425.
  • Lemennicier, Bertrand (1987), ‘IndemnitŽs de licenciement: assurances tous risques, rŽparation d’un prŽjudice ou imp™t sur la libertŽ de contracter (Damages of Licensing: All Risk Insurance, Retrieving a Loss or Taxation on the Freedom of Contract)’, Revue de la Recherche Juridique Droit Perspectif .
  • Litan, Robert E. and Winston, Clifford (eds.) (1988), Liability: Perspectives and Policy , Washington, Brookings Institution, 248 p.
  • LoubergŽ, Henri (1990), Risk, Information and Insurance. Essays in the Memory of Karl H. Borch , Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 274 p.
  • Lynk, William J. (1982), ‘Regulation & Competition: An Examination of the “Consumer Choice Health Plan”‘, 6 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law , 625 ff.
  • Manove, M. (1983), ‘Provider Insurance’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 489-496.
  • Marshall, John M. (1974), ‘Insurance as a Market in Contingent Claims: Structure and Performance’, 5 Bell Journal of Economics , 670-682.
  • Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1981), ‘Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets’, 54 Journal of Business , 407-434.
  • Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1982), ‘On the Corporate Demand for Insurance’, 55 Journal of Business , 281-295.
  • Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1987), ‘Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment Problem’, 1 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 45-54.
  • Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1988), ‘Ownership Structure across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 351-378.
  • Mayers, David and Smith, Clifford W., Jr. (1990), ‘On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market’, 63 Journal of Business , 19-40.
  • McDowell, Banks (1987), ‘Competition as a Regulatory Mechanism in Insurance’, 19 Connecticut Law Review , 287-310.
  • McNeely, M. (1941), ‘Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance’, 41 Columbia Law Review , 26-60.
  • Meier, Kenneth J. (1988), The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of I , Albany, State University of New York Press, 230 p.
  • Meurer, Michael J. (1992), ‘The Value of Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: The Settlement Conflict between a Liability Insurer and Defendant’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 502-522.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. and Macey, Jonathan R. (1993), Costly Policies: State Regulation and Antitrust Exemption in Insurance Markets , AEI Press.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. and Macey, Jonathan R. (1995), ‘The Mccarran-Ferguson Act: A Case Study of Regulatory Federalism,’, 68 New York University Law Review , 13 ff. Republished in 7 National Insurance Law Rev.
  • Moller, Michael (1996), ‘Inskydergarantifonden og redning af konkurstruede pengeinstitutter (Devising a System to Rescue Failing Banks)’, 5 Finans/Invest .
  • Moore, Peter G. (1983), The Business of Risk , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 244 p.
  • Nosett, Richard N. and Feldstein, Martin S. (eds.) (1976), ”, in Nosett, Richard N. (ed.), The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector , Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, National Bureau of Economic Research, 156-160.
  • O’Connell, Jeffrey (1989), ‘No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back by Popular (Market) Demand?’, 26 San Diego Law Review , 993-1015.
  • O’Connell, Jeffrey and Guinivan, James (1988), ‘An Irrational Combination: the Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance’, 19 Ohio State Law Journal , 757-771.
  • O’Connell, Jeffrey and Joost, Robert H. (1986), ‘Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance’, 72 Virginia Law Review , 61-89.
  • O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. (1987), ‘The Liability Crisis: A Law and Economics Analysis’, 0(11) Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review , 1-13.
  • Olson, Walter (ed.) (1988), New Directions in Liability Law , New York, The Academy of Political Science, 214 p.
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