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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics - 5640 The Market for Corporate Control (incl. Takeovers)

  • Adams, Michael (1989), 'Der Markt fŸr Unternehmenskontrolle und sein Missbrauch (The Market of Corporate Control and Its Abuse)', Die Aktiengesellschaft , 333-338.
  • Adams, Michael (1990), 'Hšchststimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige wundersame Hindernisse auf dem Markt fŸr Unternehmenskontrolle (Maximum Voting Right, Multiple Voting Right, and some Wonderfull Obstacles from the Market of Corporate Control)', 35 Die Aktiengesellschaft , 63-78.
  • Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1987), 'Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions', 42 Journal of Finance , 823-837.
  • Agrawal, Arun and Mandelker, G.N. (1990), 'Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers : The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments', 25 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 143-161.
  • Agrawal, Arun and Walkling R. (1994), 'Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding takeover Bids', 49 Journal of Finance , 985-1014.
  • Agrawal, Arun, Jaffe, J. and Mandelker, G. N. (1992), 'The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms : A Re-examination of an Anomaly', 47 Journal of Finance , 1605-1621.
  • Arru–ada, Benito, 'Market vs. Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: Interactions Between Takeovers and Industrial Policiy in Spain', in Pardolesi, Roberto and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Law and Economics: Some further Insights , Milano, Giuffr, 71-106.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1988), 'Un an‡lisis econ—mico de la regulaci—n de la sociedad an—nima en Espa–a (An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of the Joint-Stock Society in Spain)', 3 Anales de Estudios Econ—micos y Empresariales , 191-224.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1988), 'Tiburones y sanguijuelas en la Plaza de la Lealtad (Sharks and Spongers in the Stockmarket)', 2123 Bolet’n del ICE , 771-772.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), Control y Regulaci—n de la Sociedad an—nima (Control and Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies) , Madrid, Alianza Editorial.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), 'Control y propiedad: L’mites al desarrollo de la empresa espa–ola (Corporate Control and Ownership: Limits to it's Growth in Spain)', 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola - Revista de Economia , 67-88.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1992), 'Cr’tica a la regulaci—n de las opas (A Critic on the Regulation of Takeovers)', 203-4 Revista de Derecho Mercantil , 29-67.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1992), 'ÀHacia un 'mercado œnico' de control societario? (Towards a Common Market of Corporate Control)', 703 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 144-170.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1992), 'La conversi—n coactiva de acciones comunes en acciones sin voto para lograr el control de las sociedades an—nimas: De c—mo la ingenuidad legal prefigura el fraude (Mandatory Conversion of Common Shares into Non-Voting Shares to Reach Corporate Control over Joint-Stock Companies: How legal Simplicity Leads to Fraud)', 71 Revista Espa–ola de Financiaci—n y Contabilidad , 283-314.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1992), 'Tiburones s—lo en el diccionario (Sharks only in the Dictionary)', 56 Bolet’n del C’rculo de Empresarios , 15-30.
  • Arru–ada, Benito and Paz Ares, C‡ndido (1995), 'Conversion of Ordinary Shares into Non-Voting Shares', 15 International Review of Law and Economics .
  • Asquith, P. (1983), 'Merger Bids, Uncertainty and Stockholder Returns', 11 Journal of Financial Economics , 51-83.
  • Auerbach, Alan J. (ed.) (1991), Corporate Takeovers , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 354 p.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1986), 'State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts', 90 Dickinson Law Review , 731 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1990), 'Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions', 75 Minnesota Law Review , 239 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1991), 'The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4', 69 Washington University Law Quarterly , 565 ff. Reprinted in 1992 Securities Law Review 377.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1992), 'Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests', Wisconsin Law Review , 1071 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1992), 'Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes', 19 Pepperdine Law Review , 971 ff. Reprinted in 34 Corporate Practice Commentator 641, 1993.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1994), 'Revisiting the One-Share/One-Vote Controversy: The Exchanges' Uniform Voting Rights Policy', 22 Securities Regulation Law Journal , 175 ff.
  • Baysinger, Barry D. and Butler, Henry N. (1985), 'Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation', 71 Virginia Law Review , 1257-1303.
  • Bebchuck, Lucian Arye (1986), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers', 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 253-271.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1988), 'The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy', 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 197-229.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Kahan, Marcel (1990), 'A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contest', 78 California Law Review , 1071-1135.
  • Berkovitch, Elazar, Bradley, Michael D. and Khanna, Naveen (1989), 'Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare', 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 395-412.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1989), 'Shareholder Heterogeneity and the Gains from Merger', in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses , Antwerpen, Maklu, 49-70.
  • Black, Bernard and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1996), 'A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law', 109 Harvard Law Review , 1911-1979.
  • Booth, Richard A. (1989), 'State Takeovers Statutes Revisited', 88 Michigan Law Review , 120 ff.
  • Booth, Richard A. (1989), 'The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law', 77 California Law Review , 707-776.
  • Boukema, C.A. (1991), 'Economische en juridische aspecten van Hoofdstuk I Fusiecode (Economic and Legal Aspects of Chapter I Dutch Merger Rules)', in Coljee, P.D., Franken, H., Heertje, A. and Kanning, W. (eds.), Law and Welfare Economics , Amsterdam, VU Amsterdam.
  • Braakman, A.J. (1988), 'Europees kartelrecht als strijdmiddel bij overnames (European Anti-trust Law as Takeover Combat Mechanism)', 73 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 854-858.
  • Bradford, C. Steven (1990), 'Stampeding Shareholders and Other Myths: Target Shareholders and Hostile Tender Offers', 15 Journal of Corporation Law , 417-464.
  • Bradley, Michael D. (1980), 'Interfirm Tender Offers, and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Business , 1-55.
  • Brickley, James A. and James, Christopher M. (1987), 'The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking', 30 Journal of Law and Economics , 161-180.
  • Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (1987), 'Are Hostile Takeovers Different?', in Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (ed.), The Merger Boom: Proceedings of a Conference Held at Melvin Village, New Hampshire, October 1987 , Boston, Federal Bank of Boston, 199-229.
  • Buckley, Francis H. (1990), 'When the Medium is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals', 65 Indiana Law Journal , 493-547.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E., 'State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause', 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 611 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), 'The Contract Clause and the Corporation', 55 Brooklyn Law Review , 767 ff.
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  • Byttebier, Koen (1995), 'Hostile Take-Overs: Economic (Dis)Functions and Legal Policy Questions', in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 77-134.
  • Campbell, David (1990), 'Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation', 19 Anglo-American Law Review , 185-208.
  • Carney, William J. (1980), 'Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders and Business Purposes', American Bar Foundation Research Journal , 69 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1983), 'Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties', American Bar Foundation Research Journal , 341 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1984), 'Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control', 9 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law , 593 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1986), 'Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents', 4(2) Midland Corporate Finance Journal , 48 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1988), 'Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model', Wisconsin Law Review , 383 ff.
  • Caves, Richard E. (1989), 'Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs. Hindsight', 7 International Journal of Industrial Organization , 151-174.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1993), 'Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation', 43 University of Toronto Law Journal , 547-588.
  • Coffee, John C., Jr. (1984), 'Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance', 84 Columbia Law Review , 1145-1296.
  • Coffee, John C., Jr. (1987), 'Are Hostile Takeovers Different? Discussion', in Browne, Lynn E. and Rosengren, Eric S. (ed.), The Merger Boom: Proceedings of a Conference Held , Boston, Federal Bank of Boston, 230-242.
  • Cohen, Lloyd R. (1990), 'Why Tender Offers? the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Supply of Stock, and Signaling', 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 113-143.
  • Cohen, Lloyd R. (1991), 'Holdouts and Free Riders', 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 351-362.
  • Craig, Lee A. and Knoeber, Charles R. (1992), 'Manager Shareholding, the Market for Managers, and the End Period Problem: Evidence from the U.S. Whaling Industry', 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 607-627.
  • Cramton, Peter and Schwartz, Alan (1991), 'Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation', 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 27-53.
  • Deangelo, Harry, Deangelo, Linda and Rice, Edward M. (1984), 'Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth', 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 367-401.
  • Denis, Debra K. and McConnell, John J. (1986), 'Corporate Mergers and Security Returns', 16 Journal of Financial Economics , 143-187.
  • Dodd, Peter (1986), 'The Market for Corporate Control: A Review of the Evidence', in Stern, Joel M. and Chew, Donald H. (eds.), The Revolution in Corporate Finance , Oxford, Blackwell.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer', 91 Harvard Law Review , 1161-1201.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fishel, Daniel R. (1982), 'Corporate Control Transactions', 91 Yale Law Journal , 698-737.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1992), 'The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine', 59 University of Chicago Law Review , 1465 ff.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1993), 'Toward a European Sale of Control Doctrine', 41 American Journal of Comparative Law , 627 ff.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1985), 'The Pirates of Pennzoil: A Comic Opera Made Possible by a Grant from the Texaco Corporation', 9(6) Regulation , 18-2442.
  • Ferguson, Michael F. (1994), 'Ownership Structure, Potential Competition, and the Free Rider Problem in Tender Offers', 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 35-62.
  • Filer, John E., Kenny, Lawrence W. and Morton, Rebecca B. (1991), 'Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority Turnout', 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 371-393.
  • Fischel, Daniel R. (1978), 'Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers', 57 Texas Law Review , 1-46.
  • Fishman, Michael J. (1988), 'A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding', 19 Rand Journal of Economics , 88-101.
  • Fitzsimons, Peter G. (1997), 'Takeovers and Efficiency in the Context of Concentrated Shareholdings: The Case of New Zealand', 15 Companies and Securities Law Journal , 4-15.
  • Franks, Julian and Mayer, Colin (1990), 'Takeovers: Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the UK', 0(10) Economic Policy: A European Forum , 189-231.
  • Garcia De Enterria, Javier, 'El control del poder societario en la gran empresa y la funci—n disciplinar de las OPAS (Corporate Control of Large Companies and the Disciplinary Role of Takeovers)', 47 Revista de Derecho bancario y bursatil , 665-689.
  • Garcia De Enterria, Javier (1996), La Opa Obligatoria (Mandatory Takeovers) , Madrid, Editorial C’vitas, 324 p.
  • Geddes, R. Richard (1997), 'Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry', Journal of Law and Economics .
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1989), 'Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality Rule?', 44 The Business Lawyer , 247-274.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1990), 'What Triggers Revlon?', 25 Wake Forest Law Review , 37-59.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), 'Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors', 43 Stanford Law Review , 863-906.
  • Gordon, Jeffrey N. and Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1986), 'Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models', 96 Yale Law Journal , 295-321.
  • Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D. (1980), 'Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation', 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 42-64.
  • Guerin-Calvert, Margaret E., McGuckin, Robert H. and Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. (1987), 'State and Federal Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control', 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 661-691.
  • Hackl, Jo Watson and Testani, Rosa Anna (1988), 'Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study', 97 Yale Law Journal , 1193-1231.
  • Haddock, David D., Macey, Jonathan R. and McChesney, Fred (1987), 'Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers', 73 Virginia Law Review , 701-746.
  • Hahn, Dieter (1990), 'Takeover Rules in the European Community: An Economic Analysis of Proposed Takeover Guidelines and Already Issued Disclosure Rules', 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 131-148.
  • Hill, Alfred (1957), 'The Sale of Controlling Shares', 70 Harvard Law Review , 986-1039.
  • Hirschey, Mark (1986), 'Mergers, Buyouts and Takeouts', 76 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 317-322.
  • Hirschleifer, David and Titman, Sheridan (1990), 'Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids', 98 Journal of Political Economy , 295-324.
  • Hšgholm, Kenneth (1994), Essays in the Market for Corporate Control , Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration.
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  • Jahera, John S., Jr. and Pugh, William N. (1991), 'State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware', 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 410-428.
  • James, Christopher M. (1984), 'An Analysis of the Effect of State Acquisition Laws on Managerial Efficiency: The Case of the Bank Holding Company Acquisitions', 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 211-226.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A. (1985), 'The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge ?', 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 151-179.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A. and Bradley, Michael D. (1980), 'The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers', 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 371-407.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A. and Poulsen, Annette B. (1987), 'Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendements since 1980', 19 Journal of Financial Economics , 127-168.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A., Brickley, James A. and Netter, Jeffrey M. (1988), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence since 1980', 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 49-68.
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  • Jensen, Michael C. (1984), 'Takeovers: Folklore and Science', 6 Harvard Business Review , 109-121.
  • Jensen, Michael C. (1986), 'Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers', 76 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 323-329.
  • Jensen, Michael C. (1988), 'Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences', 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 21-48.
  • Jensen, Michael C. (1989), 'The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence', in Coffee, John, Lowenstein, Louis and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.), Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Jensen, Michael C. and Ruback, Richard S. (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence', 11 Journal of Financial Economics , 5-50.
  • Johnson, Lyman and Mylon, David (1989), 'Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes', 87 Michigan Law Review , 846-857.
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  • Kahan, Marcel (1993), 'Sales of Corporate Control', 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 368-379.
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  • Kahan, Marcel and Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1989), 'Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?', Duke Law Journal , 27 ff. Reprinted in 32 Corporate Practice Commentator, 1990, p. 1.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1990), 'A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests', 78 California Law Review , 1071 ff.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael (1993), 'Anti-Takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment', 40 UCLA Law Review , 931 ff. Reprinted in 35 Corporate Practice Commentator 575, 1994.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael (1996), 'Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control', Stanford Law Review .
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