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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5610 The Theory of the Firm

  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1989), ‘Islands of Conscious Power: Louis D. Brandeis and the Modern Corporation’, 63 Business History Review , 614-656.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, J.L. (1980), ‘Corporate Leverage and Growth: The Game-Theoretic Issues’, Journal of Financial Economics , 379-399.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, Jeffrey L. (1983), ‘Reorganization in Bankruptcy and the Issue of Strategic Risk’, 7 Journal of Banking and Finance , 119-133.
  • Alchian, Armen A. (1991), ‘Development of Economic Theory and Antitrust: A View From the Theory of the Firm’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 232-234.
  • Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 American Economic Review , 777-795.
  • Aoki, Masahiko (1984), The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Aoki, Masahiko (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’, 28 Journal of Economic Literature , 1-27.
  • Aoki, Masahiko and others (eds.) (1989), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties , London, Sage, 358 p.
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  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), ‘Control y propiedad: L’mites al desarrollo de la empresa espa–ola (Corporate Control and Ownership: Limits to it’s Growth in Spain)’, 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola – Revista de Economia , 67-88.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1993), ‘Pintando la caja negra: Notas a ‘La empresa en el an‡lisis econ—mico’ de V. Salas (Painting the black box: A Note on “The Firm in V. Salas’ Economic Analysis)’, 57 Papeles de Econom’a Espa–ola , 156-169.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1994), ‘El reparto del monopolio: Obreros y empresarios en la historia de Asturias (Sharing the Monopoly: Workers and Managers in the History of Asturias)’, in Garc’a Delgado, J.L. and L. Fern‡ndez de la Buelga, L. (eds.), Econom’a y empresa en Asturias: Homenaje al MarquŽs de Aledo , Madrid, Editioral C’vitas, 690-720.
  • Averch, H. and Johnson, L.L. (1962), ‘Behaviour of the Firm under Regulatory Constraints’, 52 American Economic Review , 1052-1069.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1987), ‘The Emergence of Worker Participation: Evolution and Legislation Compared’, 21 Journal of Economic Issues , 895-910.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1993), ‘Independant Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project’, 61 George Washington Law Review , 1034 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1993), ‘In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’, 50 Washington and Lee Law Review , 1423 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1996), ‘Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm’, 21 Journal of Corporation Law , 657 ff.
  • Baysinger, Barry D. and Butler, Henry N. (1985), ‘The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 179-191.
  • Berle, Adolph A. and Means, Gardiner C. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property , New York, MacMillan.
  • Bjuggren, Per-Olof and Skogh, Gšran (eds.) (1990), Fšretaget. En kontraktsekonomisk analys (The Firm. A Contractual Approach) , SNS Publishing company.
  • Black, Robert A., Kreide, Rosalie S. and Sullivan, Mark (1988), ‘Critical Legal Studies, Economic Realism, and the Theory of the Firm’, 43 University of Miami Law Review , 343-360.
  • Blegvad, Britt-Mari and Collin, Finn (eds.) (1987), Virksomheden mellem ¢konomi og jura (The Firm between Law and Economics) , Samfundslitteratur.
  • Boardman, Anthony E. and Vining, Aidan R. (1991), ‘The Behavior of Mixed Enterprises’, 14 Research in Law and Economics , 223-250.
  • Bond, Ronald S. and Greenberg, Warren (1976), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy: A Comment’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 201-204.
  • Boudreaux, Donald J. and Holcombe, Randall G. (1989), ‘The Coasian and Knightian Theories of the Firm’, 10 Managerial & Decision Economics , 147-154.
  • Bratton, William W., Jr. (1989), ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’, 41 Stanford Law Review , 1471-1527.
  • Butler, Henry N. (1985), ‘Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 129-166.
  • Butler, Henry N. (1986), ‘General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 169-188.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause’, 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 611 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), ‘The Contract Clause and the Corporation’, 55 Brooklyn Law Review , 767 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, 65 Washington Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Buxbaum, Richard M. (1984), ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine’, 45 Ohio State Law Journal , 515-543.
  • Cabrillo, Francisco (1993), ‘La teor’a econ—mica de la reorganizaci—n de las empresas en quiebra (Economic Theory of the Reorganization of Bankrupty Firms)’, 58 Economistas , 62-67.
  • Campbell, David (1990), ‘Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation’, 19 Anglo-American Law Review , 185-208.
  • Campbell, David (1993), ‘Why Regulate the Modern Corporation? The Failure of Market Failure’, in McCahery, Joseph, Lol Picciotto, Lol and Scott, Colin (eds.), Corporate Accountability and Control , Oxford, Clarendon, 103-131.
  • Carney, William J. (1987), ‘The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums and Ownership Structure’, 65 Washington University Law Quarterly , 1 ff.
  • Carr, Jack L. and Mathewson, G. Frank (1990), ‘The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 307-330.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1993), ‘Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation’, 43 University of Toronto Law Journal , 547-588.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1983), ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-21.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica , 386-405. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 31-32.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1988), The Firm, the Market and the Law , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 217 p.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1992), ‘Contracts and the Activities of Firms’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 451-452.
  • Coelho Philip R. P. (1975), ‘Externalities, Liability Separability and Resource Allocation : Comment’, 65 American Economic Review , 721-723.
  • Coelho Philip R. P. (1976), ‘Pollution, Direct Controls, Regulation and the Size of the Firm : Comment’, 56 American Economic Review , 976-978.
  • Coelho Philip R. P. and James E. McClure (1987), ‘Barriers to Entry in the Market for Stud Services: Government and ‘Non-Profit’ Institutions in Collusion’, 25 Economic Inquiry , 659-670.
  • Coffee, John C., Jr. (1990), ‘Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game’, 78 Georgetown Law Journal , 1495-1549.
  • Cyert, Richard M. and March, James G. (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm , Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall.
  • Davenport, Herbert Joseph (1913), The Economics of Enterprise , New York, MacMillan, 544 p.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1983), ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 375-390.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1988), ‘The Theory of the Firm Revisited’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 141-161.
  • Easley, David and O’Hara, Maureen (1988), ‘Contracts and Asymmetric Information in the Theory of the Firm’, 9 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 229-246.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1991), ‘High Yield Debt as an Incentive Device’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 183-201.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1986), ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’, 38 Stanford Law Review , 271-301.
  • Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1990), ‘Bad Arguments in Corporate Law’, 78 Georgetown Law Journal , 1551-1558.
  • Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. and Tollison, Robert D. (1980), ‘Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation’, 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 715-720.
  • Ekern, S. (1975), ‘On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets: an Addendum’, 6 Bell Journal of Economics , 388-393.
  • Ekern, S. and Wilson, R. (1974), ‘On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets’, 5 Bell Journal of Economics , 171-180.
  • Engel, David L. (1979), ‘An Approach to Corporate Social Responsability’, 32 Stanford Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C. (1983), ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 327-349.
  • Fishel, Daniel R. (1982), ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’, 35 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1259 ff.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1975), ‘Property Rights and Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism: Comment’, 83(1) Journal of Political Economy , 209-214.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1976), ‘Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment’, 84(1) Journal of Political Economy , 143-152.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Managerial Incentives in Nonproprietary Institutions’, S.1 Research in Law and Economics , 46-49.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘The Property Rights Theory of the Firm and Competitive Markets for Top Decision-Makers’, 2 Research in Law and Economics , 49-63.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Health Insurance: Private, Mutual or Government’, S.1 Research in Law and Economics , 61-73.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1980), ‘Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Health Care Costs: A Review of the Economic Evidence’, in Paul, Mark V. (ed.), National Health Insurance: What Now, What Later, What Never , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 250-263.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1985), ‘The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence form the U.S. Nursing Home Indusrty’, 141 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 146-166.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), ‘Preferred Provider Organizations and Health Care Competition’, in Frech, H.E., III (ed.), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Fransisco, Pacific Research Institute, 353-372.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), ‘Introduction: The Political Economy of Health Care’, in Frech, H.E., III (ed.), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Fransisco, Pacific Research Institute, 1-26.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), ‘Monopoly in Health Insurance: The Economics of Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts’, in Frech, H.E., III (ed.), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Fransisco, Pacific Research Institute, 293-322.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1984), ‘Strategic Behavior and Antitrust Analysis’, 74(2) American Economic Review , 372-376.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1987), ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Reply’, 77(5) American Economic Review , 1069-1072.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1993), ‘Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent’, 38 Antitrust Bulletin , 293-308.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul B. (1981), ‘Property Rights and Competition in Health Insurance: Multiple Objectives for Nonprofit Firms’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 155-171.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Mobley, Lee Rivers (1994), ‘Firm Growth and Failure in Increasingly Competitive Markets: Theory and Application to Hospital Markets’, 1(1) Journal of the Economics of Business , 77-94.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Mobley, Lee Rivers (1995), ‘Resolving the Impasse on Hospital Scale Economies: A New Approach’, 27 Applied Economics , 286-296.
  • Frech, H. Edward III, Borjas, George J. and Ginsburg, Paul B. (1983), ‘Property Rights and Wages: The Case of Nursing Homes’, 18(2) Journal of Human Resources , 231-246.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1980), ‘The Cost of Nursing Home Care in the United States: Government Financing, Ownership and Efficiency’, in Van Der Gaag, Jaques and Perlman, Mark (eds.), Health, Economics and Health Economics: Proceedings of the World Congress on Health Economics , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 67-91.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1981), ‘Property Rights and Competition in Health Insurance: Multiple Objectives for Nonprofit Firms’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 155-172.
  • Frost, Christopher (1993), ‘Organizational Form, Misappropriation Risk and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups’, 44 Hastings Law Journal , 449 ff.
  • Furubotn, Eirik G. and Pejovich, Svetozar (1973), ‘Property Rights, Economic Decentralization and the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-1972’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 275-302.
  • Gatignon, Hubert and Anderson, Erin (1988), ‘The Multinational Corporation’s Degree of Control over Foreign Subsidiairies: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 305-336.
  • Geddes, R. Richard (1997), ‘Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry’, Journal of Law and Economics .
  • Geddes, R. Richard and Crowley, Peter T. (1994), ‘Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service’, in Sidak, Gregory J. (ed.), Governing the Postal Service , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
  • Gifford, Adam, Jr. (1991), ‘A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm’, 68 Public Choice , 91-106.
  • Grant, Wyn (1985), ‘Corporatism and the Public-Private Distinction’, in Lane, Jan-Erik (ed.), State and Market. The Politics of the Public and the Private , London, Sage, 158-180.
  • Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), ‘Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-26.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. (1985), ‘The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 125-153.
  • Hanson, Robert C. and Song, Moon H. (1995), ‘Managerial Ownership Change and Firm Value: Evidence from Dual-Class Recapitalizations and Insider Trading’, 18 Journal of Financial Research , 281-297.
  • Hart, Oliver D. (1988), ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 119-139.
  • Hermalin, Benjamin E. (1993), ‘Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 127-135.
  • Hessen, Robert (1979), ‘A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model’, 30 Hastings Law Journal , 1327-1350.
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  • Jaffe, Austin J. and Nigh, Douglas (1987), ‘Cross-Cultural Attitudes Toward Property: Implications for International Management’, in X (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Conference of the Eastern Academy of Management , 77-82.
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  • Levmore, Saul (1993), ‘Irreversibility and the Law: the Size of Firms and Other Organizations’, 18 Journal of Corporation Law , 333-358. Reprinted at Corporate Practice Commentator, 1994-1995, 527.
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  • Macey, Jonathan R. (1988), ‘Ethics, Economics, and Insider Trading: Ann Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm’, 11 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 785-804.
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  • Marcus, Alan J. (1982), ‘Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm’, 13 Bell Journal of Economics , 369-378.
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