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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5600 Corporate Law: General

  • Adams, Michael (1989), ‘Der Markt fŸr Unternehmenskontrolle und sein Missbrauch (The Market of Corporate Control and Its Abuse)’, Die Aktiengesellschaft , 333-338.
  • Adams, Michael (1990), ‘Hšchststimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige wundersame Hindernisse auf dem Markt fŸr Unternehmenskontrolle (Maximum Voting Right, Multiple Voting Right, and some Wonderfull Obstacles from the Market of Corporate Control)’, 35 Die Aktiengesellschaft , 63-78.
  • Adams, Michael (1990), ‘Was spricht gegen eine unbehinderte †bertragbarkeit der in Unternehmen gebundenen Ressourcen durch ihre EigentŸmer’, Die Aktiengesellschaft , 243-252.
  • Alfaro Aguila-Real, Jesœs (1995), InterŽs social y derecho de suscripci—n preferente. Una aproximaci—n econ—mica (Economic Efficiency of a strict construction of the “interest of the corporation” clause in Corporate Law) , Madrid, Ed. C’vitas, 160 p.
  • Alfaro Aguila-Real, Jesœs (1997), ‘Los justos motivos como causa legal no escrita de exclusi—n y separaci—n de socios en la sociedad de responsabilidad limitada. C—mo deshacerse de un socio molesto (How to exclude an annoying shareholder)’, 222 Revista de Derecho Mercantil .
  • Altman, Edward I. (1973), ‘Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America’, 4 Bell Journal of Economics , 184-211.
  • Aretz, Adward (1991), ‘Taxation and Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Post-1992 Business Incorporations’, in Weigel, Wolfgang (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law – A Collection of Applications , Vienna, …sterreichischer Wirtschaftsverlag, 122-132.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), Control y Regulaci—n de la Sociedad an—nima (Control and Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies) , Madrid, Alianza Editorial.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), Econom’a de la empresa: un enfoque contractual (The Economics of the Firm: A Contractual Approach], Barcelona, Ariel,) , Madrid, Alianza Editorial.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1990), ‘Control y propriedad: l’mites al desarrollo de la empresa espa–ola (Property and Control: Limits of the Spanish Firms)’, Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 687-688.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1985), ‘Public Policy Towards Corporate Structures: Two Chicago Approaches’, 19 Journal of Economic Issues , 365-373.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1992), ‘Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes’, 19 Pepperdine Law Review , 971 ff. Reprinted in 34 Corporate Practice Commentator 641, 1993.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1994), ‘Revisiting the One-Share/One-Vote Controversy: The Exchanges’ Uniform Voting Rights Policy’, 22 Securities Regulation Law Journal , 175 ff.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1991), ‘Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-24.
  • Bebchuck, Lucian Arye (1989), ‘Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments’, 102 Harvard Law Review , 1820-1860.
  • Bebchuck, Lucian Ayre (ed.) (1990), Corporate Law and Economic Analysis , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 320 p.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1989), ‘Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law’, 89 Columbia Law Review , 1395 ff.
  • Benninga, S. and Muller, E. (1979), ‘Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 670-682.
  • Benninga, S. and Muller, E. (1981), ‘Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty: Reply’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 338-339.
  • Binder, John J. (1985), ‘Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data’, 16 Rand Journal of Economics , 167-183.
  • Black, Bernard and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1996), ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’, 109 Harvard Law Review , 1911-1979.
  • Braithwaite, John and Makkai, Toni (1991), ‘Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence’, 25 Law and Society Review , 7-39.
  • Branson, Douglas M. (1990), ‘Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law’, 43 Vanderbilt Law Review , 85 ff.
  • Brinkmann, Thomas and KŸbler, Friedrich (1981), ‘†berlegungen zur …konomischen Analyse im Unternehmensrecht (Thoughts on an Economic analysis of Company Law)’, 137 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 681-688.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause’, 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 611 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1989), ‘The Contract Clause and the Corporation’, 55 Brooklyn Law Review , 767 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, 65 Washington Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Campbell, David (1990), ‘Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation’, 19 Anglo-American Law Review , 185-208.
  • Campbell, David (1993), ‘Why Regulate the Modern Corporation? The Failure of Market Failure’, in McCahery, Joseph, Lol Picciotto, Lol and Scott, Colin (eds.), Corporate Accountability and Control , Oxford, Clarendon, 103-131.
  • Campbell, David (1995), ‘Review of R. Tomasic and S. Bottomley, Directing the Top 500’, 4 Social and Legal Studies , 428-432.
  • Campbell, David (1996), ‘Review of B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability’, 5 Social and Legal Studies , 549-554.
  • Campbell, David (1997), ‘Towards a Less Irrelevant Socialism : Stakeholding as a “Reform” of the Capitalist Economy’, 24 Journal of Law and Society (Special Issue) , 65-84. Reprinted in Deakin, Simon and Hughes, Alan (eds.), Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate Governance.
  • Carney, William J. (1990), ‘Does Defining Constituencies Matter?’, 59 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 385 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1992), ‘Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It’, 70 Washington University Law Quarterly , 523 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1993), ‘The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: the Death of Property Rights?’, 61 George Washington Law Review , 898 ff.
  • Carney, William J. (1995), ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’, in Wouters, Jan and Schneider, Hildegard (eds.), Current Issues of Cross-Border Establishment of Companies in the European Union , Maastricht, Institute for Transational Legal Research.
  • Carney, William J. (1996), ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the Results of Competition’, in McCary, Joseph and Bratton, William (eds.), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Carney, William J. (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Centner, Terence J. (1985), ‘Cooperatives: A Search for Equitable Relief from the Equity Redemption Problem’, 8 Journal of Agricultural Taxation and Law , 120-144.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1993), ‘Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation’, 43 University of Toronto Law Journal , 547-588.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1996), ‘Corporate Stakeholders, Choice Procedures, and Commitees’, 26 Canadian Business Law Journal , 211 ff.
  • Cohen, Kalman J. and Conroy, Robert M. (1990), ‘An Empirical Study of the Effect of Rule’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics .
  • Coljee, P.D. (1991), ‘Het economisch adviesrecht van de ondernemingsraad, quo vadis? Artikel 25 WOR nader beschouwd (The Workers Council Economic Right of Advice, Quo)’, in Coljee, P.D., Franken, H., Heertje, A. and Kanning, W. (eds.), Law and Welfare Economics , Amsterdam, VU Amsterdam, 77-99.
  • Crafton, Steven M. (1980), ‘An Empirical Test of the Effect of Usury Laws’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 135-145.
  • Cross, Mark L., Davidson, W.N., II and Thornton, John H. (1989), ‘The Impact of Directors and Officers’ Liability Suits on Firm Value’, 56 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 128-136.
  • Deutsch, Jan G. (1988), ‘Regulation and the United States Corporation: an Alternative to Law-and-order Economics’, 9 Cardozo Law Review , 1463-1487.
  • Dion, Michel (1992), ‘Le raisonnement Žthique en affaires (Ethics Reasoning in Business)’, in Dion, Michel (ed.), L’Žthique ou le profit , MontrŽal, Fides, 13-98.
  • Dion, Michel (ed.) (1992), L’Žthique ou le profit (Ethics or Profit) , MontrŽal, Fides.
  • Dowd, Kevin (1996), Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics , MacMillan Press, 572 p.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. (1993), ‘The Economic Structure of Corporate Law’, 525 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science , 200 ff.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1992), ‘The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine’, 59 University of Chicago Law Review , 1465 ff.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1993), ‘Toward a European Sale of Control Doctrine’, 41 American Journal of Comparative Law , 627 ff.
  • Enriques, Luca (1996), ‘L’economia delle societˆ per azioni di Frank Easterbrook e Daniel Fischel: Diritto societario, efficienza dei mercati e analisi economica’, Rivista critica del diritto privato , 563-578.
  • Estrada, Javier (1994), ‘Insider Trading: Regulation, Deregulation, and Taxation’, 5 Swiss Review of Business Law , 209 ff.
  • Estrada, Javier (1995), ‘Insider Trading: Regulation, Securities Markets, and Welfare Under Risk Aversion’, 35 Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance , 421-449.
  • Fisch, Jill E. (1991), ‘Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures’, 32 William & Mary Law Review , 587 ff.
  • Fisch, Jill E. (1995), ‘Review Essay: Picking A Winner (reviewing Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law)’, 20 Journal of Corporate Law , 451-474.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1984), ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, 70 Virginia Law Review , 549-644.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), ‘Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors’, 43 Stanford Law Review , 863-906.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1993), ‘Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate’, 45 Stanford Law Review , 985-1010.
  • Gutrie, James and Turnbull, Shann (1995), ‘Audit Committees: Is There a Role for Corporate Senates and/or Stakeholders Councils?’, 3(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review , 78-89.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1991), ‘The Uneasy Case for Limiting Shareholder Liability in Tort’, 100 Yale Law Journal , 1879-1934.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), ‘Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability?’, 94 Yale Law Journal , 427-436.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), ‘A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Liability’, 106 Harvard Law Review , 446-459.
  • Harmathy, Attila (1977), ‘V‡llalati gazdas‡gpolitika – szerzšdŽsek (Business Policy of the Company – Contracts)’, 4 Allam- Žs Jogtudom‡ny , 528-567.
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1989), ‘An‡lisis de la integraci—n vertical de empresas en Espa–a (Analysis of Firm_s Vertical Integration in Spain)’, Papeles de Econom’a Espa–ola .
  • Huls, N.J.H. (1988), Van liquidatie tot rehabilitatie (From Liquidation to Rehabilitation) , s-Gravenhage, Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 106 p.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1995), ‘Anti Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities’, 2 Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance , 147 ff.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1995), ‘The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds’, 89 Northwestern University Law Review , 565-622.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman (1996), ‘Private versus Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants’, in Finnerty, John D. and Martin, S. Fridson (eds.), The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 1995 , 253-274.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1993), ‘Do Bondholders Lose From Junk Bond Covenant Changes’, 66 Journal of Business , 499 ff.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. (1994), ‘Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 142-159.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1984), ‘Ansatze zu einer škonomischen Analyse des Konzernrechts (Starting Point for an Economic Analysis of Large Companies Law)’, in Boettcher, Erik, Herder- Dorneich, Philipp and Schenk, Karl-Ernst (eds.), Jahrbuch fŸr neue politische …konomie , TŸbingen, Mohr, 223-251.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1982), ‘Review of Kripke, the SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose’, 47 University of Chicago Law Review , 394 ff.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1991), ‘Business Organization Law: State or Federal?’, in Buxbaum, Richard M., Hertig, Gerard, Hirsch, Alain and Hopt, Klaus J. (eds.), European Business Law , Berlin, Waller de Gruyter, 35 ff.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1995), ‘The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure’, 61 Brooklyn Law Review , 761 ff.
  • Klausner, Michael (1995), ‘Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts’, 81 Virginia Law Review , 757-852.
  • Klausner, Michael and Kahan, Marcel (1996), ‘Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behaviour and Cognitive Biases’, 74 Washington University Law Quarterly , 347 ff.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1996), ‘Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company’, 34 Economic Inquiry .
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1989), ‘The Nexus-of-Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel’, 89 Columbia Law Review , 1449 ff.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Gordon, J. (1985), ‘Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research’, 60 New York University Law Review , 761-849.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. and Gordon, J. (1986), ‘Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models’, 96 Yale Law Journal , 295 ff.
  • Kraakman, Reinier H. (1984), ‘The Economic Functions of Corporate Liability’, in Hopt, Klaus J. and Teubner, Gunther (eds.), Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities: , New York, de Gruyter, 178-207.
  • Kraakman, Reinier H., Park Hyun and Shavell Steven (1994), ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholders’ Interests?’, 82 Georgetown Law Journal , 1733-1775.
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  • Levmore, Saul and Kanda, Hideki (1985), ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law’, 32 UCLA Law Review , 429-473.
  • Llebot Majo, JosŽ Oriol (1996), ‘Doctrina y teor’a de la empresa en el Derecho mercantil (Una aproximaci—n al significado de la teor’a contractual de la empresa) (Doctrine and Theory of the Firm in Contract Law Approaching the Meaning of Corporate Contractual Theory)’, 210 Revista de Derecho Mercantil , 319-388.
  • Llebot Majo, JosŽ Oriol (1996), ‘El Sistema de la responsabilidad de los administradores, doctrina y jurisprudencia (Manager’s Liability System, Doctrine and Jurisprudence)’, Revista de Derecho de Sociedades .
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  • Macey, Jonathan R. (1989), ‘Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes’, Duke Law Journal , 173-201.
  • Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1987), ‘Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’, 65 Texas Law Review , 469-523.
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