Skip to main content
Find a Lawyer

Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5300 Antitrust Law & Competition Law in General

  • ‘T Gilde, A.P.J. and Haank, D.J. (1985), De praktijk van de Wet economische mededinging (The Competition Act in Practice) , s-Gravenhage, SWOKA, Onderzoeksrapport, No. 37.
  • ‘T Gilde, A.P.J. and Haank, D.J. (1985), De praktijk van de Wet economische mededinging (The Competition Act in Practice) , s-Gravenhage, SWOKA, Onderzoeksrapport, No. 37.
  • Adams, Gregory B. (1985), ‘European and American Antitrust Regulation of Pricing by Monopolists’, 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law , 1-70.
  • Adams, Michael (1990), ‘Zur Nichtigkeit von Preisaufslagsverboten in KreditkartenvertrŠgen gemŠss 15 GWB (On the Nullity of Rebates in Credit Card Contracts according to Art. 15 GWB)’, Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftsrecht , 632-635.
  • Adams, Michael (1990), ‘Zur Nichtigkeit von Preisaufschlagverboten in KreditkartenvertrŠgen gemŠ§¤ 15 GWB (On the Voidness of Supplementary Charges Prohibition Clauses in Contracts on Credit Cards)’, Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftsrecht , 632-635.
  • Adams, Walter and Brock, James W. (1986), ‘The “New Learning” and the Euthanasia of Antitrust’, 74 California Law Review , 1515-1566.
  • Adams, Walter and Brock, James W. (1987), ‘Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment’, 62 New York University Law Review , 1116-1124.
  • Adams, Walter and Brock, James W. (1988), ‘Reaganomics and the Transmogrification of Merger Policy’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 309-359.
  • Adams, Walter and Brock, James W. (1990), ‘Mergers and Economic Performance: The Experience Abroad’, 5(2) Review of Industrial Organization , 175-188.
  • Adams, William James (1991), ‘Comment (on Jenny, Evolution of Anti-Trust Policies in France)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 60-65.
  • Aelen, L.O.M. (1990), ‘De EEG-groepsvrijstelling voor franchise-overeenkomsten (The EX Block Exemption for Franchise Agreements)’, 38 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 3-16.
  • Alb¾k, Svend, Molgaard, H. Peter and Baltzer Overgaard, Per (1995), ‘Dansk konkurrenceret og vertikal kontrol (Danish Competition Law and Vertical Control)’, 133 Nationalokonomisk Tidsskrift , 268-283.
  • Alchian, Armen A. (1991), ‘Development of Economic Theory and Antitrust: A View From the Theory of the Firm’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 232-234.
  • Alejo, M. Enrique (1987), ‘La efectividad de la pol’tica de competencia (The Effectiveness of Competition Policy)’, Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 51-66.
  • Alejo, M. Enrique (1987), ‘La efectividad de la pol’tica de la competencia (The Effectiveness of Competition Policy)’, 687 Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola .
  • Allen, Bruce T. (1971), ‘Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure: The Case of Cement and Concrete’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 251-274.
  • Allen, Bruce T. (1972), ‘Vertical Foreclosure in the Cement Industry: Reply’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 467-471.
  • Allen, Bruce T. (1975), ‘Industrial Reciprocity: A Statistical Analysis’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 507-520.
  • Alsmšller, Horst (1982), Wettbewerbspolitische Ziele und kooperationstheoretische Hvpothesen im Wandel der Zeit: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung von Einstellungen zu Verbundsystemen und von Grunden fŸr diese Einstellun gen (Competition Policy Purpose and Cooperation-Theoretical Hypotheses Through the Times: A Historical Investigation of the Institutions for Alliance Systems and for the Causes of these Institutions) , TŸbingen, Mohr, 337 p.
  • Angoff, Jay (1988), ‘Insurance against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry’, 5 Yale Journal on Regulation , 397-415.
  • Areeda, Elhauge and Hovenkamp Herbert J. (1995), Antitrust Law , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Areeda, Phillip (1987), ‘Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future’, 75 California Law Review , 959-981.
  • Areeda, Phillip (1990), ‘A Second Century of the Rule of Reason’, 59 Antitrust Law Journal , 143-150.
  • Armentano, Dominick T. (1982), Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure , New York, Wiley, 292 p.
  • Armentano, Dominick T. (1987), ‘Comment: Efficiency, Liberty, and Antitrust Policy’, in Dorn, James A. and Manne, Henry G. (eds.), Economic Liberties and the Judiciary , Fairfax, George Mason University Press, 309-316.
  • Armentano, Dominick T. (1989), ‘Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act Be Repealed?’, 8 Cato Journal , 729-749.
  • Armentano, Dominick T. (1990), ‘Time to Repeal Antitrust Regulation?’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 311-328.
  • Armentano, Dominick T. (1990), ‘Rationalizing Antitrust: Reply’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 345-347.
  • Aronowitz, Daniel (1991), ‘Retracing the Antitrust Roots of Section 1972 of the Bank Holding Company Act’, 44 Vanderbilt Law Review , 865-898.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1995), An‡lisis econ—mico del notariado (Economic Analisis of the Notary) , Madrid, Consejo General del Notariado.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1996), ‘The Economics of Notaries’, 3 European Journal of Law and Economics , 5-37.
  • Asch, Peter (1975), ‘The Determinants and Effects of Antitrust Activity’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 575-581.
  • Asch, Peter (1981), ‘Industrial Concentration, Efficiency and Antitrust Reform: Once Again: A Reply to Professor Liebeler’, 12 Southwestern University Law Review , 405-411.
  • Audretsch, David B. (1988), ‘Divergent Views in Antitrust Economics’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 135-160.
  • Audretsch, David B. (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Jorde and Teece, Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor Cooperation], (on Jorde and Teece, Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor Cooperation)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 145-151.
  • Auerbach, Paul (1988), Competition: The Economics of Industrial Change , Oxford, Blackwell, 339 p.
  • Ayres, Ian (1985), ‘Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets’, 95 Yale Law Journal , 109-125.
  • Baden Fuller, C.W. (1979), ‘Article 86: Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Dominant Position’, 4 European Law Review , 423-441.
  • Baden Fuller, C.W. (1981), ‘Economic Issues Relating to Property Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging’, 6 European Law Review , 162-179.
  • Bailey, Elizabeth E. and Baumol, William J. (1984), ‘Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets’, 2 Yale Journal on Regulation , 110-137.
  • Bain, Joe S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Bain, Joe S. (1968), Industrial Organization (2nd ed) , New York, John Wiley, 678 p.
  • Bain, Joe S. (1986), ‘Structure Versus Conduct as Indicators of Market Performance: The Chicago-School Attempts Revisited’, 18(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 17-50.
  • Baker, D.J. and Blumenthal, W. (1983), ‘The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law’, 71 California Law Review , 311-347.
  • Baker, Jonathan B. (1988), ‘Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 385-408.
  • Baker, Jonathan B. (1989), ‘Identifying Cartel Policing under Uncertainty: the U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 47-76.
  • Bakker, Luit M. and Ridder, Ronald K. De (1990), ‘Het EG- mededingingsbeleid en de samenwerking en concentratie binnen het Europese bankwezen (EC Competition Policy and European Banking Cooperation and Concentration)’, 39(11) Bank- en Effectenbedrijf , 42-46.
  • Baldrige, Malcolm (1983), ‘Two Areas of Antitrust Law in Need of Reform’, Detroit College of Law Review , 1035-1043.
  • Baldwin, W.L. (1990), ‘Efficiency and Competition: The Reagan Administration’s Legacy in Merger Policy’, 5(2) Review of Industrial Organization , 159-174.
  • Baldwin, William L. (1969), ‘The Feedback Effect of Business Conduct on Industry Structure’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 123-153.
  • Balmer, Thomas A. (1986), ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Economic Analysis and Political Considerations in Antitrust Law Revision’, 31 Antitrust Bulletin , 981-1001.
  • Barents, R. (1986), ‘Enige recente ontwikkelingen in het Europese mededingingsbeleid (1980-1985) (Some Recent Developments in European Competition Policy)’, 29 TVVS Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht en Rechtspersonen , 192-198.
  • Barnes, David W. (1989), ‘Revolutionary Antitrust: Efficiency, Ideology, and Democracy’, 58 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 59 ff.
  • Barnes, David W. (1989), ‘Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers’, 30 William & Mary Law Review , 787 ff.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economic Foundations of Regulation and Antitrust Law , West Publishing.
  • Bauer, Joseph P. (1983), ‘Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers’, 71 California Law Review , 348-375.
  • Baumol, William J. (1982), ‘Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure’, 72 American Economic Review , 1-15.
  • Baumol, William J. and Ordover, Janusz A. (1985), ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 247-265.
  • Baumol, William J., Panzar, John C. and Willig, Robert D. (1983), ‘Reply’, 73 American Economic Review , 491-496.
  • Baumol, William J., Panzar, John C. and Willig, Robert D. (1988), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Str , Orlando.
  • Baumol, William J., Panzer, John C. and Willig, Robert D. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Str , New York, Harcourt Brace.
  • Baxter, William F. (1983), ‘Responding to the Reaction: The Draftman’s Response’, 71 California Law Review , 618-631.
  • Baxter, William F. (1987), ‘The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine’, 75 California Law Review , 933-950.
  • Bays, Carson W. (1989), ‘Tying Arrangements Should be Per Se Legal’, 26 American Business Law Journal , 625-663.
  • Bays, Carson W. (1990), ‘Balancing the Benefits and Costs of the Tying Prohibition’, 28 American Business Law Journal , 161-167.
  • Beckenstein, Alan R. and Gabel, H. Landis (1986), ‘Predation Rules: An Economic and Behavioral Analysis’, 31 Antitrust Bulletin , 29-49.
  • Benjamin, Daniel K. (1983), ‘The Effect of Monopolies and Cartels on Market Prices’, 5 Research in Law and Economics , 1-15.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1979), ‘Spatial Microeconomics: Implications for the Use of Concentration Ratios to Represent Market Power’, 9 Review of Regional Studies , 1-15.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1980), ‘An Examination of U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank in the Context of Spatial Microeconomics’, 8 Industrial Organization Review , 27-65.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1980), ‘Spatial Competition: Implications for Market Area Delineation in Antimerger Cases’, 14 Antitrust Bulletin , 893-916. Reprinted in 25 The Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, 1984, p. 729-749. Reprinted in Greenhut, Melvin L. and Norman , George (Eds.), The Economics of Location, Vol. II London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995, p.352-366.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions’, 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 839-862.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1990), ‘Increasing Product Variety and Rising Prices’, 5 Review of Industrial Organization , 31-51.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Greenhut, Melvin L. (1986), ‘Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox’, in Grieson, Ronald E. (ed.), Antitrust and Regulation , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 53-90.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Faminow, Merle D., Marquis, Milton H. and Sauer, Douglas G. (1996), ‘Delineating Spatial Markets Using Multivariate Time Series’, 25 Review of Regional Studies .
  • Benson, Bruce L., Greenhut, Melvin L. and Holcombe, Randall (1987), ‘Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox’, 6 Cato Journal , 801-817.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Greenhut, Melvin L. and Holcombe, Randall G. (1987), ‘Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox’, 6 Cato Journal , 801-817.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Marquis, Milton H. and Sauer, Douglas G. (1993), ‘Spatial Price Theory and Market Delineation’, in Ohta, Hiroshi and Thisse, Jacques-Francois (eds.), Does Economic Space Matter? , London, MacMillan, 316-334.
  • Bergman, Mats (1997), ‘Antitrust, Marketing Cooperatives and Market Power’, 4 European Journal of Law and Economics , 73-92.
  • Bern, Roger and Tansey, Michael M. (1983), ‘Proper Application of the Rule of Reason to Vertical Territorial Restraints: Debunking the “Intrabranding-Interbrand” and “Efficiencies” Deviations’, 20 American Business Law Journal , 435-469.
  • Bernhard, Richard C. (1960), ‘English Law and American Law on Monopolies and Restraints of Trade’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics , 136-145.
  • Berry, Charles H. (1971), ‘Corporate Growth and Diversification’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 371-383.
  • Besanko, David A. and Spulber, Daniel F. (1990), ‘Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement’, 80 American Economic Review , 870-887.
  • Besanko, David A. and Spulber, Daniel F. (1993), ‘Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 1-29.
  • Bickel, David R. (1983), ‘The Antitrust Division’s Adaption of a Chicago School Economic Policy Calls for Some Reorganization: But is the Division’s New Policy Here to Stay?’, 20 Houston Law Review , 1083-1127.
  • Bilmes, Jack and Woodbury, John R. (1991), ‘Deterrence and Justice: Setting Civil Penalties in the Federal Trade Commission’, 14 Research in Law and Economics , 191-221.
  • Binder, John J. (1988), ‘The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Railroad Cartels’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 443-468.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1982), ‘Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 201-229.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1983), ‘Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case’, 5 Research in Law and Economics , 57-130.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1985), ‘Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 77-118.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1987), ‘Die wettbewerbspolitische Vorstellungen der Chicago School (Competition Policy According to the Chicago School)’, 37 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 709-718.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1987), ‘Chicago Credo’, 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 658-667.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1989), ‘The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute’, 14 Law and Social Inquiry , 739-762.
  • Bittlingmayer, George (1993), ‘The Stock Market and Early Antitrust Enforcement’, 36 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-32.
  • Blair, John M. (1972), Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Pu , New York, Harcourt Brace, 742 p.
  • Blair, Roger D. and Finci, Jeffrey (1983), ‘The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis’, 10 Florida State University Law Review , 531 ff.
  • Blair, Roger D. and Kaserman, David L. (1983), Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control , New York, Academic Press, 211 p.
  • Blake, Harlan M. and Jones, William K. (1965), ‘In Defense of Antitrust’, 65 Columbia Law Review , 377-400.
  • Blake, Harlan M. and Jones, William K. (1965), ‘Toward a Three- dimensional Antitrust Policy’, 65 Columbia Law Review , 422-466.
  • Blakeney, Michael (1982), ‘Comment (on Williams)’, in Cranston, Ross and Schick, Anne (eds.), Law and Economics , Canberra, Australian National University, 122-128.
  • Bleeker, K.A.M. (1989), ‘De geheimhoudingsplicht volgens art. 42 WEM in het licht van het EEG-Verdrag (The Secrecy Duty According to s. 42 WEM in the Light of the EC Treaty)’, 37 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 714-722.
  • Block, Michael K. and Sidak, Joseph Gergory (1980), ‘The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1131-1139.
  • Bodoff, Jean (1984), ‘Competition Policies of the US and the EEC: An Overview’, 5 European Competition Law Review , 51-81.
  • Bok, Derek C. (1960), ‘Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics’, 74 Harvard Law Review , 226-355.
  • Bolkestein, Frits (1985), Freedom and Regulation: A Liberal View on Competition Policy (Vrijheid en regeling: Een liberale visie op de mededingingspolitiek) , s-Gravenhage, 35 p.
  • Bolton, Patrick and Whinston, Michael D. (1991), ‘The “Foreclosure” Effects of Vertical Mergers’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 207-226.
  • Borchert, Manfred and Grossekettler, Heinz (1985), Preis- und Wettbewerbstheorie: Marktprozesse als analystische Problem un Ordnungspolitische Gestalungsaufgabe (PriceTheory and Competition Theory: Market Processes as Analytical Problem and Policy Recomandations) , Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 371 p.
  • Bork, Robert H. (1965), ‘Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I’, 65 Columbia Law Review , 401-416.
  • Bork, Robert H. (1966), ‘Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act’, 9 Journal of Law and Economics , 7-48.
  • Bork, Robert H. (1967), ‘Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy’, 57 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 242-253.
  • Bork, Robert H. (1978), The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself , New York, Basic Books, 468 p.
  • Bork, Robert H. (1985), ‘The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics’, 54 Antitrust Law Journal , 21-26.
  • Bork, Robert H. and Bowman, Ward S. (1965), ‘The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy’, 65 Columbia Law Review , 363-376.
  • Borrie, Sir Gordon (1982), ‘Competition Policy in Britain: Retrospect and Prospect’, 2 International Review of Law and Economics , 139-149.
  • Bos, P.V.F. and Fierstra, Marc A. (1989), Europees mededingingsrecht (European Competition Law) , Deventer, Kluwer, 274 p.
  • Bos, P.V.F. and Stuyck, J.H.V. (1989), ‘Concentratiecontrole naar EEG-recht (Concentration Control in EC-Law)’, 37 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 300-404.
  • Bouckaert, Boudewijn (1986), ‘Is de prins een goede herder van de mededinging? Grondslagen van het internationaal Europees economisch recht (Is the Prince a Good Shepherd for Competition? Basics of international European Economic Law)’, 15 Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie , 8-27.
  • Bowman, Ward S. (1965), ‘Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II’, 65 Columbia Law Review , 417-421.
  • Bowman, Ward S., Jr. (1973), Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic App , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Braakman, A.J. (1988), ‘Europees kartelrecht als strijdmiddel bij overnames (European Anti-trust Law as Takeover Combat Mechanism)’, 73 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 854-858.
  • Brace, Frederic F., Jr., Webb, Dan K., Joslin, Rodney D. and Wildman, Max E. (1989), ‘Opening Statements and Testimony: Ohio- Sealy et al. v. Sealy, Inc. et al.’, 21(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 9-110.
  • Bradley, Robert L., Jr. (1990), ‘On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act’, 9 Cato Journal , 737-742.
  • Braeutigam, Ronald R. (1981), ‘Regulation of Multiproduct Enterprises by Rate of Return, Markup, and Operating Ratio’, 3 Research in Law and Economics , 15-38.
  • Breit, William (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: What do Economists Know and When did They Know it?’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 72-90.
  • Breit, William and Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1974), ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 329-356.
  • Breit, William and Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1985), ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 405-443.
  • Brennan, Timothy J. (1982), ‘Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules’, 95 Harvard Law Review , 1849-1856.
  • Brenner, Gabrielle A. and Brenner, Reuven (1989), Les innovations et la Loi sur la concurrence (Innovations and the Competition Law) , MontrŽal, Ecole des hautes Žtudes commerciales, Institut d’Žconomie appliquŽe. ActualitŽ Economique 65, 146-63 (1990)
  • Brenner, Reuven (1989), Rivalry , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1990), ‘Inventions et innovations dans le monde des affaires et des sciences (Inventions and Innovations in Business and Science)’, 26 ƒtudes franaises , 51-78.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1990), ‘Market Power: Innovations and Anti-trust’, in Trebilcock, Michael J. (ed.), Economic Competition and the Law , Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 179-216.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1990), ‘Innovations and Anti-trust’, in Schenk, H. (ed.), Perspectives in Industrial Economics , Boston, Kluwer-Nijhoff, 235-261.
  • Brenner, Reuven and Brenner, Gabrielle A. (1988), ‘Entrepreneurship – Le nouveau nom d’un vieux phŽnomne (Entrepreneurship – A New Name for an Old Phenomenon)’, Revue internationale de gestion .
  • Brenner, Reuven and Brenner, Gabrielle A. (1989), ‘Les Innovations et la Loi sur La Concurrence’, 65(1) Actualite Economique , 146-163.
  • Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Suslow, Valerie Y. (1989), ‘Short-Run Supply with Capacity Constraints’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 11-42.
  • Breyer, Stephen G. (1987), ‘Antitrust, Deregulation and the Newly Liberated Marketplace’, 75 California Law Review , 1005-1047.
  • Brickley, James A., Dark, Frederick H. and Weisbach, Michael S. (1991), ‘The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 101-132.
  • Brittan, Leon (1990), ‘The Law and Policy of Merger Control in the EEC’, 15 European Law Review , 351-357.
  • Brock, William A. (1983), ‘Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article’, 91 Journal of Political Economy , 1055-1066.
  • Brodley, Joseph F. (1983), ‘Potential Competition under the Merger Guidelines’, 71 California Law Review , 377-401.
  • Brodley, Joseph F. (1987), ‘The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress’, 62 New York University Law Review , 1020-1053.
  • Bronsteen, Peter (1986), ‘Market Share and Market Power in the Domestic Lemon Industry’, 9 Research in Law and Economics , 13-28.
  • Brozen, Yale (1970), ‘The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 279-292.
  • Brozen, Yale (1971), ‘Bain’s Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 351-369.
  • Brozen, Yale (1971), ‘Deconcentration Reconsidered: Comment’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 489-491.
  • Brozen, Yale (1971), ‘The Persistence of “High Rates of Return” in High-Stable Concentration Industries’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 501-512.
  • Brozen, Yale (1975), The Competitive Economy: Selected Readings , Morristown, New Jersey.
  • Brozen, Yale (1986), ‘The Antitrust Tradition: Entrepreneurial Restraint’, 9 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 337-356.
  • Butler, Henry N. (1983), ‘Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic Pursuit of Treble Damages’, 59 Washington Law Review , 27-60.
  • Butler, Henry N., Lane, W.J. and Phillips, Owen R. (1984), ‘The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis’, 36 Hastings Law Journal , 173-213.
  • Buxbaum, Richard M. (1989), ‘Enforcement of US Antitrust Laws during the Reagan Administration: Review and Prospects’, 39 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 566-578.
  • Cabanelllas, Guillermo and Etzrordt, Wolf (1983), ‘The New Argentine Law: Competition as an Economic Policy Instrument’, 17 Journal of World Trade Law , 34-53.
  • Calkins, Stephen (1983), ‘The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’, 71 California Law Review , 402-429.
  • Calvani, Terry and Berg, Andrew G. (1984), ‘Resale Price Maintenance after Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself’, 84 Duke Law Journal , 1163-1204.
  • Calvani, Terry and Siegfried, John J. (eds.) (1979), Economic Analysis and Antitrust , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Campbell, Thomas J. (1984), ‘The Efficiency of the Failing Company Defense’, 63 Texas Law Review , 251-283.
  • Campbell, Thomas J. (1985), ‘The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration’, 64 Texas Law Review , 353-369.
  • Campbell, Thomas J. (1987), ‘Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods’, 87 Columbia Law Review , 1625-1675.
  • Cann, Wesley A., Jr. (1985), ‘Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic “Objectivity”: Is There Any Role for Social and Political Value in Merger Policy?’, 60 Notre Dame Law Review , 273-317.
  • Carlton, Dennis W. (1983), ‘A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 51-70.
  • Carlton, Dennis W. and Gertner, Robert H. (1989), ‘Market Power and Mergers in Durable-Good Industries’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 203-226.
  • Carstensen, Peter C. (1981), ‘Antitrust Law, Competition, and the Macroeconomy’, 14 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform , 173-203.
  • Carstensen, Peter C. (1983), ‘Commentary: Reflections on Hay, Clark, and the Relationship of Economic Analysis and Policy to Rules of Antitrust Law’, Wisconsin Law Review , 953-988.
  • Carstensen, Peter C. (1992), ‘The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade Analysis’, 14 Research in Law and Economics , 1-88.
  • Carter, John R. (1978), ‘Collusion, Efficiency, and Antitrust’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics , 435-444.
  • Cassell, Paul G. (1985), ‘Exemption of International Shipping Conferences from the American Antitrust Laws: An Economic Analysis’, 20 New England Law Review , 1-30.
  • Cavanagh, Edward D. (1987), ‘Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, 61 Tulane Law Review , 777-848.
  • Cavanagh, Edward D. (1987), ‘Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?’, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1277 ff.
  • Chamberlin, Edward H. (ed.) (1954), Monopoly, and Competition and Their Regulation , New York, 549 p.
  • Chard, J.S. (1982), ‘The Economics of the Application of Article 85 to Selective Distribution Systems’, 7 European Law Review , 83-102.
  • Chen, C. M. (1997), ‘Basing-Point Pricing, Parallel Behavior, and Colluding Behavior: From American Anti-Trust Law’, (in Chinese)’, 5 (1) Fair Trade Quarterly , 65-96.
  • Chiappori, P.A., PŽrez-Castillo, J.David and Verdier, T. (1995), ‘Spatial Competition in the Banking System: Localization, Cross Subsidies and the Regulation of Interest Rates’, 39 European Economic Review , 889-918.
  • Cirace, John (1987), ‘Schizophrenia in the Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines’, 19(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 73-79.
  • Clark, David W. (1984), ‘Ties That May Bind: Antitrust Liability for Exclusive Hospital-Physician Contracts after Jefferson Parish Hospital District v. Hyde’, 54 Mississippi Law Journal , 1-42.
  • Clarke, R.N. (1983), ‘Collusion and the Incentives for Informa tion Sharing’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 383-394.
  • Claydon, Jeanne-Marie (1986), ‘Joint Ventures: An Analysis of Commission Decisions’, 7 European Competition Law Review , 151-192.
  • Clemenz, Gerhard and Inderst, Alfred (1989), …konomische Analyse der Ladenšffnungszeiten (Economic Analysis of Shop Opening Hours) , Vienna, Manz, 128 p.
  • Cloninger, Dale O. and Kantz, Terrance R. (1987), ‘Price Fixing and Legal Sanctions: The Stockholder-Enrichment Motive’ Strickland, Thomas H.’, 19(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 17-24.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1972), ‘Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research’, in Fuchs, Victor R. (ed.), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Indust , Washington, National Bureau of Economic Research, 59-73.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1972), ‘Durability and Monopoly’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 143-149.
  • Coate, Malcolm B. (1986), ‘An Analysis of Three Approaches to Market Definition’, 9 Research in Law and Economics , 29-43.
  • Coate, Malcolm B. and Kleit, Andrew N. (1994), ‘Exclusion, Collusion, or Confusion?: The Underpinnings of Raising Rivals’ Costs’, 16 Research in Law and Economics , 73-93.
  • Coate, Malcolm B., Higgins, Richard S. and McChesney, Fred S. (1990), ‘Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 463-482.
  • Coelho Philip R.P. and McClure, James E. (1987), ‘Barriers to Entry in the Market for Stud Services: Government and ‘Non-Profit’ Institutions in Collusion’, 25 Economic Inquiry , 659-670.
  • Cohler, Charles B. (1987), ‘The New Economics and Antitrust Policy’, 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 401-414.
  • Collinge, Robert A. (1994), ‘An Alternative to Regulation: Efficiency and Second Best Optimal Revenues Irrespective of Market Structure’, 16 Research in Law and Economics , 95-107.
  • Comanor, William S. (1985), ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy’, 98 Harvard Law Review , 983-1002.
  • Comanor, William S. (1987), ‘Antitrust Enforcement Policies Towards Vertical Restraints’, 19(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 41-47.
  • Comanor, William S. and others (1991), Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions , New York, Harwood, 260 p.
  • Cone, Kenneth R. and Dranove, David (1986), ‘Why Did States Enact Hospital Rate-setting Laws ?’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 287-302.
  • Cook, Carla Tolbert (1985), ‘Antitrust Action Against Milk Marketing Cooperatives – Shaking Up the milk Industry’, 34 Drake Law Review , 493-513.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1981), ‘Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Further Comment on Economic Theory’, 129 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1523-1532.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1981), ‘Economics of Passing On: Correcting the Analysis of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe’, 129 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1516 ff. Reprinted in Blair, Roger D; and Esquibel, Amanda K. (Eds.) , Antitrust Injury and Standing: Selected Articles.
  • Correia, Eddie (1976), ‘Antitrust Policy after the First Reagan Administration’, 76 Georgetown Law Journal , 329-335.
  • Cotter, Thomas F. (1987), ‘Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.: The Supreme Court Restricts Private Antitrust Challenges to Horizontal Mergers’, 3 Wisconsin Law Review , 503-541.
  • Cowling, Keith and Mueller, Dennis C. (1978), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly Power’, 88 Economic Journal , 727-748.
  • Crandall, Robert W., Owen, Bruce M. and Skitol, R.S. (1991), ‘Competition Policy in Jamaica’, Economists Incorporated .
  • Craswell, Richard (1982), ‘Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues’, 62 Boston University Law Review , 661-700.
  • Craswell, Richard and Fratrik, Mark R. (1986), ‘Predatory Pricing Theory Applied: The Case of Supermarkets vs. Warehouse Stores’, 36 Case Western Reserve Law Review , 1-49.
  • Crew, Michael A. and Rowley, Charles K. (1988), ‘Toward a Public Choice Theory of Monopoly Regulation’, 57 Public Choice , 49-67.
  • Crump, David and Maxwell, Larry A. (1983), ‘Comment: Health Care, Cost Containment, and the Antitrust Laws: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Pireno Case’, 56 Southern California Law Review , 913 ff.
  • Cubbin, John S. (1988), Market Structure and Performance: The Empirical Research , Chur, Harwood Academic, 79 p.
  • Cummings, F. Jay and Ruhter, Wayne E. (1979), ‘The ase’, 22 Northern Pacific Journal of Law and Economics , 329-350.
  • Curran, William J. III (1987), ‘Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories: A Democratic Refiguration of Antitrust Law’, 31 Saint Louis University Law Journal , 349-378.
  • Curran, William J. III (1988), ‘On Democracy and Economics’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 753-777.
  • Dale, Richard (1980), Anti-Dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order , London, MacMillan, 237 p.
  • Dankbaar, Ben, Groenewegen, John and Schenk, Hans (eds.) (1990), Perspectives in Industrial Organization , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 311 p.
  • Darby, Michael R. and Lott, John R., Jr. (1989), ‘Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 87-103.
  • Davidow, Joel (1983), ‘Cartels, Competition Laws and the Regulation of International Trade’, 15 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics , 351-376.
  • Davidow, Joel (1990), ‘The Worldwide Influence of U.S. Antitrust’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 603-630.
  • Davidson, Kenneth M. (1983), ‘The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets’, 71 California Law Review , 445-463.
  • Davies, S.W. and Lyons, B.R. (1988), Economics of Industrial Organization , London.
  • De Vany, Arthur S. and Eckert, Ross D. (1991), ‘Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount Cases Revisited’, 14 Research in Law and Economics , 51-112.
  • Debow, Michael E. (1988), ‘What’s Wrong With Price Fixing: Responding to the New Critics of Antitrust’, 12(2) Regulation , 44-50.
  • Delong, James V., Flynn, John J., Clower, Robert W. and Goodwin, Alfred T. (1981), ‘Economic Analysis’, 12 Southwestern University Law Review , 297-377.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-9.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1976), ‘Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 371-384.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1982), Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 125 p.
  • Dennison, S.R. (1959), ‘The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956’, 2 Journal of Law and Economics , 64-83.
  • Dewey, Donald (1959), Monopoly in Economics and Law , Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 328 p.
  • Dewey, Donald (1976), ‘Industrial Concentration and the Rate of Profit: Some Neglected Theory’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 67-78.
  • Dewey, Donald (1978), ‘Antitrust and Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendship’, 87 Yale Law Journal , 1516-1526.
  • Dewey, Donald (1990), ‘Economists and Antitrust: The Circular Road’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 349-371.
  • Dick, Andrew R. (1991), ‘Learning by Doing and Dumping in the Semiconductor Industry’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 133-159.
  • Dick, Andrew R. (1992), ‘Are Export Cartels Efficiency Enhancing or Monopoly Promoting?: Evidence from the Webb Pomerene Experience’, 15 Research in Law and Economics , 89-127.
  • Dilorenzo, T.J. (1985), ‘The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest- Group Perspective’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 73-90.
  • Diplock, Kenneth Sir (1964), ‘Antitrust and the Judicial Process’, 7 Journal of Law and Economics , 27-43.
  • Dnes, Anthony W. (1996), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust’, 3 Applied Economics Letters , 107-108.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1996), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust’, 3 Applied Economics Letters , 107-108.
  • Donohue, John J. III (1987), ‘Judge Bork, Anti-Trust Law, and the Bending of Original Intent’, 22-7 Chicago Tribune .
  • Dorman, Roderick G. (1980), ‘The Case for Compensation: Why Compensatory Components Are Required for Efficient Antitrust Enforcement’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1113-1120.
  • Drijber, B.J. (1989), ‘Groepsvrijstelling know-how licenties: Rechtszekerheid of onduidelijkheid (Block Exemption Know-How Licences: Legal Certainty or Vagueness)’, 37 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 200-216.
  • Drohan, John P. (1988), ‘Antitrust: Tailoring More Efficient Summary Judgment Standards in Antitrust Conspiracy Actions: Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro’, 54 Brooklyn Law Review , 347 ff.
  • Dunne, Timothy, Roberts, Mark J. and Samuelson, Larry (1989), ‘Firm Entry and Postentry Performance in the U.S. Chemical Industries’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 233-271.
  • Dutta, Shantanu and John, George (1995), ‘Combining Lab Experiments and Industry Data in Transaction Cost Analysis: The Case of Competition as a Safeguard’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 87-111.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1983), ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 23-50.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’, 63 Texas Law Review , 1-40.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1985), ‘Detrebling Antitrust Damages’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 445-467.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1986), ‘Workable Antitrust Policy’, 84 Michigan Law Review , 1696 ff.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1987), ‘Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law’, 75 California Law Review , 983-989.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1987), ‘Allocating Antitrust Decisionma king Tasks’, 76 Georgetown Law Journal , 305-320.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1989), ‘Removing Intent and Cost in Predatory Pricing Cases: Power to Recoup as “Initial Hurdle”‘, 21(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 37-48.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H., Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 331-370.
  • Eckbo, B. Espen and Wier, Peggy (1985), ‘Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 119-149.
  • Eger, Thomas (1994), ‘Kommentar zu Helmut Kšhler, Erweiterung des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes durch UWG-Normen (Comment on Helmut Kšhler, Extension of legal protection of industrial property by UWG-norms)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Okonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen , TŸbingen, Mohr, 270-280.
  • Eichner, Alfred S. (1971), ‘Monopoly, the Emergence of Oligopoly and the Case of Sugar Refining: A Reply’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 521-527.
  • Eis, Carl (1969), ‘The 1919-1930 Merger Movement in American Industry’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 267-296.
  • Eisenberg, Barry S. (1980), ‘Information Exchange among Competitors: The Issue of Relative Value Scales for Physicians’ Services’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 441-460.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1991), ‘The Scope of Antitrust Process’, 104 Harvard International Law Journal , 667 ff.
  • Elhauge, Einer Richard (1992), ‘Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity’, 80 California Law Review , 1177 ff.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1969), ‘The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories ?’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 43-78.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1970), ‘Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 223-240.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1977), ‘The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?’, 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1191-1213.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1980), ‘The Compass of Competition for Professional Services’, in Blair, Roger D. and Rubin, Stephen (eds.), Regulating the Professions: A Public-Policy Symposium , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1984), ‘New Developments on the Cartel Front’, 29 Antitrust Bulletin , 3-26.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. (1988), ‘The New International Economics Applied: Japanese Televisions and U.S. Consumers’, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 941 ff.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. and Breit, William (1976), The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics , New Haven, Yale University Press, 160 p.
  • Elzinga, Kenneth G. and Hogarty, Thomas F. (1978), ‘the Consequences of Robinson-Patman’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics , 427-434.
  • Emons, Winand (1991), ‘Comment (on Gilbert, Legal and Economic Issues in the Commercialization of New Technology)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 182-184.
  • Empel, Martijn Van (1990), ‘Merger Control in the EEC’, 13 World Competition: Law and Economics Review , 6-22.
  • Emrich, Heinrich Maria (1978), Die Problematik der Fusionskontrolle bei Konglomeraten, Eine Untersuchung der rechtlichen Schwierigkeiten und ihrer wirtschaftlichen Grundlage unter besonderer BerŸcksichtigung der Einzelmarktbetrachtung und des Marktanteilskriteriums in den ¤ 24, 22 GWB (The Problem of Merger Control in Conglomerates) , Berlin.
  • Erickson, W. Bruce (1986), ‘Antitrust Consulting and the ‘Knowledge-Loss’ Factor: Money, Time, and Confidentiality’, 18(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 49-58.
  • Faith, Roger L., Leavens, Donald R. and Tollison, Robert D. (1982), ‘Antitrust Pork Barrel’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 329-342.
  • Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C. (1983), ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 301-325.
  • Faull, Jonathan (1984), ‘Joint Ventures under the EEC Competition Rules’, 5 European Competition Law Review , 358-374.
  • Feenstra, J.J. (1988), ‘Fusiecontrole door de EEG na het Philip Morris arrest (EC Merger Control after the Philip Morris Case)’, 66 De Naamloze Vennootschap , 60-67.
  • Feinberg, Robert M. (1986), ‘The Effects of European Competition Policy on Pricing and Profit Margins’, 39 Kyklos , 267-287.
  • Fejo, Jens (1990), Monopoly Law and Market: Studies of EC Competition , Deventer, Kluwer, 416 p.
  • Fejo, Jens (1994), Monopol-ret og Marked (Monopoly Law and Market) , K¢benhavn, HHK.
  • Feldman, Roger, Cootner, Paul H. and Bailey, M.N. (1972), ‘An Econometric Model of the World Copper Industry’, 3 Bell Journal of Economics , 568-609.
  • Ferguson, James M. (1983), ‘Daily Newspaper Advertising Rates, Local Media Cross-Ownership, Newspaper Chains, and Media Competition’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 635-654.
  • Ferguson, Paul R. (1988), Industrial Economics: Issues and Perspectives , Basingstoke, MacMillan, 216 p.
  • Ferrall, Victor E., Jr. (1960), ‘Quantity Discounts and Competition: Economic Rationality or Robinson-Patman’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics , 146-166.
  • Ferris, J. Stephen (1990), ‘Time, Space, and Shopping: The Regulation of Shopping Hours’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 171-187.
  • Fierstra, Marc A. (1990), ‘Communautaire concentratiecontrole: Een nieuwe fase in een ontwikkeling (Community Concentration Control: A New Development Stage)’, 38 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 330-350.
  • Fine, Frank L. (1987), ‘The Philip Morris Judgment: Does Article 85 Now Extend to Mergers?’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 333-343.
  • Fine, Frank L. (1989), Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and , London, Graham and Trotman.
  • Fine, Frank L. (1990), ‘Ec Merger Control: An Analysis of the New Regulation’, 11 European Competition Law Review , 47-51.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg and Schulenburg, J. Matthias Graf Von Der (1989), ‘Der Sonntagsverkauf (The Effects of Sunday Trading)’, 109 Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften , 119-128.
  • Fischer, Franklin M. (1985), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered (Comment)’, 93 Journal of Political Economy , 410-416.
  • Fisher, Alan A. and Lande, Robert H. (1983), ‘Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement’, 71 California Law Review , 1582-1696.
  • Fisher, Alan A. and Sciacca, Richard (1984), ‘An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy’, 6 Research in Law and Economics , 1-133.
  • Fisher, Alan A., Johnson, Frederick I. and Lande, Robert H. (1989), ‘Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers’, 77 California Law Review , 777-827.
  • Fisher, Alan A., Lande, Robert H. and Vandaele, Walter (1983), ‘Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?’, 71 California Law Review , 1697-1706.
  • Fisher, Franklin M. (1988), ‘Matsushita: Myth v. Analysis in the Economics of Predation’, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 969 ff.
  • Fishwick, F. (1986), Definition of the Relevant Market in Community Competition Policy , Luxemburg, 175 p.
  • Flynn, John J. (1977), ‘Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, Introduction’, 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1182-1190.
  • Flynn, John J. (1983), ‘”Reaganomics” and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Critique’, Utah Law Review , 269-312.
  • Flynn, John J. (1988), ‘The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy: “Original Intent” and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 259-307.
  • Flynn, John J. (1988), ‘Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the Social “Science” of Economics’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 713-743.
  • Flynn, John J. and Ponsoldt, James F. (1987), ‘Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes’, 62 New York University Law Review , 1125-1152.
  • Fortenberry, Joseph E. (1988), ‘A History of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Practices’, 11 Research in Law and Economics , 133-259.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1980), ‘Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy’, 37 Washington and Lee Law Review , 49-71.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1981), ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’, 66 Cornell Law Review , 1140-1192.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1981), ‘The New American Competition Policy: From Anti-Trust to Pro-Efficiency’, 2 European Competition Law Review , 439-451.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1983), ‘Introduction. the 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists Are Kings?’, 71 California Law Review , 281-302.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1986), ‘The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window’, 61 New York University Law Review , 554-588.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1986), ‘Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness’, 61 Notre Dame Law Review , 981 ff.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1986), ‘Consumer Beware Chicago’, 84 Michigan Law Review , 1714-1720.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1987), ‘The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust’, 75 California Law Review , 917-923.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. (1988), ‘Antitrust, Economics, and Bias’, 2 Antitrust , 6-10.
  • Fox, Eleanor M. and Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1987), ‘Antitrust: Retrospective and Prospective, Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?’, 62 New York University Law Review , 937-988.
  • Fox, Eleanor M., White, Lawrence J. and Topkis, Jay (1983), ‘Demonstration: Economic Analysis and Expert Testimony: Defendant’s Economist’, 52 Antitrust Law Journal , 799-814.
  • Fox, Pauline H. (1988), ‘Anti-Antitrust Bias in the US Judiciary’, 20(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 57-60.
  • Frankena, Mark W. and Owen, Bruce M. (1992), ‘Competitive Issues in Electric Utility Mergers’, 26 International Merger Law .
  • Frankena, Mark W. and Owen, Bruce M. (1993), ‘Antitrust Analysis of Electric Utility Mergers After the Energy Policy Act’, 30 International Merger Law .
  • Frawley, Alfred C. (1989), ‘Predatory Intent, Pricing Below AVC, and Oligopoly Market Power: Usurping the Jury’s Function’, 21(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 27-36.
  • Frazer, Tim (1988), Monopoly. Competition and the Law: The Regulation , Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 265 p.
  • Frazer, Tim (1990), ‘Competition Policy after 1992: The Next Step’, 53 Modern Law Review , 609-623.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1984), ‘Competition in Medical Care: Research and Policy’, 5 Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research , 1-27.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1987), ‘Comments on Antitrust Issues’, 7 Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research , 263-267.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), ‘Introduction: The Political Economy of Health Care’, in Frech, H.E., III (ed.), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Fransisco, Pacific Research Institute, 1-26.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1988), ‘Monopoly in Health Insurance: The Economics of Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts’, in Frech, H.E., III (ed.), Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance , San Fransisco, Pacific Research Institute, 293-322.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1993), ‘Health Insurance: Designing Products to Reduce Costs’, in Duetsch, Larry L. and Cliffs, Englewood (eds.), Indusrty Studies , New York, Prentice Hall, 307-323.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (ed.) (1991), Health Economics Worldwide , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1984), ‘Strategic Behavior and Antitrust Analysis’, 74(2) American Economic Review , 372-376.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1985), ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements’, 75(3) American Economic Review , 539-546. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints of Antitrust Law and Economics, vol. 10 (1).
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1987), ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Reply’, 77(5) American Economic Review , 1069-1072.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1993), ‘Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent’, 38 Antitrust Bulletin , 293-308.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Mobley, Lee Rivers (1994), ‘Firm Growth and Failure in Increasingly Competitive Markets: Theory and Application to Hospital Markets’, 1(1) Journal of the Economics of Business , 77-94.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Mobley, Lee Rivers (1995), ‘Resolving the Impasse on Hospital Scale Economies: A New Approach’, 27 Applied Economics , 286-296.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Springer, Robert F. (1986), ‘Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance’, 59(3) Journal of Business , 433-450.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Woolley, Michael J. (1989), ‘How Hospitals Compete: A Review of Literature’, 2 Journal of Law and Public Policy , 57-80.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Woolley, Michael J. (1992), ‘Consumer Information, Price and Nonprice Competition Among Hospitals’, in Frech, H.E., III and Zweifel, Peter (eds.), Health Economics Worldwide: Proceeding of the Second World Congres on Health Economics , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 217-244.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Zweifel, Peter (1991), ‘Preface’, in Frech, H.E., III and Zweifel, Peter (eds.), Health Economics Worldwide: Proceeding of the Second World Congres on Health Economics , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 7-8.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1975), ‘Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets, A Theoretical Analysis’, 13(1) Economic Inquiry , 55-70.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1978), ‘Competition Among Health Insurers’, in Greenberg, Warren (ed.), Competition in the Health Care Sector: Past, Presence and Future , Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 210-237. Reprinted by Aspen Systems, Germantown, MD.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1978), Public Insurance in Private Medical Markets: Some Problems of National Health Insurance , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
  • Frech, H.Edward III and Ginsburg, Paul G. (1988), ‘Competition Among Health Insurers, Revisited’, 13(2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law , 279-291. Reprinted Greenberg, Warren, Competition in the Health Care Sector: Ten Years Later, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, pp. 57-70.
  • Frey, Bruno S. (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Shughart and Tollison, the Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 53-57.
  • Frignani, Aldo, Pardolesi, Roberto, Patroni Griffi, Antonio and Ubertazzi, Luigi Carlo (eds.) (1993), Diritto antitrust italiano commento alla l. 10 ottobre 1990 n. 287 (Italian antitrust law) , Bologna, Zanichelli.
  • Frignani, Aldo, Pardolesi, Roberto, Patroni Griffi, Antonio and Ubertazzi, Luigi Carlo (eds.) (1993), Diritto antitrust italiano, commento alla l. 10 ottobre 1990 n. 287, 2 vol. (Italian antitrust law) , Bologna, Zanichelli.
  • Fršhlich, P. (1975), Marktabgrenzung in der Wettbewerbspolitik: Die (Market Definition in Competition Policy: The P) , Gšttingen.
  • Gaay Fortman, Bastiaan De (1966), Theory of Competition Policy: A Confrontation of Economic, Political and Legal Principles , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 341 p.
  • Gal Or, Esther (1992), ‘Vertical Integration in Oligopoly’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 377-393.
  • Gallhorn, Ernest A. (1987), ‘The Practical Uses of Economic Analysis: Hope vs. Reality’, 56 Antitrust Law Journal , 933-945.
  • Gallo, Joseph C. and others (1994), ‘Criminal Penalties under the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and Economics’, 16 Research in Law and Economics , 25-71.
  • Gallo, Joseph C., Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. and Craycraft, Joseph (1997), ‘The First Century of Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement’, Review of Industrial Organization .
  • Ganal, Michael (1986), Die handels- und kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Agentursystemen. Eine juristische und škonomische Analyse, Schriftenreihe Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (Evaluation of Agency Systems from the Viewpoint of Mercantile Law and Anti-Trust Law) , MŸnchen, Florentz, 379 p.
  • Garcia Gallego, Aurora and Georgantzis, Nikolaos (1992), On the Antitrust Implications of Information Sharing: An Overview of the Theoretical Findings and Possible Applications to the Tractors Industry Case , Report for the A-3 Unit (Economic Questions and Studies) of DG IV (Competition) of the European Comission.
  • Garcia Gallego, Aurora and Georgantzis, Nikolaos (1995), Competitive and Predatory Multi-Plant Location Decisions , Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ—micas, Valencia, Spain, No. WP-EC95-03.
  • Garcia Gallego, Aurora and Georgantzis, Nikolaos (1996), ‘Multiproduct Activity and Competition Policy: The Tetra Pak Case’, 31(1) European Journal of Law and Economics , 83-95.
  • Garcia Gallego, Aurora and Georgantzis, Nikolaos (1996), ‘Competition Intensity vs. Service Quality: On the Distribution of Para-Pharmaceutical Products in Spain’, in Martin, Stephen (ed.), Interaction of Member State and EU Competition Policy , Amsterdam, forthcoming.
  • Garland, Merrick B. (1987), ‘Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process’, 96 Yale Law Journal , 486-519.
  • Gellhorn, Ernest A. (1976), Antitrust Law and Economics , St. Paul, West Publishing Company, 472 p.
  • Gellhorn, Ernest A. (1987), ‘The Practical Uses of Economic Analysis: Hope vs. Reality’, 56 Antitrust Law Journal , 933-945.
  • Gellhorn, Ernest A. and others (1990), ‘Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 695-743.
  • Georgantzis, Nikolaos (1992), The Effect of Mergers on Potential Competition under Economies or Diseconomies of Joint Production , Istituto Universitario Europeo, EUI Working Paper ECO, Florence, Italy, No. 92/67.
  • Georgantzis, Nikolaos and Aurora Garcia Gallego, La actividad multiproducto y sus implicaciones para la politica de la competencia (Multiproduct Activity and Competiton Policy Implications) , Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas.
  • Gerber, David J. (1989), ‘International Competitive Harm and Domestic Antitrust Laws: Forms of Analysis’, 10 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business , 41-55.
  • Gerhart, Peter M. (1982), ‘The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School’, Supreme Court Review , 319-349.
  • Gerla, Harry S. (1988), ‘A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play’, 86 Michigan Law Review , 892-929.
  • Gevurtz, Franklin A. (1987), ‘Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade’, 27 Virginia Journal of International Law , 211-272.
  • Gibbons, John J. (1987), ‘Antitrust, Law & Economics, and Politics’, 50(4) Law and Contemporary Problems , 217-224.
  • Gilbert, Richard J. (1991), ‘Legal and Economic Issues in the Commercialization of New Technology’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 155-181.
  • Gilley, O.W. and Karels, G.V. (1981), ‘The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 637-648.
  • Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1990), ‘Rationalizing Antitrust: A Rejoinder’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 329-343.
  • Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1991), ‘Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason’, 60 Antitrust Law Journal , 67 ff.
  • Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Mšschel, the Goals of Antitrust Revisited],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 24-30.
  • Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1991), ‘Antitrust as Antimonopoly’, Regulation .
  • Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1993), ‘Nonprice Competition’, 38 Antitrust Bulletin , 83 ff.
  • Goetz, Charles J., Granet, Lloyd and Schwartz, Warren F. (1986), ‘The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in the Countervailing Duty Law’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 17-32.
  • Goldberg, Lawrence G. (1973), ‘The Effect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 137-158.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1971), ‘Price Discrimintation and Product Variation in Cellophane’, 16 Antitrust Bulletin , 431-442.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1972), ‘A Note on the Costs of Monopoly’, 17 Antitrust Bulletin , 479-483.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), ‘Reflections on the Welfare Loss Rectangle’, 4 Industrial Organization Review , 151-155.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1978), ‘Welfare Loss and Monopoly: The Unmaking of an Estimate’, 16 Economic Inquiry , 310-312.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1979), ‘Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective’, 58 Texas Law Review , 91-129.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), ‘Comments on Oliver E. Williamson: Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: The Transaction Cost Approach’, in Williamson, Oliver E. (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics , 86-92.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), ‘Enforcing Resale Price Maintenance: The FTC Investigation of Lenox’, 18 American Business Law Journal , 225-258.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1982), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and the FTC: the Magnavox Investigation’, 23 William & Mary Law Review , 439-500.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), ‘The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services’, 79 Northwestern University Law Review , 736-757. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, 1990.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), ‘Television and the Quest for Gold: The Unofficial Paper of the 1984 Olympics’, 79 Northwestern University Law Review , 1172-1182.
  • Goldschmid, Harvey J. (1987), ‘Horizontal Restraints in Anti trust: Current Treatment and Future Needs’, 75 California Law Review , 925-931.
  • Gort, Michael and Hogarty, Thomas F. (1970), ‘New Evidence on Mergers’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 167-184.
  • Gotthold, JŸrgen (1981), ‘Neuere Entwicklungen der Wettbewerbstheorie: Kritische Bemerkungen zur neo-liberalen Theorie der Wettbewerbspolitik (New Developments in Competition Theory: Critical Remarks on the Neo-Liberal Theory of Competition Policy)’, 145 Zeitschrift fŸr das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht , 286-340.
  • Grady, Mark F. (1992), ‘Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust’, 30 Economic Inquiry , 225 ff.
  • Greco, Anthony J. (1985), ‘A Profile of Private Antitrust Suits Filed in a Federal District Court’, 17(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 55-59.
  • Greco, Anthony J. (1987), ‘State Fluid Milk Regulation: Antitrust and Price Controls’, 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 165-188.
  • Greco, Anthony J. (1988), ‘Errors in Antitrust Economic Reasoning: 14 Appellate-Court Opinions of ’87’, 20(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 81-88.
  • Green, Nicholas (1988), ‘Article 85 in Perspective: Stretching Jurisdiction, Narrowing the Concept of a Restriction and Plugging a Few Gaps’, 9 European Competition Law Review , 190-206.
  • Greenfield, Jay (1984), ‘Beyond Herfindahl: Non-Structural Elements of Merger Analysis’, 53 Antitrust Law Journal , 229-254.
  • Greenhut, Melvin L. and Benson, Bruce L. (1989), American Antitrust Law in Theory and in Practice , Aldershot, Avebury.
  • Grossman, Gene M. and Shapiro, Carl (1986), ‘Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis’, 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 315-337.
  • Groves, Peter (1987), ‘Motor Vehicle Distribution: The Block Exemption’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 77-87.
  • Gulland, Eugene D., Byrne, J. Peter and Steinbach, Sheldon Elliot (1984), ‘Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges’, 52 Fordham Law Review , 717 ff.
  • Gyselen, Luc and Kyriazis, Nicholas (1986), ‘Article 86 EEC: The Monoply Measurement Issue Revisited’, 11 European Law Review , 4-148.
  • Hale, G.E. (1970), ‘The Case of Coal: Should Alt Horizontal Mergers Be Held Illegal ?’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 421-437.
  • Hale, Rosemary D. (1967), ‘Cookware: A Study in Vertical Integration’, 10 Journal of Law and Economics , 169-179.
  • Hale, Rosemary D. (1969), ‘Cookware and Vertical Integration: A Rejoinder’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 439-440.
  • Hale, Rosemary D. and Hale, G.E. (1962), ‘More on Mergers’, 5 Journal of Law and Economics , 119-130.
  • Hall, Margaret (1980), ‘EEC: Competition or Competition Policy? An Economist’s Enquiry’, 1 European Competition Law Review , 287-296.
  • Hanreich, Hanspeter (1983), ‘Verbraucherpolitik durch Wettbewerbsrecht (Consumer Policy By Competition Law)’, in Korinek, Karl (ed.), BeitrŠge zum Wirtschaftsrecht , Vienna, Orac Publishers, 539-560.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. (1989), ‘Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 605-635.
  • Harbord, David and Hoehn, Tom (1994), ‘Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition Policy’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 411-435.
  • Harris, Barry C. and Simons, Joseph J. (1989), ‘Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 207-226.
  • Harris, Robert G. and Jorde, Thomas M. (1983), ‘Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement’, 71 California Law Review , 464-496.
  • Harris, Robert G. and Jorde, Thomas M. (1984), ‘Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach’, 72 California Law Review , 3-67.
  • Harris, Robert G. and Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1980), ‘Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to Landes and Posner’, 28 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1274-1292.
  • Harris, Robert G. and Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1981), ‘More on Passing On: A Reply to Cooter and to Viton and Winston’, 129 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1533-1540.
  • Hauschka, Christoph E. (1990), ‘Zielkonflikte zwischen Unternehmenkontrolle und Wirtschaftsfšrderung in den wettbewerbspolitischen Programmaussagen der EG-Kommission (Conflict of Goals Between Enterprise Control and Economic Imperatives in the Competition Programme of the EC-Commission)’, 40 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 205-216.
  • Hause, John C. (1989), ‘Comment (on Bresnahan and Suslow)’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 43-46.
  • Hawk, Barry E. (1988), ‘The American (Antitrust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?’, 9 European Competition Law Review , 53-87.
  • Hay, Donald A. and Morris, Derek J. (1979), Industrial Economics: Theory and Evidence , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 649 p.
  • Hay, Donald A. and Vickers, John S. (1987), The Economics of Market Dominance , Oxford, Blackwell, 172 p.
  • Hay, George A. and Kelley, Daniel (1974), ‘An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 13-38.
  • Hay, George H. (1985), ‘Competition Policy’, 1(3) Oxford Review of Economic Policy , 39-63.
  • Hazlett, Thomas W. (1986), ‘Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?’, 9 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 277-336.
  • Hazlett, Thomas W. (1992), ‘The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined’, 30 Economic Inquiry , 263-276.
  • Hazlett, Thomas W. (1995), ‘Predation in Local Cable TV Markets’, 40 Antitrust Bulletin , 609-644.
  • Heggestad, Arnold A. and Wolken, John D. (1985), ‘Mergers and Acquisitions in Commercial Banking: Economic and Financial Considerations’, 18 Layola of Los Angeles Law Review , 1165-1193.
  • Helfat, Constance E. and Teece, David J. (1987), ‘Vertical Integration and Risk Reduction’, 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 47-67.
  • Hendricks, Kenneth, Porter, Robert H. and Spady, Richard H. (1989), ‘Random Reservation Prices and Bidding Bevahavior in OCS Drainage Auctions’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 83-106.
  • Hennipman, P. (1966), De taak van de mededingingspolitiek (The Role of Competition Policy) , Bohn, Haarlem, 41 p.
  • Herdzina, Klaus (1985), ‘Marktentwicklung und Wettbewerbsverhalten (Market Development and Competition Attitude)’, in Bombach, G., Gahlen, B. and Ott, A.E. (eds.), Industrieškonomik: Theorie und Empirie , TŸbingen, Mohr, 105-123.
  • Herdzina, Klaus (1987), Wettbewerbspolitik (Competition Policy) , Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 237 p.
  • Herdzina, Klaus (1988), Mšglichkeiten und Grenzen einer wirtschaftstheoretische Fundierung der Wettbewerbspolitik (Possibilities and Limits of an Economic Foundation of Competition Policy) , TŸbingen, Walter Eucken Institut, 61 p.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1979), ‘Verbandskonzentration und Gro§unternehmen. Zur Bedeutung des Vereinsrechts fŸr die Organisation von Gro§unternehmen in den InteressenverbŠnden der deutschen und englischen Industrie (1871-1914) (Concentration of Trade Assoiations and Big Enterprises. To the Impact of the Law of Associations for the Organisation of Big Enterprises in the Trade Associations of the German and British Industry (1981-1914))’, in Horn, N. and Kocka, J. (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Gro§unternehmen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA , Gšttingen, 676 ff.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1981), ‘Der Trigger-Preismechanismus der USA. Erfahrungen des amerikanischen Wirtschaftsministeriums und antitrustrechtliche Grenzen interessenverbandlicher Einflu§nahme (The Trigger-Price-Mechanism of the USA. The Experience of the U.S.-American Commerce Department and Antitrust Limits of Lobbying)’, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft , 525-533.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1982), ‘Anzapfverbote im Einzelhandel und privatrechtlicher Verbraucherschutz (Predatory Pricing by Retail Companies and the Private Law of Consumer Protection)’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht , 917 ff.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1983), ‘Kaufrechtliche Grenzen der HŠndlerwerbung. – Ein marktbezogener Vorschlag zur Haftung fŸr “stillschweigende” Zusicherung und positive Vertragsverletzung (Sale’s Law Limits of Advertising of Retailers. – An Antitrust Proposal on the Liability for Implied Warranties and Breach of Contract)’, Archiv fŸr die civilistische Praxis , 248-278.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1984), InteressenverbŠnde und Wettbewerbsrecht. – Ein deutsch-amerikanischer Vergleich zum Recht der unberechtigten Verfahrenseinleitung, SelbstbeschrŠnkungsabkommen und Wettbewerbsregeln (Trade Associations and Antitrust Law.- A German-American Comparison for the Law of Harrassing, Self-Regulation and Trade Practice Rules) , Baden-Baden, Nomos.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1984), ‘Sanierungsfusion und Behinderungsmi§brauch. – Zum Rechtsmodell funktionsfŠhigen Wettbewerbs im GWB und im Montanvertrag (Pre-Insolvenca-Merger and Monopoly Practices. – To the Concept of Workable Competition in the German Antitrust Law and in the EG-Treaty of Coal and Steel)’, Die Aktiengesellschaft , 1-12.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1986), ‘Die gefŠhrdungstatbestandliche Auslegung des ¤ 23a Abs. 1 Nr. 1 a/b GWB bei Marktverkettungsfusionen. – Ein deutsch-amerikanischer Rechtsvergleich (The Prospective Interpretation of ¤ 23a Sec.1 No.1a/b GWB in Cases of Tying Markets by Vertical Mergers. – A German-American Law)’, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft , 253-269.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1988), ‘Vertragliche Preisvorbehalte bei beschrŠnktem und unlauterem Wettbewerb (Contract Clauses on Price Adaptation in Cases of Restricted and Unfair Competition)’, Recht und Risiko , 325-364.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1989), ‘Wettbewerbsgefahren von Konglomeratfusionen (Dangers to Competition in Cases of Conglomerate Mergers)’, BB , 1213-1217.
  • Herrmann, Harald (1994), ‘Wettbewerbliche Transparenzgebote im AGB-Gesetz und UWG (Provisions of Market Transparence in the Law of Adheasion Contracts and of Fair Trade)’, Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftsrecht , 45-102.
  • Hertig (1984), Le r™le du consommateur dans le droit de la concurrence en Suisse, aux Etats-Unis et dans la CEE , Thse Genve, Lausanne.
  • Hertig, Gerard (1994), ‘Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 177-186.
  • Hesselborn, Per-Ove (1978), ‘Comments on Stuyck’s Paper’, in Skogh, Gšran (ed.), Law and Economics. Report from a Symposium in Lund , Lund, Juridiska Fšreningen, 152-154.
  • Hill, C.W.L. and Pickering, J.F. (1986), ‘Conglomerate Mergers, Internal Organization and Competition Policy’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 59-75.
  • Holt, Charles A. (1989), ‘The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 107-130.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1966), ‘Das Konzept der optimalen WettbewerbsintensitŠt (The Concept of Optimal Competition Intensity)’, 180 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 286-323.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1967), ‘Die FunktionsfŠhigkeit des Wettbewerbs: Bemerkungen zu Kantzenbachs Erwiderung (The Functionality of Competition: Remarks on Kantzenbach’s Reaction)’, 181 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 251-264.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1967), ‘Wettbewerb als Norm der Wettbewerbspolitik (Competition as Norm for Competition Policy)’, 18 Ordo: Jahrbuch fŸr die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 77-94.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1968), ‘Zum Problem einer wirtschaftpolitischen praktikablen Definition des Wettbewerbs (On the Problem of and Economic and Practical Defin)’, in Schneider, H.K. (ed.), Grundlagen der Wettbewerbspolitik , Berlin, 9-49.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1970), ‘Neue Wettbewerbspolitik: Vom Wettbewerb zur staatlichen Mikro-Steuerung: Bemerkungen zu einem “neuen Leitbild” der Wettbewerbspolitik (New Competition Policy: From Competition to Govern)’, 184 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 397-416.
  • Hoppmann, Erich (1988), Wirtschaftsordnung und Wettbewerb (Economic Order and Competition) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 566 p.
  • Hornsby, Stephen B. (1987), ‘National and Community Control of Concentrations in a Single Market: Should Member States Be Allowed to Impose Stricter Standards?’, 13 European Law Review , 295-317.
  • Hornsby, Stephen B. (1987), ‘Competition Policy in the 80’s: More Policy Less Competition?’, 12 European Law Review , 79-101.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1985), ‘Antitrust Policy after Chicago’, 84 Michigan Law Review , 213-284.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1986), ‘Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument’, 84 Michigan Law Review , 1721-1729.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1986), ‘Chicago and Its Alternatives’, Duke Law Journal , 1014-1029.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1987), ‘Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary Rights’, 71 Minnesota Law Review , 1293-1318.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1987), ‘Fact, Value and Theory in Antitrust Adjudication’, Duke Law Journal , 897-914.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1988), ‘Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics’, 21 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform , 515-539.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1988), ‘Treble Damages Reform’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 233-258.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1989), ‘The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization’, 68 Texas Law Review , 105-168.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1989), ‘The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition’, 74 Iowa Law Review , 1019-1065.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1989), ‘Antitrust’s Protected Classes’, 88 Michigan Law Review , 1-48.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. (1990), ‘Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An Historical Perspective’, 59 Antitrust Law Journal , 75-91.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert J. and Schwartz, Louis B. (1986), ‘Treble Damages and Antitrust Deterrence: A Dialogue’, 18(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 67-79.
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1987), ‘Eficienc’a en los sistemas de distribuci—n: Un modelo de duopolio sucesivo (Eficiency in Distribution Systems: A Consecutive Duopoly Model)’, Cuadernos de Econom’a .
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1988), ‘ÀNecesitaremos una pol’tica de defensa de la competencia? (Shall We Need a Competition Policy?)’, Investigaciones Econ—micas .
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1989), Pol’tica de competencia en Espa–a y organizaci—n industrial (Competition Policy in Spain and Industrial Organization) , Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola.
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1991), ‘La competitividad de las empresas y la politica de defensa de la competencia (Firm’s Competitiveness and Competition Policy)’, 21 Revista Vasca de Ecomom’a EKONOMIAZ .
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1994), ‘La pol’tica de defensa de la competenc’a en Espa–a: Algunos ejemplos (Competition Policy in Spain: Some Examples)’, Cuadernos Econ—micos de ICE .
  • Huerta Arribas, Emilio (1996), ‘Restricciones verticales y pol’tica de defensa de la competencia (Vertical Restrictions and Competition Law Policy)’, Investigaciones Econ—micas .
  • Huerta, E. (1987), ‘Pol’tica de competencia y econom’a industrial en Espa–a (Competition Policy and Industrial Economics in Spain)’, Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola .
  • Huerta, E. (1989), ‘An‡lisis de la integraci—n vertical de empresas en Espa–a (An Analysis of Firms Vertical Integration in Spain)’, Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola , 39-40.
  • Huntley, John A.K. and Pitt, Douglas C. (1990), ‘Judicial Policymaking: The Greeneing of US Telecommunications’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 77-100.
  • Hutton, Susan and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1990), ‘An Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian Anti-Dumping Laws: A Search for Normative Rationales’, 24 Journal of World Trade , 123-146.
  • Hwang, L. T. (1995), ‘The Paradoxical Regulation of Fair Trade Law on Vertical Merger: An Economic Analysis’, 3(3) Fair Trade Quarterly , 19-31.
  • Hwang, L. T. (1996), ‘The Anti-Competitive Effect of Intra-Industry Mutual Holdings of Stocks: A Discussion on Fair Trade Law’, 4(2) Fair Trade Quarterly , 1-14.
  • Ippolito, Pauline M. (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 263-294.
  • Jacquemin, Alexis P. and Jong, Hendrik W. De (1977), European Industrial Organization , London, MacMillan, 269 p.
  • Jaffer, Susan M. and Kay, John A. (1986), ‘The Regulation of Shop Opening Hours in the United Kingdom’, in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, Gšran (eds.), Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 169-183.
  • Janicki, Thomas (1990), ‘EG-Fusionskontrolle auf dem Weg zur praktischen Umsetzung (EC Merger Control on the Way of Practical Realization)’, 40 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 195-205.
  • Jewkes, John and Jewkes, Sylvia (1966), ‘A Hundred Years of Change in the Structure of the Cotton Industry’, 9 Journal of Law and Economics , 115-134.
  • John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Eric Rasmusen and Ramseyer, Mark J. (1990), ‘The Leasing Monopolist’, 37 UCLA Law Review , 693 ff.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce (1991), ‘Property Rights to Cartel Rents: The Socony-Vacuum Story’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 177-202.
  • Johnson, Frederick I. (1989), ‘Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines: Critical Demand Elasticities’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 235-246.
  • Johnson, Frederick I. (1989), ‘Two Approaches to Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 227-234.
  • Johnson, Ronald N. and Parkman, Allen M. (1991), ‘Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 145-162.
  • Johnson, Sam D. and Ferrill, A. Michael (1984), ‘Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decisionmaking’, 36 Baylor Law Review , 585-621.
  • Johnstone, Robert P. (1989), ‘Innovation, Lower Costs, and Hard Price Competition: Rose Acre’s American Success Story’, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 63-76.
  • Jones, J.C.H. and Laudadio, L. (1983), ‘Risk, Profitability, and Market Structure: Some Canadian Evidence on Structural and Behavioral Approaches to Antitrust’, 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 349-379.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1981), ‘Marktorganisatie, mededinging en prijsvorming (Market Organisation, Competition and Price- Making)’, 66 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1268-1280.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1982), ‘De Europese mededingingspolitiek: overzicht en beoordeling (European Competition Policy: Overview and Assessme)’, Beleid en Maatschappij , 230-240.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1988), ‘Fusies, overnames en beschermingsconstructies (Mergers, Take-overs and Protective Devices)’, 73 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 842-847.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1989), ‘Concurrentie en concentratie in de markteconomie (Competition and Concentration in the Market Economy)’, 37 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 664-688.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1989), ‘Concurrentie, concentratie en het Europese mededingingsbeleid (Competition, Concentration and European Competition Policy)’, 74 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1182-1187.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1989), Dynamische markttheorie (Dynamic Market Theory) , Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 334 p.
  • Jong, Hendrik W. De (1990), ‘Nederland: Het kartelparadijs van Europa (The Netherlands: European Anti-trust Paradise)’, 75 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 244-248.
  • Jorde, Thomas M. (1989), ‘Remarks on Acceptable Cooperation among Competitors in the Face of Growing International Competition’, 58 Antitrust Law Journal , 519-527.
  • Jorde, Thomas M. and Teece, David J. (1989), ‘Acceptable Cooperation among Competitors in the Face of Growing International Competition’, 58 Antitrust Law Journal , 529-556.
  • Jorde, Thomas M. and Teece, David J. (1991), ‘Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor Cooperation’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 118-144.
  • Joskow, Paul L. (1991), ‘The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies’, 7(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 53-83.
  • Juang, C. F. (1997), ‘Foreign Competition and the Demarcation of Geographical Market’, 5(1) Fair Trade Quarterly , 1-47.
  • Kahn, Alfred E. (1987), ‘Comment: Deregulatory Schizophrenia’, 75 California Law Review , 1059-1068.
  • Kallfass, Hermann H. (1980), ‘Die Chicago School: Eine Skizze des “neuen” amerikanisches Ansatzes fŸr die Wettbewerbspolitik (The Chicago School: A Sketch of the “New” American Approach for Competition Policy)’, 30 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 596-601.
  • Kallfass, Hermann H. (1997), ‘Konzepte und Indikatoren zur Abgrenzung rŠumlicher MŠrkte in der europŠischen Zusammenschlu§kontrolle (Indicators for the Definition of Local Markets)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 111 ff.
  • Kanda, Hideki (1994), ‘The Legal Foundation for Competition in EC Capital Markets: The Gap between Rhetoric and Reality: Comment’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 174-176.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1967), ‘Das Konzept der optimalen WettbewerbsintensitŠt: Eine Erwiderung auf den gleichnamigen Besprechungsaufsatz von Erich Hoppmann (The Concept of Optimal Competition Intensity: A Reaction on Erich Hoppman’s Comment of the Same Name)’, 181 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 193-241.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1984), ‘Zehn Jahre Monopolkommission (Ten Years Monopoly Commission)’, 34 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 297-301.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1987), ‘Die VorschlŠge der Monopolkommission (The Proposals of the Monopoly Commission)’, in Ršper, B. (ed.), Wettbewerb im Medienbereich Schriften des Vereins fŸr Socialpolitik N.F. 162 , Berlin, 143-153.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Neuberger and Neumann, Banking and Antitrust: Limiting Industrial Ownership by Banks?],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 200-201.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1995), ‘Wettbewerbsrecht und Wettbewerbspolitik in der EuropŠischen Union. Diskussionsbeitrag zum gleichnamigen Referat von Ernst Joachim MestmŠcker (Competition Law and Competition Policy in the European Union. Comment)’, in Gerken, LŸder (ed.), Europa zwischen Ordnungswettbewerb und Harmonisierung , Berlin, 213-217.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard (1996), ‘Wettbewerbspolitik versus Industriepolitik (Competition Policy vs. Industrial Policy)’, in X. (ed.), Maastricht II – Entwicklungschancen und Risiken der EU. Tagungsband zur Jahresversammlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute Beihefte der Konjunkturpolitik 44 , Berlin, 43-47.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard and Kinne, Konstanze (1997), ‘Nationale Zusammenschlu§kontrolle und internationale WettbewerbsfŠhigkeit von Unternehmen (National Merger Control and International Competitive Power of Firms)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 67 ff.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard and KrŸger, Reinald (1990), ‘Zur Frage der richtigen Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Markten bei der wettbewerbspolitischen Beurteilung von UnternehmenszusammenschlŸssen (On the Question of the Correct Definition of the Relevant Market at the Judgment of Mergers)’, 40 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 472-481.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard and Kruse, J. (1989), ‘Kollektive Marktbeherrschung (Collective Market Power)’, in JŸrgensen, H., Kantzenbach, E. (eds.), Wirtschaftspolitische Studien aus den Instituten fŸr EuropŠische Wirtschaftspolitik und fŸr Industrie- und Gewerbepolitik der UniversitŠt Hamburg 75 , Gšttingen.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard and Otremba, W. (1983), ‘Vertikale Integration und Wettbewerb in der Mineralšlindustrie und Petrochemie (Vertical Integration and Competition in the Oil and Petrochemical Industries)’, 7 Zeitschrift fŸr Energiewirtschaft , 74-77.
  • Kantzenbach, Erhard, Kottmann, Elke and KrŸger, Reinald (1996), Kollektive Marktbeherrschung. Neue Industrieškonomik und Erfahrungen aus der EuropŠischen Fusionskontrolle, Veršffentlichungen des HWWA-Instituts fŸr Wirtschaftsforschung Hamburg 28 (Collective Market Power. New Industrial Economics and Experiences from the European Anti-Merger Policy) , Baden-Baden.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1982), ‘The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and A Direct Adjustment Alternative’, 95 Harvard Law Review , 1817-1848.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1984), ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’, 97 Harvard Law Review , 1815-1892.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1984), ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’, 97 Harvard Law Review , 1813-1892.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1985), ‘Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 515-556.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1987), ‘Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts’, 50 Law and Contemporary Problems , 181-216.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Areeda, Phillip (1992), Antitrust Analysis: 1992 Supplement , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Areeda, Phillip (1994), Antitrust Analysis: 1994 Supplement , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1989), ‘Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability’, 102 Harvard Law Review , 565-615.
  • Karp, David C. (1984), ‘A Consumer Oriented Approach to Market Definition Under the Antitrust Laws’, 18 University of San Francisco Law Review , 221-251.
  • Kaufer, Erich (1966), ‘Kantzenbachs Konzept des funktionsfŠhigen Wettbewerbs: Ein Kommentar (Kantenbach’s Concept of Functional Competition: A Comment)’, 179 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 481-492.
  • Kaufer, Erich (1968), ‘Das Konzept der optimalen WettbewerbsintensitŠt: Eine Replik (The Concept of Optimal Competition Intensity: A Reply)’, 181 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 242-250.
  • Kauper, Thomas E. (1980), ‘The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy: The Current Debate’, 136 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 408-434.
  • Kauper, Thomas E. (1983), ‘The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure’, 71 California Law Review , 497-534.
  • Kauper, Thomas E. (1984), ‘The Role of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division Before and After the Establishment of the Economic Policy Office: A Lawyer’s View’, 29 Antitrust Bulletin , 111-132.
  • Kauper, Thomas E. (1987), ‘The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints’, 75 California Law Review , 893-915.
  • Kay, John A. and Morris, C.N. (1987), ‘The Economic Efficiency of Sunday Trading Restrictions’, 36 Journal of Industrial Economics , 113-129.
  • Kaysen, Carl and Turner, Donald F. (1959), Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 345 p.
  • Kenney, Roy W. and Klein, Benjamin (1983), ‘The Economics of Block Booking’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 497-540.
  • Kingdon, John S. (1985), ‘Economic Arguments Applied in Depart ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Investigations’, 6 European Competition Law Review , 366-376.
  • Kingdon, John S. (1987), ‘Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases: An American Litigator’s Perspective’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 371-385.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1980), ‘”…konomische Analyse des Rechts” und Recht der WettbewerbsbeschrŠnkungen (Economic Analysis of Law” and Antitrust Law)’, 144 Zeitschrift fŸr das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht , 563-588.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1991), ‘Comment’ [on von WeizsŠcker, Antitrust and the Division of Labor],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 114-117.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1997), ‘Kartellrecht und neue Institutionenškonomik. InterdisziplinŠre †berlegungen (Antitrust Law and New Institutional Economics. Some Interdisciplinary Ideas)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 33 ff.
  • Kirchner, Christian and Picot, Arnold (1987), ‘Transaction Cost Analysis of Structural Changes in the Distribution System: Reflections on Institutional Developments in the Fe deral Republic of Germany’, 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 62-81.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1972), ‘The Yellow Cab Antitrust Case’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 327-336.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1985), ‘The Antitrust Economics of Joint Ventures’, 54 Antitrust Law Journal , 957 ff. Reprinted in Fox, Eleanor M. and Halverson, James T. (Eds.), Collaborations Among Competitors: Antitrust Policy and Economics, American Bar Association, 1991, p. 865.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1986), ‘Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?’, 8 Research in Law and Economics , 31-49.
  • Klein, Benjamin and Murphy, Kevin M. (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 265-297.
  • Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G. and Alchian, Armen A. (1978), ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics , 297-326.
  • Klein, Christopher C. (1990), ‘Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham Litigation Cases’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 29-40.
  • Kleit, Andrew N. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), ‘Market Failure of Market Efficiency? Evidence on Airport Slot Usage’, 4 Research in Transportation Economics .
  • Knight, Frank H. (1935), The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays , London, Allen and Unwin.
  • Knutson, Ronald D. (1969), ‘The Economic Consequences of the Minnesota Dairy Industry Unfair Trade Practices Act’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 377-389.
  • Kolbe, A. Lawrence and Tye, William B. (1992), ‘The Fair Allowed Rate of Return with Regulatory Risk’, 15 Research in Law and Economics , 129-169.
  • Korah, Valentine, ‘EEC Competition Policy: Legal Form or Economic Efficiency’, in Rideout, R. and Jonnell J. (eds.), Current Legal Problems , 85-109.
  • Korah, Valentine (1987), ‘Critical Comments on the Commission’s Recent Decisions Exempting Joint Ventures to Exploit Research that Needs Further Development’, 12 European Law Review , 18-39.
  • Korah, Valentine (1987), ‘Franchising and the Draft Group Exemption’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 124-142.
  • Korah, Valentine (1987), ‘The Control of Mergers Under the Eec Competition Law’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 239-255.
  • Korah, Valentine and Lasok, Paul (1988), ‘Philip Morris and its Aftermath: Merger Control?’, 25 Common Market Law Review , 333-368.
  • Kovacic, William E. (1989), ‘Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 173-206.
  • Krakowsn, Michael (1989), ‘The Requirements for EEC Merger Control,’, Intereconomics , 120-126.
  • Krattenmaker, Thomas G. and Salop, Steven C. (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price’, 96 Yale Law Journal , 209-293.
  • Krattenmaker, Thomas G., Lande, Robert H. and Salop, Steven C. (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’, 76 Georgetown Law Journal , 241-269. Reprinted in First, Harry, Fox, Eleonor and Pitovsky, Robert, Revitalizing Antritrust in Its Second Century, 1991, 175 ff. Excerpted in Gavil, Andrew, An Antritrust Anthology, 1996, 245-250.
  • Kruse, J. (1997), ‘Vertikale Integration als Wettbewerbsproblem (Vertical Integration as a Problem of Competition)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 247 ff.
  • Kruse, J., Stockmann, Kurt and Vollmer, Lothar (eds.) (1997), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos.
  • Kurz, Rudi and Rall, Lothar (1983), Behinderungsmi§brauch, Probleme einer ordnungskonformen Konkretisierung (Abuse of Market Power) , TŸbingen.
  • Laband, David N. and Heinbuch, Deborah Hendry (1987), Blue Laws: The History, Economics, and Politics of Sunday Closing Laws , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 232 p.
  • Lacroix, Sumner, Miklius, Walter and Mak, James (1987), ‘The New Standards of Unfair Competition: An Economic Analysis of the Du Pont V. Ftc Litigation’, 9 University of Hawa• Law Review , 457-486.
  • Lafuente, Alberto (1987), ‘Aspectos econ—micos de la definici—n de mercado (Some Economic Aspects of the Market Definition)’, Informaci—n Comercial Espa–ola .
  • Lambers, H.W. (1962), ‘Mededingingspolitiek (Competition Policy)’, in Andriessen, J.E. and Van Meerhaeghe, M.A.G. (eds.), Theorie van de Economische Politiek , Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 307-338.
  • Lampe, Hanes-Eckhard (1979), Wettbewerb. Wettbewerbsbeziehungen. WettbewerbsintensitŠt (Competition. Competition Relations, Competition Intensity) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 317 p.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1982), ‘Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged’, 34 Hastings Law Journal , 67-151.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1988), ‘Antitrust Law and Economics: Responding to an Ivory Tower Critique’, 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 235 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1988), ‘The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 429-466. Reprinted in 23 Revista de Direito Economico 39 (1996) (Brazil) ; Eleanor Fox and James Halverson, Collaborations Among Competitors: Antitrust Policy and Economics 105-130 (1992)
  • Lande, Robert H. (1989), ‘Commentary: Implications of Professor Scherer’s Research for the Future of Antitrust’, 29 Washburn Law Journal , 256 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1989), ‘Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust’, 58 Antitrust Law Journal , 631 ff. F.M. Scherer, Monopoly and Competition Policy: Volume 1, 241 (1993)
  • Lande, Robert H. (1990), ‘When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance’, 35 New York Law School Law Journal , 1047 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1993), ‘Chicago Takes It On the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play A Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World’, 62 Antitrust Bulletin , 193 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1994), ‘Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust Arise Again ?’, 34 Antitrust Bulletin , 1 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1996), ‘Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution’, 46 Duke Law Journal , 197 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. and Averitt, Neil, ‘Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law’, Antitrust Law Journal .
  • Lande, Robert H. and Langenfeld, James (1997), ‘From Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy’, 11 Antitrust , 5 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. and Sims, Joe (1986), ‘The End of Antitrust – or a New Beginning ?’, 31 Antitrust Bulletin , 301 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. and Sobin, Sturgis (1996), ‘Reverse Engineering of Computer Software and U.S. Antitrust Law’, 9 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology , 237 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H. and Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (1985), ‘Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 297-310. Reprinted in 29 Corporate Practice Commentator, 1987, 107-122.
  • Lande, Robert H., , and (1993), ‘Are Antitrust ‘Treble’ Damages Really Single Damages ?’, 54 Ohio State Law Journal , 115 ff. Journal Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics (1996) 26, 463
  • Lande, Robert H., Fisher, Alan A. and Johnson, Frederick I. (1987), ‘Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance ?’, 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 609 ff.
  • Lande, Robert H., Fisher, Alan A. and Johnson, Frederick I. (1989), ‘Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers’, 77 California Law Review , 777 ff. Journal Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics (1991) 21, 471 ; 32 Corp. Prac. Commentator 153 (1990) ; Eleanor Fox and James Halverson, Collaborations Among Competitors: Antitrust Policy and Economics 361-402 (1992)
  • Lande, Robert H., Lafferty, Ronald N. and Kirkwood, John (1984), Impact Evaluations of Federal Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases , FTC Publication. 19 Journal Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics 1 (1986)
  • Landes, William M. (1983), ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’, 50 University of Chicago Law Review , 652-678.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan’, 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1274-1279.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’, 94 Harvard Law Review , 937-996.
  • Langenfeld, J. and Scheffman, David T. (1990), ‘The FTC in the 1980s’, 5(2) Review of Industrial Organization , 79-98.
  • Langenfeld, James (1989), ‘Comment (on Baker)’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 77-82.
  • Langenfeld, James and Scheffman, David T. (1989), ‘Innovation and U.S. Competition Policy’, 34 Antitrust Bulletin , 1-63.
  • Larson, David A. (1970), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Webb- Pomerene Act’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 461-500.
  • Laudati, Laraine L. (1981), ‘Economies of Scale: Weighing Operating Efficiency When Enforcing Antitrust Law’, 49 Fordham Law Review , 771-801.
  • Lavey, Warren G. (1985), ‘Commentary: Focus of Antitrust Markets’, 62 Washington University Law Quarterly , 671-679.
  • Le Bolzer, Jean-Marc (1991), ‘The New EEC Merger Control Policy After the Adoption of Regulation 4064/89’, 14 World Competition: Law and Economics Review , 33-47.
  • Lee, Ruben (1994), ‘The Legal Foundation for Competition in EC Capital Markets: The Gap between Rhetoric and Reality’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 163-173.
  • Leffler, Keith B. (1985), ‘Toward a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 381-386.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1977), ‘Considerazioni di ordine economico nel diritto della concorrenza nella Republica Federale Tedesca (Economic Considerations Concerning German Competition Law)’, XXXProblemi attuali del diritto industriale, Volume celebrativo del XXV anno della Rivista di diritto industriale , 689-699.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1981), ‘Die bŸrgerlich-rechtliche Haftung fŸr Werbeangaben. Culpa in contrahendo als Haftungsgrundlage fŸr vertragsanbahnende ErklŠrungen’, 36 Der Betriebs-Berater , 1233-1242.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1987), ‘Die UWG-Neuregelungen 1987 – ErlŠuterungen und Kritik (The New UWG Unfair Competition Rules – Explanations and Critique)’, 89 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht , 199-214.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1990), ‘Das Prinzip Wettbewerb (The Principle of Competition)’, 2 Juristenzeitung , 61-67.
  • Leidig, Guido (1979), Dominante Werbung. Ziele, Wirkungen, rechtliche Gestaltung (Advertising. Objectives, Effects, Legal Aspects) , Frankfurt/M., Bern, Cirencester.
  • Leigh, Guy I.F. (1986), ‘EEC Law and Selective Distribution: Recent Developments’, 7 European Competition Law Review , 419-436.
  • Leitzinger, Jeffrey J. and Tamor, Kenneth L. (1983), ‘Foreign Competition in Antitrust Law’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 87-102.
  • Lemley, Mark A. (1988), ‘Bad Economics in the 9th Circuit, Northern District of California’, 20(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 9-13.
  • Lemley, Mark A. (1990), ‘The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine’, 78 California Law Review , 1599 ff.
  • Lemley, Mark A. (1996), ‘Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem’, 28 Connecticut Law Review , 1041 ff.
  • Lemley, Mark A. and Durie, Daralyn J. (1992), ‘The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive Litigation’, 80 California Law Review , 757 ff.
  • Lemley, Mark A. and Jorde, Thomas M. (1991), ‘Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases : Understanding Monsanto and Matsushita’, 36 Antitrust Bulletin , 271 ff.
  • Lemley, Mark A. and McGowan, David (1994), ‘Antitrust Immunity : State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment’, 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 293 ff.
  • Lerner, Abba P. (1934), ‘The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power’, 1 Review of Economic Studies , 157-175.
  • Levmore, Saul (1982), ‘Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Costumer Information’, 67 Iowa Law Review , 981-993. Reprinted in Corporate Practice Commentator, 1982-1983, 561.
  • Levy, David T. (1985), ‘The Transactions Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination’, 67 Review of Economics and Statistics , 438-445.
  • Levy, David T. (1989), ‘Comment (on Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson)’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 273-275.
  • Li, Y. M. and Chen, H. M. (1995), ‘An Economic Analysis of Intra-Industry Alliance in Product Designs’, Fair Trade Quarterly , 109-125.
  • Liebeler, Wesley J. (1981), ‘Industrial Concentration, Efficiency, and Antitrust Reform: Another View’, 12 Southwestern University Law Review , 379-404.
  • Liebeler, Wesley J. (1986), ‘1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule’, 33 UCLA Law Review , 1019-1062.
  • Liebeler, Wesley J. (1987), ‘What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?’, Duke Law Journal , 879-898.
  • Liebeler, Wesley J. (1989), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.’, 36 UCLA Law Review , 889-913.
  • Liebowitz, S.J. (1982), ‘What Do Census Price-Cost Margins Measure?’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 231-246.
  • Liebowitz, S.J. (1987), ‘The Measurement and Mismeasurement of Monopoly Power’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 89-99.
  • Liesner, Jeremy and Glynn, Dermot (1987), ‘Does Anti-trust Make Economic Sense?’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 344-370.
  • Linder, Ludwig (1980), Privatklage und Schadensersatz im Kartellrecht, Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zum deutschen und amerikanischen Recht (Civil Suit and Damage Compensation in Antitrust Law, A Comparision of German and American Law) , Baden-Baden, Nomos.
  • Linssen, G.J. (1973), ‘De Rol van de Commissie bij de toepassing van het Europese mededingingsrecht (The Role of the Commission in Applying European Competition Law)’, in Verloren Van Themaat, Pieter (ed.), Europees kartelrecht anno 1973 , Deventer, Kluwer, 23-45.
  • Linssen, G.J. (1981), ‘De Verhouding Tussen Het Formele en het Informele Kartelbeleid in Nederland en de Plaats van de Commissie Economische Mededinging (The Interrelationship between the Formal and Informal Dutch Anti-trust Policy and the Position of the Commit)’, 24 TVVS Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht en Rechtspersonen , 255-259.
  • Littlechild, Stephen C. (1981), ‘Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power’, 91 Economic Journal , 348-363.
  • Long, William F., Schramm, Richard and Tollison, Robert D. (1973), ‘The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 351-364.
  • Lopatka, John E. (1984), ‘State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach’, 53 Fordham Law Review , 23 ff.
  • Lorie, James H. and Halpern, Paul J. (1970), ‘Conglomerates: The Rhetoric and the Evidence’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 149-166.
  • Lustgarten, Steven (1979), ‘Gains and Losses from Concentration: A Comment’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 183-190.
  • Lynk, William J. (1984), ‘Restraint of Trade Through Hospital Exclusive Contracts: An Economic Appraisal of the Legal Theory’, 9 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law , 269 ff.
  • Lynk, William J. (1987), ‘Antitrust Analysis and Hospital Certificate-Of-Need Policy’, 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 61 ff.
  • Lynk, William J. (1988), ‘Physician Price Fixing under the Sherman Act: An Indirect Test of the Maricopa Issues’, 7 Journal of Health Economics , 95-109.
  • Lynk, William J. (1994), ‘Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis’, 39 Antitrust Bulletin , 363 ff.
  • Lynk, William J. (1994), ‘Tying and Exclusive Dealing: Jefferson Parish Hospital V. Hyde’, in Kwoka, J. & White, L. (ed.), The Antitrust Revolution: The Role of Economics , Scott Foresman.
  • Lynk, William J. and Morrisey, Michael A. (1987), ‘The Economic Basis of Hyde … Are Market Power and Hospital Exclusive Contracts Related ?’, 30 Journal of Law and Economics , 399-421.
  • Macavoy, Paul W., McKie, James W. and Preston, Lee E. (1971), ‘High and Stable Concentration Levels, Profitability, and Public Policy: A Response’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 493-499.
  • MacCrimmon, Marilyn and Sadanard, Asha (1989), ‘Models of Market Behaviour and Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing’, 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal , 711-768.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1980), ‘Le Droit de la Concurrence comme Facteur d’IntŽgration en Europe et au Canada (Competition Law as a Factor of Integration in Europe and Canada)’, in Letemendia, Miren and Zuidwijk, Ton (eds.), Les Politiques de Concurrence de la CommunautŽ Economique EuropŽenne et du Canada , UniversitŽ de Montreal and Institute of Private and Comparative Law, McGill University, 71-73.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1995), ‘Mededinging, welvaart en federalisme (Competition, Welfare and Federalism)’, in Kanning, Walter (ed.), Liber amicorum voor Arnold Heertje , Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 93-100.
  • MacKay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Yandle, Bruce (1987), ‘Public Choice and Regulation: An Overview’, in Mackay, Robert J., Miller, James C., III and Ya (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission , Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 3-12.
  • MacLeod, William C. (1988), ‘FTC Consumer Protection Activities’, 57 Antitrust Law Journal , 163-167.
  • Magoulas, Georgios and Schwartze, Andreas (1986), ‘Das Gesetz Ÿber den Widerruf von HaustŸrgeschŠften und Šhnlichen GeschŠften: Eine rechtliche und škonomische Analyse (The Law Regarding Revocation of Door-to-Door Dealings and Similar Transactions: A Legal and Economic Analysis)’, 18(5) JŸristische ArbeitsblŠtter , 225-235.
  • Magoulas, Georgios and Simon, JŸrgen (eds.) (1985), Recht und …konomie beim Konsumentenschutz und Konsumentenkredit (Law and Economics of Consumer Protection and C) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 436 p.
  • Malina, Michael (1987), ‘Comment: Some Thoughts on Monopoly, Markets, and Mergers’, 75 California Law Review , 997-1003.
  • Manne, Henry G. (1991), ‘New Views on Antitrust: Summary Comments’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 235-239.
  • Marfels, Christian (1986), ‘Economic Criteria for the Application of Antitrust – Overview and Assessment of the Fifth Report of the Monopolies Commission of the Federal Republic of Germany’, 31 Antitrust Bulletin , 1067-1087.
  • Markert, Kurt (1997), ‘Deutsche Fusionskontrolle im Energeiversorgungsbereich (Merger Control in the German Public Utilities Sector)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 231 ff.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1978), ‘Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive World: A Non-Market-Oriented Proposal and Critique of the Market Definition-Market Share-Market Concentration Approach’, 56 Texas Law Review , 587-731.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1979), ‘Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article’, 77 Michigan Law Review , 567-640.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1984), ‘The Limits of Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Eeasterbrook’, 63 Texas Law Review , 41-87.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1985), ‘The Functions, Allocative Efficiency, and Legality of Tie-ins: A Comment’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 387-404.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1985), ‘An Ideal Antitrust Regime’, 64 Texas Law Review , 251-352.
  • Markovits, Richard S. (1990), ‘The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization’, 38 Buffalo Law Review , 673-776.
  • Marshall, Robert C. and Meurer, Michael J. (1998), ‘Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law’, in Chatterjee, Kalyan (ed.), Game Theory and Business Applications , Kluwer.
  • Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J. and Richard, Jean Francois (1994), ‘Litigation Settlement and Collusion’, 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 213-239.
  • Martin, Stephen (1988), Industrial Economics: Economic Analysis and Public Policy , New York, MacMillan, 540 p.
  • Marvel, Howard P. (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-25.
  • Marvel, Howard P. and McCafferty, Stephen (1985), ‘The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 363-379.
  • Marvel, Howard P., Netter, Jeffrey M. and Robinson, Anthony M. (1988), ‘Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis’, 40 Stanford Law Review , 561-575.
  • Massel, Mark S. (1962), Competition and Monopoly , Washington, Brookings Institution, 477 p.
  • Masten, Scott E. and Snyder, Edward A. (1989), ‘The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considera tions’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 63-85.
  • Mathewson, G. Frank, Trebilcock, Michael J. and Walker, Michael A. (eds.) (1990), The Law and Economics of Competition Policy , Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 443 p.
  • Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (eds.) (1994), Consumatore, ambiente, concorrenza – Analisi economica del diritto (Consumer, environment, competition – Economic analysis of law) , Milano, Giuffr.
  • Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (eds.) (1994), Consumatore, ambiente, concorrenza – Analisi economica del diritto (Consumer, environment, competition – Economic analysis of law) , Milano, Giuffr.
  • Maule, C.J. (1969), ‘Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of American Firms in Canada: A Rejoinder’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 419-424.
  • Maule, C.J. (1970), ‘Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of American Firms in Canada: A Final Comment’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 261 ff.
  • May, James (1989), ‘Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918’, 50 Ohio State Law Journal , 257-395.
  • Mayer, Colin (1985), ‘The Assessment: Recents Developments in Industrial Economics and their Implications for Policy’, 1(3) Oxford Review of Economic Policy , 1985 ff.
  • Mays, Andrea and Greco, Anthony J. (1988), ‘Dr. Greco on Beer Competition; Reply’, 20(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 53-58.
  • McCall, Charles W. (1984), ‘The Administrative Feasibility of a Rule of Reason Predatory Pricing Standard’, 16 University of Toledo Law Review , 91-122.
  • McChesney, Fred S. (1980), ‘On the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1103-1111.
  • McDavid, Janet L. (1981), ‘Failing Companies and the Antitrust Laws’, 14 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform , 229-265.
  • McGee, John S. (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’, 1 Journal of Law and Economics , 137-169.
  • McGee, John S. (1971), In Defense of Industrial Concentration , New York, Praeger, 167 p.
  • McGee, John S. (1973), ‘Economies of Size in Auto Body Manufacture’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 239-273.
  • McGee, John S. (1980), ‘Predatory Pricing Revisited’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 289-330.
  • McGee, John S. (1988), Industrial Organization , Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 497 p.
  • McGee, John S. and Bassett, Lowell R. (1976), ‘Vertical Integration Revisited’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 17-38.
  • McGowan, John J. (1971), ‘International Comparisons of Merger Activity’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 233-250.
  • McNulty, Paul J. (1968), ‘Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition’, 82 Quarterly Journal of Economics .
  • McQuaid, Kim (1985), ‘The Corporate Counterattack: Fighting for the Levers of Power (II)’, 17(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 61-72.
  • Means, Gardiner C. (1983), ‘Corporate Power in the Marketplace’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 467-485.
  • Meehan, James W., Jr. (1972), ‘Vertical Foreclosure in the Cement Industry: A Comment’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 461-465.
  • Meehan, James W., Jr. (1983), ‘A Search for an Explanation of Kodak’s Dominance of the Amateur Photographic Equipment Industry, Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman’, Research in Law and Economics , 131-165.
  • Mensch, Elizabeth and Freeman, Alan (1990), ‘Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue’, Duke Law Journal , 321 ff.
  • MestmŠcker, Ernst-Joachim (1980), ‘Competition Policy and Antitrust: Some Comparative Observations’, 136 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 387-407.
  • MestmŠcker, Ernst-Joachim (1988), ‘Fusions kontrolle im Gemeinsamen Markt zwischen Wettbewerbspolitik und Industriepolitik (Merger Control in the Common Market Between Compet)’, Europarecht , 349-377.
  • Metzenbaum, Howard M. (1989), ‘Overruling Monsanto and Sharp: S. 865 and the Per Se Rule Against Resale Price Fixing’, 21(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 71-86.
  • MiguŽ, Jean-Luc (1990), Retour au vrai fŽdŽralisme: institutionnalisation de la concurrence entre gouvernments (Return to a True Federalism: The Institutionalization of Competition Between Governments) , Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du QuŽbec (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau), Les avis des spŽcialistes invitŽs ˆ rŽpondre aux huit questions par la Commission (Commission BŽlanger-Campeau).
  • Miles, John J. (1986), ‘Antitrust, Hospital Staff Priviled Decisions and Hospital Joint Venture’, 17 University of Toledo Law Review , 873-922.
  • Miller, Edward M. (1980), ‘Do Economies of Scale Attract Enry?’, 25 Antitrust Bulletin , 583-587.
  • Miller, Elizabeth (1989), ‘Note: Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal Review and Economic Analysis’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 183-209.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. (1992), ‘Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis,’, 77 Iowa Law Review , 1083 ff.
  • Miller, James C., III and Pautler, Paul V. (1985), ‘Predation: The Changing View in Economics and the Law’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 495-502.
  • Miller, John P. (ed.) (1962), Competition. Cartels and their Regulation , Amsterdam, North-Holland.
  • Miller, Roger Leroy (1982), ‘Where Joe Bain, Mike Scherer, and Fritz Mueller ‘Went Wrong’: A Libertarian View’, 14 Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 15-70.
  • Millstein, Ira M. (1986), ‘The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on America’s Ability to Restructure Its Industries and Proposals for Change’, 47 University of Pittsburgh Law Review , 713-725.
  • Millstein, Ira M. and Kessler, Jeffrey L. (1988), ‘The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan Administration’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 505-541.
  • Minda, Gary (1990), ‘Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine’, 41 Hastings Law Journal , 905-1028.
  • Mok, M.R. (1976), ‘Kartelbeleid nu en in de toekomst (Present and Future Anti-trust Policy)’, in Mok, M.R., Et Al. (ed.), Nieuwe ontwikkelingen in het Europese kartel recht , Kluwer, Deventer, 1-15.
  • Mok, M.R. (1978), ’20 jaar WEM (20 Years WEM)’, 26 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 737-760.
  • Mok, M.R. (1983), ‘Het paard achter de wagen: Deregulering en kartelrecht (The Cart Before the Horse: Deregulation and Anti- trust Law)’, 31 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 666-678.
  • Molgaard, H. Peter, Baltzer Overgaard, Per and Ohlenschl¾ger Madsen, Ole (1996), Den danske konkurrencelov i moderne industri¢konomisk belysning (The Danish Law of Competition analysed in the Perspective of Modern Industrial Economics) , Aarhus University Press.
  • Monteverde, Kirk and Teece, David J. (1982), ‘Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 321-328.
  • Morgan, Thomas D. (1980), ‘Review of Calvani & Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law’, 33 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1523 ff.
  • Morgan, Thomas D. (1994), Modern Antitrust Law and Its Origins: Cases and Materials , West Publishing.
  • Morrison, Steven A. and Winston, Clifford (1987), ‘Empirical Implications and Tests of the Contestability Hypothesis’, 30 Journal of Law and Economics , 53-66.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1978), ‘Wettbewerb im Schnittfeld von Rechtswissenschaft und Nationalškonomie’ [Competition at the Crossing of Legal Science and National Economy],’, Wirtschaftwissenschaftliche Studien , 351-357.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1981), ‘Zur wettbewerbstheoretischen BegrŸndbarkeit von Ausnahmebereichen (Areas Exempt from Competition and Competition Theory)’, 32 Ordo , 85-102.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1981), ‘Neuere Entwicklungen der Wettbewerbstheorie. Kritische Bemerkungen zu kritischen Bemerkungen (Recent Developments in Competition Theory)’, 145 Zeitschrift fŸr das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht , 590-598.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1983), ‘Divergierende Entwicklungen im amerikanischen und europŠischen Kartellrecht’ [Conflicting Developments in American and European Antitrust Law],’, Wirtschaftwissenschaftliche Studien , 603-609.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1986), ‘…konomische Kriterien in der Anwendung des Kartellgesetzes (Views of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation)’, JA , 525-533.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1986), ‘Effizienz und Wettbewerbspolitik (Efficiency and Policy of Competition)’, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , 341-346.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1988), Wettbewerbspolitik aus ordoliberaler Sicht, in Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht. Festschrift fŸr Gerd Pfeiffer zum Abschied aus dem Amt als PrŠsident des Bundesgerichtshofes (Competition Policy from an Ordo-liberal Point of View) , Kšln, Berlin, Bonn, MŸnchen, Carl Heymanns Verlag.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1989), ‘International Restraints of Competition: A Regulatory Outline’, 10 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business , 76-83.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1991), ‘The Goals of Antitrust Revisited’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 7-23.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1992), EG-Industriepolitik nach Maastricht, in Festschrift fŸr Rudolf Nirk (EC-Industrial Policy after “Maastricht”) , MŸnchen.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1992), Wettbewerbspolitik vor neuen Herausforderungen, in Ordnung in Freiheit (Competition Policy Faced by New Challenges) , Symposium aus Anla§ des 100. Jahrestages des Geburtstages von Walter Eucken am 17. Januar 1991, TŸbingen.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1996), Rabattgesetz und Deregulierung, Frankfurter Institut – Kleine Handbibliothek – Band 19 (Discounts Act and Deregulation) , Bad Homburg vdH.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1996), Kartellrecht in der Reform, in Festschrift fŸr Ernst-Joachim MestmŠcker (The Reform of Antitrust Law) , Baden-Baden.
  • Mšschel, Wernhard (1997), ‘Notwendigkeit und Potentiale der Aufgabenprivatisierung (Privatization)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 351 ff.
  • Mouri E Silva, Miguel (1994), ‘Controlo de Concentra›as na Comunidade Europeia’, 8 Revista Direito e Justia , 133-139.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1985), ‘Developments in Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy: An Overview’, 17(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 79-94.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1986), ‘Developments in Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy: An Overview (II)’, 18(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 101-110.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1986), ‘Developments in Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy: An Overview (III)’, 18(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 93-110.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1986), ‘Developments in Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy: An Overview (IV)’, 18(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 59-74.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1987), ‘Roundtable on U.S. Antitrust Policy: Further Reflections and a Summing Up (II)’, 19(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 81-96.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1987), ‘Roundtable on U.S. Antitrust Policy: Further Reflections and a Summing Up (III)’, 19(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 81-94.
  • Mueller, Charles E. (1988), ‘Economics, the Courts, and Antitrust Policy: A Roundtable Discussion (II)’, 20(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 21-38.
  • Mueller, Charles E., Hiura, Thomas M. and Scanlon, Paul D. (1989), ‘Predatory “Recoupment” Cases in 3 U.S. Circuits: Jury Findings Versus Judicial “Economic” Theorizing’, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 1-10.
  • Mueller, Dennis C. (1986), ‘Das Antitrustrecht der Vereinigten Staaten am Scheideweg (The Antitrust Law of the United States at the Parting of the Ways)’, 36 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 533-555.
  • Mueller, Willard F. (1986), ‘A New Attack on Antitrust: The Chicago Case’, 18 Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 29-66.
  • Mueller, Willard F. (1988), ‘End of the Chicago-School’s Free Ride on Sealy: The Free-Rider Theory Meets the Facts of Life’, 20(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 17-38.
  • Mueller, Willard F. (1989), ‘The Rose Acre Decision and Below- Cost Price Discrimination: Spoiled Economic Eggs in the 7th Circuit’, 21(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 49-70.
  • Mueller, Willard F. (1989), ‘The Rose Acre Decision and Below- Cost Price Discrimination: Spoiled Economic Eggs in the 7th Circuit (II)’, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 77-87.
  • Mueller, Willard F. (1989), ‘The Threshold of Market Power in Economics: 4-Firm Share of 40% to 50%’, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 11-21.
  • Mullin, Foseph C. and Mullin, Wallace P. (1997), ‘United States Steel’s Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance?’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 74-100.
  • Murray, Tracy and Rousslang, Donald J. (1989), ‘A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by Unfair Trade Practices’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 149-164.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1979), ‘Kann die Fusionskontrolle ihren Anspruch einlšsen? (Is the Merger Control Able to Achieve its Goals)’, DB , 1021-1025.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1981), ‘Fusion und Fusionskontrolle (Merger and Merger Control)’, in Cox, Jens and Markert (eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs , MŸnchen.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1982), ‘Der Schutz von ArbeitsplŠtzen im Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht (Protection of Jobs in Anti-Trust- and Competition Law)’, in Kittner (ed.), Arbeitsmarkt – škonomische, soziale und rechtliche Grundlagen , Heidelberg, MŸller Juristischer Verlag.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1982), ‘Fusionskontrolle und Schutz von ArbeitsplŠtzen (Merger Control and Job Protection)’, Arbeit und Recht , 207-215.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1993), ‘Die Marken der Hersteller von Autoteilen und das Wettbewerbsrecht der EG (Brands of Automobile Parts and the Competition Law of the EG)’, Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftsrecht , 987-993.
  • Netz, Janet, Non-Profits and Price-Fixing: The Case of the Ivy League, Part I, , Working Paper.
  • Netz, Janet, Price-Fixing and Non-Price Competition: the Case of the Ivy League, Part II , Working Paper.
  • Netz, Janet, Borenstein, Severin and Mackie-Mason, Jeffrey K., ‘Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets’, Journal of Economic and Management Strategy .
  • Netz, Janet, Borenstein, Severin and Mackie-Mason, Jeffrey K. (1994), ‘The Economics of Customer Lock-In and Market Power in Services’, in Harker, Patrick T. (ed.), The Service Productivity and Quality Challenge , Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Netz, Janet, Borenstein, Severin and Mackie-Mason, Jeffrey K. (1995), ‘Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets’, 63(2) Antitrust Law Journal , 455-482.
  • Neuberger, Doris and Neumann, Manfred J.M. (1991), ‘Banking and Antitrust: Limiting Industrial Ownership by Banks?’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 188-199.
  • Newmark, Craig M. (1988), ‘Does Horizontal Price Fixing Raise Price? A Look at the Bakers of Washington Case’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 469-484.
  • Newmark, Craig M. (1988), ‘Is Antitrust Enforcement Effective?’, 96 Journal of Political Economy , 1315-1328.
  • Nix, Joan (1990), ‘Fair Competition: An Unambiguous Policy Guide?’, Wisconsin Law Review , 501-511.
  • Noland, James E. (1989), ‘$9 Million Jury Verdict “Against the Clear Weight of the Evidence’, 21(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 13-26.
  • Noll, Roger G. and Owen, Bruce M. (1988), ‘United States v. AT&T: An Interim Assessment,’, in Hausman and Bradley (eds.), Future Competition in Telecommunications , Cambridge (MA), Harvard Business School Press.
  • Noll, Roger G. and Owen, Bruce M. (1994), ‘United States v. AT&T: The Economic Issues’, in Kwoka, J. & White, L. (ed.), The Antitrust Revolution: The Role of Economics , Scott Foresman.
  • Nutter, G. Warren and Moore, John H. (1976), ‘A Theory of Competition’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 39-65.
  • O’Brien, Daniel P. and Shaffer, Greg (1994), ‘The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis of Robinson Patman’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 296-318.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. and Baumol, William J. (1988), ‘Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries’, 4 Oxford Review of Economic Policy , 13-34.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. and Wall, Daniel M. (1988), ‘Proving Entry Barriers: A Practical Guide to the Economics of New Entry’, 2 Antitrust , 12-17.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. and Willig, Robert D. (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’, 71 California Law Review , 535-574.
  • Ordover, Janusz A. and Willig, Robert D. (1985), ‘Antitrust for High-Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 311-333.
  • Ordover, Janusz A., Sykes, Alan O. and Willig, Robert D. (1982), ‘Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers’, 95 Harvard Law Review , 1857-1874.
  • Ordover, Janusz A., Sykes, Alan O. and Willig, Robert D. (1983), ‘Unfair International Trade Practices’, 15 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics , 323-337.
  • Osti, Cristoforo (1995), Antitrust e oligopolio: concorrenza, cooperazione e concentrazione (Antitrust and oligopoly: competition, cooperation and merger) , Bologna, Il Mulino.
  • Osti, Cristoforo (1995), Antitrust e oligopolio: concorrenza, cooperazione e concentrazione (Antitrust and oligopoly: competition, cooperation and merger) , Bologna, Il Mulino.
  • Ostry, Sylvia (1978), ‘Competition Policy and the Self- Regulating Professions’, in Slayton, Philip and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), The Professions and Public Policy , Toronto, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 17-29.
  • Owen, Bruce M., ‘Book Review of F.M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy’, Journal of Economic Literature .
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1969), ‘Comment (on the Perfectly Competitive Al location of Public Goods)’, Review of Economics and Statistics .
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1970), ‘Monopoly Pricing in Combined Gas and Electric Utilities’, 15 Antitrust Bulletin , 713 ff.
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1984), ‘The Use of Economists in An titrust Litigation’, in Greenfield, J. (ed.), ABA Section of Antitrust Law .
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1984), ‘Book Review of F. Fisher, et al., Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis of U.S. v. IBM’, Sloan Management Review .
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1986), ‘The Evolution of Clayton ¤7 Enforcement and the Beginnings of U.S. Industrial Policy’, 31 Antitrust Bulletin , 409 ff.
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1987), ‘Defining Geographic Markets under the 1984 Merger Guidelines: An Economic Perspective (Outline)’, in X (ed.), Practicing Law Institute, 27th Annual Ad vanced Antitrust Seminar, Course Handbook Series No. 581 , Practising Law Institute.
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1989), ‘Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities’, 58 Antitrust Law Journal , 887 ff.
  • Owen, Bruce M. (1992), ‘Merger Control in Argentina’, 27 International Merger Law .
  • Owen, Bruce M. and Grundfest, Joseph A. (1977), ‘Kickbacks, Specializa tion, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets’, 29 Stanford Law Review , 931 ff.
  • Owen, Bruce M. and others (1992), ‘Competition Policy and Consumer Protection in Argentinia’, Economists Incorporated .
  • Owen, Bruce M. and others (1995), ‘Competition Policy in Perœ: Report and Recommendations’, Economists Incorporated .
  • Owen, Bruce M., Greenhalgh, P.R. and Myslinski, W.C. (1982), ‘Notes on the Merger Guidelines: Economic Perspectives’, Economists Incorporated .
  • Owen, Bruce M., Spence, M. and Greenhalgh, P.R., ‘Federal Antitrust Policy and the Incentive to Undertake Research and Development in the Information Technologies’, Economists Incorporated .
  • Page, William H. (1987), ‘Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation’, Duke Law Journal , 618-668.
  • Page, William H. (1989), ‘The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency’, 75 Virginia Law Review , 1221-1308.
  • Page, William H. (1990), ‘State Action and “Active Supervision”: An Antitrust Anomaly’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 745-770.
  • Page, William H. (1990), ‘Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors’ Injury’, 88 Michigan Law Review , 2151-2166.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto (1993), ‘Analisi economica della legislazione antitrust italiana (Economic analysis of Italian antitrust law)’, V Il Foro Italiano , 1-18.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto (1994), ‘Parallelismo e collusione oligopolistica: il lato oscuro dell’ antitrust (Parallelism and oligopolistic collusion: the dark side of antitrust)’, IV Il Foro Italiano , 65-76.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto and Osti, Cristoforo (1996), ‘Avvisi di burrasca: antitrust e diritti Tv su manifestazioni sportive (Storm warnings: antitrust and television rights on sport events)’, Rivista di diritto sportivo , 1-31.
  • Parsons, Donald O. and Ray, Edward John (1975), ‘The United States Steel Consolidation: The Creation of Market Control’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 181-219.
  • Pashigian, B. Peter (1968), ‘Market Concentration in the United States and Great Britain’, 11 Journal of Law and Economics , 299-319.
  • Paule, C.L. (1968), ‘Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of American Firms in Canada’, 11 Journal of Law and Economics , 423-432.
  • Pautler, Paul A. (1983), ‘A Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy’, 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 571-651.
  • Pautler, Paul A. (1983), ‘A Guide to the Herfindahl Index for Antitrust Attorneys’, 5 Research in Law and Economics , 167-190.
  • Peeperkorn, Luc (1987), ‘Mededingingsbeleid op klompen (Competition Policy on Wooden Shoes)’, 10 Tijdschrift voor politieke economie , 57-75.
  • Peeperkorn, Luc (1988), ‘Openbaarheid van kartels (The Public Nature of Cartels)’, 73 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 212-214.
  • Peeperkorn, Luc (1989), ‘Fusiecontrole in de EG (EC Merger Control)’, 74 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1163-1165.
  • Peeperkorn, Luc (1989), ‘Het EG-mededingingsbeleid (EC Competition Policy)’, 74 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1139-1142.
  • Peltman, Sam (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Jorde and Teece, Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor Cooperation],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 152-154.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1977), ‘The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration’, 20 Journal of Law and Economics , 229-263.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1979), ‘The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial Concentration: A Reply’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 209-211.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1987), ‘Comment (on J. Stiglitz, “Technological Change, Sunk Costs and Competition”)’, 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity .
  • Peltzman, Sam (1990), ‘Comment (on M. Salinger, “The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered”)’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics .
  • Peltzman, Sam and Weston, Fred J. (eds.) (1969), Public Policy Toward Mergers , California, Pacific Palisades.
  • Peritz, Rudolph J. (1984), ‘The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudenc: Econmics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination’, Duke Law Journal , 1205-1295.
  • Peritz, Rudolph J. (1989), ‘A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine’, 40 Hastings Law Journal , 511-576.
  • Peritz, Rudolph J. (1989), ‘The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition’, 40 Hastings Law Journal , 285-342.
  • Perloff, Jeffrey M. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1988), ‘Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation’, in White, Lawrence J. (ed.), Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Meaning , Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
  • Perloff, Jeffrey M., Rubinfeld, Daniel L. and Ruud, Paul (1996), ‘Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes’, Review of Economics and Statistics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1978), ‘Related Market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers: A Comment’, American Economic Review .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1978), ‘Price Discrimination and Forward Integration’, Bell Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1978), ‘Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case’, American Economic Review .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1980), ‘Forward Integration: Alcoa 1888-1930’, Journal of Industrial Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1981), ‘The Manager and the Competitive Firm’s Supply’, Southern Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1982), ‘Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations’, Bell Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1982), ‘Vertical Integration by Competitive Firms: Uncertainty and Diversification’, Southern Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1984), ‘Vertical Equilibrium in a Competitive Input Market’, International Journal of Industrial Organization .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1984), ‘Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy’, Journal of Industrial Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1985), ‘Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger’, American Economic Review .
  • Perry, Martin Kent (1989), ‘Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects’, in X (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization , Amsterdam, North Holland.
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Besanko, David (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competetion for Exclusive Dealerships’, Journal of Industrial Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Besanko, David (1993), ‘Equilibrium Incentives of Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly’, Rand Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Besanko, David (1994), ‘Exclusive Dealing in a Spatial Model of Retail Competition’, International Journal of Industrial Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Groff, Robert H. (1985), ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Forward Integration into a Monopolistically Competitive Industry’, Quarterly Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Groff, Robert H. (1986), ‘Trademark Licensing in a Monopolistically Competitive Industry’, Rand Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Koenker, Roger W. (1981), ‘Product Differentiation, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy’, Bell Journal of Economics .
  • Perry, Martin Kent and Porter, Robert H. (1990), ‘Can Resale Price Maintenance and Franchise Fees Correct Sub-Optimal Levels of Retail Service’, International Journal of Industrial Organization .
  • Perry, Martin Kent, Besanko, David and Spady, Ricard H. (1990), ‘The Logit Model of Monopolistic Competition’, Journal of Industrial Economics .
  • Peterman, John L. (1975), ‘The Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Company’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 361-419.
  • Peterman, John L. (1975), ‘The Brown Shoe Case’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 81-146.
  • Phillips, Almarin (1986), ‘Market Concentration and Performance: A Survey of the Evidence’, 61 Notre Dame Law Review , 1099-1145.
  • Phillips, Bernard J. (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: What do Economists Know and When did They Know it?],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 91-93.
  • Phillips, C.F., Jr. (1971), ‘Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance.”, 2 Bell Journal of Economics , 683-687.
  • Picot, Arnold (1991), ‘Comment’ [on Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: What do Economists Know and When did They Know it?],’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 94-98.
  • Pindyck, Robert S. (1985), ‘The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 193-222.
  • Pitofsky, Robert (1987), ‘Does Antitrust Have a Future?’, 76 Georgetown Law Journal , 321-327.
  • Pitofsky, Robert (1987), ‘Antitrust in the Next 100 Years’, 75 California Law Review , 817-833.
  • Pittman, R.W. and Werden, Gregory J. (1990), ‘The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets: Indications from Justice Department Merger Cases’, 33 Economic Letters , 283-286.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1986), ‘Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement’, 74 Georgetown Law Journal , 1231-1236.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven (1981), ‘Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis’, 33 Stanford Law Review , 447-471.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1986), ‘Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement’, 74(4) Georgetown Law Journal , 1231-1236.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Shavell, Steven (1981), ‘Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis’, 33(3) Stanford Law Review , 447-471.
  • Ponsoldt, James F. (1987), ‘The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justification for Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago’s Swiftian Modest Proposal’, 62 New York University Law Review , 1166-1171.
  • Popper, Andrew F. (1983), ‘The Antitrust System: An Impediment to the Development of Negotiation Models’, 32 American University Law Review , 283-334.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1970), ‘A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 365-419.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1971), ‘A Program for the Antitrust Division’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 500-536.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1974), ‘Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Law’, 41 University of Chicago Law Review , 506-535.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’, 83 Journal of Political Economy , 807-827.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1976), Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 262 p.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1979), ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 925-952. Reprinted in 22, Corporate Practice Commentator, 1981, 583-610.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1988), ‘The Insignificance of Macroeconomics in Patent Antitrust Law: A Comment on Millstein’, 9 Cardozo Law Review , 1203-1207.
  • Prasad, Ravi (1992), ‘Pro-Competitive Regulation’, Office of Regulation Review .
  • Prasad, Ravi (1995), ‘Competition and Retail Banking’, Office of Regulation Review .
  • Prasad, Ravi (1996), ‘Merger Regulation’, Office of Regulation Review .
  • Prichard, J. Robert S., Stanbury, W.T. and Wilson, Thomas A. (eds.) (1979), Canadian Competition Policy – Essays in Law and Ec , Toronto, Butterworths.
  • Priest, George L. (1989), ‘Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance’, 63 Tulane Law Review , 999-1044.
  • Primeaux, Walter J., Jr. and Smith, Mickey C. (1976), ‘Pricing Patterns and the Kinky Demand Curve’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 189-199.
  • Radler, Warren S. (1989), ‘Rose Acre’s Long-Term Predatory Price Discrimination: “Picked Off One at a Time”‘, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 51-62.
  • Rapp, Richard Tilden (1986), ‘Predatory Pricing and Entry Deterring Strategies: The Economics of AKZO’, 7 European Competition Law Review , 233-240.
  • Rapp, Richard Tilden (1988), ‘The Application of Economic Argument in Anti-Trust Cases: Recent American Trends’, 9 European Competition Law Review , 207-226.
  • Rapp, Richard Tilden (1990), ‘Predatory Pricing Analysis: A Practical Synthesis’, 59 Antitrust Law Journal , 595-607.
  • Rapp, Richard Tilden (1995), ‘The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger’, 64(1) Antitrust Law Journal , 19-47.
  • Rapp, Richard Tilden and Forest, Elisabeth (1994), ‘The Antitrust-Intellectual Property Intersection’, Antitrust Report , 3-12.
  • Rasmusen, Eric B., Ramseyer, Mark J. and Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’, 81 American Economic Review , 1137 ff.
  • Ravenscraft, David J. and Scherer, Frederic M. (1987), Sell- Offs and Economic Efficiency, , Washington, Brookings Institution.
  • Reagan, Patricia B. (1986), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: A Re- examination of the Outlets Hypothesis’, 9 Research in Law and Economics , 1-12.
  • Reed, Randal L. and Waldman, Don E. (1988), ‘Mergers and Air Fares: “Contestable Markets” in the Airline Industry’, 20(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 15-20.
  • Reene, W.D. (1989), Industrial Economics: A Critical Introduction to C , Aldershot, Gower.
  • Reid, Gavin C. (1987), Theories of Industrial Organization , Oxford, Blackwell, 234 p.
  • Reiffen, David and Kleit, Andrew N. (1990), ‘Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 419-438.
  • Reiss, Peter C. and Spiller, Pablo T. (1989), ‘Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 179-202.
  • Reuber, Grant L. (1969), ‘Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of American Firms in Canada: A Further Analysis’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 405-417.
  • Reuber, Grant L. (1970), ‘Antitrust and the Takeover Activity of American Firms in Canada: A Reply’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 257-259.
  • Reynolds, Michael J. (1985), ‘Extra-territorial Aspects of Mergers and Joint Ventures: The EEC Position’, 6 European Competition Law Review , 165-184.
  • Reynolds, Robert J. (1980), ‘An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Measurement’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1121-1130.
  • Rhoades, S.A. and Burke, J. (1990), ‘Economic and Political Foundations of Section 7 Enforcement in the 1980’s’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 373-446.
  • Rhoades, Stephen A. (1985), ‘The Decline and Possible Resurrection of Antitrust Policy Toward Mergers’, 17(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 49-55.
  • Ricketts, Martin (1987), The New Industrial Economics: An Introduction to Modern Theories of the Firm , New York, St. Martin’s Press, 305 p.
  • Ridyard, Derek (1990), ‘An Economic Perspective on the EC Merger Regulation’, 11 European Competition Law Review , 247-254.
  • Rock, James M. (1969), ‘Cookware: A Study in Vertical Integration -A Reexamination’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 425-438.
  • Rock, James M. (1969), ‘Cookware and Vertical Integration: A Reply’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 441-443.
  • Rogers, C. Paul (1983), ‘The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in Horizontal Mergers’, 58 Tulane Law Review , 503-542.
  • Rogowsky, Robert A. (1984), ‘The Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines: A Study in the Application of the Rule’, 6 Research in Law and Economics , 135-166.
  • Ršper, Bernd (1982), Die Mi brauchaufsicht vor dem Hintergrund der (The Abuse Aspect as Background for the Development of a New Competition Theory) , Berlin, Humboldt.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1973), ‘State Regulation of Agricultural Labor Regulations – the Arizona Farm Labor Law – A Constitutional Analysis’, Arizona State Law Journal , 373-431.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1978), ‘Antitrust and the Supreme Court – 1977 Docket’, 14 Arizona Bar Journal , 14 ff.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1979), ‘Municipal Antitrust Liability After City of Lafayette’, 42B Municipal Law Review , 203 ff.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1979), ‘Occupational Licensing – A Framework for Analysis’, Arizona State Law Journal , 189 ff.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1979), ‘Antitrust and the Supreme Court – 1978 Docket’, 15 Arizona Bar Journal , 42 ff.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1979), ‘Antitrust. A New Liability’, 29 (2 &3) Urban Georgia .
  • Rose, Jonathan (1980), ‘Municipal Antitrust Liability – An Overview’, Arizona State Law Journal , 245-251.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1980), ‘Municipal Activities and the Antitrust Laws After City of Lafayette’, 57 University of Det. Journal of Urban Law , 482-522.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1980), ‘Contribution in Antitrust: Some Policy Considerations’, 49 Antitrust Law Journal , 1606-1625.
  • Rose, Jonathan (1995), ‘State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics’, 41 Wayne Law Review , 71 ff.
  • Rose, Jonathan and Cohen, Warren, H. (1973), ‘State Regulation of Agricultural Labor Regulations – the Arizona Farm Labor Law – An Interpretive and Comparative Analysis’, Arizona State Law Journal , 313-373.
  • Rosenfield, Andrew M. (1986), ‘The Use of Economics in Antitrust Litigation and Counseling’, Columbia Business Law Review , 49-82.
  • Ross, Howard N. (1987), ‘Oligopoly Theory and Price Rigidity’, 32 Antitrust Bulletin , 451-469.
  • Ross, Thomas W. (1984), ‘Winners and Losers under the Robinson- Patman Act’, 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 243-271.
  • Rottenberg, Simon (1961), ‘Legislated Early Shop Closing in Britain’, 4 Journal of Law and Economics , 118-130.
  • Round, D.K. (1975), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy: Some Australian Evidence’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 273-281.
  • Rowe, Frederick M. (1962), Price Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Rowe, Frederick M. (1984), ‘The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics’, 72 Georgetown Law Journal , 1511-1570.
  • Rowe, Frederick M. (1987), ‘Market as a Mirage’, 75 California Law Review , 991-996.
  • Rowley, Charles K. (1968), ‘Mergers and Public Policy in Great Britain’, 11 Journal of Law and Economics , 75-132.
  • Rowley, Charles K. (1971), ‘Antitrust policy: The Application of Rules’, Moortgat and Wall Street , 37-50.
  • Rowley, Charles K. (1973), ‘Mergers and Public Policy in Great Britain’, in Moskoff, W. (ed.), Comparitive National Economic Policies .
  • Rowley, Charles K. (1973), Antitrust and Economic Efficiency , London, MacMillan, 95 p.
  • Rowley, Charles K. and Crew, Michael A., ‘Antitrust Policiy: Economics versus Management Science’, in Rowley, Charles K. (ed.), Readings in Industrial Economics Volume 2 .
  • Rowley, Charles K. and Crew, Michael A. (1970), ‘Antitrust Policy: Economics versus Management Science’, Moortgat and Wall Street , 19-34.
  • Rowley, Charles K. and Yarrow, G.K. (1978), Evolution of Concentration in the United Kingdom Cement Industry , Commission of the European Communities. French edition 1979.
  • Rubin, Paul H., ‘What Do Economists Think About Antitrust: A Random Walk Down Pennsylvania Avenue’, in McChesney, Fred and Shughart, William (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Ruffner, Markus (1990), Neue Wettbewerbstheorie und schweizerisches Ka (New Competition Theory and Swiss Antitrust Law, Possibilities and Limitations of a Market and Institutionalist Foundation of Competition Policy) , Zurich, Schulthess.
  • Rule, Charles F. and Meyer, David L. (1988), ‘An Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of all Consumers’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 677-712.
  • Ruppelt, Hans-Joachim (1989), ‘Der Verordnungsentwurf fŸr eine europŠische Fusionskontrolle im EG-Ministerrat (The Regulation Bill for a European Fusion Control in the EC-Cabinet Council)’, 39 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 187-202.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1993), Antitrust Enforcement – An Inquiry into Policy Analysis of Competition Law , Working Paper, Centre for Research in Economics & Business Administration, Bergen, No. 89.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1996), ‘Towards a Nordic Competition Law?’, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap .
  • Salant, Stephen W. (1987), ‘Treble Damages Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing’, 95 Journal of Political Economy , 1326-1336.
  • Salop, Steven C. and White, Lawrence J. (1986), ‘Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation’, 74 Georgetown Law Journal , 1001-1064.
  • Santangelo, Jerry M. (1983), ‘Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge Posner’s Applications of His Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine’, 32 DePaul Law Review , 839-899.
  • Sass, Tim R. and Gisser, Micha (1989), ‘Agency Cost, Firm Size, and Exclusive Dealing’, 32 Journal of Law and Economics , 381-400.
  • Sass, Tim R. and Saurman, David S. (1993), ‘Mandated Exclusive Territories and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of the Malt-Beverage Industry’, 36 Journal of Law and Economics , 153-177.
  • Sauter, Herbert (1989), ‘Gruppenfreistellungs-Verordnung fŸr Know-how-Vereinbarungen (The Group Exemption Regulation for Know-How Agreements)’, 39 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 383-391.
  • Schanze, Erich (1991), ‘Evolution of Antitrust Policies in France. Comment’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 66-71.
  • Schap, David (1986), ‘Review of the Effects of Research and Development on U.S. Market Structure’, 53 Southern Economic Journal , 553-554.
  • Scheffman, David T. and Spiller, Pablo T. (1987), ‘Geographic Market Definition under the’, 30 Journal of Law and Economics , 123-147.
  • Scheffman, David T. and Spiller, Pablo T. (1989), ‘Introduction: Empirical Approaches to Market Power’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 3-10.
  • Scherer, Frederic M. (1977), ‘The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff’, 86 Yale Law Journal , 974-1002.
  • Scherer, Frederic M. (1979), ‘The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial Concentration: A Comment’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 191-208.
  • Scherer, Frederic M. (1985), ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Industrieškonomik (S nd Perspectives of Industrial Economics)’, in Bombach, G., Gahlen, B. and Ott, A.E. (eds.), Industrieškonomik: Theorie und Empirie , TŸbingen, Mohr, 3-19.
  • Scherer, Frederic M. (1990), ‘Efficiency, Fairness, and the Early Contributions of Economists to the Antitrust Debate’, 29 Washburn Law Journal , 243-255.
  • Scherer, Frederic M. and Ross David (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd ed) , Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 713 p.
  • Schlicht, Ekkehart (1991), ‘Comment (on Gilbert, Legal and Economic Issues in the Commercialization of New Technology)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 185-187.
  • Schlieper, Ulrich (1991), ‘Comment (on Shughart and Tollison, The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 58-59.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L. (1979), ‘On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Ralemon Case’, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 994-1050.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L. (1982), ‘Another Look at Market Power’, 95 Harvard Law Review , 1789-1816.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L. (1982), ‘Commodity Bundling by Single- Product Monopolies’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 67-71.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L. (1988), ‘Industrial Economics: An Overview’, 98 Economic Journal , 643-681.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L. and Willig, Robert D. (1990), Handbook of Industrial Organization , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1555 p.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1963), ‘Markttransparenz als Voraussetzung fŸr WettbewerbsbeschrŠnkungen (Market Transparency as a Prerogative for Competition Distortions)’, 13 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 97 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1963), ‘Die šffentliche Hand als Unternehmen im Sinne des GWB (The Government as an Enterprise with Respect to Competition Law)’, 18 Der Betriebs-Berater , 1404 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1964), ‘Zum Begriff des Preiswettbewerbs nach ¤ 16 GWB (Price Competition)’, 14 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 120 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1965), ‘Relevanter Markt, Marktbeherrschung und Mi§brauch in ¤ 22 GWB und Art. 86 EWGV (Relevant Market, Domination, and Abuse according to German and European Competition Law)’, 15 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 453 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1965), ‘Das VerhŠltnis von Patent- und Kartellrecht – Folgerungen aus der Konzentrationsenquete fŸr die Patentreform (The Relation of Patent Law and Competition Law)’, Die Aussprache , 155 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1966), ‘Neuere Entwicklungen in der Wettbewerbstheorie unter BerŸcksichtigung wachstumspolitischer Zielsetzungen (New Developments in the Competition Theory)’, 16 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 699 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1967), ‘Zum Nachweis des Mi§brauchs einer rechtlichen oder faktischen WettbewerbsbeschrŠnkung, Eine Analyse der im amerikanischen Recht entwickelten Theorien und Kriterien zur Schadenshšhe in den ‘civil damage suits’ und zur ‘performance’-Kontrolle in den ‘public (On Proving the Abuse of a Legal or Factual Restraints of Competition: An Analysis of the American Theories)’, 17 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 635 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1967), ‘Zum Nachweis des Mi§brauchs einer rechtlichen oder faktischen WettbewerbsbeschrŠnkung, Eine Analyse der im amerikanischen Recht entwickelten Theorien und Kriterien zur Schadenshšhe in den ‘civil damage suits’ und zur ‘performance’-Kontrolle in den ‘public (On Proving the Abuse of a Legal or Factual Restraints of Competition: An Analysis of the American Theries)’, 17 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 777 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1968), ‘Zum Schutzzweck der Mi§brauchsaufsicht Ÿber marktbeherrschende Unternehmen (The Goal of Abuse Control)’, 21 Der Betriebs-Berater , 1795 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1969), ‘Reform des GWB – Aufgabe des nŠchsten Bundestages (Reform of the German Anti-Trust Law)’, 49 Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftspolitik , 450 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1970), ‘Erweiterter Schutz kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (Extended Protection for Small and Medium Firms)’, Marktwirtschaft , 21 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1972), ‘Entwicklung der Antitrustrechtsprechung gegenŸber Konglomeraten (The Development of the Anti-Trust Judicature on Conglomerates)’, 18 Au§enwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters , 275 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1973), ‘US-amerikanische und deutsche Wettbewerbspolitik gegenŸber Marktmacht, Eine vergleichende Untersuchung und kritische Analyse der Rechtsprechung gegenŸber TatbestŠnden des externen und internen Unternehmenswachstums sowie des Behinderungswettbewerbs (Competition Policy and Market Power in the US and in Germany)’, in Besters, Hans (ed.), Quaestiones Oeconomicae Band 6 , Berlin.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1976), ‘Die ZusammenhŠnge von relevantem Markt, Marktbeherrschung und Marktergebnis am Beispiel der Mi§brauchsaufsicht des Bundeskartellamtes bei Arzneimitteln (The Federal Anti-Trust Authority’s Abuse Control of the Pharmaceutical Market as an Example for the Relation of Relevant Market, Market Dominance und Market Results)’, 190 Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 67 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1981), ‘Per se Rule oder Rule of Reason (Per-se rules or Rules of Reason)’, 10 WiSt , 282 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1981), ‘Wettbewerbspolitik in den USA (Competition Policy in the US)’, in Cox, Jens and Markert (eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs , MŸnchen, 533-556.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1981), ‘Obsoleszenz als Mi§brauch wirtschaftlicher Macht (Obsolescence as an Abuse of Economic Power)’, 21 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 868 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1986), ‘Ist Grš§e an sich gefŠhrlich (Is Bigness Dangerous Per Se?)’, 36 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 193 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1990), ‘Die EuropŠische Fusionskontroll-Verordnung (The European Merger Control Law)’, 70 Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftspolitik , 90 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1990), Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht: Eine EinfŸhrung, (3rd ed) (Competition Policy and Antitrust Law: An Introduction) , Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 330 p.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1992), ‘EG-Integration, Industrie- versus Wettbewerbspolitik (European Integration, Industrial Policy vs. Competition Policy)’, 72 Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschaftspolitik , 628 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1992), ‘Die Wettbewerbsordnung (The Competition Restraint)’, in Adams, W.P., et al. (ed.), LŠnderbericht USA I, Geographie, Geschichte, Politische Kultur, Politisches System, Wirtschaft, Schriftenreihe vol. 293/I der Bundeszentrale fŸr politische Bildung, 2nd ed. , Bonn, 606 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1995), ‘EuropŠische Industriepolitik – ein Widerspruch zur Wettbewerbsordnung? (European Industrial Policy – Contradiction to the Competition Law System?)’, 45 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 971 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1996), ‘Pro und Contra Konzentrationsprivileg, Die unterschiedlichen Wirkungen von Kartellen und Fusionen auf Wettbewerb und Effizienz (Pro and Contra Privileged Concentration, The Different Impacts of Cartels and Mergers on Comptition and Efficiency)’, in Kruse, Jšrn and Otto G. Mayer, Otto G. (ed.), Aktuelle Probleme der Wettbewerbs- und Wirtschaftspolitik, Erhard Kantzenbach zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, 119 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo (1996), ‘Wettbewerbspolitik versus Industriepolitik in der EG, Korreferat zu Erhard Kantzenbach (Industrial Policy vs. Competition Policy, Comment)’, 44 Applied Economics Quarterly , 59 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and (1973), ‘Wie kann Marktmacht kontrolliert werden? (How Can Market Power Be Controlled?)’, 23 Der BŸrger im Staat , 252 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Binder, Steffen (1994), ‘Wettbewerbspolitik im internationalen Vergleich, Die Erfassung wettbewerbsbeschrŠnkender Strategien in Deutschland, England, Frankreich, den USA und der EG (International Comparision of Competition Policies)’, .
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Binder, Steffen (1996), Wettbewerbspolitik im internationalen Vergleich, Die Erfassung wettbewerbsbeschrŠnkender Strategien in Deutschland, England, Frankreich, den USA und der EG (An international Comparision of Competition Policy) , Heidelberg.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and El§er, Stefan (1990), ‘Innovationsoptimale Unternehmensgrš§en und Marktstrukturen (Innovation Optimal Firm Sizes and Market Structures)’, 19 WiSt , 556 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Engelke, Heinz (1989), ‘Marktzutrittsschranken und potentieller Wettbewerb (Market Entry Barriers and Potential Competition)’, 18 WiSt , 399 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Kirschner, Ulrich (1985), ‘Darstellung und wettbewerbspolitische WŸrdigung der U.S. Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Critical Evaluation of the US Vertical Restraint Guidelines)’, 35 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 781 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Richard, Sabine (1989), ‘Unternehmensgrš§e, Ausdruck von Macht oder Effizienz? (Size of Firms as an Indicator for Efficiency or Power?)’, gdi impuls , 26 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Richard, Sabine (1991), ‘Zum VerhŠltnis von Dumpingrecht und Kartellrecht in der EG (On the Relation of Anti-Dumping Law and Antitrust Law)’, 41 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 665 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Ries, W. (1983), ‘Der Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI) als wettbewerbspolitisches Instrument in den US-Fusionsrichtlinien 1982 (The Hirschmann-Herfindah-Index as an Instrument of Competition Policy in the US Merger Guidelines)’, 33 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 525 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Rittaler, Jan B., Das wettbewerbstheoretische und -politische Credo der sog. Chicago School (The Guidelines of the so Called Chicago School on Competition Theory and Competition Policy) , DiskussionsbeitrŠge aus dem Institut fŸr VWL No. 23/85.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Rittaler, Jan B. (1986), ‘Chicago School of Antitrust Law, …konomische Analyse des Wettbewerbsrechts (Chicago School of Antitrust Law, Economic Analysis of Competition Law)’, 15 WiSt , 283 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Rittaler, Jan B. (1986), Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis: Wett (The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis: Competition Theoretical and Political Analysis of a Credo) , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 119 p.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Rittaler, Jan B. (1987), ‘Marktphasen und Wettbewerb (Marketphases and Competition)’, 16 WiSt , 597 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Rittaler, Jan B. (1989), A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 132 p.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Ršhrich, Martina (1992), ‘Kompetitive Marktstrukturen und externes Unternehmenwachstum (Competitive Marketstructures and External Firm Growth)’, 29 WiSt , 179 ff.
  • Schmidt, Ingo and Schmidt, Andr (1996), ‘X-Ineffizienz, Lean Production und WettbewerbsfŠhigkeit (X-Inefficiency, Lean Production, and Ability to Compete)’, 25 WiSt , 65 ff.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1973), ‘FŸr eine konsequente Wettbewerbspolitik und Ÿber die Wege dorthin, Bemerkungen zum WettbewerbsverstŠndnis des SachverstŠndigenrates (For a Consistent Competition Policy and How to Achieve It)’, 129 Zeitschrift fŸr die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft , 102 ff.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1978), Wettbewerbspolitik als Aufgabe: Methodologisch (Competition Policy as Task: Methodological and System Theoretical Foundations for a Reorientatation) , Baden-Baden, Nomos.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1979), ‘Ausbeutung aufgrund einer WettbewerbsbeschrŠnkung durch Zustand? Kritische Analyse der theoretischen Grundlagen einer freiheitsgefŠhrdenden Wettbewerbspolitik (Expropriation through a Competition Restraint by State? A Critical Analysis of the Theoretical Foundations of a Competition Policy that Threatens Freedom)’, 30 Ordo: Jahrbuch fŸr die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 273 ff.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1981), ‘Leitungspartizipation, Wettbewerb und FunktionsfŠhigkeit des Marktsystems (Management Participation)’, in Issing, D. (ed.), Zukunftsprobleme der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Schriften des Vereins fŸr Socialpolitik, N.F. Bd. 116 , Berlin, 191 ff.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1982), ‘Property Rights, Freiheitsschutz und die Logik staatlicher Preisinterventionen: Kritische Analyse der theoretischen Grundlagen einer freiheits gefŠhrdenden Wettbewerbspolitik (Property Rights, Protection of Liberty and the Logic of Governmental Price)’, in Die Mi Brauchsaufsicht Vor Dem Hintergrund Der En (ed.), Schriften des Vereins fŸr Socialpolitik, Vol. 124, .
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1983), Property Rights, Freiheit und Wettbewerbspolitik (Property Rights, Freedom and Competition Policy) , TŸbingen, Mohr, 71 p.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1985), ‘Monopol und Institutional Choice (Monopoly and Institutional Choice)’, in Schenk, K.-E. (ed.), Wirtschaftsordnung, Industrieorganisation und Koordination – Theorie und LŠndervergleiche , Stuttgart, 180-211.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1988), ‘Fehlurteile Ÿber das Konzept der Wettbewerbsfreiheit (Wrong Conclusions on the Concept of Competitive Freedom)’, 39 Ordo: Jahrbuch fŸr die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 111-135.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1991), ‘Comment (on Mšschel, The Goals of Antitrust Revisited)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 31-37.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter (1994), ‘Antitrust zwischen Marktmachtphobie und Effizienzeuphorie, Alte Themen – neue AnsŠtze (Antitrust between Fear of Market Power and Euphoria about Efficiency)’, in Mšschel, W., Streit, M., Witt, U. (ed.), Marktwirtschaft und Rechtsordnung, Festschrift fŸr Erich Hoppmann , Baden-Baden, 143-166.
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter and Fehl, E. U. (1986), ‘Wettbewerbstheoretische Aspekte der Mi§brauchsaufsicht Ÿber Autobahntankstellen (Competition Theoretical Approach of the Abuse Control Concerning Highway Gas Stations)’, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb , 572 ff.
  • Schšdermeier, M. (1990), ‘Collective Dominance Revisited: An Analysis of the Ec Commission’s New Concepts of Oligopoly Control’, 11 European Competition Law Review , 28-34.
  • Schulenburg, J. Matthias Graf Von Der and Wagner, Michael J. (1990), ‘Protektionismus, Marktstruktur und Importkonkurrenz, Eine vergleichende škonometrische Studie fŸr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die USA (Protectionism, Market Structure and Import Competition)’, 36(4) Ifo-Studien zur Industriewirtschaft , 267-291.
  • SchŸller, Alfred (1979), ‘Eigentumsrechte, Unternehmenskontrollen und Wettbewerbsordnung (Property Rights, Corporate Control and Competition)’, 30 Ordo: Jahrbuch fŸr die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 325-364.
  • SchŸller, Alfred (1983), ‘Theorie der Firma und wettbewerbliches Marktsystem (Theory of the Firm and Competitive Market System)’, in SchŸller, Alfred (ed.), Property Rights und škonomische Theorie , MŸnchen, Vahlen, 145-183.
  • SchŸrmann, Leo (1990), ‘Der Wettbewerb im Urteil der Staatswissenschaft (The Competition in the Judgment of Economics)’, 42 Wirtschaft und Recht , 35-41.
  • Schwark, Eberhard (1997), ‘Wirtschaftssubventionen im Spannungsfeld von nationalem Recht und Gemeinschaftsrecht (Subsidies Between National and European Law)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 325 ff.
  • Schwartz, Gary T. (1980), ‘An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement’, 68 Georgetown Law Journal , 1075-1102.
  • Schwartz, Louis (1979), ‘On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises (Book Reviews)’, 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 244 ff.
  • Schwartz, Louis B. (1983), ‘The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revsion of the Antitrust Laws?’, 71 California Law Review , 575-603.
  • Schwartz, Louis B. (1987), ‘Some Additional Safeguards for the Newly Liberated Marketplace: Deregulatory Schizophrenia’, 75 California Law Review , 1049-1057.
  • Schweizer, Urs (1991), ‘Comment (on Bolton and Whinston, The “Foreclosure” Effects of Vertical Mergers)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 227-231.
  • Scott, Kenneth E. (1991), ‘Comment (on Neuberger and Neumann, Banking and Antitrust: Limiting Industrial Ownership by Banks?)’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 202-206.
  • See, Harold F. and Gunther, William D. (1984), ‘Limit Pricing and Predation in the Antitrust Laws: Economic and Legal Aspects’, 35 Alabama Law Review , 211-239.
  • Shapiro, Carl (1989), ‘Comment (on Carlton and Gertner)’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 227-232.
  • Sharpe, Tom (1987), ‘Predation’, 8 European Competition Law Review , 53-76.
  • Shenefield, John J. (1983), ‘Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints: A Response to Professor Areeda’, 52 Antitrust Law Journal , 587-600.
  • Shenfield, Arthur (1983), Myth and Reality in Antitrust , London.
  • Shepard, Lawrence (1986), ‘Cartelization of the California- Arizona Orange Industry, 1934-1981’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 83-123.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1984), ‘Contestability vs. Competition’, 74 American Economic Review , 572-587.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1985), Public Policies Toward Business , Homewood (IL), Richard D. Irwin, 541 p.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1985), The Economics of Industrial Organization , Homewood (IL), Richard D. Irwin, 566 p.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1986), ‘The Twilight of Antitrust’, 18(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 21-27.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1987), ’14 Recent Antitrust Cases and Mainstream Industrial-Organization Economic Criteria’, 19(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 35-43.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1988), ’14 Recent Antitrust Cases and Mainstream Industrial-Organization Economic Criteria (Part 2)’, 20(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 61-70.
  • Shepherd, William G. (1988), ‘Three “Efficiency School” Hypotheses about Market Power’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 395-415.
  • Shughart, William F., II (1987), ‘Don’t Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!’, 6 Cato Journal , 925-932.
  • Shughart, William F., II and Tollison, Robert D. (1985), ‘The Positive Economics of Anti-Trust Policy: A Survey Article’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics , 39-57.
  • Shughart, William F., II and Tollison, Robert D. (1991), ‘The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 38-52.
  • Siegfried, John J. (1975), ‘The Determinants of Antitrust Activity’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 559-574.
  • Skogh, Gšran (1976), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Some Comments’, 84 Journal of Political Economy , 1319-1323.
  • Skogh, Gšran (1991), ‘Comment (on Van den Bergh, Competition Law and European Integration)’, in Weigel, Wolfgang (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law – A Collection of Applications , Vienna, …sterreichischer Wirtschaftsverlag, 118-121.
  • Skogh, Gšran and Stuart, Charles (1990), ‘The Cost of Rivalry and Horizontal Mergers’, in Carlsson, H. and Larsson, B. (eds.), Problems of the Mixed Economy. Cooperation, Efficiency, and Stability , Amsterdam, North Holland.
  • Smith, Paul A. (1989), ‘The Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing: The Problem with Predatory Pricing’, 14 European Law Review , 209-222.
  • Smith, Richard L., II (1982), ‘Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 125-157.
  • Snijders, W.L. (1975), ‘Misbruikstoezicht en verbodsbeginsel in het kartelrecht (I) (Supervising Abuse and the Principle of Banning Orders in Anti-trust Law I)’, 40 Maandschrift Economie , 133-154.
  • Snijders, W.L. (1982), ‘Het optreden tegen economische machtsposities op grond van de Wet economische mededinging (The Action against Economic Position of Powers on the Basis of the Economic Competition Act)’, in X (ed.), In Orde: Liber Amicorum Pieter Verloren van Themaat , Deventer, Kluwer, 267-293.
  • Snyder, Edward A. (1985), ‘Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 469-482.
  • Snyder, Edward A. (1990), ‘The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antritrust Enforcement’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 439-462.
  • Soames, Trevor (1990), ‘The Community Dimension in the EEC Merger Regulation: The Calculation of the Turnover Criteria’, 11 European Competition Law Review , 213-225.
  • Spence, A. Michael (1983), ‘Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article’, 21 Journal of Economic Literature , 981-990.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael Whinston (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, an Renegotiation’, 26 (2) Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Whinston, Michael D. (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation’, 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Spiller, Pablo T. (1985), ‘On Vertical Mergers’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 285-312.
  • Spitzer, Matthew L. (1988), ‘Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory’, 61 Southern California Law Review , 1293-1326.
  • Spivack, Gordon B. (1983), ‘The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response’, 52 Antitrust Law Journal , 651-674.
  • Spulber, Daniel F. (1989), Regulation and Markets , Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
  • Steele, Henry (1962), ‘Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs Market’, 5 Journal of Law and Economics , 131-163.
  • Steiner, Peter O. (1977), ‘Review “Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective”‘, 44 University of Chicago Law Review , 873-894.
  • Stelzer, Irving M. (1983), ‘Economic Defences in Antitrust Litigation’, 4 European Competition Law Review , 253-267.
  • Steuer, R.M. (1990), ‘The Turning Points in Distribution Law’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 467-536.
  • Stigler, George J. (1957), ‘Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated’, 65 Journal of Political Economy , 1-17.
  • Stigler, George J. (1965), ‘The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella’, 8 Journal of Law and Economics , 167-171.
  • Stigler, George J. (1966), ‘The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws’, 9 Journal of Law and Economics , 225-258.
  • Stigler, George J. (1968), The Organization of Industry , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Stigler, George J. (1982), ‘The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly’, 72 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 1-11.
  • Stigler, George J. (1985), ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-12.
  • Stigler, George J. and Friedland, Claire (1983), ‘The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 237-268.
  • Stigler, George J. and Sherwin, Robert A. (1985), ‘The Extent of the Market’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 555-585.
  • Stockmann, Kurt (1997), ‘Das Wettbewerbselement in der Spruchparixis des vergabeŸberwachungsausschusses des Bundes (Competition as a Decision Factor of a Federal Licensing Commission)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 379 ff.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Economic Foundations of Regulation and Antitrust Law , West Publishing.
  • Streit, Manfred E. (1994), ‘EuropŠische Industriepolitik nach Maastricht – Eine ordnungspolitische Analyse (European Industrial Policy after Maastricht)’, in Mšschel, W., Streit, M., Witt, U. (ed.), Marktwirtschaft und Rechtsordnung, Festschrift fŸr Erich Hoppmann , Baden-Baden, 189-211.
  • Stuyck, Jules (1978), ‘Six Years of Experience with some Aspects of the Belgian Trade Practices Act 1971 as an Instrument of Consumer Protection’, in Skogh, Gšran (ed.), Law and Economics. Report from a Symposium in Lund , Lund, Juridiska Fšreningen, 133-151.
  • Sullivan, Daniel (1989), ‘Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 135-178.
  • Sullivan, E. Thomas (1982), ‘The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years’, 58 Notre Dame Law Review , 1-59.
  • Sullivan, E. Thomas (1984), ‘On Nonprice Competition: An Economic and Marketing Analysis’, 45 University of Pittsburgh Law Review , 771 ff.
  • Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1977), ‘Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust’, 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1214-1243.
  • Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1980), ‘Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships’, 68 California Law Review , 1-12.
  • Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1983), ‘U.S. Policy in a Mixed World Economy’, 15 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics , 309-321.
  • Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1983), ‘The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword’, 71 California Law Review , 632-648.
  • Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1987), ‘The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints’, 72 California Law Review , 835-891.
  • Swan, Peter L. (1971), ‘The Durability of Goods and Regulation of Monopoly’, 2 Bell Journal of Economics , 347-357.
  • Swann, Dennis (1983), Competition and Industrial Policy in the European , London.
  • Symposium (1989), ‘Empirical Approaches To Market Power’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 1-275.
  • Symposium (1991), ‘Symposium on New Views on Antitrust’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 1-239.
  • Taffett, Richard S. (1983), ‘Appendix A: Summary of Facts for the Demonstration of Economic Analysis and Expert Testimony’, 52 Antitrust Law Journal , 819-821.
  • Telser, Lester G. (1960), ‘Why should Manufacturers want Fair Trade?’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics , 86-105.
  • Telser, Lester G. (1966), ‘Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse’, 9 Journal of Law and Economics , 259-277.
  • Telser, Lester G. (1985), ‘Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 271-295.
  • Telser, Lester G. (1990), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade II?’, 33 Journal of Law and Economics , 409-417.
  • Telser, Lester G., Best, William, Egan, John W. and Higinbotham, Harlow N. (1975), ‘The Theory of Supply with Applications to the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 449-478.
  • Thompson, D.R. (1984), ‘Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards Through Multiplieres in Antitrust Class Actions’, 21 Houston Law Review , 801-853.
  • Toffoletto, Alberto (1996), Il risarcimento del danno nel sistema delle sanzioni per la violazione della normativa antitrust (The compensation for damages in the liability system for the infringment of antitrust law) , Milano, Giuffr.
  • Toffoletto, Alberto (1996), Il risarcimento del danno nel sistema delle sanzioni per la violazione della normativa antitrust (The compensation for damages in the liability system for the infringment of antitrust law) , Milano, Giuffr.
  • Tollison, Robert D. (1982), ”Efficiency’, ‘Cost Benefit’ an Other Key Words – the Practical Uses of Economics at the FTC’, 51 Antitrust Law Journal , 581-588.
  • Tollison, Robert D. (1987), ‘Public Choice and Antitrust’, in Dorn, James A. and Manne, Henry G. (eds.), Economic Liberties and the Judiciary , Fairfax, George Mason University Press, 289-300.
  • Tollison, Robert D. (1989), ‘Comment (on Holt)’, 32(S) Journal of Law and Economics , 131-133.
  • Turner, Donald F. (1987), ‘The Durability, Relevance and Future of American Antitrust Policy’, 75 California Law Review , 797-815.
  • Turner, Donald F. (1990), ‘The Virtues and Problems of Antitrust Law’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 297-310.
  • Tye, William B. (1986), ‘Post-Merger Denials of Competitive Access and Trackage Rights in the Rail Industry’, 53 Transportation Practitioners Journal , 413-427.
  • Uitermark, P.J. (1986), ‘Het Nederlandse mededingingspolitieke regime: Over de verhouding tussen verbod, misbruik, misstand en casu•stisch beleid (Dutch Competition Policy: On the Interrelationship between Banning, Abuse, Wrongs and Case-to- Case Policy)’, 29 TVVS Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht en Rechtspersonen , 108-115.
  • Uitermark, P.J. (1987), ‘Over economische mededinging (On Economic Competition)’, 35 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 339-372.
  • Uitermark, P.J. (1988), ‘Over informeel mededingingsbeleid (On Informal Competition Policy)’, 2 Recht der Werkelijkheid , 30-53.
  • Uitermark, P.J. (1990), Economische Mededinging en Algemeen Belang: Een onderzoek naar de economisch-theoretische fundering van de mededingingspolitiek (Economic Competition and Public Interest: An Investigation into the Economic-theoretical Foundations of Competition Policy],) , Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 475 p.
  • Uri, Noel D. and Coate, Malcolm B. (1987), ‘The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: The Search for Empirical Support’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 113-120.
  • Van den Bergh, Roger (1980), ‘Over de mededingingsbeperkende werking van de Wet Handelspraktijken of het verhaal van concurrenten die tegen de concurrentie beschermd willen worden (On the Competition Limiting Effect of the Law on Trade Practices or the Stoy of Competitors Who Want to Be Protected Against Competition)’, 34 Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift , 421-446.
  • Van den Bergh, Roger (1991), ‘Competition Law and European Integration: Will Free Riders Become the Heroes of the Internal Market?’, in Weigel, Wolfgang (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law – A Collection of Applications , Vienna, …sterreichischer Wirtschaftsverlag, 107-117.
  • VŠth, Andreas (1987), Die Wettbewerbskonzeption des EuropŠischen Ger (The Competition Concept of the European Court) , Bayreuth, P.C.O.-Verlag, 298 p.
  • Venit, J.E. (1990), ‘The “Merger” Control Regulation: Europe Comes of Age … or Caliban’s Dinner?’, 27 Common Market Law Review , 7-50.
  • Verloren Van Themaat, Pieter (1978), ‘Het wetsontwerp-Lubbers tot wijziging van de Wet economische mededinging (The Lubbers Bill on a Change of the Economic Competition Act)’, 26 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 178-192.
  • Verloren Van Themaat, Pieter (1988), ‘Nieuw leven in de Wet economische mededinging of terug naar Abtsweg? (New Life in the Economic Competition Act or Back to Abtsweg?)’, 36 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 4-15.
  • Vollmer, Lothar (1997), ‘Die SondermŠrkte im Spannungsfeld von nationalen und europŠischen Regulierungs- und DeregulierungsaktivitŠten (Tensions between national and European Regulation and Deregulation)’, in Kruse, Jšrn, Stockmann, Kurt, Vollmer, Lothar (eds.), Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und internationaler Kartellrechtsordnungen. Festschrift fŸr Ingo Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 289 ff.
  • Von WeizsŠcker, Carl-Christian (1991), ‘Antitrust and the Division of Labor’, 147 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 99-113.
  • Vuaridel, Roger (1986), ‘L’objet et le niveau de la concurrence dans la thŽorie Žconomique et dans la jurisprudence (The Object and Level of Competition in Economic Theory and in Jurisprudence)’, 20 Wirtschaft und Recht , 111-128.
  • Wachter, Susan M. (1987), ‘Residential Real Estate Brokage: Rate Uniformity and Moral Hazard’, 10 Research in Law and Economics , 189-210.
  • Waldman, Don E. (1986), The Economics of Antitrust: Cases and Analysis , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Walters, Stephen J. K. (1986), ‘Reciprocity Reexamined: The Consolidated Foods Case’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 423-438.
  • Wang, William K.S. (1975), ‘The Unbundling of Higher Education’, 1975 Duke Law Journal , 53-90.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1981), ‘Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule’, 42 University of Pittsburgh Law Review , 515 ff.
  • Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. (1990), ‘Implications of U.S. Experience with Horizontal Mergers and Takeovers for Canadian Competition Policy’, in Mathewson, Frank, Trebilcock, Michael and Walke (eds.), The Law and Economics of Competition Policy , Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 337-368.
  • Weijden, Carel J. Van Der (1962), Toegang en toetreding: facetten van de mededinging (Entry and Entrance: Aspects of Competition) , Den Haag.
  • Weijden, Carel J. Van Der (1981), ‘Toestaan of verbieden? Een beschouwing rond de Wet economische mededinging (Allowing or Banning? Considerations about the Economic Competition Act)’, 66 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1281-1284.
  • Weijden, Carel J. Van Der (1987), ‘Werkzame mededinging (Workable Competition)’, 72 Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 1194-1199.
  • Weiss, Leonard W. (1979), ‘The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust’, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1104-1140.
  • Weiss, Leonard W. (1983), ‘The Extent and Effects of Aggregate Concentration’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 429-455.
  • Weissel, Erwin (1990), ‘Zur Problematik der Kartellrechtlichen Behandlung von Vertriebsbindungen bei Markenartikeln (The Problem of Vertical Restraints of Brands in Cartel-Law)’, 6 …sterreichische BlŠtter fŸr Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht .
  • Wenders, John T. (1971), ‘Deconcentration Reconsidered’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 485-488.
  • Werden, Gregory J. (1985), ‘A Closer Analysis of Antitrust Markets’, 62 Washington University Law Quarterly , 647-669.
  • Werden, Gregory J. and Schwartz, Marius (1984), ‘Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations – An Economic Analysis’, 35 Hastings Law Journal , 629-668.
  • Wertheimer, H.W. (1983), ‘De Europese Concentratiecontrole in De Revisie (European Concentration Control in Revision)’, 31 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 66-84.
  • White, David L. (1989), ‘Shaping Antitrust Enforcement: Greater Emphasis on Barriers to Entry’, Brigham Young University Law Review , 823-851.
  • Wiley, John S. (1986), ‘After Chicago: An Exaggerated Demise?,’, Duke Law Journal , 1003-1029.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1986), ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism’, 99 Harvard Law Review , 713-789.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1987), ‘Antitrust and Core Theory’, 54 University of Chicago Law Review , 556-589.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1988), ‘Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma’, 86 Michigan Law Review , 1906-1928.
  • Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1988), ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer’, 61 Southern California Law Review , 1327-1341.
  • Willeke, Frans-Ullrich (1980), Wettbewerbspolitik (Competition Policy) , TŸbingen, Mohr.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1977), ‘The ABG Decision: Competition or Fair Shares?’, 2 European Law Review , 294-301.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1982), ‘The Problem of Proving ‘Arrangement or Understanding’ under Section 45 A of the Trade Practices Act’, in Cranston, Ross and Schick, Anne (eds.), Law and Economics , Canberra, Australian National University, 112-121.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1982), ‘Welfare and Collusion: Comment’, 72 American Economic Review , 272-275.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1990), ‘Why Regulate for Competition?’, in James, Michael (ed.), Regulating for Competition? , Sydney, Centre for Independent Studies. Reprinted in John Duns and Mark Davison, Trade Practices and Consumer Protection: Cases and Materials, Sydney, Butterworths, 1994.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1994), ‘The Exercise of Market Power: Its Treatment under the Australian and New Zealand Statutes’, 9 Review of Industrial Organization , 607-626.
  • Williams, Philip L. (1994), ‘The Trade Practices Act and the Conditions of Entry’, 108 Australian Economic Review , 108-111.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Hanks, Frances (1987), ‘The Treatment of Vertical Restraints Under the Australian Trade Practices Act’, 15 Australian Business Law Review , 147-168. Reprinted in John Duns and Mark Davison, Trade Practices and Consumer Protection: Cases and Materials, Sydney, Butterworths, 1994.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Hanks, Frances (1990), ‘Queensland Wire Industries v. BHP, Judgment of the High Court of Australia’, 27 Common Market Law Review , 151-161.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Hanks, Frances (1990), ‘Implications of the decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire’, 17 Melbourne University Law Review , 437-461.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Norman, Neville R. (1983), ‘The Analysis of Market and Competition under the Trade Practices Act: Towards the Resolution of Some Hitherto Unresolved Issues’, 11 Australian Business Law Review , 396-420.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Officer, Robert (1995), ‘The Public Benefit Test in an Authorisation Decision’, in Richardson, Megan and Williams, Philip (eds.), The Law and the Market: Essays in Honour of Maureen Brunt , Melbourne, The Federation Press.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Richardson, Megan (1995), The Law and the Market: Essays in Honour of Maureen Brunt , Melbourne, The Federation Press.
  • Williams, Philip L. and Williams, Ross A. (1992), ‘Competition and the Cost of Justice’, 8 Policy , 22-24.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization , New York, Free Press, 286 p.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1983), ‘Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms’, 71 California Law Review , 604-617.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), ‘Assessing Contract’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 177-208.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1987), ‘Delimiting Antitrust’, 76 Georgetown Law Journal , 271-303.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1989), Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting and Strategic Behavior , Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 363 p.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (ed.) (1990), Industrial Organization , Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 500 p.
  • Wills, Robert L. (1987), ‘Economists and Competition Policy: A Case Study’, in Wills, Robert L. and Caswell, Julie A. and Cul (eds.), Issues after a Century of Federal Competition Policy , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 3-8.
  • Wills, Robert L., Caswell, Julie A. and Culbertson, John D. (eds.) (1987), Issues after a Century of Federal Competition Policy , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 387 p.
  • Wils, Wouter P.J. (1996), ‘EC Competition Fines: To Deter or Not to Deter’, in Barav, E. and Wyatt, D.A. (eds.), Yearbook of European Law 1995 , Oxford, Clarendon, 17-46.
  • Wils, Wouter P.J. (1997), ‘The Commission Notice on the Non- Imposition of Fines in Cartel Cases: A Legal and Economic Analysis’, 22 European Law Review , 125-140.
  • Winn, Daryl N. and Leabo, Dick A. (1974), ‘Rates of Return, Concentration and Growth – Question of Disequilibrium’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 97-115.
  • Wollenberg, Keith K. (1987), ‘Note: An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory’, 39 Stanford Law Review , 737-760.
  • Woods, R. Kyle (1988), ‘Comment: Functional Discounts and Integrated Distribution under the Robinson-Patman Act’, 37 Emory Law Journal , 799 ff.
  • Woude, M.H. Van Der (1989), ‘Kartelrechtelijke beschikkingen EG-Commissie 1985-1987 (Commission Anti-trust Orders 1985- 1987)’, 37 Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht , 2-27.
  • X (1982), ‘No Anti-Antitrust ‘Bias’ at the Law and Economics Center: Federal Judges Can’t Be ‘Brainwashed’, 14 Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 15-70.
  • X (1983), ‘Foreword: Chicago Economics, the FTC, and the Education of the Federal Judiciary’, 15 Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 1-8.
  • X (1983), ‘Note: An Economic Analysis of the 1982 Justice Department Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers’, 67 Minnesota Law Review , 749-792.
  • X (1985), ‘Antitrust and Small Business: Killing the Big-Is- Better Myth’, 17(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 97-110.
  • X (1985), ‘Mergers, Tacit Collusion, and Import Protection: The Case for Hard Competition’, 17(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 99-110.
  • X (1985), ‘Monopoly, Unemployment, and the Welfare Burden: The Deindustrialization of America’, 17(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 95-110.
  • X (1985), ‘Antitrust and Capitol Hill: Industrial Policy, Foreign Competition, and the ‘Siege’ Syndrome’, 17(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 73-96.
  • X (1985), ‘Antitrust, Large Corporations and the Innovation- Entrepreneurship Problem: A ”Satellite” Approach’, 17(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 67-97.
  • X (1985), ‘Mergers, Tacit Collusion, and Import Protection: The Case for Hard Competition (II)’, 17(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 57-77.
  • X (1985), ‘Antitrust and International Competition: Courting the ‘Cartel Malignancy’ (II)’, 17(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 41-54.
  • X (1985), ‘Antitrust and Small Business: Killing the Business- Is-Better Myth (II)’, 17(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 39-66.
  • X (1986), ‘Adverse Effects of Free-Riding and Intrabrand Competition: Ohio-Sealy v. Sealy, Inc.’, 18(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 51-74.
  • X (1986), ‘Economists and Antitrust Policymaking: The ‘Communications’ Gap (II)’, 18(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 67-82.
  • X (1986), ‘Antitrust and Industrial Organization: The Loss of Idealism and Leadership (Part 1)’, 18(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 75-94.
  • X (1986), ‘Monopoly, Unemployment, and the Welfare Burden: The Deindustrialization of America (II)’, 18(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 81-100.
  • X (1986), ‘Antitrust, Economic Consulting, and the Public Interest: Deposition of the Economic Expert in the Settlement Process (Part 1)’, 18(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 83-92.
  • X (1986), ‘Antitrust and International ‘Competitiveness’: The European Experience (Part 1)’, 18(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 93-110.
  • X (1986), ‘Economists and Antitrust Policymaking: The ‘Communications’ Gap (Part 1)’, 18(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 95-110.
  • X (1986), ‘Antitrust and Industrial Organization: The Loss of Idealism and Leadership (II)’, 18(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 43-66.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust and International ‘Competitiveness’: The European Experience (III)’, 19(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 79-97.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust and Industrial Organization: The Loss of Idealism and Leadership (III)’, 19(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 25-44.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust and International ‘Competitiveness’: The European Experience (IV)’, 19(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 49-64.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust, Economic Consulting, and the Public Interest: Deposition of the Economic Expert in the Settlement Process (III)’, 19(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 59-78.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust and International ‘Competitiveness’: The European Experience (II)’, 19(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 85-110.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust, Economics, and the ‘Social’ Issues: Fairness Is Good Economics (II)’, 19(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 95-110.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust, Economics, and the ‘Social’ Issues: Fairness Is Good Economics’, 19(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 97-110.
  • X (1987), ‘Antitrust, Economic Consulting, and the Public Interest: Deposition of the Economic Expert in the Settlement Process (II)’, 19(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 65-84.
  • X (1988), ‘Antitrust Economics and the Courts: The “When” and “How” of Judicial Miseducation (II)’, 20(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 95-110.
  • X (1988), ‘Antitrust, Economics, and the ‘Social’ Issues: Fairness Is Good Economics (Part 3)’, 20(1) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 103-110.
  • X (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints and Market Power: Killing Price Competition in Court (III)’, 20(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 79-94.
  • X (1988), ‘Antitrust Economics in the Courts: Theory Versus Empiricism (II)’, 20(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 53-94.
  • X (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints and Market Power: Killing Price Competition in Court (II)’, 20(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 39-52.
  • X (1988), ‘Bad Antitrust Economics in the US Supreme Court: Business Electronics v. Sharp’, 20(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 35-56.
  • X (1988), ‘Foreword: Brennan, Marshall, and Sealy’s 30% Higher Price Without Intrabrand Competition’, 20(4) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 1-16.
  • X (1988), ‘Judges Versus Juries in Antitrust: Rush to Summary Judgment’, 20(2) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 1-34.
  • X (1989), ‘Entry, Recoupment, and Higher Prices: Irrelevance of High Market Shares in Predatory Pricing’, 21(3) Antitrust Law and Economics Review , 89-110.
  • Yamey, Basil S. (1972), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 129-142.
  • Yamey, Basil S. (1974), ‘Monopolistic Price Discrimination and Economic Welfare’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 377-480.
  • Yamey, Basil S. (1986), ‘The Unfinished Agenda: Essays on the Political Economy of Government Policy in honour of Arthur Seldon’, in Anderson, Martin J. (ed.), The New Anti-Trust Economics , London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 65-79.
  • Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (1969), ‘The American Sugar Refinery Company, 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 339-375.
  • Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (1970), ‘Monopoly, the Emergence of Oligopoly and the Case of Sugar Refining’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 501-515.
  • Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (1982), ‘An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules’, 61 Texas Law Review , 655-715.
  • Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (1983), ‘The Chicago Board of Trade Case, 1918’, 5 Research in Law and Economics , 17-55.
  • Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. (ed.) (1984), ‘Symposium: Antitrust and Regulation’, 6 Research in Law and Economics , 292 ff.
  • Zijlstra, Jelle and Goudzwaard, Bob (1966), Economische politiek en concurrentieproblematiek in de EEG en de lidstaten (Economic Policy and Competition Problems in the EC and the Member States) , Serie Concurrentie, Brussel.
  • Zimmerman, Edwin M. (1990), ‘Section 7 and the Evolving Role of Economics’, 35 Antitrust Bulletin , 447-465.
Copied to clipboard