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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5140 Product Liability

  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1987), ‘Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis’, 48 Ohio State Law Journal , 399-411.
  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1988), ‘The Causes of the Insurance Crisis’, in Olson, Walter (ed.), New Directions in Liability Law , New York, The Academy of Political Science, 54-66.
  • Abraham, Kenneth S. (1990), ‘Products Liability Law and Insurance Profitability’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 837-844.
  • Adams, Michael (1987), ‘Produkthaftung – Wohltat oder Plage – Eine škomische Analyse (Product Liability – Benefit or Plague – An Economic Analysis)’, 3124 Der Betriebs-Berater .
  • Adams, Michael (1987), ‘…konomische Analyse der Produkthaftung (Economic Analysis of Product Liability)’, 87 Der Betriebs-Berater .
  • Adams, Michael (1989), ‘…konomische BegrŸndung des AGB-Gesetzes – VertrŠge bei asymetrischer Information (The Economic Basis of the German Unfair Contract T)’, Der Betriebs-Berater , 781-788.
  • Adams, Michael (1995), ‘The Conflict of Jurisdictors – An Economic Analysis of Pretrial Discovery, Fact Gathering and Cost Allocation Rules in the United States and Germany’, 3(1) European Review of Private Law , 53-94.
  • Akerlof, George A. (1970), ‘The Markets for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 488-500.
  • Allen, Franklin (1984), ‘Reputation and Product Quality’, 15 Rand Journal of Economics , 311-327.
  • American Law Institute (1991), Reporters’ Study, ‘Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury: Volume I, The Institutional Framework , Philadelphia, American Law Institute,.
  • American Law Institute (1991), Reporters’ Study, Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury: Volume II, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change , Philadelphia, The American Law Institute.
  • American Law Institute (1995), Restatement of the Law, Torts: Products Liability (Tentative Draft No. 2) , Philadelphia, The American Law Institute.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1992), ‘Book Review: W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability’, 30 Journal of Economic Literature , 2170-2172.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1993), ‘Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence’, 52 Maryland Law Review , 1093-1136.
  • Armstrong, Dwight L. (1976), ‘Products Liability, Comparative Negligence and the Allocation of Damages among Multiple Defendants’, 50 Southern California Law Review , 73-108.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971), Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing , Chicago, Markham.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1982), ‘Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics’, 20 Economic Inquiry , 1-9.
  • Ashford, Nicholas A. and Stone, Robert F. (1991), ‘Liability, Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry’, in Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (eds.), The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation , Washington, Brookings Institution, 367-427.
  • Attanasio, John B. (1988), ‘The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products Liability’, 74 Virginia Law Review , 677-750.
  • Bagwell, Kyle and Riordan, Michael H. (1991), ‘High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality’, 81 American Economic Review , 224-239.
  • Barker, Drucilla K. (1991), ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Product Liability Laws on Underwriting Risk’, 51 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 63 ff.
  • Beales, J. Howard, III, Craswell, Richard and Salop, Steven C. (1981), ‘Information Remedies for Consumer Protection’, 71 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 410-413.
  • Beales, J. Howard, III, Craswell, Richard and Salop, Steven C. (1981), ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 481-539.
  • Beales, J. Howard, III, Craswell, Richard and Salop, Steven C. (1981), ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 491-539.
  • Becker, Gary S. and Ehrlich, Isaac (1972), ‘Market Insurance, Self-insurance, and Self-protection’, 80 Journal of Political Economy , 623-648.
  • Bell, John W. (1977), ‘Averting a Crisis in Product Liability : An Evolutionary Process of Socioeconomic Justice’, 65 Illinois Bar Journal , 640-648.
  • Bell, Peter A. (1990), ‘Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract’, 74 Minnesota Law Review , 1177-1249.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Toxic Torts by Government , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Uncertainty, the Race for Property Rights, and Rent Dissipation due to Judicial Changes in Product Liability Tort Law’, Cultural Dynamics .
  • Blight, Catherine (1989), ‘”What if that Snail had been in a Bottle of Milk?” or Product Liability in the UK – the Special Case of Agricultural Products’, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses , Antwerpen, Maklu, 215-232.
  • Bonney, Paul R. (1985), ‘Manufacturers’ Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis’, 73 Georgetown Law Journal , 1437-1463.
  • Boyd, James and Ingberman, Daniel E. (1994), Extending Liability: Should the Sins of the Producer Be Visited Upon Others? , Business, Law, and Economics Center Working Paper BLE.
  • Boyd, James and Ingberman, Daniel E. (1994), ‘Noncompensatory Damages and Potential Insolvency’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 895-910.
  • Boyd, James and Ingberman, Daniel E. (1997), ‘The Search for Deep Pockets: Is “Extended Liability” Expensive Liability?’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 232-258.
  • Boyd, James and Ingberman, Daniel E. (1997), ‘Should “Relative Safety” Be a Test of Product Liability?’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies , 433-473.
  • Brown, John Prather (1974), ‘Product Liability: The Case of an Asset with Random Life’, 64 American Economic Review , 149-161.
  • BrŸggemeier, Gert (1989), ‘Die GefŠhrdungshaftung der Produzenten nach der EG-Richtlinie – ein Fortschritt der Rechtsentwicklung? (Strict Liability of Producers according to the EC-)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Allekationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung , Berlin, Springer, 228-247.
  • Bryant, W. Keith and Gerner, Jennifer L. (1978), ‘The Price of a Warranty: The Case for Refrigerators’, 12 Journal of Consumer Affairs , 30-47.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1970), ‘In Defense of Caveat Emptor’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 64-73.
  • Burrows, Paul (1992), ‘Consumer Safety under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 457-478.
  • Burrows, Paul (1994), ‘Products Liability and the Control of Product Risk in the European Community’, 10 Oxford Review of Economic Policy , 68-83.
  • Butters, Gerard R. (1986), ‘The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers: Comments’, in Ippolito, Pauline M. and Scheffman, David T. (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Econom , Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 411-413.
  • Calabresi, Guido (1984), ‘First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?’, 69 Iowa Law Review , 833 ff.
  • Calabresi, Guido and Bass, Kenneth C. II (1970), ‘Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of McKean on Products Liability’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 74-91.
  • Calabresi, Guido and Hirschoff, Jon T. (1972), ‘Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort’, 81 Yale Law Journal , 1054-1085. Reprinted in Rabin, Robert L. (ed.), Perspectives on Tort Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1983, 192-212.
  • Calfee, John E. and Rubin, Paul H. (1992), ‘Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 371-411.
  • Calfee, John E. and Winston, Clifford (1988), ‘Economic Aspects of Liability Rules and Liability Insurance’, in Litan, Robert E. and Winston, Clifford (eds.), Liability: Perspectives and Policy , Washington, Brookings Institution, 16-41.
  • Calfee, John E. and Winston, Clifford (1993), ‘The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis’, 1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics , 133-196.
  • Camerer, Colin F. and Kunreuther, Howard (1993), ‘Making Decisions About Liability and Insurance: Editors’ Comments’, 7 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 5-15.
  • Cass, Ronald A. and Gillette, Clayton P. (1991), ‘The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk’, 77 Virginia Law Review , 257-336.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1992), ‘The New ‘Tractor Lemon Laws’: An Attempt to Squeeze Manufacturers Draws Sour Benefits’, 14(2) Journal of Products Liability , 121-137.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1993), ‘Separating Lemons: Automobiles and Tractors under the ‘Motor Vehicle Warranty Rights Act’ and the ‘Farm Tractor Warranty Act’, 30(1) Georgia State Bar Journal , 36-43.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1995), ‘Lemon Laws: Sour Options for Consumers of Farm Tractors’, 18(3) Hamline Law Review , 347-362.
  • Centner, Terence J. and Wetzstein, Michael E. (1995), ‘Obligations and Penalties under Lemon Laws: Automobiles Versus Tractors’, 20(1) Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics , 135-145.
  • Chan, Yuk-Shee and Leland, Hayne E. (1982), ‘Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information’, 49 Review of Economic Studies , 499-516.
  • Chapman, Kenneth and Meurer, Michael J. (1989), ‘Efficient Remedies for Breach of Warranty’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 107-131.
  • Choharis, Peter Charles (1995), ‘A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform’, 12 Yale Journal on Regulation , 435-525.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1992), Risks and Wrongs , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Cook, Philip J. and Graham, Daniel A. (1977), ‘The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities’, 91 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 143-156.
  • Cooper, Russell and Ross, Thomas W. (1984), ‘Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: the Competitive Case’, 51 Review of Economic Studies , 197-208.
  • Cooper, Russell and Ross, Thomas W. (1985), ‘Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard’, 16 Rand Journal of Economics , 103-113.
  • Cooper, Russell and Ross, Thomas W. (1985), ‘Monopoly Provision of Product Quality with Uninformed Buyers’, 3 International Journal of Industrial Organization , 433-449.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1985), ‘Defective Warnings, Remote Causes, and Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 737-750.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1989), ‘Towards A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims’, 75 University of Virginia Law Review , 383-411.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1991), ‘Economic Theories of Legal Liability (Italian translation:”Le teorie economiche della risponsibilitˆ efficenza produttiva: alcuni contributi su noti argomenti” 379-409)’, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 11-30. Reprinted in Medema, Steven G. (Ed.), The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing, Glocestershire, forthcoming. Italian translation: “Le Teorie Economiche Della Risponsabilit Legale”), published in Gianandrea Goisis.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Sugarman, Stephen D. (1988), ‘A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract’, in Olson, Walter (ed.), New Directions in Liability Law , New York, The Academy of Political Science, 174-185.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Ulen, Thomas S. (1988), Law and Economics , Glenview (IL), Scott Foresman.
  • Cosentino, Fabrizio (1989), ‘Responsabilitˆ da prodotto difettoso: appunti di analisi economica del diritto (nota a U.S. Supreme Court California, 31 marzo 1988, Brown c. Abbott Laboratories) (Liability for Defective Products: An Economic Analysis of Law)’, 4 Foro Italiano , 137-143.
  • Courville, LŽon and Hausman, Warren H. (1979), ‘Warranty Scope and Reliability under Imperfect Information and Alternative Market Structures’, 52 Journal of Business , 361-378.
  • Cousy, Herman (1976), ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid. Proeve van een juridisch-economische analyse (Product Liability. Attempt of a Legal-Economic Ana)’, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht , 995-1035.
  • Craig, Andrew (1991), ‘Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation’, in Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (eds.), The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation , Washington, Brookings Institution, 456-477.
  • Craswell, Richard (1991), ‘Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships’, 43 Stanford Law Review , 361-398.
  • Craswell, Richard (1996), ‘Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships’, 25 Journal of Legal Studies , 463-492.
  • Croley, Steven P. and Hanson, Jon D. (1991), ‘What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability’, 8 Yale Journal on Regulation , 1-111.
  • Croley, Steven P. and Hanson, Jon D. (1993), ‘Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability’, 91 Michigan Law Review , 683-797.
  • Croley, Steven P. and Hanson, Jon D. (1995), ‘The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law’, 108 Harvard Law Review , 1785-1917.
  • Curran, Christopher (1992), ‘The Spread of Comparative Negligence in the United States’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 317-332.
  • Daniels, Stephen and Martin, Joanne (1990), ‘Myth and reality in Punitive Damages’, 75 Minnesota Law Review , 1-64.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1984), ‘Tort Reform and the Role of Governement in Private Insurance Markets’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 517-549.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1985), ‘Comments on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 569-583.
  • Danzon, Patricia M. (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Workers’ Compensation: Lessons for Product Liability’, 78 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 305-310.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), ‘Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling’, 85 American Economic Review , 1187-1206.
  • De Alessi, Louis (1994), ‘Reputation and the Efficiency of Legal Rules’, 14 Cato Journal , 11-21.
  • De Alessi, Louis and Staaf, Robert J. (1987), ‘Liability, Control and the Organization of Economic Activity’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 5-20.
  • Dewees, Donald N. (1983), ‘The Quality of Consumer Durables’, in Dewees, Donald N. (ed.), The Regulation of Quality; Products, Services, Workplaces, the Environment , Toronto, Butterworths.
  • Dewees, Donald N., Duff, David and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1996), Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 452 p.
  • Dorfman, Robert (1970), ‘The Economics of Product Liability: A Reaction to McKean’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 92-102.
  • Dungworth, Terence (1988), Product Liability and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal Courts , Santa Monica, Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation.
  • Eads, George C. and Reuter, Peter (1983), Designing Safer Products: Corporate Reponses to Product Liability Law and Regulation ,.
  • Egon Zehnder International (1987), ‘The Litigious Society: Is It Hampering Creativity, Innovation, and Our Ability to Compete?’, 2(3) Corporate Issues Monitor , 1 ff.
  • Eisman, Deborah E. (1983), ‘Product Liability: Who Should Bear the Burden?’, 27 American Economist , 54-57.
  • Emons, Winand (1988), ‘Warranties, Moral Hazard, and the Lemons Problem’, 46 Journal of Economic Theory , 16-33.
  • Emons, Winand (1990), ‘Some Recent Developments in the Economic Analysis of Liability Law: An Introduction’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 237-248.
  • Epple, Dennis and Raviv, Artur (1978), ‘Product Safety: Liability Rules, Market Structure, and Imperfect Information’, 68 American Economic Review , 80-95.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1980), Modern Product Liability Law , Westport, Quorum Books, 211 p.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1984), ‘The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 475-506.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1985), ‘Products Liability as an Insurance Market’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 645-669.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1986), ‘The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law’, 53 University of Chicago Law Review , 1175-1218.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1987), ‘The Risks of Risk/Utility’, 48 Ohio State Law Journal , 469-477.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform’, 78 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 311-315.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1989), ‘The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law’, 10 Cardozo Law Review , 2193-2222.
  • Faure, Michael G. (1986), ‘Commentaar bij de paper van Dr.Jan C. Bongaerts: Coase en Produktenaansprakelijkheid (Comment on the paper of Dr. Jan C. Bongaerts: Coas)’, in Van Den Bergh, Roger (ed.), Verslagboek Eerste Werkvergadering Recht en Economie , Antwerpen, Leerstoel A. Van Melkebeke, Handelshogeschool, 31-37.
  • Faure, Michael G. and Van Buggenhout, Willy (1987), ‘Produktenaan sprakelijkheid. De Europese richtlijn: harmonisatie en consumentenbescherming? (The European Directive Concerning Product Liability, Harmonization and Consumer Protection?)’, 51 Rechtskundig Weekblad , 33-88.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg (1991), ‘The Choice of Risky Technologies and Liability’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 11-22.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg and Simon, JŸrgen (1988), Eine škonomische Bewertung der EG-Produkthaftu (An Economic Appreciation of the EC- Product Li) , LŸneburg, Arbeitsbericht Hochschule LŸneburg, Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 44 p.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg and Simon, JŸrgen (1989), ‘An Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and the Product Liability Law of the Federal Republic of Germany’, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses , Antwerpen, Maklu, 185-214.
  • Finsinger, Jšrg, Hoehn, T. and Pototschnig, A. (1991), ‘The Enforcement of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases’, 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 133-148.
  • Fischoff, Baruch and Merz, Jon F. (1994), ‘The Inconvenient Public: Behavioral Research Approaches to Reducing Product Liability Risks’, in Hunziker, Janet R. and Jones, Trevor O. (eds.), Product Liability and Innovation: Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment , Washington, National Academy Press.
  • Gal-Or, Esther (1989), ‘Warranties as a Signal of Quality’, 22 Canadian Journal of Economics , 50-61.
  • Galitsky, S. (1979), ‘Manufacturers’ Liability: An Examination of the Policy and Social Cost of a New Regime’, 3 University of New South Wales Law Journal , 145-174.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1988), ‘Note: Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products Liability’, 88 Columbia Law Review , 1057-1068.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1992), ‘Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski’, 67 New York University Law Review , 1157 ff.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1994), ‘The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform’, 72 Texas Law Review , 803-847.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1995), ‘Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the Tort Contract Issue in Products Liability’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 241-257.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1995), ‘Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries’, 83 California Law Review , 773-852.
  • Geistfeld, Mark (1997), ‘Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform .
  • Gerner, Jennifer L. and Bryant, W. Keith (1981), ‘Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?’, 15 Journal of Consumer Affairs , 75-86.
  • Gilmore, Grant (1970), ‘Products Liability: A Commentary’, 38 University of Chicago Law Review , 103-116.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1974), ‘The Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect Information’, 5 Bell Journal of Economics , 683-688.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1988), ‘Accountable Accountants: Is Third- Party Liability Necessary ?’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 295-312.
  • Graham, Daniel A. and Price, Ellen R. (1984), ‘Contingent Damages for Products Liability’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 441-468.
  • Graham, John D. (1991), ‘Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety’, in Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (eds.), The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation , Washington, Brookings Institution, 120-190.
  • Grether, David M., Schwartz, Alan and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), ‘The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure’, 59 Southern California Law Review , 277-303.
  • Grether, David M., Schwartz, Alan and Wilde, Louis L. (1988), ‘Uncertainty and Shopping Behavior: An Experimental Analysis’, 55 Review of Economic Studies , 323-342.
  • Grether, David M., Schwartz, Alan and Wilde, Louis L. (1992), ‘Price, Quality and Timing of Moves in Markets with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Analysis’, 102 Economic Journal , 754-771.
  • Grossman, Sanford J. (1981), ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 461-483.
  • Gupta, Pola and Ratchford, Brian T. (1992), ‘Estimating the efficiency of consumer choices of new automobiles’, 13 Journal of Economic Psychology , 375-397.
  • Hamada, Koichi (1976), ‘Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Products Liability’, 66 American Economic Review , 228-234.
  • Hamada, Koichi, Ishida, Hidetoh and Murakami, Masahiro (1986), ‘The Evolution and Economic Consequences of Product Liability Rules in Japan’, in Saxonhouse, Gary R. and Yamamura, Kozo (eds.), Law and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy: Amer , Seattle, University of Washington Press, 83-106.
  • Hammitt, James K., Carroll, Stephen J. and Relles, Daniel A. (1985), ‘Tort Standards and Jury Decisions’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 751-762.
  • Hanson, Jon D. and Logue, Kyle D. (1990), ‘The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability’, 76 Cornell Law Review , 129-196.
  • Harrington, Scott E. (1988), ‘Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market’, in Litan, Robert E. and Winston, Clifford (eds.), Liability: Perspectives and Policy , Washington, Brookings Institution, 42-100.
  • Harrington, Scott E. (1991), ‘Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices and in the Availability of Coverage’, in Schuck, Peter H. (ed.), Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare , New York, W.W. Norton, 47-79.
  • Hay, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System’, 80 Georgetown Law Journal , 617-652.
  • Heal, Geoffrey M. (1977), ‘Guarantees and Risk Sharing’, 44 Review of Economic Studies , 549-560.
  • Heinkel, R. (1981), ‘Uncertain Product Quality: the Market for Lemons with an Imperfect E Testing Technology’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 625-636.
  • Henderson, James A. (1973), ‘Judicial Review of Manufacturer’s Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication’, 73 Columbia Law Review , 1531 ff.
  • Henderson, James A. (1980), ‘Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of Second Best’, 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 1036-1093.
  • Henderson, James A. (1983), ‘Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality’, 58 New York University Law Review , 765-795.
  • Henderson, James A. (1991), ‘Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis’, 59 George Washington Law Review , 1570 ff.
  • Henderson, James A. and Twerski, Aaron D. (1990), ‘Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn’, 65 New York University Law Review , 265-327.
  • Henderson, James A. and Twerski, Aaron D. (1991), ‘Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Fault’, 66 New York University Law Review , 1263-1331.
  • Hensler, Deborah R., Marquis, M. Susan, Abrahamse, Allan F., Berry, Sandra H., Ebener, Patricia A. and Lewis, Elizabeth G. (1991), Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States , Santa Monica, Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation.
  • Higgins, Richard S. (1978), ‘Producers’ Liability and Product Related Accidents’, 7 Journal of Legal Studies , 299-321.
  • Higgins, Richard S. (1981), ‘Products Liability Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Contributory Negligence’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 111-130.
  • Hoffer, George E., Pruitt, Stephen W. and Reilly, Robert J. (1988), ‘The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers: A Reexamination’, 96 Journal of Political Economy , 663-670.
  • Holmstršm, Bengt (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 74-91.
  • Horvitz, Sigmund A. and Stern, Louis H. (1987), ‘Liability Rules and the Selection of a Socially Optimal Production Technology’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 121-126.
  • Huber, Peter (1992), ‘Liability and Insurance Problems in the Commercialization of New Products: A Perspective from the United States and England’, in Rosenbergh, Nathan, Landau, Ralph, and Mowery, David C. (eds.), Technology and the Wealth of Nations , Stanford, Stanford University Press, 207-221.
  • Huber, Peter W. (1986), ‘Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 277-337.
  • Huber, Peter W. (1988), Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences , New York, Basic Books, 260 p.
  • Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (1991), ‘Overview’, in Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (eds.), The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation , Washington, Brookings Institution, 1-27.
  • Inter-Agency Task Force On Products Liability (1977), Final Report on the Insurance Industry , Washington, United States Department of Commerce.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A. and Peltzman, Sam (1985), ‘The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers’, 93 Journal of Political Economy , 512-536. Reprinted in Ippolito, Pauline M. and Scheffman, David T. (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, Washington (DC), Federal Trade Commission, 377-409.
  • Johnson, Rollin B. (1991), ‘The Impact of Liability on Innovation in the Chemical Industry’, in Huber, Peter W. and Litan, Robert E. (eds.), The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation , Washington, Brookings Institution, 428-455.
  • Jones, William K. (1990), ‘Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendency of Contract Over Tort’, 44 University of Miami Law Review , 731-806.
  • Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’, 47 Econometrica , 160-173.
  • Kahneman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul and Tversky, Amos (1982), Judgment and Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Kambhu, John (1982), ‘Optimal Product Quality under Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard.’, Bell Journal of Economics , 483-492.
  • Kaprelian, Mark A. (1985), ‘Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product’s Self-Inflicted Damage’, 84 Michigan Law Review , 517-540.
  • Keenan, Donald C. and Rubin, Paul H. (1988), ‘Shadow Interest Groups and Safety Regulation’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 21-36.
  • Keeton, W. Page, Owen, David, Montgomery, John E. and Green, Michael D. (1989), Products Liability and Safety: Cases and Materials (2d ed.) ,.
  • Kinkaid, Peter M. and Stuntz, William J. (1983), ‘Note: Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability’, 69 Virginia Law Review , 1111-1152.
  • Kirchner, Christian (1989), ‘Kommentar (Comment On BrŸggemeier, Die GefŠhrdungshaftung der)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Allekationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung , Berlin, Springer, 248-253.
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