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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 4610 Penalty Clauses. Liquidated Damages

  • Anderson, James E. and Gollop, Frank M. (1986), ‘The Effect of Warranty Provisions on Used Car Prices’, in Ippolito, Pauline M. and Scheffman, David T. (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Econom , Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 67-102.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1985), ‘Are FmHA Loans Entitlements Protected by the Due Process Clause?’, 34 Drake Law Review , 389-427.
  • Centner, Terence J. and White, F.C. (1987), ‘FmHA’s Efforts Against Delinquent Borrowers: Property Interests and Transaction Costs.’, 12 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics , 35-41.
  • Chung, Tai-Yeong (1992), ‘On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 280-305.
  • Clarkson, Kenneth W., Miller, Roger Leroy and Muris, Timothy J. (1978), ‘Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?’, Wisconsin Law Review , 351-390. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 152-160.
  • Coopersmith, Jeffrey B. (1990), ‘Comment: Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine’, 39 Emory Law Journal , 267 ff.
  • De Alessi, Louis and Staaf, Robert J. (1989), ‘Subjective Value in Contract Law’, 145 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 561-577.
  • Goetz, Charles J. and Scott, Robert E. (1977), ‘Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach’, 77 Columbia Law Review , 554-594. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown,1979, 194-207.
  • Gross, Leonard E. (1986), ‘Contractual Limitations on Attorney Malpractice Liability: An Economic Approach’, 75 Kentucky Law Journal , 793 ff.
  • Harris, Frederick H. (1987), ‘Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts: Comment’, 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 168-174.
  • Hess, James D. and Knoeber, Charles R. (1987), ‘Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts’, 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 149-167.
  • Jarrell, Gregg A. and Peltzman, Sam (1985), ‘The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers’, 93 Journal of Political Economy , 512-536. Reprinted in Ippolito, Pauline M. and Scheffman, David T. (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, Washington (DC), Federal Trade Commission, 377-409.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman (1996), ‘Private versus Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants’, in Finnerty, John D. and Martin, S. Fridson (eds.), The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 1995 , 253-274.
  • Kaplan, Philipp R. (1977), ‘A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages’, 50 Southern California Law Review , 1055-1090.
  • Koller, Ingo (1981), ‘Die Verteilung des ScheckfŠlschungsrisikos zwischen Kunde und Bank (The Division of the False Cheque Risk Between Client and Bank)’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift , 2433 ff.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1983), ‘Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract’, 27 Journal of Law and Economics , 691-706.
  • Kštz, Hein (1983), ‘Haftungsausschluss der Chemischreiniger (Exemption Clauses in Cleaning Contracts, Legal Validity and Economic Efficiency)’, in Walz, W. Rainer and Rascher-Friesenhausen, Hein (eds.), Sozialwissenschaften im Zivilrecht: FŠlle und Lšsungen in Ausbild und PrŸfung , Neuwied und Darmstadt, Luchterhand, 76-88.
  • Kštz, Hein (1983), ‘Haftungsausschlussklauseln, Eine juristisch-škonomische Analyse (Exemption Clauses, a Legal- Economic Analysis)’, 25 Jahre Karlsruher Forum. Beiheft zu Versicherungsrecht , 145-152.
  • Kštz, Hein (1989), ‘Zur Effizienz von Haftungsausschlu klauseln (On the Efficiency of Exemption Clauses)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Allekationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung , Berlin, Springer, 189-200.
  • Langenfeld, James (1986), ‘The Effect of Warranty Provisions on Used Car Prices: Comments’, in Ippolito, Pauline M. and Scheffman, David T. (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Econom , Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 105-107.
  • Masten, Scott E. and Snyder, Edward A. (1989), ‘The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considera tions’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 63-85.
  • Mattei, Ugo (1995), ‘The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses’, 43 American Journal of Law and Economics , 427-445.
  • Milner, Alan (1979), ‘Liquidated Damages: An Empirical Study in the Travel Industry’, 42 Modern Law Review , 508-532.
  • Muris, Timothy J. (1981), ‘Opportunistic Behaviour and the Law of Contracts’, 65 Minnesota Law Review , 521-590.
  • Nagel, Bernhard (1991), ‘Kommentar (Comment On Wehrt, Die QualitŠtshaftung des VerkŠuf)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), …konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts , Berlin, Springer, 260-264.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1983), ‘Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 427-444.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1984), ‘Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 147-167.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1984), ‘Arm-breaking, Consumer Credit, and Personal Bankruptcy’, Economic Inquiry , 188-208.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1988), ‘Liquidated Damages and Penalties: An Economic Perspective’, in Knapp, Charles L. (ed.), Commercial Damages , New York, Matthew Bender, 99-108.
  • Rubin, Paul H. (1981), ‘Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 237-247.
  • Sappington, David E.M. (1983), ‘Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent’, 29 Journal of Economic Theory , 1-21.
  • Schumann, Jochen (1987), ‘Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts: Comment’, 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 175-179.
  • Seidl, Christian (1989), ‘Kommentar (Comment On Kštz, Zur Effizienz von Haftungsausschl)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Allekationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung , Berlin, Springer, 201-207.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael Whinston (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, an Renegotiation’, 26 (2) Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Whinston, Michael D. (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation’, 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Stake, Jeffrey E. (1991), ‘Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions’, 79 Georgetown Law Journal , 1447-1497.
  • Stole, Lars A. (1992), ‘The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 582-606.
  • Thorpe, Jeremy (1994), ‘Economist’s Divided: Different Perceptions of Contract’s Penalty Doctrine’, 6(2) Bond Law Review , 189 ff.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1983), ‘Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code’, 32 UCLA Law Review , 898 ff.
  • X (1978), ‘Note: Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages’, 72 Northwestern University Law Review , 1055-1094.
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