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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 4100 Contractual Choice

  • Aivazian, Varouj A., Trebilcock, Michael J. and Penny, Michael (1984), ‘The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability’, 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal , 173-212. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 207.
  • Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 American Economic Review , 777-795.
  • Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, Dean (1992), ‘Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 397-426.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1989), ‘A Transaction Cost Approach to Explaining Historical Contract Structures’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 223-226.
  • Balbien, J. and Wilde, L.L. (1982), ‘A Dynamic Model of Research Contracting’, 13 Bell Journal of Economics , 107-119.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Contract Law , Minneapolis, West Publishing.
  • Baron, David P. and Besanko, David A. (1987), ‘Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 509-532.
  • Beale, H. and Dugdale, T. (1975), ‘Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’, 2 British Journal of Law and Society , 45-60.
  • Bjuggren, Per-Olof (1992), ‘The Effects of Contractual Restrictions on Industrial Organization: The Case of Swedish Pulpwood Transactions’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 517-532.
  • Bowles, Roger A. and Skogh, Gšran (1989), ‘Reputation, Monitoring and the Organisation of the Law Firm’, in Faure, Michael and Van Den Bergh, Roger (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses , Antwerpen, Maklu, 33-47.
  • Brown, Donald J. and Atkinson, J. H. (1981), ‘Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 296-299.
  • Bucovetsky, Sam and Chilton, John (1986), ‘Concurrent Renting and Selling in a Durable-Goods Monopoly under Threat of Entry’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 261-278.
  • Buscaglia, Edgardo and Guerrero, Jose Luis (1995), ‘Quantitative Analysis of Counterfeiting Activities in Developing Countries in the Pre-GATT Period’, 35 Jurimetrics Journal , 221-241.
  • Butler, Henry N. (1983), ‘Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic Pursuit of Treble Damages’, 59 Washington Law Review , 27-60.
  • Cantor, Richard (1990), ‘Firm Specific Training and Contract Length’, 57 Economica , 1-14.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1969), ‘Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 23-42.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1983), ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-21.
  • Chisholm, Darlene C. (1993), ‘Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures Industry’, 19 Eastern Economic Journal , 143-155.
  • Chisholm, Darlene C. (1996), ‘Continuous Degrees of Residual Claimancy: Some Contractual Evidence’, 3 Applied Economics Letters , 739-741.
  • Chisholm, Darlene C. (1997), ‘Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-Payment Contracts: Evidence From the Motion Pictures Industry’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 169-201.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1992), ‘Contracts and the Activities of Firms’, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 451-452.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Landa, Janet T. (1984), ‘Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law’, 4 International Review of Law and Economics , 15-22.
  • Cooter, Robert D. and Rubin, Edward L. (1987), ‘A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments’, 66 University of Texas Law Review , 63-130.
  • Cosentino, Fabrizio (1993), ‘Il paternalismo del legislatore nelle norme di limitazione dell’autonomia dei privati (The paternalism of the legislator in the rules limiting private autonomy)’, Quadrimestre , 119-139.
  • Craswell, Richard (1993), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines’, 60 University of Chicago Law Review , 1-65.
  • Craswell, Richard (1995), ‘Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence’, 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal , 209-235.
  • CrŽmer, Jacques and Riordan, Michael H. (1987), ‘On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 436-451.
  • Crew, Michael A. (1984), ‘Royalty Contracts: An Efficient Form of Contracting?’, 50 Southern Economic Journal , 724-733.
  • Crocker, Thomas D. (1973), ‘Contractual Choice’, 13 Natural Resources Journal , 561-577.
  • Cummins, J. Michael (1977), ‘Incentive Contracting for National Defense: a Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing’, 8 Bell Journal of Economics , 168-185.
  • De Lorenzi, Valeria (1993), ‘Il mandato alla luce dell’analisi economica del diritto (Agency law in the light of economic analysis of law)’, Contratto e impresa , 965-1013.
  • De Lorenzi, Valeria (1997), ‘La rappresentanza diretta volontaria. Problemi e soluzioni alla luce dell’analisi economica del diritto (Agency law. Problems and solutions in the light of economic analysis of law)’, Contratto e impresa , 595-669.
  • Demougin, Dominique M. (1989), ‘A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection’, 20 Rand Journal of Economics , 256-267.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1968), ‘The Cost of Transacting’, 82 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 33-53.
  • Domberger, Simon and Sherr, Avrom (1981), ‘Economic Efficiency in the Provision of Legal Services: The Private Practitioner and the Law Centre’, 1 International Review of Law and Economics , 29-49.
  • Dye, Ronald A. (1985), ‘Costly Contract Contingencies’, 26 International Economic Review , 233-250.
  • Dye, Ronald A. (1986), ‘Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 339-350.
  • Faith, Roger L. and Tollison, Robert D. (1980), ‘Contractual Exchange and the Timing of Payment’, 1 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 325-342.
  • Feldman, Roger, Sloan, Frank A. and Paringer, L. (1983), ‘Compensa tion Arrangements between Hospitals and Physicians’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 155-170.
  • Fishback, Price V. (1992), ‘The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 346-365.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1985), ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements’, 75(3) American Economic Review , 539-546. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints of Antitrust Law and Economics, vol. 10 (1).
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Comanor, William S. (1987), ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Reply’, 77(5) American Economic Review , 1069-1072.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Decanio, Stephen J. (1993), ‘Vertical Contracts: A Natural Experiment in Gas Pipeline Regulation’, 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 370-392.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Springer, Robert F. (1986), ‘Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance’, 59(3) Journal of Business , 433-450.
  • Garvey, Gerald T. (1994), ‘Money Transfers versus Hostages as Guarantors of Contractual Performance’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 245-259.
  • Gemmell, Norman (1989), ‘Is There a Conflict between Authors and Publishers over Royalty Terms?’, 29 Economic Letters , 7-11.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), ‘The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services’, 79 Northwestern University Law Review , 736-757. Reprinted in Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, 1990.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), ‘Television and the Quest for Gold: The Unofficial Paper of the 1984 Olympics’, 79 Northwestern University Law Review , 1172-1182.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1985), ‘Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts’, Wisconsin Law Review , 527-543. Reprinted in Speidel, Summers and White, Commercial Law: Teaching Materials, fourth edition, 1987.
  • Hall, Edward C. and Parsons, John E. (1990), ‘The Efficient Design of Contracts to Purchase Cogenerated Power’, 11 Energy Journal , 105-116.
  • Halpern, Paul J. and Turnbull, Stuart M. (1983), ‘Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 3-26.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), ‘Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 628-655.
  • Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur (1978), ‘Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement’, 68 American Economic Review , 20-30.
  • Hart, Oliver D. and Holmstršm, Bengt (1987), ‘The Theory of Contracts’, in Bewley, T. (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress , 71 ff.
  • Henderson, J. Vernon. and Ionnides, Y.M. (1983), ‘A Model of Housing Tenure Choice’, 73 American Economic Review , 98-113.
  • Hennart, Jean-Franois (1989), ‘The Transaction-Cost Rationale for Countertrade’, 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 127-153.
  • Hennart, Jean-Franois, Anderson, E. and Anderson, Erin (1993), ‘Countertrade and the Minimization of Transaction Costs: An Empirical Examination’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 290-313.
  • Hiller, John R. and Tollison, Robert D. (1974), ‘An Economic Model of Performance Contracting in Education’, 29 Public Finance , 36-48.
  • Holmstršm, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul R. (1991), ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 24-52.
  • Holmstršm, Bengt and Tirole, Jean (1991), ‘Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 201-228.
  • Jacob, Nancy L. and Page, Alfred N. (1980), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization: The Buyer Monitoring Case’, 70 American Economic Review , 476-478.
  • Jesse, Edward V. and Johnson, Aaron C., Jr. (1970), ‘An Analysis of Vegetable Contracts’, 52 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 545-554.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1995), ‘Anti Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities’, 2 Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance , 147 ff.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1995), ‘The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds’, 89 Northwestern University Law Review , 565-622.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman (1996), ‘Private versus Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants’, in Finnerty, John D. and Martin, S. Fridson (eds.), The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 1995 , 253-274.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael (1993), ‘Anti-Takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment’, 40 UCLA Law Review , 931 ff. Reprinted in 35 Corporate Practice Commentator 575, 1994.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Yermack, David (1996), ‘Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities’,.
  • Kahn, Charles and Huberman, Gur (1988), ‘Two-sided Uncertainty and “Up-or-Out” Contracts,’, 6 Journal of Labor Economics , 423-444.
  • Kahn, Charles and Huberman, Guy (1989), ‘Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 49-61.
  • Kan, Steven S. and Hsiao, Ding-Way (1996), ‘Contracts in Tsing Dynasty to Build Irrigation System at Lan-Yang Plain : A Transaction Cost Analysis’, 59 Journal of Agricultural Economics (Chinese) , 111-157.
  • Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu and MacLeod, W. Bentley (1989), ‘Optimal Labor Contracts with Non contractible Human Capital’, 3 Journal of the Japanese and International Economy , 385-3402.
  • Klein, Benjamin (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’, 70 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 356-362. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 139-146.
  • Klein, Benjamin and Leffler, Keith B. (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’, 89 Journal of Political Economy , 615-641.
  • Klein, Benjamin and Murphy, Kevin M. (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 265-297.
  • Knapp, Charles L. (1988), ‘Judgment Call: Theoretical Approaches to Contract Decision-Making’, Annual Survey of American Law , 307-351.
  • Knoeber, Charles R. (1983), ‘An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 333-343.
  • Knoeber, Charles R. (1989), ‘A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers’, 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 271-292.
  • Knoll, Michael S. (1988), ‘Uncertainty, Efficiency, and the Brokerage Industry’, 31 Journal of Law and Economics , 249-263.
  • Koller, Ingo (1979), Die Risikozurechnung bei Vertragsstšrungen in AustauschvertrŠgen (The Risk Allocation of Contract Disturbances in Bilateral Contracts) , MŸnchen, C.H. Beck, 474 p.
  • Laffont, Jean- Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1991), ‘Privatization and Incentives’, 7(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 84-105.
  • Landa, Janet T. (1976), ‘An Exchange Economy with Legally Binding Contracts: A Public Choice Approach’, 10 Journal of Economic Issues , 905-922.
  • Landa, Janet T. (1981), ‘A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 349-362.
  • Landa, Janet T. (1983), ‘The Enigma of the Kula Ring … Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 137-160.
  • Leffler, Keith B. (1985), ‘Toward a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments’, 28 Journal of Law and Economics , 381-386.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1990), ‘Just in time: Handels- und ABG- rechtliche Probleme (Just in Time: Problems in the Law of Commerce and of Unfair Contract Terms)’, 27 Der Betriebs-Berater , 1849-1855.
  • Leitzel, Jim (1989), ‘The New Institutional Economics and a Model of Contract’, 11 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 75-89.
  • Leitzel, Jim (1989), ‘Damage Measures and Incomplete Contracts’, 20 Rand Journal of Economics , 92-101.
  • Leonard, Herman B. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. (1985), ‘Financial Risk and the Burdens of Contracts’, 75 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 375-380.
  • Lewis, Tracy R. (1980), ‘Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting’, 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 292-301.
  • Lueck, Dean (1993), ‘Contracting into the Commons’, in Anderson, Terry L. and Simmons, Randy T., (eds.), The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem , Lanham, (MD), Rowman and Littlefield.
  • Lueck, Dean (1994), ‘Common Property as an Egalitarian Share Contract’, 25(2) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 93-108.
  • Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1992), ‘Farmland Leasing in Modern Agriculture’, Choices , 30-31.
  • Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1993), ‘Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts’, 24(1) Rand Journal of Economics , 78-100.
  • Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1995), ‘Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts’, 85 American Economic Review , 447-451.
  • Lueck, Dean and Allen, Douglas W. (1996), ‘The Transaction Cost Approach to Agricultural Contracts’, in Martimort, David (ed.), Agricultural Markets: Mechanisms, Failures, Regulations , Amsterdam, North Holland Press, 31-64.
  • Lueck, Dean and Caputo, Michael R. (1994), ‘Modeling Common Property Ownership as a Dynamic Contract’, 8(3) Natural Resources Modeling , 225-245.
  • Lyon, Thomas P. and Hackett, Steven C. (1993), ‘Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long Term Contracting in Natural Gas’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 380-398.
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  • Macho-Stadler, I. and PŽrez-Castrillo, J.David (1991), ‘Moral Hazard and Cooperation’, 35(1) Economics Letters , 17-20.
  • Macho-Stadler, I. and PŽrez-Castrillo, J.David (1993), ‘Moral Hazard with Several Agents: the Gains from Cooperation’, 11(1) International Journal of Industrial Organization , 73-100.
  • Macho-Stadler, I. and PŽrez-Castrillo, J.David (1997), An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Manne, Henry G. (1988), ‘Some Perspectives on Contractual Relations: Concluding Remarks’, 144 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 237-241.
  • Masten, Scott E. (1988), ‘Minimum Bill Contracts: Theory and Policy’, 37 Journal of Industrial Economics , 85-97.
  • Masten, Scott E. (1988), ‘Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations’, 144 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 180-195.
  • McAfee, R. Preston and McMillan, John (1986), ‘Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 326-338.
  • Miller, Robert S. (1990), ‘The Sale of Horses and Horse Inte rests: A Transactional Approach’, 78 Kentucky Law Journal , 517 ff.
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