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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 4000 Contract Law: General Theories (incl. nature of default rules, non-economic theories)

  • Aghion, Philippe and Hermalin, Benjamin E. (1990), ‘Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 381-409.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A., Trebilcock, Michael J. and Penny, Michael (1984), ‘The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability’, 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal , 173-212. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 207.
  • Alexander, Larry and Wang, William K.S. (1984), ‘Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice’, 3 Law and Philosophy , 281-297. Reprinted in Contract Law, vol. 2, International Library in Law & Legal Theory, 1991, 453-469.
  • Alfaro Aguila-Real, Jesœs (1991), Las condiciones generales de la contrataci—n, Estudio de las disposiciones generales (Standard Form Contracts: Why Are They Binding?) , Madrid, Pr—logo, chapter 1, 507 p.
  • Allen, Franklin and Gale, Douglas (1992), ‘Measurement Distortion and Mising Contigencies in Optimal Contracts’, 2 Economic Theory , 1-26.
  • Atiyah, Patrick S. (1979), The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract , Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press.
  • Atiyah, Patrick S. (1981), Promises, Morals, and Law , Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press.
  • Atiyah, Patrick S. (1981), Promises, Morals, and Law, , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Atiyah, Patrick S. (1981), ‘The Theoretical Basis of Contract Law – An English Perspective’, 1 International Review of Law and Economics , 183-205.
  • Ayres, Ian (1993), ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 1-18.
  • Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert H. (1989), ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Analysis of Default Rules’, 99 Yale Law Journal , 87-130.
  • Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert H. (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’, 101 Yale Law Journal , 729-773.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Weisberg, Robert (1982), ‘Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of ¤2-207’, 68 Virginia Law Review , 1217-1262.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Contract Law , Minneapolis, West Publishing.
  • Barnett, Randy E. (1986), ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’, 86 Columbia Law Review , 269-321.
  • Barnett, Randy E. (1992), ‘The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent’, 78 Virginia Law Review , 821-911.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Shavell, Steven (1991), ‘Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley vs. Baxendale’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 284-312.
  • Belley, Jean-Guy (1996), ‘Le contrat comme phŽnomne d’internormativitŽ (The Contract as a Phenomenon of Inter-Normativity)’, in Belley, Jean-Guy (ed.), Le droit soluble – Contributions quŽbŽcoises ˆ l’Žtude de la normativitŽ , Paris, Librairie GŽnŽrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 195-232.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1993), ‘Costs of Technical Violation of Accounting-Based Debt Convenants’, 68 Accounting Review , 233-257.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1995), ‘The Resolution of Technical Default’, 70 Accounting Review , 337-353.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1995), ‘Interrelation Among Events of Default’, 12 Contemporary Accounting Research , 57-84.
  • Bernstein, Lisa (1993), ‘Social norms and Default Rule Analysis’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 59-90.
  • Birmingham, Robert L. (1968), ‘Legal and Moral Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies’, 18 Buffalo Law Review , 99-117. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 16-21.
  • Brousseau, Eric (1993), ‘Les Theories des Contrats: Une Revue’, 103(1) Revue d’Economie Politique , 1-82.
  • Brousseau, Eric (1993), L’economie des contrats; technologies de l’information et coordination interentreprises , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF).
  • Brousseau, Eric (1995), ‘Contracts as Modular Mechanisms: Some Propositions for the Study of ‘Hybrid Forms”, 2(3) International Journal of the Economics of Business , 409-439.
  • Brown, Patricia A. and Feinman, Jay M. (1991), ‘Economic Loss, Commercial Practices, and Legal Process: Spring Motors Distributors,Inc. v. Ford Motor Company’, 22 Rutgers Law Review , 301-360.
  • Brudney, Daniel (1991), ‘Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force’, 10 Law and Philosophy , 253-270.
  • Buckley, Francis H. (1988), ‘Paradox Lost’, 72 Minnesota Law Review , 775-827.
  • Burton, Steven J. (1993), ‘Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 115-166.
  • Campbell, David (1990), ‘The Social Theory of Relational Contract: Macneil as the Modern Proudhon’, 18 International Journal of the Sociology of Law , 75-95.
  • Campbell, David (1990), ‘Review of D. Harris, Remedies in Contract and Tort’, 17 Journal of Law and Society , 254-261.
  • Campbell, David (1992), ‘The Undeath of Contract: A Study in the Degeneration of a Research Programme’, 22 The Hong Kong Law Journal , 20-47.
  • Campbell, David (1992), ‘Review of S. Wheeler. Reservation of Title Clauses’, 19 Journal of Law and Society , 6-12.
  • Campbell, David (1996), ‘The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract’, in Campbell, David and Vincent-Jones, Peter (eds.), Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives , Aldershot, Dartmouth, 40-66.
  • Campbell, David (1997), ‘Socio-legal Analysis of the Law of Contract’, in Thomas, Philip A. (ed.), Socio-legal Studies , Aldershot, Dartmouth, 239-278.
  • Campbell, David (1997), ‘The Relational Constitution of Contract and the Limits of Economics: Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets’, in Deakin, Simon and Michie, Jonathan (eds.), Contracts, Co-operation and Competition: Studies in Economics, Management and Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 529-596.
  • Campbell, David and Clay, Susan, Long-Term Contracting: A Research Bibliography and Review of the Literature , Oxford, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies.
  • Campbell, David and Harris, Donald R. (1993), ‘Flexibility in Long-term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-operation’, 20 Journal of Law and Society , 166-191.
  • Campbell, David and Vincent-Jones, Peter (eds.) (1997), Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives , Aldershot, Dartmouth.
  • Charny, David (1991), ‘Hypothetical bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation’, 89 Michigan Law Review , 1815-1879.
  • Cohen, George M. (1992), ‘The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law’, 20 Hofstra Law Review , 941 ff.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1980), ‘Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law’, 68 California Law Review , 221-249.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1980), ‘Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization’, 8 Hofstra Law Review , 509-551.
  • Coleman, Jules L., Hekathorn, Douglas D. and Maser, Steven M. (1989), ‘A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law’, 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 639 ff.
  • Coleman, Jules, Heckathorn, Douglas D. and Maser,Steven M. (1989), ‘A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law’, 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 639-709.
  • Craswell, Richard (1989), ‘Performance, Reliance, and One-sided Information’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 365-401.
  • Craswell, Richard (1989), ‘Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising’, 88 Michigan Law Review , 489-529.
  • Craswell, Richard (1992), ‘Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings’, 15 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 805-837.
  • Craswell, Richard (1993), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines’, 60 University of Chicago Law Review , 1-65.
  • Craswell, Richard (1993), ‘The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 91-114.
  • Craswell, Richard and Schwartz, Alan (eds.) (1994), Foundations of Contract Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • D’Ursel, Laurent (1985), ‘L’analyse Žconomique du droit des contracts (Economic Analysis of Contract Law)’, 14 Revue interdisciplinaire d’Žtudes juridiques , 45-88.
  • Danzig, Richard (1975), ‘Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies , 249-284.
  • De Geest, Gerrit (1994), Economische analyse van het contracten- en quasi-contractenrecht: een onderzoek naar de wetenschappelijke waarde van de rechtseconomie (Economic Analysis of Contract Law and Quasi Contract Law: A Study on the Scientic Value of Law and Economics) , Antwerpen, Maklu, 568 p.
  • Dowie, J. (1982), ‘The Risks of Contract Law’, 2 International Review of Law and Economics , 193-204.
  • Duggan, A.J. (1994), Contractual Non-Disclosure: An Applied Study in Modern Contract Theory , Melbourne, Longman Professional.
  • Eisenberg, Melvin Aron (1982), ‘The Bargain Principle and Its Limits’, 95 Harvard Law Review , 741-801.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1984), ‘Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause’, 51 University of Chicago Law Review , 703-751.
  • Farber, Daniel A. (1983), ‘Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory’, 78 Northwestern University Law Review , 303-339.
  • Feinman, Jay M. (1983), ‘Critical Approaches to Contract Law’, 30 UCLA Law Review , 829-860.
  • Feinman, Jay M. (1990), ‘The Significance of Contract Theory’, 58 University of Cincinnati Law Review , 1283-1318.
  • Feinman, Jay M. (1993), ‘Relational Contract and Default Rules’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 43-58.
  • Fried, Charles, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Fried, Charles (1981), Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Defaults , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Gauthier, David Peter (1986), Morals by Agreement , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Geddes, R. Richard (1994), ‘Privatization and Contracts in U.S. Electric Utilities’, in X (ed.), Private Power in the Pacific , Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Minerals and Energy Forum, 11-24.
  • Gillette, Clayton P. ( (1993), ‘Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 167-188.
  • Gillette, Clayton P. (1990), ‘Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 535-581.
  • Gillette, Clayton P. (1993), ‘Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 167-188.
  • Goetz, Charles J. and Scott, Robert E. (1980), ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’, 89 Yale Law Journal , 1261-1322.
  • Goetz, Charles J. and Scott, Robert E. (1985), ‘The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms’, 73 California Law Review , 261-322.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.) (1989), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 252 p.
  • Gordley, James (1991), The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Law , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Gordley, James (1995), ‘Enforcing Promises’, 83 California Law Review , 547-614.
  • Hadfield, Gillian K. (1994), ‘Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts’, 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 159-184.
  • Harris, Donald (1983), ‘Contract as Promise – A Review Article Based on Charles Fried … Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation’, 3 International Review of Law and Economics , 69-77.
  • Harris, Donald and Veljanovski, Cento G. (1984), ‘The Use of Economics to Elucidate Legal Concepts: The Law of Contract’, in Daintith, Terence and Teubner, Gunther (eds.), Law and the Social Sciences , Florence, European University Institute.
  • Harrison, Jeffrey L. (1989), ‘Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law’, 130 Annual Survey of American Law , 73-114.
  • Hillman, Robert A. (1988), ‘The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory’, 67 Texas Law Review , 103-136.
  • Holderness, Clifford G. (1985), ‘A Legal Foundation for Exchan ge’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 321-344.
  • Horwitz, Morton J. (1974), ‘The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law’, 87 Harvard Law Review , 917-956.
  • Hviid, Morten (1996), ‘Default Rules and Equilibrium Selection of Contract Terms’, 16 International Review of Law and Economics , 223-245.
  • Hwang, Chun-Sin and Kan, Steven S. (1994), Principles of Economics, Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) , Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei.
  • Johnston, Jason Scott (1990), ‘Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules’, 100 Yale Law Journal , 615-664.
  • Kan, Steven S. and Hwang, Chun-Sin (1994), Principles of Economics: Cooperating for Mutual Prosperity and Progress (in Chinese) , Published by the authors and distributed by Shin Lu Bookstore, Taipei.
  • Karp, Larry S. and Perloff, Jeffrey M. (1993), ‘Legal Requirements That Artists Receive Resale Royalties’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 163-177.
  • Klausner, Michael (1995), ‘Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts’, 81 Virginia Law Review , 757-852.
  • Kšhler, Helmut (1989), ‘Zur škonomischen Analyse der Regeln Ÿber die GeschŠftsgrundlage (On the Economic Analysis of the Rules of the Impli)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Allekationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung , Berlin, Springer, 148-162.
  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. (1982), ‘The Resurrection of Contract’, 82 Columbia Law Review , 184 ff.
  • Kronman, Anthony T. (1980), ‘Contract Law and Distributive Justice’, 89 Yale Law Journal , 472-511.
  • Kronman, Anthony T. (1983), ‘Paternalism and the Law of Contracts’, 92 Yale Law Journal , 763-798.
  • Kronman, Anthony T. (1985), ‘Contract Law and the State of Nature’, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 5-32.
  • Lando, Ole (1978), ‘The Scope and Application of Statutes on Unfair Contract Clauses’, in Skogh, Gšran (ed.), Law and Economics. Report from a Symposium in Lund , Lund, Juridiska Fšreningen, 165-184.
  • Lehmann, Michael (1983), Buergerliches Recht und Handelsrecht – eine juristische und oekonomische Analyse , Stuttgart, Poeschel.
  • Linzer, Peter (1988), ‘Is Consent the Essence of Contract? Replying to Four Critics’, Annual Survey of American Law , 213-220.
  • Lowry, S. Todd (1976), ‘Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics’, 10 Journal of Economic Issues , 1-22. Reprinted in Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), The Chicago School of Political Economy, East Lansing, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University, 1976, 215-236.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1979), ‘The Costliness of Information and its Effects on the Economic Analysis of Law’, in Ziegel, Jacob B. (ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law , Toronto, Canada Law Book.
  • MacKaay, Ejan and Fabien, Claude (1983), ‘Le Droit Civil aux Prises avec l’Inflation’, Revue de Droit de McGill , 284-334.
  • MacKaay, Ejan and Fabien, Claude (1984), ‘Civil Law ande the Fight against Inflation – A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Quebec Case’, Louisiana Law Review , 719-754.
  • MacNeil, Ian R. (1978), ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’, 72 Northwestern University Law Review , 854-905.
  • MacNeil, Ian R. (1980), The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations , New Haven, Yale University Press, 164 p.
  • macneil, ian r. (1981), ‘economic analysis of contractual relations: its shortfalls and the need for a >Rich Classificatory Apparatus’, 75 Northwestern University Law Review , 1018-1063.
  • Marini, Giovanni (1990), Promessa ed affidamento nel diritto dei contratti (Promise and Reliance in Contract Law) , Napoli, Jovene, 317 p.
  • Marini, Giovanni (1995), Promessa e affidamento nel diritto dei contratti (Promise and reliance in contract law) , Napoli, Jovene.
  • Marini, Giovanni (1995), Promessa e affidamento nel diritto dei contratti (Promise and reliance in contract law) , Napoli, Jovene.
  • Meurer, Michael J. (1989), ‘Foreword: Economics of Contract Law’, 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 1-7.
  • Nadeau, Richard (1989), ‘La rŽforme du droit des obligations – Le point de vue du Barreau du QuŽbec (The Opinion of the Quebec Bar on the Reform of Contract Law)’, 30 Cahiers de Droit , 647-656.
  • Orlic, V. Miodrag (1993), Zakljucivanje ugovora (Conclusion of Contracts) , Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.
  • Papanikolaou, Panagiotis A. (1991), Peri ton Orion tes Prostateutikes Paremvaseos tou Dikaste ste Symbase: Pros mia Genike Theoria Peri Katachreseos tes Symvatikes Eleutherias (On the Boundaries of the Paternalistic Intervention of the Judge on a Contract: Towards a General Theory on the Abuse of Freedom of Contracts) , Athens-Komotini, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publications.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto (1996), ‘Regole di default e razionalitˆ limitata: per un (diverso) approccio di analisi economica al diritto dei contratti (Default rules and bounded rationality: for a (different) economic approach to contract law)’, Rivista critica del diritto privato , 451-466.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto (1996), ‘Regole di default e razionalit.. limitata: per un (diverso) approccio di analisi economica al diritto dei contratti (Default rules and bounded rationality: for a different economic approach to contract law)’, Rivista critica del diritto privato .
  • Parisi, Francesco (1994), ‘Autonomy and Private Ordering in Contract Law : Review Essay’, 1 European Journal of Law and Economics , 213-227.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1998), ‘Autonomia e Ordinamento Privato nella Legislazione Contrattuale’, in Parisi, Francesco and Giacobbe, Giovanni (ed.), Analisi Economica e Libertˆ Contrattuali , Guiffr.
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  • Paz-Ares, C‡ndido (1983), ‘Una Teor’a econ—mica sobre la mercantilidad de la compraventa (An Economic Theory for Sale Being Contract Law)’, ADC , 943-996.
  • Perron, Edgar Du (1990), ‘De rechtseconomische analyse van het verbintenissenrecht (A Law-and-economics Analysis of the Law of Obligations)’, 39(10) Ars Aequi , 770-776.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1983), ‘Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 427-444.
  • Posner, Eric A. (1995), ‘Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract’, 24 Journal of Legal Studies , 283-319.
  • Posner, Eric A. (1997), ‘The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and Related Rules of Contractual Interpretation’, 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review .
  • Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication’, 8 Hofstra Law Review , 487-507.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1981), ‘A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law’, 9 Hofstra Law Review , 775 ff.
  • Poughon, Jean-Michel (1990), ‘Une constante doctrinale: l’approche Žconomique du contract’, 12 Droits: Revue franaise de thŽorie juridique , 47-59.
  • Romani, Franco (1985), ‘Appunti sull’ analisi economica dei contratti (Notes about the Economic Analysis of Contract Law)’, Quadrimestre , 15-29.
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  • Scanlon, Thomas (1982), ‘Contractualism and Utilitarism’, in Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard, Utilitaririanism and Beyond , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1988), ‘A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies , 237-268.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1992), ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 271-318.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1993), ‘The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 389-419.
  • Scott, Robert E. (1990), ‘A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 597-616.
  • Shavell, Steven (1991), ‘An Economic Analysis of Altriusm and Deferred Gifts’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 401-421.
  • Simpson, Alfred William Brian (1979), ‘The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts’, 46 University of Chicago Law Review , 533-601.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Cases and Materials on Law and Economics , West Publishing.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Economics of Contract Law , West Publishing.
  • Symposium, ‘Default Rules and Contractual Consent’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 1-444.
  • Trebilcock, Michael J. and Dewees, Donald N. (1981), ‘Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts’, in Burrow, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), The Economic Approach to Law , London, Butterworths.
  • Trimarchi, Pietro (1970), ‘Sul Significato Economico Dei Criteri Di Responsabilitˆ Contrattuale (Economic Meaning of Contract-Liability Criteria)’, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile , 512-531.
  • Wang, William K.S. (1982), ‘Reflections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to Kronman’, 34 Hastings Law Journal , 513-527.
  • Witt, Ulrich (1986), ‘Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts’, 39 Kyklos , 245-266.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1981), ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages and Related Doctrines in the Law’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 65-91.
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