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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 3800 Property Rules vs. Liability Rules

  • Anderson, Elizabeth (1993), Value in Ethics and Economics , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Arneson, Richard (1992), ‘Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy’, 21 Philosophy And Public Affairs , 132-164.
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  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1978), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics’, 12 Journal of Economic Issues , 43-60.
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  • Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review , 1089-1128. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A., Economic Foundations of Property Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 31-48.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-44. Reprinted in Ackermann, Bruce A., Economic Foundations of Property Law,Boston,Little Brown,1975,17-22. Reprinted in Medema, Steven G.,The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis,Vol.2,Aldershot,Edward Elgar Publishig, 1995, 5-48. Reprinted in Coase, Ronald H., The Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1987), ‘Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate’, 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review , 451-470.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1992), ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’, 67 Indiana Law Journal , 349 ff.
  • Coleman, Jules L. and Kraus, Jody S. (1986), ‘Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights’, 95 Yale Law Journal , 1335-1371.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1991), ‘Economic Theories of Legal Liability (Italian translation:”Le teorie economiche della risponsibilitˆ efficenza produttiva: alcuni contributi su noti argomenti” 379-409)’, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 11-30. Reprinted in Medema, Steven G. (Ed.), The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing, Glocestershire, forthcoming. Italian translation: “Le Teorie Economiche Della Risponsabilit Legale”), published in Gianandrea Goisis.
  • Craswell, Richard (1993), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines’, 60 University of Chicago Law Review , 1-65.
  • Dworkin, Ronald M. (1978), Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1985), ‘Why Restrain Alienation?’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 970-990.
  • Frank, Robert H. (1987), ‘If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?’, 77 American Economic Review , 393-394.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1973), ‘Pricing of Pollution: The Coase Theorem in the Long Run’, 4(1) Bell Journal of Economics , 316-319.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1979), ‘The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The Non-Equivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights’, 27(1) Economic Inquiry , 254-268.
  • Friedman, David D. (1984), ‘Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 379-397.
  • Gallo, Paolo (1992), ‘Errore sul valore, giustizia contrattuale e trasferimenti ingiustificati di ricchezza alla luce dell’analisi economica del diritto (Mistake on value, contractual justice and unjust enrichment)’, Quadrimestre , 656-703.
  • Gambaro, Antonio (1996), ‘L’analisi economica e la ricerca della logica proprietaria (Economic analysis and the search for the rationale of ownership)’, Rivista critica del diritto privato , 235-244.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. (1982), ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors’, 82 Columbia Law Review , 1600-1657.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. (1992), ‘On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse’, 78 Virginia Law Review , 149-281.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. (1992), ‘Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 449-482.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. (1993), ‘A Property Right in Self- Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property’, 102 Yale Law Journal , 1533-1609.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. (1994), ‘Systemische und fallbezogene Losungsansatze fur Marktversagen bei Immaterialgutern (Systemic and Case-by-Case Responses to Failures in Markets for Intangible Goods)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), Okonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von Innovationen , TŸbingen, Mohr, 328-367.
  • Gordon, Wendy J. and Gowen, Anne, ‘Mandated Access: Commensurability and the Right to Say ‘No’,’, 17 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal , 46 ff.
  • Haddock, David D., McChesney, Fred S. and Spiegel, Menahem (1990), ‘An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions’, 78 California Law Review , 1-51.
  • Hasen, Richard L. (1995), ‘The Efficient Duty to Rescue’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 141 ff.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1995), ‘Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley’, 105(1) Yale Law Journal , 221-233.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1996), ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 109 Harvard Law Review , 713-790.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Steven Schavell (1995), ‘Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley’, 105 Yale Law Journal , 221 ff.
  • Knetsch, Jack L. (1983), Property Rights and Compensation. Compulsory Acqui, ch.10 , Toronto, Butterworths.
  • Krauss, Michael I. (1986), ‘L’affaire Lapierre: vers une thŽorie Žconomique de l’obligation quasi-contractuelle (The Lapierre Case: Toward an Economic Theory of the Quasi-Contractual Obligation)’, 31 McGill Law Journal , 683-721.
  • Krauss, Michael I. (1992), ‘Tort Law and Private Ordering’, 53 St. Louis University Law Journal , 423 ff.
  • Krauss, Michael I. (1994), ‘Regulation vs. Markets in the Development of Standards’, 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal , 781-808.
  • Krier, James E. and Schwab, S. (1995), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light.’, 70 New York University Law Review , 440-483.
  • Krier, James E. and Schwab, Stewart J. (1995), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light’, 70 New York University Law Review , 440 ff.
  • Kronman, Anthony T. (1978), ‘Specific Performance’, 45 University of Chicago Law Review , 351-382. Reprinted in Kronman, Anthony T. and Posner, Richard A. (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979, 181-194.
  • Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1975), ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-46.
  • Levmore, Saul (1985), ‘Explaining Restitution’, 71 Virginia Law Review , 65-124.
  • Levmore, Saul (1994), ‘Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts’, 67 University of Southern California Law Review , 1411-1449.
  • Marella, Maria Rosaria (1994), ‘Onerositˆ del risarcimento in forma specifica (Onerousness of specific performance)’, I,2 Giurisprudenza italiana , 1067-1074.
  • McChesney, Fred S. (1990), ‘Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Land Ownership, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 297-335.
  • Michelman, Frank I. (1967), ‘Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law’, 80 Harvard Law Review , 1165-1258. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A. (ed.), Economic Foundations of Property a Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 100 ff.
  • Pardolesi, Roberto (1977), ‘Azione Reale E Azione Di Danni Nell Art. 844 C.C. Logica Economica E Logica Giuridica Nella Composizione Del Conflitto Tra Usi Incompatibili Delle Proprietˆ Vicine (Property Rule and Liability Rule in Article 844 Codice Civile: Economic Arguments, Legal Arguments and Litigation for Inconsistent Uses of Neighbours Lands)’, 1 Foro Italiano , 1144-1154.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1979), ‘Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-48.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1980), ‘Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies’, 33 Stanford Law Review , 1075-1112.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1980), ‘On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules’, 18(2) Economic Inquiry , 233-246.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1979), ‘Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-48.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1980), ‘Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies’, 32(6) Stanford Law Review , 1075-1112.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1980), ‘On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules’, 18(2) Economic Inquiry , 233-246.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. and Shavell, Steven (1994), ‘Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 427-437.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1971), ‘Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest’, 14 Journal of Law and Economics , 201-232.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1972), Economic Analysis of Law, 1st ed. ,.
  • Radin, Margaret Jane (1987), ‘Market-Inalienability’, 100 Harvard Law Review , 1849-1937.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1985), ‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 931-969. Reprinted In J. Coleman and J. Lange (Eds.), New York University Press, Law and Economics, Vol. I, New York, 1992, 421-459.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1986), ‘I’d Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note on Property Rules and Liability Rules’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 267-275.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1986), ‘Efficiency, Equity and Inalienability’, in Graf Von Der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias and Skogh, Gšran (eds.), Law and Economics and The Economics of Legal Regulation , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 11-37.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1986), ‘I’d Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note on Property Rules and Liability Rules’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 255-263.
  • Samuels, Warren J. and Mercuro, Nicholas (1981), ‘The Role of the Compensation Principle in Society’, in Samuels, Warren J. and Schmid, A. Allan (eds.), Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective , Boston, Nijhoff, 210-247.
  • Schap, David (1986), ‘The Nonequivalence of Property Rules and Liability Rules’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics , 125-132.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1989), ‘Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not’, 87 Michigan Law Review , 1171-1198.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1979), ‘The Case for Specific Performance’, 89 Yale Law Journal , 271-306.
  • Schwartz, Gary (1994), ‘Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law’, 42 UCLA Law Review , 377 ff.
  • Schwartz, Gary T. (1994), ‘Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?’, 42 UCLA Law Review , 377-444.
  • Staaf, Robert J. (1983), ‘Liability Rules, Property Rights, and Taxes’, 5 Research in Law and Economics , 225-231.
  • Stephen, Frank H. (1987), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules in the Regulation of Land Development: An Analysis of Development Control in Great Britain and Ontario’, 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 33-49.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Economics of Contract Law , West Publishing.
  • Thompson, Barton H. (1975), ‘Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral and Legal Analysis’, 27 Stanford Law Review , 1563-1595.
  • Villa, Gianroberto (1992), ‘Contratto illecito ed irripetibilitˆ della prestazione – Una analisi economica (Unlawful contract and non repayable performance – An economic analysis)’, Quadrimestre , 19-64.
  • Wils, Wouter P.J. (1993), ‘Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A Functional Inquiry into Precontractual Liability’, 4 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 93-134.
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