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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 2500 Pollution Tax

  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Property Rights and Nuisance Law , West Publishing.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), ‘Spatial Price Theory and an Efficient Congestion Toll Established by the Free Market”‘, 22 Economic Inquiry , 244-252. Reprinted in Greenhut, Melvin L. and Norman, George (Eds.), The Economics of Location, Vol. II, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995, 172-180.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1985), ‘Free Market Congestion Tolls: A Correction’, 23 Economic Inquiry , 361-362.
  • Bishop, John A. (1988), ‘Pigovian Taxes and “Full” Property Rights’, 14 Eastern Economic Journal , 193-196.
  • Bongaerts, Jan C., Meyerhoff, JŸrgen, Thomasberger, Claus and Wittke, Anja (1989), LšsungsansŠtze fŸr ein ganzheitliches System von Umweltsteuern und Sonderabgaben in der Bundesrepu blik Deutschland (A Solution for a Total Environmental System and Special Taxes in the Federal Republic of Germany) , Berlin, Schriftenreihe des Instituts fŸr Oekologische Wirtschaftsforschung Nr. 31,.
  • Bowles, Roger A. and Jones, Philip (1993), ‘Nonpayment of Poll Tax: An Exploratory Analysis of Tax Resistance’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 445-455.
  • Braulke, M. and Endres, Alfred (1985), ‘On the Economics of Affluent Charges’, 18 Canadian Journal of Economics , 891-897.
  • Brito, Dagobert L. and Intriligator, Michael D. (1987), ‘Stock Externalities, Pigovian Taxation and Dynamic Stability’, 33 Journal of Public Economics , 59-72.
  • Brooks, Michael A. and Heijdra, Ben J. (1987), ‘Rent Seeking and Pollution Taxation: An Extension’, 54 Southern Economic Journal , 335-342.
  • Brown, Gardner M., Jr. and Johnson, Ralph W. (1984), ‘Pollution Control by Effluent Charges: It Works in the Federal Republic of Germany, Why Not in the U.S.?’, 24 Natural Resources Journal , 929-966.
  • Brown, John Prather and Holahan, William L. (1980), ‘Taxes and Legal Rules for the Control of Externalities When There Are Strategic Responses’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies , 165-178.
  • Carlson, J. Lon and Bausell, Charles W., Jr. (1987), ‘Financing Superfund: An Evaluation of Alternative Tax Mechanisms’, 27 Natural Resources Journal , 103-122.
  • Carlton, Dennis W. and Loury, Glenn C. (1986), ‘The Limitation of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-run Remedy for Externalities: An Extension of Results’, 101 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 631-634.
  • Coelho Philip R. P. (1976), ‘Pollution, Direct Controls, Regulation and the Size of the Firm : Comment’, 56 American Economic Review , 976-978.
  • Conrad, Klaus (1990), ‘Taxes on Emissions, Conjectural Variations and Overinvestment in Abatement Capital’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 281-297.
  • De Meza, David (1988), ‘The Efficacy of Effluent Charges’, 21 Canadian Journal of Economics , 182-186.
  • Desaigues, Brigitte and Rabl, Ari (1994), ‘Preferences individuelles et calcul de la taxe optimale (Individual Preferences and Calculation of Optimal Tax)’, 45(3) Revue Žconomique , 917-929.
  • Dewees, Donald N. (1983), ‘Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy’, 21 Economic Inquiry , 53-71.
  • Endres, Alfred (1983), ‘Do Effluent Charges (Always) Reduce Environmental Damage?’, 35 Oxford Economic Papers , 254-261.
  • Endres, Alfred (1985), ‘Effluent Charges and Environmental Damage: Comment’, 37 Oxford Economic Papers , 703-704.
  • Ethridge, D. (1972), ‘User Charges as a Means for Pollution Control: the Case of Sewer Surcharges’, 3 Bell Journal of Economics , 346-353.
  • Frankel, Marvin (1987), ‘Taxes, Pollution, and Optimal Abatement in an Urban Economy’, 22(2) Journal of Urban Economics , 117-135.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1979), ‘The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The Non-Equivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights’, 27(1) Economic Inquiry , 254-268.
  • Germain, Marc (1989), ‘ExternalitŽs, taxation et traitement de la pollution dans le cadre d’un duopole de Cournot (Externalities, Taxation and Dealing with Pollution in the Case of a Cournot Duopoly)’, 55 Recherches Economiques de Louvain , 273-292.
  • Grabitz, Eberhard and Zacker, Christian (1989), ‘Scope for Action by the EC Member States for the Improvement of Environmental Protection Under EEC Law: The Example of Environmental Taxes and Subsidies’, 26 Common Market Law Review , 423-447.
  • Haddock, David D., McChesney, Fred S. and Spiegel, Menahem (1990), ‘An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions’, 78 California Law Review , 1-51.
  • Hamilton, Jonathan H., Sheshinski, Eytan and Slutsky, Steven M. (1989), ‘Production Externalities and Long run Equilibria: Bargaining and Pigovian Taxation’, 27(3) Economic Inquiry , 453-471.
  • Helfand, Gloria E. and Rubin, Jonathan (1994), ‘Spending versus Concentrating Damages: Environmental Policy in the Presence of Nonconvexities’, 27(1) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 84-91.
  • Hrubovcak, James, Leblanc, Michael and Miranowski, John (1990), ‘Limitations in Evaluating Environmental and Agricultural Policy Coordination Benefits’, 80 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 208-212.
  • Hung, N. M. (1994), ‘Taxing Pollution in an International Duopoly Context’, 44(3) Economics Letters , 339-343.
  • Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven (1996), ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 109 Harvard Law Review , 713-790.
  • Kohn, Robert E., ‘The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-run Remedy for Externalities: Comment’,, 625-630.
  • Lee, Dwight R. and Misiolek, Walter S. (1986), ‘Substituting Pollution Taxation for General Taxation: Some Implications for Efficiency in Pollutions Taxation’, 13 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 338-347.
  • Leung, Michael C. M. (1992), ‘Pollution, Taxation, and Strategic Behaviour’, 40(2) Economics Letters , 251-255.
  • MŠŠttŠ, Kalle (1997), Environmental Taxes. From an Economic Idea to a Legal Institution , Helsinki, Finnish Lawyer’s Publishing.
  • Markusen, James R., Morey, Edward R. and Olewiler, Nancy (1995), ‘Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous’, 56(1) Journal of Public Economics , 55-77.
  • McGee, Robert W. and Block, Walter E. (1994), ‘Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution’, 6(1) Fordham Environmental Law Journal , 51-77.
  • Misiolek, Walter S. (1988), ‘Pollution Control Through Price Incentives: The Role of Rent Seeking’, 15 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 1-8.
  • Nielsen, Soren Bo, Pedersen, Lars Haagen and Sorensen, Peter Birch (1995), ‘Environmental Policy, Pollution, Unemployment, and Endogenous Growth’, 2(2) International Tax and Public Finance , 185-205.
  • Nikolai, Loren A., Elam, Rick and Bozeman, Barry (1979), ‘Financial Statement Modeling: Analyzing the Pollution Control Tax Incentive’, 5(2) Policy Analysis , 243-254.
  • Parry, Ian W. H. (1995), ‘Optimal Pollution Taxes and Endogenous Technological Progress’, 17(1) Resource and Energy Economics , 69-85.
  • Pigou, A.C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare , London, MacMillan, 876 p.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1979), ‘Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-48.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1979), ‘Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-48.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1975), ‘Effluent Charges: A Critique’, 6 Canadian Journal of Economics , 512-527.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1977), ‘Market Models for Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses’, in Brown, G.,Kneese, A. and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.), Public Policy , 383-406.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1992), ‘Assessing the State of the Art: Environmental Liability Law’, in Tietenberg, T. (ed.), Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 223-243.
  • Shibata, Hirofumi (1972), ‘Pareto-optimality and Trade and the Pigovian Tax’, 39 Economica , 190-202.
  • Shibata, Hirofumi (1974), ‘Pareto-optimality and Gains-from- trade: a Further Elucidation’, 41 Economica , 71-78.
  • Skogh, Gšran and Lidgren, K. (1996), ‘Extended Producers Responsibility. Recycling Liability and Guarantee Funds’, 79 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 170-181.
  • Smith, J.B. and Sims, W.A. (1985), ‘The Impact of Pollution Charges on Productivity Growth in Canadian Brewing’, 16 Rand Journal of Economics , 410-423.
  • Starret, David A. and Zeckhauser, Richard (1974), ‘Treating External Diseconomies – Markets or Taxes?’, in Pratt, J.W. (ed.), Statistical and Mathematical Aspects of Pollution , New York, Dekker, 65-84.
  • Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (1993), ‘Fordele ved et marked for CO2 -kvoter (Advantages in CO2 Emissions Trading)’, 7 Samfunds¢konomen , 5-9.
  • Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (1994), ‘Kvoter og syreregn (Quotas and Acid Rain)’, 3 Okonomi & politik , 33-39.
  • Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (1994), ‘Globalt CO2 -marked’, 1 Fremtidsorientering , 35-36.
  • Tahvonen, Olli (1995), ‘International CO2 Taxation and the Dynamics of Fossil Fuel Markets’, 2(2) International Tax and Public Finance , 261-278.
  • Thomas, Alban (1995), ‘Regulating Pollution under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Industrial Wastewater Treatment’, 28(3) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 357-373.
  • Wang, Lih Jau (1995), ‘Environmental Capital Flight and Pollution Tax’, 5(3) Environmental and Resource Economics , 273-286.
  • Wenders, John T. (1973), ‘Corrective Taxes and Pollution Abatement’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 365-368.
  • White, Michelle J. (1979), ‘Suburban Growth Controls: Liability Rules and Pigovian Taxes’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 207-230.
  • White, Michelle J. and Wittman, Donald A. (1983), ‘A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 413-425.
  • Wittman, Donald A. (1985), ‘Pigovian Taxes which Work in in the Small number Case’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 144-154.
  • Wittman, Donald A. and White M. (1981), ‘Optimal Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 249-268.
  • Wittman, Donald A. and White, Michelle J. (1983), ‘Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location’, Economica , 297-311.
  • Wittman, Donald A. and White, Michelle J. (1983), ‘A Comparison of Regulation and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 413-426.
  • Yohe, Gary W. (1989), ‘More on the Properties of a Tax cum Subsidy Pollution Control Strategy’, 31 Economic Letters , 193-198.
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