Skip to main content
Find a Lawyer

Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 2000 Common Property: General Theory (incl. Common Property versus Private Property)

  • Acheson, James M. (1988), The Lobster Gangs of Maine , Hanover (NH), University Press of New England.
  • Ackerman, Bruce A. (ed.) (1975), Economic Foundations of Property Law , Boston, Little Brown, 332 p.
  • Adamson, Hoebel E. (1954), The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Adasiak, Allen (1979), ‘Alaska’s Experience with Limited Entry’, 36(7) Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada , 770-782.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. and Edelson, Noel (1976), ‘Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities’, 5 Journal of Legal Studies , 147-163.
  • Agrawal, Arun, Greener Pastures: Exchange Politics and Community among a Mobile People , Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington (IN), Indiana University.
  • Agrawal, Arun (1994), ‘Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use’, in Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James M. (eds.), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 276-282.
  • Agrawal, Arun (1996), Group Size and Successful Collective Action: A Case Study of Forest Management Institutions in the Indian Himalayas , Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working paper, Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
  • Agrawal, Arun (1997), ‘How Do Local Institutions Mediate the Impact of Market and Population Pressures on Resource Use? Van Panchayats in the Kumaon Himalayas, India’, Development and Change .
  • Aguilera-Klink, Federico (1991), The Tragedy of the Commons or the Tragedy of Misinterpretation in Economics , presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Manitoba, Winnipeg.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, J.L. (1979), ‘A Note on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources’, Feb. Canadian Journal of Economics , 83-89.
  • Alchian, Armen A. (1961), Some Economics of Property , Rand Corporation, No. P-2316.
  • Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1973), ‘The Property Right Paradigm’, 33 Journal of Economic History , 16-27.
  • Allen, Douglas W. (1991), ‘Origins of Theories of Organization: The Common Property Root: Comments’, in Rymes, Thomas K. (ed.), Gordon, H. Scott. Welfare, property rights and economic policy: Essays and tributes in honour of H. Scott Gordon , Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 75-85.
  • Allen, Douglas W. (1991), ‘Homesteading and Property Rights; or “How the West Was Really Won”‘, 34 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-23.
  • Allen, P. M. and McGlade, J. M. (1987), ‘Modelling Complex Human Systems: A Fisheries Example’, 30 European Journal of Operational Research , 147-167.
  • Allison, S. T. and Messick, David M. (1985), ‘Effects of Experience on Performance in a Replenishable Resource Trap’, 49 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 943-948.
  • Alston, Lee J., Eggertsson, Thrainn and North, Douglass C. (1996), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D. and Schneider, Robert (1996), ‘The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier’, 12 , 25-61.
  • Andelson, Robert V. (1991), ‘Commons Without Tragedy: The Congruence of Garrett Hardin and Henry George’, in Andelson, R.V. (ed.), Commons Without Tragedy: The Social Ecology of Land Tenure and Democracy , London, Centre for Incentive Taxation.
  • Anderson, C. Leigh (1991), Nature vs. Nurture: Systems of Property Rights in First Peoples , presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Manitoba, Winnipeg.
  • Anderson, J. M. (1974), ‘Model for Tragedy of Commons’, 2434(1) IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics , 103-105.
  • Anderson, Terry L. (1992), Property Rights and Indian Economies , Savage (MD), Rowman and Littlefield.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1975), ‘The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 163-179.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1978), ‘An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not so Wild, Wild West’, 2 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 9-29.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1983), ‘Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?’, 50 Southern Economic Journal , 438-450.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1986), ‘Privatizing the Commons: Comment’, 52 Southern Economic Journal , 1162-1167.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1987), ‘Privatizing the Commons: Reply’, 54 Southern Economic Journal , 225-226.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Lueck, Dean (1992), ‘Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 427-454.
  • Antilla, Sten and Torp, Aivind (1996), Environmental Adjustment and Private Economic Strategies in Reindeer Pastoralism: Combining Game Theory with Participatory Action Theory , Working Paper, Mid-Sweden University.
  • Arnason, Ragnar (1990), ‘Minimum Information Management in Fisheries’, 23(3) Canadian Journal of Economics , 630-653.
  • Arnold, J. E. M. (1993), ‘Management of Forest Resources as Common Property’, 72(3) Commonwealth Forestry Review , 157-161.
  • Arnold, J. E. M. and Campbell, J. Gabriel (1986), ‘Collective Management of Hill Forests in Nepal: The Community Forestry Development Project’, in X (ed.), National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management , Washington, National Academy Press, 425-454.
  • Arnold, J. E. M. and Stewart, W.C. (1989), Common Property Resource Management in India , Tropical Forestry Papers, University of Oxford, Forestry Institute, Department of Plant Sciences.
  • Ascher, William (1995), Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Atran, Scott (1986), ‘Hamula Organization and Masha’a Tenure in Palestine’, 21 Man , 271-295.
  • Atran, Scott (1993), ‘Itza Maya Tropical Agro-Forestry’, 34(5) Current Anthropology , 633-700.
  • Ault, David E. and Rutman, Gilbert L. (1979), ‘The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal Africa’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 163-182.
  • Ault, David E. and Rutman, Gilbert L. (1989), ‘Land Scarcity, Economic Efficiency and African Common Law’, 12 Research in Law and Economics , 33-54.
  • Baack, Bennett (1982), ‘Testing the Impact of Exclusive Property Rights: The Case of Enclosing Commons Fields’, in Ransom, R. (ed.), Explorations in the New Economic History: Essays in Honor of Douglass C. North , New York, Academic Press.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. and Krabbe, J. J. (1991), ‘Henry George’s Contribution to Modern Environmental Policy: Part I, Theoretical Postulates’, 50(4) American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 485-501.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. and Krabbe, J. J. (1992), ‘Henry George’s Contribution to Modern Environmental Policy: Part II, the Theory Applied’, 51(1) American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 115-127.
  • Baden, John A. (1977), ‘A Primer for the Management of Common Pool Resources’, in Hardin, Garrett and Baden, John (eds.), Managing the Commons , San Francisco, Freeman.
  • Bailey, Martin J. (1992), ‘Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 183-198.
  • Baird, Douglas G., Gertner, Robert H. and Picker, Randal C. (1994), Game Theory and the Law , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Baird, John S. (1982), ‘Conservation of the Commons: Effects of Group Cohesiveness and Prior Sharing’, 10 Journal of Community Psychology , 210-215.
  • Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe (1994), Should Common Property Resources be Privatized? A Re-Examination of the Tragedy of the Commons , Cahiers de la FacultŽ des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Collection “DŽveloppement”, Namur (Belgium), FacultŽ des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, FacultŽs Universitaire Notre-Dame de la Paix, No. 143.
  • Bardhan, Pranab K. (1993), ‘Symposium on Management of Local Commons’, 7 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 87-92.
  • Bardhan, Pranab K. (1993), ‘Analytics of the Institutions of Informal Cooperation in Rural Development’, 21 World Development , 633-639.
  • Bardhan, Pranab K. (ed.) (1989), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Property Rights and Nuisance Law , West Publishing.
  • Barrett, Scott (1990), ‘The Problem of Global Environmental Protection’, 6(1) Oxford Review of Economic Policy , 68-79.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1991), Economic Analysis of Property Rights , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Bauer, C. (1983), ‘A Tragedy of the Commons?’, 3 Free Market Magazine , 18-22.
  • Becker, Nir (1990), ‘Common Property Resources and Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: The Missing Linkage’, presented at the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property’, Durham (NC) , 27-30.
  • Becker, Nir and Easter, K. William (1992), ‘Dynamic Supply from Common Property Resource: Water Diversions from the Great Lakes’, 6(4) Natural Resource Modeling , 343-371.
  • Behnke, Roy H., Jr. (1984), ‘Fenced and Open-Range Ranching: The Commercialization of Pastoral Land and Livestock in Africa’, in Simpson, J.R. and Evangelou, P. (eds.), Livestock Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boulder (CO) , Boulder, Westview Press.
  • Behnke, Roy H., Jr. (1985), Open-Range Management and Property Rights in Pastoral Africa: A Case of Spontaneous Range Enclosure in South Darfur, Sudan , London, Overseas Development Institute.
  • Bell, Frederick W. (1986), ‘Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons’, 52 Southern Economic Journal , 653-664.
  • Benjamin, Paul, Lam, Wai Fung, Ostrom, Elinor and Shivakoti, Ganesh (1994), Institutions, Incentives, and Irrigation in Nepal, Decentralization: Finance & Management Project Report , Burlington (VT), Associates in Rural Development.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1986), ‘Boom Towns in the West: Is Profit the Culprit?’, 11 Review of Regional Economics and Business , 27-38.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1986), ‘The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment’, 9 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy , 399-427.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), ‘An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials’, 8(1) Cato Journal , 139-163.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), ‘Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of “The Tragedy of the Commons” Arising with Public Allocation Processes’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 73-84.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Are Public Goods Really Common Pools: Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England’, 39 Economic Inquiry , 249-271.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Emerging From the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights’, 5 Constitutional Political Economy , 129-158. Reprinted inTranslated into Spanish and republished (1995) Las Instituciones y Los Derechos de Propiedad al Emerger de la Jungla Hobbesiana: La Fuerza Quita los Reprinted Derechos y los Crea Libertas, 12, 35-75.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Privatization in Criminal Justice , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘Rights, Entitlements, and Individual Responsibility in the Welfare State’, in Karslon, Nils (ed.), Can the Present Problems of Mature Welfare States Such as Sweden be Solved? , Stockholm, City University Press, 88-98.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Toxic Torts by Government , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Uncertainty, the Race for Property Rights, and Rent Dissipation due to Judicial Changes in Product Liability Tort Law’, Cultural Dynamics .
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Restitution in Theory and in Practice’, 12 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 75-98.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Baden, John A. (1985), ‘The Political Economy of Government Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 391-410.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1989), ‘Prison Overcrowding and Judicial Incentives’, 3 Madison Paper Series , 1-22.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1991), ‘Increasing Judicial Responsibility Can Reduce Prison Overcrowding in America’s Prisons: Opposing Viewpoints’, in Tipp, Stacey L. (ed.), San Diego, Greenhaven Press, 139-144.
  • Berck, Peter and Perloff, Jeffrey M. (1985), ‘The Commons as a Natural Barrier to Entry: Why There Are So Few Fish Farms’, 67 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 360-363.
  • Beres, L. R. (1973), ‘Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Tragedy of the Commons’, 26 Western Political Quarterly , 649-658.
  • Berge, Erling and Stenseth, Nils C (1995), Law and the Management of Renewable Resources , Trondheim, Norway, Department of Sociology and Political Science, University of Trondheim.
  • Bergstrom, John C. and Centner, Terence J. (1989), ‘Agricultural Nuisances and Right to Farm Laws’, 19 Review of Regional Studies , 23-30.
  • Berkes, Fikret (1983), The Critique of the ‘Tragedy of Commons’ Paradigm , Canada, Quebec City, presented at the ICAES, August 1983.
  • Berkes, Fikret (1992), ‘Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development and Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey’, in Bromley, Daniel W (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 161-182.
  • Berkes, Fikret, Feeny, David, McCay, Bonnie J. and Acheson, James M. (1989), ‘The Benefits of the Commons’, 340(6229) Nature , 91-93.
  • Blaikie, Piers M. and Brookfield, Harold C. (1987), Land Degradation and Society , New York, Methuen.
  • Blewett, Robert A. (1994), Property Rights as a Cause of the Tragedy of the Commons: Institutional Change and the Pastoral Maasai in Kenya , presented at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, Austin, University of Texas.
  • Blomquist, William (1992), Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Blomquist, William and Ostrom, Elinor (1985), ‘Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma’, 5(2) Policy Studies Review , 383-393.
  • Bockstael, Nancy E., Strand, Ivar E., Jr. and Lipton, Douglas W. (1992), ‘Pulsed Generic Advertising: The Case of Common Property’, 7(4) Marine Resource Economics , 189-208.
  • Bšhm, Stephan (1987), ‘Handlungsrechte, Wettbewerb Und Privatisierung (Property Rights, Competition and Privatization)’, 34 Wirtschaftspolitische BlŠtter , 576-583.
  • Bolle, Friedel (1986), ‘On the Oligopolistic Extraction of Non-Renewable Common-Pool Resources’, 53 Economica , 519-527.
  • Bottomley, Anthony (1963), ‘The Effect of Common Ownership of Land upon Resource Allocation in Tripolitania’, 39 Land Economics , 91-95.
  • Boulding, Kenneth E. (1977), ‘Commons and Community: The Idea of a Public’, in Hardin, Garrett and Baden, John (eds.), Managing the Commons , San Francisco, Freeman.
  • Boyce, John R. (1992), ‘Individual Transferable Quotas and Production Externalities in a Fishery’, 6(4) Natural Resource Modeling , 385-408.
  • Boyce, John R. (1993), ‘Using Participation Data to Estimate Fishing Costs for Commercial Salmon Fisheries in Alaska’, 8(4) Marine Resource Economics , 367-394.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1978), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics’, 12 Journal of Economic Issues , 43-60.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1985), ‘Common Property Issues in International Development’, 5 Bostid Developments , 12-15.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1989), Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foudations of Public Policy , New York, Blackwell, 274 p.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1991), ‘Testing for Common Versus Private Property: Comment on J. S. Clark and G. A. Carlson’, 21 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 92-96.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1991), Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy , Cambridge (MA), Blackwell.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1992), ‘The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy’, 2(1) Environmental and Resource Economics , 1-17.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1992), ‘The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes’, in Bromley, Daniel W. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 3-15.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. and Cernea, Michael M. (1989), The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies , Discussion Paper, Washington, World Bank, No. 57.
  • Bromley, Daniel W. and othersXXX (eds.) (1992), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Brox, Ottar (1990), ‘The Common Property Theory: Epistemological Status and Analytical Utility’, 49 Human Organization , 227-235.
  • Bruce, John W. (1995), Legal Bases for the Management of Land-Based Natural Resources as Common Property, Forests, Trees and People Programme , Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
  • Bruce, John W. and Migot-Adholla, Shem E. (1994), Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa , Dubuque (IA), Kendall/Hunt.
  • Bruce, John W., Fortmann, Louise and Nhira, Calvin (1993), ‘Tenures in Transition, Tenures in Conflict: Examples from the Zimbabwe Social Forest’, 58 Rural Sociology , 626-642.
  • Bruggink, Thomas H. (1992), ‘Third Party Effects of Groundwater Law in the United States: Private versus Common Property’, 51(1) American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 1-17.
  • Bruggink, Thomas H. (1992), ‘Privatization versus Groundwater Central Management: Public Policy Choices to Prevent a Water Crisis in the 1990s’, 51(2) American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 205-222.
  • Bruno, S. (1990), ‘Institutions Matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions’, 34 European Economic Review , 443-449.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1968), ‘Congestion on the Commons: A Case for Government Intervention’, 33 Il Politico: Revista Italiana Di Scienze Politiche , 776-786.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1973), ‘The Institutional Structure of Externality’, 14 Public Choice , 69-82.
  • Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon (1962), The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review , 1089-1128. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A., Economic Foundations of Property Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 31-48.
  • Caputo, Michael R. and Lueck, Dean (1994), ‘Modeling Common Property Ownership as a Dynamic Contract’, 8(3) Natural Resource Modeling , 225-245.
  • Carroll, Thomas M., Ciscil, David H. and Chisholm, R.K. (1979), ‘Market as a Commons: Unconventional View of Property Rights’, 13 Journal of Economic Issues , 605-627.
  • Casimir, Michael J. (1990), ‘The Determinants of Rights to Pasture: Territorial Organization and Ecological Constraints’, in Casimir, M. J. and Rao, A (eds.), Mobility and Territoriality , New York, Berg.
  • Cass, Robert C. and Edney, Julian J. (1978), ‘The Commons Dilemma: A Simulation Testing the Effects of Resource Visibility and Territorial Division’, 6 Human Ecology , 371-386.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1986), ‘Agricultural Nuisances and the Georgia Right to Farm Law’, 22 Georgia State Bar Journal , 19-26.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1988), ‘Agricultural Nuisances Under the Amended Georgia ‘Right-to-Farm’ Law’, 25 Georgia State Bar Journal , 36-41.
  • Cernea, Michael M. (1991), Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Christy, Francis T. (1964), The Exploitation of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Maryland Oyster Industry , University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Ph.D. Dissertation.
  • Christy, Francis T. (1973), Fisherman Quotas: A Tentative suggestion for Domestic Management , University of Rhode Island, Law of the Sea Institute.
  • Ciriacy-Wantrup, Siegfried V. (1963), Resource Conservation: Economics and Policies , Berkeley, University of California, Division of Agricultural Sciences.
  • Ciriacy-Wantrup, Siegfried V. and Bishop, Richard C. (1975), ”Common Property’ as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy’, 15 Natural Resources Journal , 713-727.
  • Clark, Colin W. (1976), Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources , New York, Wiley.
  • Clark, Colin W. (1980), ‘Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game Theoretic Analysis’, in Lin, P.T. (ed.), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics , New York, Plenum, 117-132.
  • Clark, J. Stephen and Carlson, Gerald A. (1990), ‘Testing for Common versus Private Property: The Case of Pesticide Resistance’, 19 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 45-60.
  • Clarke, Harry R. (1994), ‘The Welfare Effects of Labour Force Growth with Internationally Mobile Capital’, 7(1) Journal of Population Economics , 79-98.
  • Clemhout, Simone and Wan, Henry, Jr. (1990), ‘Environmental Problem as a Common Property Resource Game’, in Hamalainen, Raimo Pertti, Ehtamo, Harri Kalevi, (eds.), Dynamic games in economic analysis: Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications, August 9 10, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol. 157 , New York, Springer, 132-154.
  • Cleveland, Cutler (1995), The Relationship between Ecosystems and Human Systems: Scale Challenges in Linking Property Rights Systems and Natural Resource Management , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Cnossen, Sijbren and Vollebergh, Herman (1992), ‘Toward a Global Excise on Carbon’, 45(1) National Tax Journal , 23-36.
  • Commons, John R. (1968), Legal Foundations of Capitalism , Madison, University of Wisconsin.
  • Conybeare, John A. C. and Sandler, Todd (1993), ‘State Sponsored Violence as a Tragedy of the Commons: England’s Privateering Wars with France and Spain, 1625 1630’, 77(4) Public Choice , 879-897.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1991), ‘Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea’, 25 Law and Society Review , 759-801.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1992), ‘Organization as Property: Economic Analysis of Property Law and Privatization’, in Clague, Christopher and Rausser, Gordon (eds.), The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe , Oxford, Blackwell, 77-97.
  • Copes, Parzival (1984), ‘The Market as an Open Access Commons: A Neglected Aspect of Excess Capacity’, 132 De Economist , 49-60.
  • Copes, Parzival (1986), ‘A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management’, 62 Land Economics , 278-291.
  • Cordell, John C. and McKean, Margaret A. (1992), ‘Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil’, in Bromley, Daniel W. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 183-205.
  • Cornes, Richard and Sandler, Todd (1986), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 303 p.
  • Cornes, Richard and Sandler, Todd (1986), ‘On Commons and Tragedies’, 83 American Economic Review , 787-792.
  • Cornes, Richard, Mason, Charles F. and Sandler, Todd (1986), ‘The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms’, 101 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 641-646.
  • Coward, E. Walter, Jr. (1980), Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia: Perspectives from the Social Sciences , Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press.
  • Cox, Susan J.B. (1985), Flawed Perceptions in the Foundations of Public Policy: The Case of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons , presented at the Southern Political Science Association annual meeting, Nashville (TN).
  • Cox, Susan J.B. (1985), ‘No Tragedy on the Commons’, 7 Environmental Ethics , 49-61.
  • Crawford, Sue E.S. and Ostrom, Elinor (1995), ‘A Grammar of Institutions’, 89 American Political Science Review , 582-600.
  • Croucher, Jack (1989), The Use and Management of Common Property Resources: A Collective Action/Club Good Approach , University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. dissertation.
  • Cruz, Wilfrido D. (1986), ‘Overfishing and Conflict in a Traditional Fishery: San Miguel Bay, Philippines’, in X (ed.), National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management , Washington, National Academy Press, 115-135.
  • Curtis, Donald (1991), Beyond Government: Organizations for Common Benefit , London, MacMillan.
  • Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles E. (1963), Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes , New York, Harper and Row.
  • Dahlman, Carl J. (1980), The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Right , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 234 p.
  • Dales, John H. (1968), Pollution, Property, and Prices: An Essay in Policy-making and Economics , Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
  • Dasgupta, Partha S. (1982), The Control of Resources , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Dasgupta, Partha S. and Heal, Geoffrey M. (1979), Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 501 p.
  • Dawes, Robyn M. (1973), ‘The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game with a Dominating Strategy for Defection’, 13 Oregon Research Institute Bulletin , 1-12.
  • Dawes, Robyn M., McTavish, Jeanne and Shaklee, Harriet (1977), ‘Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about Other People’s Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation’, 35 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1-11.
  • De Alessi, Louis (1980), ‘The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence’, 2 Research in Law and Economics , 1-47.
  • De Alessi, Louis (1982), ‘On the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprises’, 67 Minnesota Law Review , 191-209.
  • De Geest, Gerrit (1994), ‘Private versus gemene eigendom: de ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ herbekeken (Private versus Common Property: The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ Reconsidered)’, 1994(2) Recht der Werkelijkheid , 132-146. Reprinted in Raes, Koen and Willekens, Harry (eds.), Economische verklaringen van het recht, ‘s-Gravenhage, Vuga, 1994.
  • De Meza, David and Gould, J.R. (1985), ‘Free Access vs. Private Ownership: A Comparison’, 36 Journal of Economic Theory , 387-391.
  • De Meza, David and Gould, J.R. (1987), ‘Free Access Versus Private Property in a Resource: Income Distributions Compared’, 95 Journal of Political Economy , 1317-1325.
  • Degenkamp, J.Th. and Heynen, H.M. (1980), ‘Juridische en economische eigendom. Een formele analyse (Legal and Economic Ownership. A Formal Analysis)’, in X (ed.), Tolvrije gedachten , Deventer, Kluwer, 117-129.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1964), ‘The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights’, 7 Journal of Law and Economics , 11-26.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1966), ‘Some Aspects of Property Rights’, 9 Journal of Law and Economics , 61-70.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, 57 American Economic Review , 347-359. Reprinted in Demsetz, Harold (1988), Ownership, Control and the Firm: The Organization of Economic Activity, Vol. I, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 104-116
  • Devany, Arthur S. (1969), ‘A Property System for Market Allocation of Electro-Magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study’, 30 Stanford Law Review , 1499-1561.
  • Dixon, Lloyd S. (1991), ‘Common Property Aspects of Ground Water Use and Drainage Generation’, in Dinar, Ariel and Zilberman, David (eds.), The economics and management of water and drainage in agriculture. , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 677-697.
  • Dnes, Anthony W. (1986), The European Communities’ Common Fisheries Policy: A Critique , Hume Occasional Paper, Edinburgh, No. 6.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1985), ‘Rent Seeking Behaviour and Open Access Fishing’, 32 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 159-170.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1986), The European Communities’ Common Fisheries Policy : A Critique , Hume Occasional Paper, Edinburgh, No. 6.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1988), ‘The Efficiency of Central Planning’, 35 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 404-410.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1988), ‘Rent Seeking, Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism and Property Rights : A Comment’, 144 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 891-893.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1989), ‘Rent Seeking, Conflict and Property Rights’, 36 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 366-374.
  • Doane, Michael J. and Spulber, Daniel F. (1994), ‘Open Access and the Evolution of the U.S. Spot Market for Natural Gas’, 37(2) Journal of Law and Economics , 477-517.
  • Douglas, Roy (1991), ‘The Commons and Property Rights: Towards a Synthesis of Demography and Ecology’, in Andelson, R.V. (ed.), Commons Without Tragedy: The Social Ecology of Land Tenure and Democracy , London, Centre for Incentive Taxation.
  • Dudley, Dean (1993), Essays on Individual Behavior in Social Dilemma Environments: An Experimental Analysis , Indiana University, Ph.D. Dissertation.
  • Dudley, Norman J. (1992), ‘Water Allocation by Markets, Common Property and Capacity Sharing: Companions or Competitors?’, 32(4) Natural Resources Journal , 757-778.
  • Dufournaud, C. M., Quinn, J. T. and Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. (1994), ‘A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Introducing More Efficient Wood Burning Stoves into Households in the Sahelian Region’, 26(3) Environment and Planning , 407-414.
  • Dutta, Prajit K. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1993), ‘How Different Can Strategic Models Be?’, 60(1) Journal of Economic Theory , 42-61.
  • Dutta, Prajit K. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1993), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons?’, 3(3) Economic Theory , 413-426.
  • Edney, Julian J. (1980), ‘The Commons Problem: Alternative Perspectives’, 35 American Psychologist , 131-150.
  • Edney, Julian J. and Bell, P. A. (1983), ‘The Commons Dilemma: Comparing Altruism, the Golden Rule, Perfect Equality of Outcomes, and Territoriality’, 20 Social Science Journal , 23-33.
  • Edwards, Steven F. (1994), ‘Ownership of Renewable Ocean Resources’, 9 Land Economics , 253-273.
  • Eggertsson, Thrainn (1990), Economic Behaviour and Institutions , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 385 p.
  • Eggertsson, Thrainn (1992), ‘Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millenium of Comon Mountain Pastures in Iceland’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 423-437.
  • Eggertsson, Thrainn (1993), ‘The Economic Rationale for Communal Resources’, in Berge, Erling (ed.), Common Property Regimes: Law and Management of Non-Private Resources: Proceedings of the Conference, Vol. I , Norway, The Agricultural University of Norway.
  • Eggertsson, Thrainn (1993), ‘The Economics of Institutions: Avoiding the Open-Field Syndrome and the Perils of Path Dependence’, 36 Acta Sociologica , 223-237.
  • Eggertsson, Thrainn (1994), Property Rights, Economic Analysis and the Information Problem , presented at the conference ‘What is Institutionalism Now?’, University of Maryland, College Park (MD).
  • Ellickson, Robert C. (1991), Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Ellickson, Robert C. (1993), ‘Property in Land’, 102 Yale Law Journal , 1315-1400.
  • Ellickson, Robert C., Rose, Carol M. and Ackerman, Bruce A. (1995), Perspectives on Property Law , Boston, Little Brown.
  • Emel, Jacques L. and Brooks, Elizabeth (1988), ‘Changes in Form and Function of Property Rights Institutions under Threatened Resource Scarcity’, 78 Annals of the Association of American Geographers , 241-252.
  • Engels, Friedrich (1972), The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan , New York, International Publisher.
  • Ensminger, Jean (1992), Making a Market: the Institutional Transformation of an African Society , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Ensminger, Jean and Rutten, Andrew R. (1987), The Politics of Changing Property Rights: Dismantling a Commons from Within , Working Paper, St. Louis (MO), Washington University.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (1994), ‘On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property’, in Paul, E.F., Miller, F.D., and Paul, Jeffrey (eds.), Property Rights , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Eswaran, Mukesh and Lewis, Tracy R. (1982), Exhaustible Resources, Property Rights and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts , Working Paper, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, University of British Columbia.
  • Feder, Gershon and Feeny, David (1991), ‘Land Tenure and Property Rights Theory and Implications for Development Policy’, 5 World Bank Economic Review , 135-153.
  • Feder, Gershon, Onchan, T., Chalamwong, Y. and Hangladoran, C. (1988), Land Policies and Form Productivity in Thailand , Baltimore (MD), John Hopkins University Press.
  • Feeny, David (1988), ‘Agricultural Expansion and Forest Depletion in Thailand 1900-1975’, in Richards, John F. and Tucker, Richard P. (eds.), World Deforestation in the Twentieth Century, Durham , Durham (NC), Duke University Press, 112-143.
  • Feeny, David (1993), ‘The Demand for and the Supply of Institutional Arrangements’, in Ostrom, Vincent, Feeny, David, and Picht, Hartmut (eds.), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development , San Francisco, ICS Press, 159-209.
  • Field, Barry C. (1984), ‘The Evolution of Individual Property Rights in Massachusetts Agriculture, 17th-19th Centuries’, 14 Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics , 97-109.
  • Field, Barry C. (1985), ‘The Optimal Commons’, 67 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 364-367.
  • Field, Barry C. (1986), ‘Induced Changes in Property-Rights Institutions’, 86(1) XXXDepartment of Agricultural and Resource Economics Research Paper Series .
  • Field, Barry C. (1989), ‘The Evolution of Property Rights’, 42(3) Kyklos , 319-345.
  • Folke, Carl and Berkes, Fikret (1995), ‘Mechanisms that Link Property Rights to Ecological Systems’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank.
  • Fortmann, Louise and Bruce, John W. (1988), Whose Trees? Proprietary Dimensions of Forestry , Boulder, Westview Press.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1973), ‘Pricing of Pollution: The Coase Theorem in the Long Run’, 4(1) Bell Journal of Economics , 316-319.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1991), ‘Review of Contracting for Property Rights, by Gary D. Liebcaps’, 15 Journal of Comparative Economics , 536-538.
  • Frey, Bruno S. (1993), ‘Review of: Environment and economy: Property rights and public policy’, 31 Journal of Economic Literature , 1442-1443.
  • Freyfogle, Eric T. (1985), ‘Land Use and the Study of Early American History’, 94 Yale Law Journal , 717-742.
  • Friedman, Alan E. (1971), ‘The Economics of the Common-Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources’, 18(5) UCLA Law Review , 855-873.
  • Friedman, David D. (1979), ‘Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case’, 8 Journal of Legal Studies , 399-415.
  • Frohlich, Norman and Oppenheimer, Joe E. (1972), A Reformulation of the Collective Good: Private Good Distinction , Pittsburgh (PA), presented at the 1972 annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, May 3-6, 1972.
  • Frohlich, Norman, Oppenheimer, Joe A. and Young, Oran R. (1971), Political Leadership and Collective Goods, Princeton (NJ) , Princeton, Princeton University Press.
  • Furubotn, Eirik and Pejovich, Svetozar (1972), ‘Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature’, 10 Journal of Economic Literature , 1137-1162.
  • Furubotn, Eirik G. (1987), ‘Privatizing the Commons: Comment’, 54 Southern Economic Journal , 219-224.
  • Furubotn, Eirik G. (1989), ‘Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights: Comment’, 145 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 25-31.
  • Gadgil, Madhav and Iyer, Prema (1989), ‘On the Diversification of Common-Property Resource Use by Indian Society’, in Berkes, Fikret (ed.), Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development , London, Belhaven Press, 240-272.
  • Gaffney, Mason (1992), ‘The Taxable Surplus in Water Resources’, 10 Contemporary Policy Issues , 74-82.
  • Gardner, Roy and Ostrom, Elinor (1991), ‘Rules and Games’, 70 Public Choice , 121-149.
  • Gardner, Roy, Ostrom, Elinor and Walker, James M. (1990), ‘The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems’, 2 Rationality and Society , 335-358.
  • Ghoshal, Sumantra and Moran, Peter (1996), ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory’, 21 Academy of Management Review , 13-47.
  • Gibson, Clark, The Politics of Wildlife in Africa: Zambia 1964-1991 , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Gibson, Clark and Marks, Stuart (1995), ‘Transforming Rural Hunters Into Conservationists: An Assessment of Community-Based Wildlife Management Programs in Africa’, 23 World Development , 941-957.
  • Glaser, Christine (1981), , Presented at the Conference on Advances in Comparative Institutional Analysis, Inter-University Center of Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, October 19-23.
  • Godwin, R. Kenneth and Shepard, W. Bruce (1977), ‘Population Issues and Commons Dilemmas’, 6 Policy Studies Journal , 231-238.
  • Godwin, R. Kenneth and Shepard, W. Bruce (1979), ‘Forcing Squares, Triangles, and Ellipses into a Circular Paradigm: The Use of the Commons Dilemma in Examining the Allocation of Common Resources’, 32 Western Political Quarterly , 265-277.
  • Goetze, David B (1987), ‘Identifying Appropriate Institutions for Efficient Use of Common Pools’, 27 Natural Resources Journal , 187-199.
  • Gordon, H.S. (1954), ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery’, 62 Journal of Political Economy , 124-142.
  • Grima, A.P. Limo and Berkes, Fikret (1989), ‘Natural Resources: Access, Rights to Use and Management’, in Berkes, Fikret (ed.), Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development , London, Belhaven Press, 33-54.
  • Grossi, Paolo, An Alternative to Private Property: Collective Property in the Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Gupta, Anil K. (1985), Managing Common Properties: Some Issues in Institutional Design , India, Ahmedabad, Indian Institute of Management, Center for Management in Agriculture, presented at the Common Property Resource Management Conference, Annapolis (MD), April 21-26, 1985.
  • Gupta, Anil K. (1986), ‘Socioecology of Stress: Why Do Common Property Resource Management Projects Fail?’, in X (ed.), National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management , Washington, National Academy Press, 305-322.
  • Hackett, Steven C., Dudley, Dean and Walker, James M. (1995), ‘Veterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 93-124.
  • Hackett, Steven C., Schlager, Edella and Walker, James M. (1994), ‘The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators’, 27 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 99-126.
  • Haefele, Edwin T. (1974), The Governance of Common Property Resources , Baltimore (MD), John Hopkins University Press.
  • Hampton, Nathan Eric (1990), ‘Costs of California’s Correlative Rights Doctrine as a Solution to Groundwater Overdraft’, 8(4) Contemporary Policy Issues , 106-117.
  • Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (1995), ‘An Introduction to Property Rights and the Environmen’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank.
  • Hanna, Susan, Folke, Carl and Mšler, Karl-Gšran (1995), ‘Property Rights and Environmental Resources’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank, 15-30.
  • Hanna, Susan, Folke, Carl and Mšler, Karl-Gšran (1996), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment , Washington, Island Press.
  • Hardin, Garrett (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, 162 Science , 1243-1248.
  • Hardin, Garrett (1985), Filters Against Folly: How to Survive Despite Economics, Ecologist and the Merely Eloquent , New York, Viking.
  • Hardin, Garrett (1991), ‘The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and the Disguises of Providence’, in Andelson, R.V. (ed.), Commons Without Tragedy: The Social Ecology of Land Tenure and Democracy , London, Centre for Incentive Taxation.
  • Hardin, Garrett and Baden, John A. (eds.) (1977), Managing the Commons , San Francisco, Freeman, 294 p.
  • Hayami, Yujiro and Otsuka, Keijiro (1993), The Economics of Contract Choice , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Heijman, Willem J. M. (1991), Depletable resources and the economy, Wageningen Economic Studies, no. 21. , Wageningen, the Netherlands, Wageningen Agricultural University, 267 p.
  • Herber, Bernard P. (1991), ‘The Common Heritage Principle: Antarctica and the Developing Nations’, 50(4) American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 391-406.
  • Herring, Ronald J. (1990), ‘Resurrecting the Commons: Collective Action and Ecology’, 44 Items , 64-68.
  • Hess, Charlotte (1996), Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Higgs, Robert (1982), ‘Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington Salmon Fishery’, 7 Research in Economic History , 55-86.
  • Higgs, Robert (1996), ‘Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington Salmon Fishery’, in Alston, Lee J., Eggertsson, Thrainn, and North, Douglass C. (eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change , New York, Cambridge University Press, 247-279.
  • Hilton, Rita (1992), ‘nstitutional Incentives for Resource Mobilization: An Analysis of Irrigation Schemes in Nepal’, 4 Journal of Theoretical Politics , 283-308.
  • Hine, Donald William (1990), The Commons Dilemma: Quantitative Review , University of Victoria, M.A. Thesis.
  • Hoff, Karla and Lyon, Andrew (1993), The Sequencing of Land and Credit Reforms in Developing Countries: A Theoretical Perspective , Washington, Institute for Policy Reform.
  • Hooker, Ann (1994), ‘The International Law of Forests’, 34(4) Natural Resources Journal , 823-877.
  • Hotelling, Harold (1931), ‘The Economics of Exhaustible Resources’, 39 Journal of Political Economy , 137-175.
  • Huerta De Soto, Jesœs (1994), ‘Ecolog’a de mercado (Free Market Environmentalism)’, in X (ed.), Estudios de Econom’a Pol’tica , Madrid, Uni—n Editorial, 229-249.
  • Huerta De Soto, Jesœs (1996), ‘Derechos de propiedad y gesti—n privada de los recursos de la naturaleza (Property Rights and Private Management of Environmental Resources)’, 2 Cuadernos del Pensamineto Liberal , 13-30.
  • Hutter, Michael (1979), Die Gestaltung von Property Rights als Mittel gesellschaftlichwirtschaftlicher Allokation (The Structure of Property Rights as a Means of Social-Economic Al location) , Gšttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 245 p.
  • Hviding, Edvard and Baines, Graham B. K. (1994), ‘Community Based Fisheries Management, Tradition and the Challenges of Development in Marovo, Solomon Islands’, 25(1) Development and Change , 13-39.
  • Isaac, R. Mark (1995), ‘Review of: Equity: In theory and practice’, 33 Journal of Economic Literature , 210-211.
  • Jaffe, Austin J. and Janov, M. (1989), ‘Property Rights and the Tragedy of the Commons in the National Park System’, 14 Real Estate Issues , 39-48.
  • Jankowski, Richard (1990), ‘Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner’s Dilemma Games’, 2 Rationality and Society , 449-470.
  • Jodha, Narpat S. (1986), ‘Common Property Resources and Rural Poor in Dry Regions of India’, 21 Economic and Political Weekly , 1169-1181.
  • Jodha, Narpat S. (1989), ‘Depletion of Common Property Resources in India: Micro level Evidence’, in McNicoll, Geoffrey, Cain, Mead (eds.), Rural development and population: Institutions and policy. Population and Development Review, Supplement to Volume 15 , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 261-283.
  • Jodha, Narpat S. (1996), ‘Property Rights and Development’, in X (ed.), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment , Washington, Island Press, 205-222.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce (1986), ‘The Formation and Protection of Property Rights among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 41-67.
  • Johnson, Baylor L. (1995), Common Property and Corporate Property: A Comparison of Property Rights , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Johnson, Omotunde E.G. (1972), ‘Economic Analysis: the Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems’, 15 Journal of Law and Economics , 259-276.
  • Johnson, Ronald N. (1985), ‘Restraint Under Open Access: Are Voluntary Incentives Sufficient or is Coercion Required?’, 67 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 373-376.
  • Johnson, Ronald N. and Libecap, Gary D. (1982), ‘Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery’, 72 American Economic Review , 1005-1022.
  • Kaitala, Veijo T. and Munro, Gordon R. (1995), ‘The Management of Transboundary Resources and Property Rights Systems: The Case of Fisheries’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank.
  • Kanbur, Ravi (1991), Heterogeneity, Distribution and Cooperation in Common Property Resource Management , Background Paper, Washington, World Bank.
  • Karp, Larry S. (1992), ‘Efficiency Inducing Tax for a Common Property Oligopoly’, 102(411) Economic Journal , 321-332.
  • Karp, Larry S. (1992), ‘Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly’, 33(2) International Economic Review , 353-372.
  • Kaul, Minoti Chakravarty (1996), Common Lands and Customary Law: Institutional Change in North India over the Past Two Centuries , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Kenkman, Paul (1995), Public Versus Private Property: Opinions of Estonians at the Time of Transition , Fifth Annual Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (1995), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage.
  • Keohane, Robert O., Haas, Peter M. and Levy, Marc A. (1993), ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions and Transboundary and Commons Problems’, in Haas, P.M., Keohane, Robert O., and Levy, Marc A. (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection , Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
  • Kiser, Larry L. and Ostrom, Elinor (1982), ‘The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches’, in Ostrom, Elinor (ed.), Strategies of Political Inquiry , Beverly Hills (CA), Sage Publications, 179-222.
  • Kramer, R. M. and Brewer, Marilyn M. (1986), ‘Social Group Identity and the Emergence of Cooperation in Resource Conservation Dilemmas’, in Wilke, H. A., Messick, D. M., and Rutte, Christel G. (eds.), Experimental Social Dilemmas , Frankfurt am Main, Peter D. Lang.
  • Krueckeberg, D. A. (1995), ‘The Difficult Character of Property: To Whom Do Things Belong?’, 61 Journal of the American Planning Association , 301-386.
  • Kruskal, Joseph B. (1983), ‘An Overview of Sequence Comparison’, in Sankoff, David and Kruskal, Joseph B. (eds.), Time Warps, String Edits, and Macromolecules: The Theory and Practice of Sequence Comparison , Reading (MA), Addison-Wesley.
  • Lam, Wai Fung, Institutions, Engineering Infrastructure, and Performance in the Governance and Management of Irrigation Systems: The Case of Nepal , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Lam, Wai Fung (1996), ‘Institutional Design of Public Agencies and Coproduction: A Study of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan’, 24 World Development , 1039-1054.
  • Landsburg, Steven E. (1989), Price Theory and Applications , Orlando, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Dryden Press, 646 p.
  • Larson, Bruce A. and Bromley, Daniel W. (1990), ‘Property Rights, Externalities, and Resource Degradation: Locating the Tragedy’, 33 Journal of Development Economics , 235-362.
  • Laveleye, Emile De (1985), Primitive Property: Translated from the French of Emile de Laveleye , Littleton (CO), G.R.L. MARRIOTT. Reprint of 1878, F.B. Rothman (ed.).
  • Lawry, Steven W. (1990), ‘Tenure Policy toward Common Property Natural Resources in Sub Saharan Africa’, 30(2) Natural Resources Journal , 403-422.
  • Lee, Myungsuk, Institutional Analysis, Public Policy, and the Possibility of Collective Action in Common Pool Resources: A Dynamic Game Theoretic Approach , Indiana University, Ph.D. Dissertation.
  • Lepage, Henri (1984), Pourquoi la propriŽtŽ? (Why Property?) , Paris.
  • Levi, Margaret and North, Douglass C. (1982), ‘Toward a Property Rights Theory of Exploitation’, 11 Politics and Society , 315-320.
  • Levine, B. L. (1986), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons and the Comedy of Community: The Commons in History’, 14 Journal of Community Psychology , 81-99.
  • Lewis, Tracy R. and Cowens, James (1983), Cooperation in the Commons: An Application of Repetitious Rivalry , Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1978), The Evolution of Private Mineral Rights: Nevada’s Comstock Lode ,.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1978), ‘Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights’, 38 Journal of Economic History , 338-362.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1979), ‘Government Support of Private Claims to Public Minerals: Western Mineral Rights’, 5 Business History Review , 364-385.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1989), Contracting for Property Rights , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 132 p.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1989), ‘Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights’, 145 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 6-24.
  • Libecap, Gary D. (1995), ‘The Conditions for Successful Collective Action’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 161-190.
  • Libecap, Gary D. and Wiggins, Steven N. (1984), ‘Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production’, 74 American Economic Review , 87-98.
  • Lichbach, Mark I. (1996), The Cooperator’s Dilemma , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Lipnowski, Irwin F. (1991), Solving the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’: An Alternative to Privatization , presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Manitoba, Winnipeg.
  • Lueck, Dean (1989), ‘The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 291-324.
  • Lueck, Dean (1993), ‘Contracting into the Commons’, in Anderson, Terry L. and Simmons, Randy T., (eds.), The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem , Lanham, (MD), Rowman and Littlefield.
  • Lueck, Dean (1994), ‘Common Property as an Egalitarian Share Contract’, 25(2) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 93-108.
  • Lueck, Dean (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’, 38 Journal of Law and Economics , 393-436.
  • Lueck, Dean (1995), ‘Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions’, 35 Natural Resources Journal , 625-670.
  • Lueck, Dean (1998), ‘First Possession’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , London, MacMillan.
  • Lueck, Dean and Caputo, Michael R. (1994), ‘Modeling Common Property Ownership as a Dynamic Contract’, 8(3) Natural Resources Modeling , 225-245.
  • Lund, Soren (1995), Institutional Rational Choice Theory and Design of Appropriate Institutional Arrangements for Natural Resource Management , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Maass, Arthur and Anderson, Raymond L. (1986), . . . and the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments , Malabar (FL), R. E. Krieger.
  • Magrath, William B. (1989), The Challenge of the Commons: The Allocation of Nonexclusive Resources , Washington, World Bank.
  • Mahendrarajah, Sinniah and Warr, Peter G. (1991), ‘Water Management and Technological Change: Village Dams in Sri Lanka’, 42(3) Journal of Agricultural Economics , 309-324.
  • Maine, Henry Sumner (1890), On Early Law and Custom , London, Murray.
  • Maine, Henry Sumner (1963), Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas: With Introduction and Notes by Frederick Pollack , Boston, Beacon Press.
  • Marchak, Patricia, Guppy, Neil and McMullan, John (1987), Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-Processing Industries in British Columbia , New York, Methuen.
  • Martel, Jocelyn (1991), ‘Bankruptcy Law and the Canadian Experience: An Economic Appraisal’, 17(1) Canadian Public Policy , 52-63.
  • Martichuski, Diane K. and Bell, Paul A. (1991), ‘Reward, Punishment, Privatization, and Moral Suasion in a Commons Dilemma’, 21 Journal of Applied Social Psychology , 1356-1369.
  • Martin, Edward and Yoder, Robert (1983), a, b, or c in Lin’s master bib? ,.
  • Martin, Edward G. (1986), Resource Mobilization, Water Allocation, and Farmer Organization in Hill Irrigation Systems in Nepal , Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University.
  • Martin, Edward G. and Yoder, Robert (1983), Water Allocation and Resource Mobilization for Irrigation: A Comparison of Two Systems in Nepal , presented at the annual meeting of the Nepal Studies Association, Madison, University of Wisconsin.
  • Martin, Edward G. and Yoder, Robert (1983), The Chherlung Thulo Kulo: A Case Study of a Farmer-Managed Irrigation System , Water Management in Nepal: Proceedings of the Seminar on Water Management Issuesn Kathmandu, Nepal, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Projects Services Centre, and the Agricultural Development Council.
  • Martin, Fenton (1989), Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography (Volume 1) , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Martin, Fenton (1993), Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography (Volume 2) , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Martin, Kent O. (1979), ‘Play by the Rules or Don’t Play at All: Space Division and Resource Allocation in a Rural Newfoundland Fishing Community’, in Anderson, Raoul (ed.), North Atlantic Maritime Cultures: Anthropological Essays on Changing Adaptations , The Hague, Mouton, 276-298.
  • Martin, Lisa L. (1995), ‘Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 71-92.
  • Marwell, Gerald and Oliver, Pamela (1993), The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Mason, C. F., Sandler, Todd and Cornes, Richard (1988), ‘Expectations, the Commons, and Optimal Group Size’, 15 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 99-110.
  • Mason, Charles F. and Polasky, Stephen (1994), ‘Entry Deterrence in the Commons’, 35(2) International Economic Review , 507-525.
  • Matthews, David Ralph (1993), Controlling Common Property: Regulating Canada’s East Coast Fishery , Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
  • Maurer, Georg Ludwig Von (1854), Einleitung zur Geschichte der Mark-, Hof Dorf- und Stadtverfassung under der úffentlichen Gewalt , Munich, Verlag von Christian Kaiser.
  • McCay, Bonnie J. (1992), ‘Everyone’s Concern, Whose Responsibility?: The Problem of the Commons’, in Ortiz, S. and Lees, S. (eds.), Understanding Economic Process: Monographs in Economic Anthropology , Lanham (MD), University Press of America.
  • McCay, Bonnie J. (1996), ‘Common and Private Concerns’, in X (ed.), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment , Washington, Island Press, 111-126.
  • McCay, Bonnie J. and Acheson, James M. (1987), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources , Tucson (AZ), University of Arizona Press.
  • McCay, Bonnie, J., Wright, Ian, Apostle, Richard and Mazany, Leigh (1996), Fleet Concentration in an ITQ Fishery: A Case Study of the Southwest Nova Scotia Mobile Gear Fleet , presented at the sixth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Berkeley.
  • McCloskey, Donald N. (1976), ‘English Open Fields as Behavior Towards Risk’, in Unselding, Paul (ed.), Research in Economic History 1 , Greenwich (CT), JAI Press.
  • McCloskey, Donald N. (1989), ‘The Open Fields of England: Rent, Risk, and the Rate of Interest’, in Galenson, David W. (ed.), Markets in History: Economic Studies of the Past, 1300-1815 , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • McGinnis, Michael and Ostrom, Elinor (1996), ‘Design Principles for Local and Global Commons’, in Young, Oran R. (ed.), The International Political Economy and International Institutions, Vol. II , Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar, 465-493.
  • McGranahan, Gordon (1991), ‘Fuelwood, Subsistence Foraging, and the Decline of Common Property’, 19(10) World Development , 1275-1287.
  • McKean, Margaret A. (1982), ‘The Japanese Experience with Scarcity: Management of Traditional Common Lands’, 6 Environmental Review , 63-88.
  • McKean, Margaret A. (1992), ‘Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan’, in Bromley, Daniel W. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 63-98.
  • McKean, Margaret A. (1995), Common Property Regimes as a Solution to Problems of Scale and Linkage , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • McKean, Margaret A. (1995), Common Property: What Is It, What Is It Good For, and What Makes it Work? , presented at the International Conference on Chinese Rural Collectives and Voluntary Organizations: Between State Organization and Private Interest, Leiden, Sinological Institute, University of Leiden.
  • McKean, Margaret A. and Ostrom, Elinor (1995), ‘Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic from the Past?’, 46 Unasylva , 3-15.
  • McKlevay, R. (1985), ‘Decentralized Regulation of a Common Property Renewable Resource Industry with Irreversible Investment’, 12 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 287-307.
  • McMillan, John and Sinn, Hans-Werner (1984), ‘Oligopolistic Extraction of a Common-Property Resource: Dynamic Equilibria’, in Kemp, M. C. and Long, N. V. (eds.), Essays in the Economics of Exhaustible Resources , Amsterdam, North-Holland.
  • McNicoll, Geoffrey and Cain, Mead (eds.) (1990), Rural development and population: Institutions and policy, Population and Development Review, Supplement to Volume 15, 1989 , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 366 p.
  • Mearns, Robin (1996), ‘Community, Collective Action and Common Grazing: The Case of Post-Socialist Mongolia’, 32 Journal of Development Studies , 297-339.
  • Merlo, M. (1989), ‘The Experience of the Village Communities in the North-Eastern Italian Alps’, in Merlo, M. (ed.), Collective Forest Land Tenure and Rural Development in Italy , Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 1-54.
  • Messerschmidt, Donald A. (1986), ‘People and Resources in Nepal: Customary Resource Management Systems of the Upper Kali Gandaki’, in X (ed.), National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management , Washington, National Academy Press, 455-480.
  • Messerschmidt, Donald A. (1993), Common Forest Resource Management: Annotated Bibliography of Asia, Africa, and Latin America , Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
  • Messick, David M. (1983), ‘Individual Adaptations and Structural Change as Solutions to Social Dilemmas’, 44 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 294-309.
  • Mestelman, Stuart (1995), Studying Environmental Regulation in Laboratory Environments , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Migot-Adholla, Shem E., Hazell, Peter, Blarel, Benoit and Place, Frank (1991), ‘Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?’, 5 World Bank Economic Review , 155-175.
  • Miller, David (1989), ‘The Evolution of Mexico’s Spiny Lobster Fishery’, in Berkes, Fikret (ed.), Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development , London, Belhaven Press, 185-198.
  • Mitchell, Ronald B. (1995), ‘Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 223-251.
  • Monbiot, George (1994), ‘The Tragedy of Enclosure’, 270 Scientific American , 159-160.
  • Montias, John Michael (1976), The Structure of Economic Systems , New Haven, Yale University Press.
  • Moore, James W. (1994), ‘Defining National Property Rights to a Common Property Resource: The Case of the West Bank Aquifers’, 16(4) Resource and Energy Economics , 373-390.
  • Morgan, Betty N. (1995), Chaos on the Commons: Considering the Implications of Nonequilibrium Theory for Common Property Research , presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons,’ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bodoe, Norway.
  • Moulin, Herve (1990), Interpreting Common Ownership , presented at the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham (NC), Duke University.
  • Moulin, Herve (1990), ‘Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources’, in Ichiishi, Tatsuro, Neyman, Abraham and Tauman, Yair (eds.), Game theory and applications. Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics series , New York, Harcourt Brace, 282-299.
  • Mumtaz, Soofia and Durr E Nayab (1992), ‘The Rationale of Common Property in the Development Context’, 31(3) Pakistan Development Review , 259-285.
  • Murphy, Earl Finbar (1977), Nature, Bureaucracy and the Rules of Property: Regulating the Renewing Environment , New York, North-Holland.
  • Murty, M.N. (1994), ‘Management of Common Property Resources: Limits to Voluntary Collective Action’, 4(6) Environmental and Resource Economics , 581-594.
  • Nabli, Mustapha K. and Nugent, Jeffrey B. (1989), The New Institutional Economics and Development: Theory and Tunisian Case Studies , Amsterdam, North-Holland.
  • Nam, Kidok (1991), The Effects of Uncertainty and Penalty on Cooperative Behavior in a Resource Dilemma , Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
  • Negry, Donald H. (1989), ‘The Common Property Aquifer as a Differential Game’, 25 Water Resources Research , 9-15.
  • Netting, Robert McC. (1976), ‘What Alpine Peasants Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village’, 4 Human Ecology , 135-146.
  • Netting, Robert McC. (1981), Balancing on an Alp: Ecological Change and Continuity in a Swiss Mountain Community , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Netting, Robert McC. (1982), ‘Territory, Property, and Tenure’, in Adams, R. Mcc., Smelser, N. J., and Treiman, D. J. (eds.), Behavioral and Social Science Research: A National Resource , Washington, National Academy Press, 446-501.
  • Netting, Robert McC. (1993), Smallholders, Householders: Farm Families and the Ecology of Intensive, Sustainable Agriculture , Stanford, Stanford University Press.
  • North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • North, Douglass C. (1993), ‘Toward a Theory of Institutional Change’, in Barnett, W. A., Hinich, M. J., and Schofield, N. J. (eds.), Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • North, Douglass C. and Thomas, Robert Paul (1973), The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • North, Douglass C., Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1983), Growth and Welfare in the American Past: A New Economic History , Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall.
  • Nugent, Jeffrey B. and Sanchez, Nicolas (1989), ‘The Efficiency of the Mesta Reconsidered: A Parable’, 26 Explorations in Economic History , 261-284.
  • Nugent, Jeffrey B. and Sanchez, Nicolas (1993), ‘Tribes, Chiefs, and Transhumanence: A Comparative Institutional Analysis’, 42 Economic Development and Cultural Change , 87-113.
  • Nugent, Jeffrey B. and Sanchez, Nicolas (1994), The Local Variability of Rainfall and Tribal Institutions: The Case of Sudan , presented at Washington, Middle East Economic Association/ASSA meeting.
  • Oliver, Pamela (1971), ‘Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations’, 85 American Journal of Sociology , 1356-1375.
  • Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 186 p.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1977), ‘Collective Action and the Tragedy of the Commons’, in Hardin, Garrett and Baden, John (eds.), Managing the Commons , San Francisco, Freeman, 173-181.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1986), How Inexorable is the ‘Tragedy of the Commons? Institutional Arrangements for Changing the Social Structure of Social Dilemmas , presented as a Distinguished Faculty Research Lecture, Office of Research and Graduate Development, Bloomington (IN), Indiana University.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1986), ‘Issues of Definition and Theory: Some Conclusions and Hypotheses’, in X (ed.), National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management , Washington, National Academy Press, 599-615.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1987), ‘Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Approaches’, in McCay, Bonnie J. and Acheson, James M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources , Tucson (AZ), University of Arizona, 250-265.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1992), ‘The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions’, in Bromley, Daniel W. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 293-318.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1993), The Evolution of Norms, Rules, and Rights , Presented at a Workshop on Social and Ecological System Linkages of the Property Rights and Performance of Natural Resource Systems Group at the Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1995), ‘Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank, 33-45.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1995), ‘Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 125-160.
  • Ostrom, Elinor (1996), ‘Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development’, in X (ed.), Proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995 , Washington, World Bank, 207-234.
  • Ostrom, Elinor and Gardner, Roy (1993), ‘Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: A Challenge for Development’, in Berge, Erling (ed.), Common Property Regimes: Law and Management of Non-Private Resources: Proceedings of the Conference, Vol. I , Norway, The Agricultural University of Norway, 15-39.
  • Ostrom, Elinor and Schlager, Edella (1996), ‘The Formation of Property Rights’, in X (ed.), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment , Washington, Island Press, 127-156.
  • Ostrom, Elinor and Walker, James M. (1991), ‘Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement’, in Palfrey, Thomas (ed.), Laboratory Research in Political Economy , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 287-322.
  • Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James M. (1997), ‘Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue’, in Albers, Wulf, Gsth, Werner, Hammerstein, Peter, Moldovanu, Benny, and Van Damme, Eric (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten , Berlin, Springer, 386-393.
  • Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James M. (eds.) (1994), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Ostrom, Elinor, Walker, James M. and Gardner, Roy (1992), ‘Covenants With and Without A Sword: Self-Governance is Possible’, 86 American Political Science Review , 404-417.
  • Ostrom, Vincent (1975), ‘Alternative Approaches to the Organization of Public Proprietary Interests’, 15 Natural Resources Journal , 765-789.
  • Ostrom, Vincent (1975), ‘Public Choice Theory: A New Approach to Institutional Economics’, 58 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 844-850.
  • Ostrom, Vincent (1982), ‘A Forgotten Tradition: The Constitutional Level of Analysis’, in Gillespie, Judith A. and Zinnes, Dina A (eds.), Missing Elements in Political Inquiry: Logic and Levels of Analysis , Beverly Hills (CA), Sage Publications, 237-252.
  • Ostrom, Vincent (1984), ‘Why Governments Fail: An Inquiry Into the Use of Instruments of Evil To Do Good’, in Buchanan, James M. and Tollison, Robert D. (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice II , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 422-435.
  • Ostrom, Vincent (1989), ‘Some Developments in the Study of Market Choice, Public Choice, and Institutional Choice’, in Rabin, Jack, Hildreth, W. Bartley, and Miller, Gerald J. (eds.), Handbook of Public Administration , New York, Marcel Dekker, 861-882.
  • Ostrom, Vincent and Ostrom, Elinor (1977), ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’, in Savas, E.S. (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance , Boulder (CO), Westview Press, 7-49.
  • Ostrom, Vincent and Ostrom, Elinor (1977), ‘A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems’, in Hardin, Garrett and Baden, John (eds.), Managing the Commons , San Francisco, Freeman, 157-172.
  • Ostrom, Vincent, Feeny, David and Picht, Hartmut (1988), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Oye, Kenneth A. and Maxwell, James H. (1995), ‘Self-interest and Environmental Management’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 191-221.
  • Panayotou, Theodore (1982), Management Concepts for Small-Scale Fisheries: Economic and Social Aspects , FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), No. 228.
  • Panayotou, Theodore and Ashton, Peter S. (1992), Not by Timber Alone: Economics and Ecology for Sustaining Tropical Forests , Washington, Island Press.
  • Parisi, Francesco (1995), ‘Private Property and Social Costs’, 2(2) European Journal of Law and Economics , 149-173. Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco (eds.), Law and Economics 597-622 (Elgar-Ashgate, 1997)
  • Paul, Ellen Frankel, Miller, Fred D. and Paul, Jeffrey (1994), Property Rights , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Pejovich, Svetozar (1972), ‘Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights’, Review of Social Economics .
  • Peters, Pauline E. (1994), Common Property, Property and Social Analysis , Presented at the Society for Economic Anthropology Meeting, March.
  • Peters, Pauline E. (1994), Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana , Charlottesville (VA), University Press of Virginia.
  • Pinkerton, Evelyn (1989), Co-Operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development , Vancouver, Canada, University of British Columbia.
  • Pinkerton, Evelyn (1992), ‘Conclusions: Where Do We Go From Here? the Future of Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management in Canadian Native Communities’, in Boothroyd, P. and Sadler, B. (eds.), Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Assessmen , Ottowa, Canadian Evnironmental Assessment Research Council..
  • Pinkerton, Evelyn (1994), ‘Local Fisheries Co-Management: A Review of International Experiences and Their Implications for Salmon Management in British Columbia’, 51 Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences , 363-378.
  • Place, Frank and Hazell, Peter (1993), ‘Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 75 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 10-19.
  • Plourde, C. G. (1970), ‘Exploitation of Common Property Replenishable Natural Resources’, 9 Western Economic Journal , 256-266.
  • Posner, Richard A. (1980), ‘A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-25.
  • Provencher, Bill and Burt, Oscar (1993), ‘The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater’, 24(2) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 139-158.
  • Putterman, Louis (1995), ‘Markets, Hierarchies, and Information: On a Paradox in the Economics of Organization’, 26 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 373-390.
  • Quiggin, John (1988), ‘Private and Common Property Rights in the Economics of the Environment’, 22 Journal of Economic Issues , 1071-1087.
  • Quiggin, John (1993), ‘Common Property, Equality, and Development’, 21(7) World Development , 1123-1138.
  • Quiggin, John (1995), ‘Common Property in Agricultural Production’, 26(2) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 179-200.
  • Randall, Alan (1975), ‘Property Rights and Social Microeconomics’, 15 Natural Resources Journal , 729-747.
  • Randall, Alan (1978), ‘Property Institutions and Economic Behavior’, 12 Journal of Economic Issues , 1-21.
  • Rapoport, Anatol (1988), ‘Experiments with N-Person Social Traps: Tragedy of the Commons’, 32 Journal of Conflict Resolution , 473-488.
  • Rasmussen, David W. and Benson, Bruce L. (eds.) (1994), The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons , Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield..
  • Rasmussen, Lise Nordvig and Meinzen-Dick, Ruth (1995), Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management: Lessons from Theoretical and Empirical Literature , Washington, Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute.
  • Raychaudhuri, Bikash (1980), The Moon and the Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip , Calcutta, Government of India Press, Anthropological Survey of India.
  • Rebech, Peter (1982), Konsesjoner i fisket , Oslo, TANO.
  • Rebech, Peter (1993), ‘Common and Public Property Rights Regimes to Non-Private Resources. Some Legal Issues on Self-Governing Conservation Systems’, in Berge, Erling (ed.), Common Property Regimes: Law and Management of Non-Private Resources: Proceedings of the Conference, Vol. I , Norway, The Agricultural University of Norway.
  • Repetto, Robert (1986), Skimming the Water: Rent-Seeking and the Performance of Public Irrigation Systems , Washington, World Resources Institute..
  • Ridley, Matt and Low, Bobbi S (1993), ‘Can Selfishness Save the Environment?’, 272 The Atlantic Monthly , 76-86.
  • Roberts, Russell D. (1990), The Tragicomedy of the Commons: Why Communities Rationally Choose ‘Inefficient’ Allocations of Shared Resources , St. Louis, Washington University, School of Business and Center in Political Economy..
  • Roemer, J. and Silvestre, J. (1991), Proportional Solution for Economies with both Private and Public Ownership , Manitoba, Winnipeg, presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, September 26-29, 1991.
  • Rohlmann, Monika (1992), Integrated Natural Resource Management — A Question of Property Institutions? , Washington (DC), presented at the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, September 17-20, 1992.
  • Rose, Carol M. (1985), ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’, 52 University of Chicago Law Review , 73-88.
  • Rose, Carol M. (1986), ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property’, 53 University of Chicago Law Review , 711-781.
  • Rose, Carol M. (1990), ‘Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory’, 2 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities , 37-57.
  • Rose, Carol M. (1994), Property and Persuasion , Boulder (CO), Westview Press.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1977), ‘Market Models for Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses’, in Brown, G.,Kneese, A. and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.), Public Policy , 383-406.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1985), ‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 931-969. Reprinted In J. Coleman and J. Lange (Eds.), New York University Press, Law and Economics, Vol. I, New York, 1992, 421-459.
  • Rosenberg, Nathan (1986), How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World , New York, Basic Books, 353 p.
  • Roumasset, James A. (1991), ‘Constitutional Management of Free Riders and Common Property Resources’, 40 Osaka Economic Papers , 321-330.
  • Roumasset, James A. (1992), The Coevolution of Property, Governance, and Inequality: A Constitutional Perspective , Washington (DC), presented at ‘Inequality and the Commons, ‘ third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, September 1992.
  • Ruddle, Kenneth (1989), ‘Traditional Sole Property Rights and Modern Inshore Fisheries Management in the Pacific Basin’, in Campbell, H., Menz, K., and Waugh, G. (eds.), Economics of Fishery Management in the Pacific Islands Region , Canberra, Australia, The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research..
  • Ruddle, Kenneth (1994), A Guide to the Literature on Traditional Community-Based Fishery Management in the Asia-Pacific Tropics , Rome, Italy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
  • Ruddle, Kenneth (1995), Back to First Principles: Clearly Defined Boundaries , Norway, Bodoe, presented at ‘Reinventing the Commons, ‘ the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, May 24-28.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1981), ‘Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context’, 63 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 595-606.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1984), ‘The Fallacy of Privatization’, 7 Journal of Contemporary Studies , 3-17.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1984), ‘Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action’, 46 Journal of Politics , 154-181.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1984), ‘Strategic Interdependence in Models of Property Rights’, 66 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 807-813.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1985), ‘The Innovation of Rules and the Structure of Incentives in Open Access Resource’, 67 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 368-372.
  • Runge, Carlisle Ford (1987), ‘Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development’, 14 World Development , 623-635.
  • Ryan, Alan (1984), Property and Political Theory , New York, Blackwell.
  • Samuelson, Charles D. (1984), ‘Individual and Structural Solutions to Resource Dilemmas in Two Cultures’, 47 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 94-104.
  • Samuelson, Charles D. (1991), ‘Perceived Task Difficulty, Casual Attributions, and Preferences for Structural Change in Resource Dilemmas’, 17 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 181-187.
  • Sandberg, Audun (1993), The Analytical Importance of Property Rights to Northern Resources , Colloquium Presentation, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington (IN), Indiana University.
  • Sandberg, Audun (1996), A European Debate Revisited , Working Paper, Bodoe, Norway, Nordland College.
  • Sandberg, Audun (1996), Against the Wind: On Reintroducing Commons Law in Modern Society , presented at the sixth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Berkeley.
  • Sandler, Todd (1992), Collective Action: Theory and Applications , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Sandler, Todd and Posnett, John (1991), ‘The Private Provision of Public Goods: A Perspective on Neutrality’, 19 Public Finance Quarterly , 22-42.
  • Sandler, Todd and Sargent, Keith (1995), ‘Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation’, 68 Land Economics , 249-262.
  • Sandler, Todd and Sterbenz, Frederic P. (1990), ‘Harvest Uncertainty and the Tragedy of the Commons’, 18 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 155-167.
  • Sato, Kaori (1987), ‘Distribution of the Cost of Maintaining Common Property Resources’, 23 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 19-31.
  • Savas, E.S. (1987), Privatization: The Key to Better Government , Chatham (NJ), Chatham House Publishers.
  • Sax, Joseph L. (1971), ‘Takings, Private Property and Public Rights’, 81 Yale Law Journal , 149-186. Reprinted in Ackerman, Bruce A. (ed.), Economic Foundations of Property a Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1975, 146-158.
  • Schaefer, Milner (1957), ‘Some Considerations of Population Dynamics and Economics in Relation to the Management of the Commercial Marine Fisheries’, 14 Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada , 669-681.
  • Schahczenski, Jeffrey J. (1990), Common Property and Political Power: Some Theoretical Connections , presented at the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham (NC), Duke University.
  • Schanze, Erich (1989), ‘Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights: Comment’, 145 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 32-37.
  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1978), Micromotives and Macrobehavior , New York, W.W. Norton.
  • Schlager, Edella (1990), Model Specification and Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries (Ph.D. dissertation) , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Schlager, Edella (1994), ‘Fishers’ Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas’, in Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James M. (eds.), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 247-265.
  • Schlager, Edella and Ostrom, Elinor (1992), ‘Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’, 68(3) Land Economics , 249-262.
  • Schlager, Edella, Blomquist, William and Tang, Shui Yan (1994), ‘Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources’, 70 Land Economics , 294-317.
  • Schmid, A. Allan (1994), Property, Power, and Politics: Some Methodological Challenges to Understanding Access and Control in Sub-Saharan African Resource Management , Working Paper, East Lansing (MI), Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  • Schotter, Andrew (1981), The Economic Theory of Social Institutions , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Schulz, Ulrich, Albers, Wulf and Mueller, Ulrich (1994), Social Dilemmas and Cooperation , Berlin, Springer.
  • Schworm, William E. (1983), ‘Monopsonistic Control of a Common Property Renewable Resource’, 16 Canadian Journal of Economics , 275-287.
  • Scott, Anthony D. (1955), ‘The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership’, 63 Journal of Political Economy , 116-124.
  • Scott, Anthony D. (1983), ‘Property Rights and Property Wrongs’, 16 Canadian Journal of Economics , 555-573.
  • Seabright, Paul (1993), ‘Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design’, 7(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives , 113-134.
  • Sedjo, Roger A. (1992), ‘Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 199-213.
  • Sell, Jane and Wilson, Rick K. (1991), ‘Levels of Information and Contributions to Public Goods’, 70 Social Forces , 107-124.
  • Sened, Itai (1991), ‘Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective’, 3 Journal of Theoretical Politics , 379-402.
  • Sengupta, Nirmal (1991), Managing Common Property: Irrigation in India and the Philippines , New Delhi, Sage.
  • Sengupta, Nirmal (1993), User-Friendly Irrigation Designs , New Delhi, Sage.
  • Sethi, Rajiv and Somanathan, E. (1996), ‘The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use’, 86 American Economic Review , 766-788.
  • Sevic Zeljko (1994), ‘Socijalisti i svojina: Prilog pravnoj i ekonomskoj teoriji (prava) svojine (Socialists and Property: Contribution to the Legal and Economic Theory of Property Rights)’, in X (ed.), Evropska levica danas [European Left Today) , Berlgrade, SPS.
  • Singh, Chatrapati (1986), Common Property and Common Poverty: India’s Forests, Forest Dwellers, and the Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Singh, Chatrapati (1992), Basic Issues in Management of Common Resources , presented at ‘Inequality and the Commons,’ the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington.
  • Singh, Katar (1994), Managing Common Pool Resources: Principles and Case Studies , New Delhi, Oxford University Press.
  • Singh, Katar and Ballabh, Vishwa (1996), Cooperative Management of Natural Resources , New Delhi, Sage.
  • Singleton, Sara and Taylor, Michael (1992), ‘Common Property, Collective Action and Community’, 4 Journal of Theoretical Politics , 309-324.
  • Sinn, Hans-Werner (1984), ‘Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A Cournot Model of the Oil Market’, 51 Economica , 235-252.
  • Siy, Robert Y., Jr. (1982), Community Resource Management: Lessons from the Zanjera , Quezon City, Philippines, University of the Philippines Press.
  • Smith, R. J. (1981), ‘Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife’, 1 Cato Journal , 439-468.
  • Smith, Vernon L. (1968), ‘Economics of Production from Natural Resources’, 58 American Economic Review , 409-431.
  • Smith, Vernon L. (1975), ‘The Primitive Hunter Culture, Pleistocene Extinction, and the Rise of Agriculture’, 83 Journal of Political Economy , 727-755.
  • Snidal, Duncan (1985), ‘Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes’, 79 American Political Science Review , 923-947.
  • Snidal, Duncan (1995), ‘The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 47-70.
  • Soden, Dennis L. (1988), The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty Years of Policy Literature, 1968-1988 , Monticello (IL), Vance Bibliographies.
  • Spence, David B. (1995), ‘Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality and the Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century’, 20 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law , 145-182.
  • Sproule-Jones, Mark (1982), ‘Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication and Critique’, 76 American Political Science Review , 790-804.
  • Sproule-Jones, Mark (1989), Rights, Rules and the Organization of Environmental Decision Making , Presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, Orlando.
  • Sproule-Jones, Mark (1995), ‘Institutional Design for the Economy and the Environment: The Identification and Representation of Stakeholders’, in Sadler, B., Manning, E., and Dendy, John O. (eds.), Balancing the Scale: Integrating Environmental and Economic Assessment , Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.
  • Squires, Dale (1992), ‘Productivity Measurement in Common Property Resource Industries: An Application to the Pacific Coast Trawl Fishery’, 23(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 221-236.
  • Stern, P. C. (1978), ‘When Do People Act to Maintain Common Resources: A Reformulated Psychological Question for our Times’, 13 International Journal of Psychology , 149-158.
  • Stevenson, Glenn G. (1991), Common property economics: A general theory and land use applications , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 256 p.
  • Stillman, Peter G. (1975), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons: A Re-analysis’, 4 Alternatives , 12-15.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Economics of Property Rights and Nuisance Law , West Publishing.
  • Stout, Lynn A. and Barnes, David D. (1992), Cases and Materials on Law and Economics , West Publishing.
  • Sugden, Robert (1986), The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare , New York, Blackwell, 191 p.
  • Sutinen, Jon G. and Andersen, Peder (1985), ‘The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement’, 61 Land Economics , 387-397.
  • Swallow, Brent M. and Bromley, Daniel W. (1994), ‘Co-management or No Management: The Prospects for Internal Governance of Common Property Regimes through Dynamic Contracts’, 22 Oxford Agrarian Studies , 3-16.
  • Swallow, Brent M. and Bromley, Daniel W. (1995), ‘Institutions, Governance and Incentives in Common Property Regimes for African Rangelands’, 6(2) Environmental and Resource Economics , 99-118.
  • Swaney, James A. (1990), ‘Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community’, 24 Journal of Economic Issues , 451-462.
  • Swierzbinski, Joseph (1988), ‘When More Isn’t Better: Information and Common-Property Resources’, 11 Mathematical and Computational Modelling , 899-902.
  • Tahvonen, Olli and Kuuluvainen, Jari (1991), ‘Optimal Growth with Renewable Resources and Pollution’, 35 European Economic Review , 650-661.
  • Tang, Shui Yan (1992), Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Tang, Shui Yan (1994), ‘Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics’, 13 Human Systems Management , 221-232.
  • Taylor, Michael (1987), ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Other Games in the Provision of Public Goods’, in Taylor, Michael (ed.), The Possibility of Cooperation , New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • Taylor, Michael and Singleton, Sara (1995), Anarchy and Cooperation , London, Wiley.
  • Taylor, Michael and Singleton, Sara (1995), ‘The Communal Resource: Transaction Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems’, 21 Politics and Society , 34-46.
  • Terrebonne, R. Peter (1993), ‘Privatizing the Commons: The Distribution of Total Product’, 19(2) Eastern Economic Journal , 165-171.
  • Thampapillai, Dodo J. and Anderson, Jock R. (1994), ‘A Review of the Socio economic Analysis of Soil Degradation Problems for Developed and Developing Countries’, 62(3) Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics , 291-315.
  • Thompson, Gary D. and Wilson, Paul N. (1994), ‘Common Property as an Institutional Response to Environmental Variability’, 12(3) Contemporary Economic Policy , 10-21.
  • Thompson, Gary D. and Wilson, Paul N. (1994), ‘Ejido Reforms in Mexico: Conceptual Issues and Potential Outcomes’, 70(4) Land Economics , 448-465.
  • Thomson, James T. (1977), ‘Ecological Deterioration: Local-Level Rule-Making and Enforcement Problems in Niger’, in Glantz, Michael H. (ed.), Desertification: Environmental Degradation in and around Arid Lands , Boulder (CO), Westview Press, 57-79.
  • Townsend, Ralph E. and Pooley, Samuel G. (1995), ‘Distributed Governance in Fisheries’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues , Washington, World Bank, 311-326.
  • Townsend, Ralph E. and Wilson, James (1987), ‘An Economic View of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, in McCay, Bonnie J. and Acheson, James M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources , Tucson (AZ), University of Arizona, 129-160.
  • Tullock, Gordon (1969), ‘Federalism: Problems of Scale’, 6 Public Choice , 19-30.
  • Udehn, Lars (1993), ‘Twenty-Five Years with the Logic of Collective Action’, 36 Acta Sociologica , 239-261.
  • Ullman-Margalit, Edna (1977), The Emergence of Norms , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Umbeck, John R. (1981), A Theory of Property Rights: With Application to the California Gold Rush , Ames, Iowa State University Press.
  • Umbeck, John R. (1981), ‘Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights’, 20 Economic Inquiry , 38-59.
  • Vadnjal, Dan T. (1993), Property Rights, Choice and Contingent Valuation , presented at ‘Common Property in Ecosystems Under Stress’, fourth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Philippines.
  • Vincent, Linden (1995), Hill Irrigation: Water and Development in Mountain Agriculture , London, Overseas Development Institute.
  • Vukotic Veselin (1993), ‘Privatizacija, pravicnost i efikasnost (Privatization, Justice, and Efficiency)’, 1-2 Ekonomist , 81-88.
  • Wade, Robert (1992), ‘Common-Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages’, in Bromley, Daniel W. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy , San Francisco, ICS Press, 207-228.
  • Wade, Robert (1994), Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India , San Francisco, ICS Press.
  • Wagner, Thomas (1991), ‘Effiziente Nutzung und Regulierung von Allmendegutern (With English summary) (Efficient Exploitation and Control of Common Property Resources)’, 208(4) Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 385-398.
  • Wagner, Thomas (1991), ‘Freie Nutzungsrechte: Allokationseffizienz und Einkommensverteilung (With English summary)’, 111(4) Zeitschrift fŸr Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften , 505-526.
  • Waldron, Jeremy (1988), The Right to Private Property , Oxford, Clarendon.
  • Walker, James M. and Gardner, Roy (1992), ‘Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence’, 102 Economic Journal , 1149-1161.
  • Walker, James M., Gardner, Roy and Ostrom, Elinor (1990), ‘Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence’, 19 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 203-211.
  • Walker, James M., Gardner, Roy and Ostrom, Elinor (1991), ‘Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence’, in Selten, Reinhard (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets , Berlin, Springer, 337-367.
  • Walker, James M., Gardner, Roy, Ostrom, Elinor and Herr, Andrew (1995), Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons Without Face-to-Face Communication: Theoretical Issues and Experimental Results , presented at the conference on Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences, Tuscon (AZ).
  • Walker, S. Tjip (1995), Both Pretense and Promise: The Political Economy of Privatization in Africa , Working Paper, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Wandschneider, Philip R. (1986), ‘Neoclassical and Institutionalist Explanations of Changes in Northwest Water Institutions’, 20 Journal of Economic Issues , 87-107.
  • Waters, Alan Rufus (1987), ‘Economic Growth and the Property Rights Regime’, 7 Cato Journal , 99-115.
  • Weissing, Franz and Ostrom, Elinor (1991), ‘Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed Equilibria Games’, 3 Journal of Theoretical Politics , 343-350.
  • Weitzman, Martin L. (1974), ‘Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property’, 8 Journal of Economic Theory , 225-234.
  • Welch, W. P. (1983), ‘The Political Feasibility of Full Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of Pollution and Fisheries’, 16 Policy Sciences , 165-180.
  • Welzel, Peter (1994), ‘Oligopolistic Tragedies: National Governments and the Exploitation of International Common Property’, 213(4) Jahrbuch fŸr Nationalškonomie und Statistik , 403-418.
  • White, T. Anderson and Runge, Carlisle Ford (1994), ‘Common Property and Collective Action: Lessons from Cooperative Watershed Management in Haiti’, 43(1) Economic Development and Cultural Change , 1-41.
  • Wiggins, Steven N., Hackett, Steven C. and Battalio, Raymond C. (1991), Imperfect Information, Multilateral Bargaining, and Unitization: An Experimental Analysis , presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Manitoba, Winnipeg.
  • Wilke, Henk (1992), ‘Greed, Efficiency and Fairness in Resource Management Situations’, 2 European Review of Social Psychology , 165-187.
  • Wilson, James A. (1994), ‘Chaos, Complexity, and Community Management of Fisheries’, 18 Marine Policy , 291-305.
  • Wilson, James A. (1995), When are Common Propery Institutions Efficient? , Working Paper, Orono (ME), University of Maine, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics.
  • Wilson, James A. and Dickie, Lloyd M (1995), ‘Parametric Management of Fisheries: An Ecosystem-Social Approach’, in Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan (eds.), Property Rights in a Social and Ecological Context: Case Studies and Design Applicationstions , Washington, World Bank.
  • Wilson, James A., French, J., Kleban, P., McKay, S. R. and Townsend, Robert M. (1991), ‘Chaotic Dynamics in a Multiple Species Fishery: A Model of Community Predation’, 58 Ecological Modelling , 303-322.
  • Wilson, Paul N. and Thompson, Gary D. (1993), ‘Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico’s Patoral Ejidatarios’, 41(2) Economic Development and Cultural Change , 299-318.
  • Wilson, Rick K. (1985), ‘Constraints on Social Dilemmas: An Institutional Approach’, 2 Annals of Operations Research , 183-200.
  • Wunderlich, Gene (1974), ‘Property Rights and Information’, 412 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science , 80-96.
  • Wunderlich, Gene and Gibson, W. L. (1972), Perspectives of Property , College Station (PA), Pennsylvania State University, Institute for Research on Land and Water Resources.
  • Yandle, Bruce (1995), Land Rights: The 1990’s Property Rights Rebellion , Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield.
  • Yang, Tai-Shuenn (1987), Property Rights and Constitutional Order in Imperial China (Ph.D. dissertation) , Bloomington (IN), Indiana University Press.
  • Young, Oran R. (1982), Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions , Berkeley, University of California Press.
  • Young, Oran R. (1989), International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment , Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press.
  • Young, Oran R. (1995), ‘The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships’, in Keohane, Robert O. and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.), Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains , London, Sage, 27-46.
Copied to clipboard