Skip to main content
For Legal Professionals
Find a Lawyer
...

Encyclopedia of Law & Economics - 1500 Security & Bankruptcy Priority Rights

  • Adams, Michael (1980), …konomische Analyse des Sicherungsrechte (Economic Analysis of Security Law], Kšnigstein/Ts, AthenŠum,) ,, 322 p.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1992), 'Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation', 77 Cornell Law Review , 439 ff.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1993), 'An Equity Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle', 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 73-98.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1993), 'Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy', 45 Stanford Law Review , 311 ff.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1994), 'A World Without Debt', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 811-827.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1994), 'Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules', 67 Southern California Law Review , 1107 ff.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1994), 'Limits on Politics in Competitive Credit Markets', 80 Virginia Law Review , 1879-1885.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1995), 'A Reexamination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives', 62 University of Chicago Law Review , 575-606.
  • Adler, Barry E. (1996), 'A Theory of Corporate Insolvency', New York University Law Review .
  • Aghion, Philippe, Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John (1992), 'The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform', 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 523-546.
  • Aghion, Philippe, Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John (1994), 'Improving Bankruptcy Procedure', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 811-827.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, J.L. (1980), 'Corporate Leverage and Growth: The Game-Theoretic Issues', Journal of Financial Economics , 379-399.
  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, Jeffrey L. (1983), 'Reorganization in Bankruptcy and the Issue of Strategic Risk', 7 Journal of Banking and Finance , 119-133.
  • Alderson, Michael J. and Betker, Brian L. (1995), 'Liquidation Costs and Capital Structure', 39 Journal of Financial Economics , 45-69.
  • Altman, Edward I. (1984), 'A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question', 39 Journal of Finance , 1067 ff.
  • Bainbridge, Stephen M. (1986), 'Comity and Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy', 10 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade , 1 ff.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1983), 'Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership', 12 Journal of Legal Studies , 53-67.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1986), 'The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization', 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 127-147.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1987), 'A World Without Bankruptcy', Law and Contemporary Problems , 173 ff.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1987), 'Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy. A Reply to Warren', 54 University of Chicago Law Review , 815-834.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1991), 'The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy', 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 223-232.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1993), 'Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11', 36 Journal of Law and Economics , 633-653.
  • Baird, Douglas G. (1994), 'The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt-Out" Problem', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 913-930.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Jackson, Thomas H. (1983), 'Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9', 35 Stanford Law Review , 175-212.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Jackson, Thomas H. (1984), 'Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy', 51 University of Chicago Law Review , 97-130.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Jackson, Thomas H. (1985), 'Fraudulant Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain', 38 Vanderbilt Law Review , 829 ff.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Jackson, Thomas H. (1987), Cases, Problems, and Materials on Security Interests in Personal Property , Mineola (N.Y.), Foundation Press, 889 p.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Picker, Ronald C. (1991), 'A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations', 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 311-349.
  • Barclay, Michael J. and Smith, Clifford W. (1995), 'The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities', 50 Journal of Finance , 899 ff.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Howard F. Chang. (1992), 'Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization', 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 253-279.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Jesse M. Fried (1996), 'The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy', 105 Yale Law Journal , 857-934.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Picker, Randal C.XXX (1993), Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm -Specific Human Capital , University of Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper, No. 16 2d Series.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1988), 'A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations', 101 Harvard Law Review , 775-804.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Chang, Howard F. (1988), 'A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations', 101 Harvard Law Review , 775-804.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1993), 'Costs of Technical Violation of Accounting-Based Debt Convenants', 68 Accounting Review , 233-257.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1995), 'The Resolution of Technical Default', 70 Accounting Review , 337-353.
  • Beneish, Messod D. and Press, Eric (1995), 'Interrelation Among Events of Default', 12 Contemporary Accounting Research , 57-84.
  • Bhagat, Sanjai, James A Brickley and Jeffery L. Coles (1994), 'The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits', 35 Journal of Financial Economics , 221-247.
  • Bisdal, Joaqu’m (1986), La empresa en crisis y el derecho de quiebras (The Crisis of the Firm and Bankruptcy Law) , Bolonia, Real Colegio de Espa–a, 383 p.
  • Blum, Walter J. (1950), 'The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganizations', 17 University of Chicago Law Review , 565-603.
  • Bowers, James W. (1990), 'Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure', 88 Michigan Law Review , 2097 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. (1991), 'Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution', 26 Georgia Law Review , 27 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. (1993), 'The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment', 91 Michigan Law Review , 1773 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. (1994), 'Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 955 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. (1994), 'Kissing Off Economics and Misunderstanding Murphy's Law: Carlson's on the Efficiency of Secured Lending', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2215 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. (1995), 'Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in- Law and Bankruptcy Taxes: The Article 9 Filing System and the Market for Information', 79 Minnesota Law Review , 721 ff.
  • Bowers, James W. and John P. Bigelow (1996), The Economics of Relationships and The Limits of The Law , Louisiana State University Law & Economics Working Group Discussion Paper, July 10.
  • Bradley, Michael and Michael Rosenzweig (1992), 'The Untenable Case for Chapter 11', 101 Yale Law Journal , 1043-1089.
  • Bratton, Dale (1985), 'Note: The California Agricultural Producer's Lien, Processing Company Insolvencies, and Federal Bankruptcy Law: An Evaluation and Alternative Methods of Protecting Farmers', 36 Hastings Law Journal , 609-644.
  • Brown, David T. (1989), 'Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law', 2 Review of Financial Studies , 109 ff.
  • Brown, David T., Christopher M. James and Robert M. Mooradian (1993), 'The Information Content of Distressed Restructurings Involving Public and Private Debt Claims', 33 Journal of Financial Economics , 93-118.
  • Buckley, F.H. (1986), 'The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle', 72 Virginia Law Review , 1393-1470.
  • Buckley, F.H. (1992), 'The Termination Decision', 61 University of Missouri- Kansas City Law Review , 243-289.
  • Bufford, Samuel L. (1994), 'What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About its Critics', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 829-848.
  • Bulow, Jeremy and John Shoven (1978), 'The Bankruptcy Decision', 9 Bell Journal of Economics , 437-456.
  • Cabrillo, Francisco (1987), An‡lisis econ—mico del Derecho concursal espa–ol (An Economic Analysis of Spanish Bankruptcy Law) , Madrid, Fundaci—n Juan March.
  • Cabrillo, Francisco (1989), Quiebra y liquidaci—n de empresas (Bankruptcy and Closing Down of Firms) , Madrid, Uni—n Editorial, 151 p.
  • Carlson, David G. (1994), 'On the Efficiency of Secured Lending', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2179-2213.
  • Carlson, David Gray (1986), 'Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code', 71 Minnesota Law Review , 207 ff.
  • Chatterjee, Sris, Upinder S. Dhillon and Gabriel G. Rarirez (1995), 'Coercive Tender and Exchange Offers in Distressed High-Yield Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Analysis', 38 Journal of Financial Economics , 333-360.
  • Cramton, Peter and Schwartz, Alan (1991), 'Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation', 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 27-53.
  • Cuelenaere, L.M. and Leen, A.R. (1989), 'Een rechtseconomisch aspect van de positie van de crediteur in een faillissement. Is afschaffing van de maximum rente een oplossing? (A Law-and- economics Aspect of the Creditors Posit)', 38(10) Ars Aequi , 834-836.
  • Daigle, Katherine H. and Maloney, Michael T. (1994), 'Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation', 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 157-192.
  • Dale-Johnson, David, Dietrich, J. Kimball and Langetieg, Terence G. (1987), 'A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Due-on-Sale Clause: A Retrospective Examination', 10 Research in Law and Economics , 105-127.
  • Diamond, Douglas W. (1994), 'Corporate Capital Structure: The Control Roles of Bank and Public Debt with Taxes and Costly Bankruptcy', 80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly , 11 ff.
  • Drukarczyk, Jochen (1991), 'Secured Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Creditors' Bargain Model', 11 International Review of Law and Economics , 203-221.
  • Duggan, A.J. (1994), 'Personal Property Security Interests and Third Party Disputes: Economic Considerations in Reforming the Law', in Gillooly, Michael (ed.), Securities over Personality , Sydney, The Federation Press, 234-290.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), 'Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends', 74 American Economic Review , 650-659.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. (1990), 'Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?', 27 Journal of Financial Economics , 411-417.
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel (1991), The Economic Structure of Corporate Law , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Eberhart, Allen C., William Moore and Rodney Roenfelt (1990), 'Securities Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule', 37 Journal of Financial Economics , 1457-1469.
  • Eisenberg, Theodore and Shoichi Tagashira (1994), 'Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence From Japan', 23 Journal of Legal Studies , 111-157.
  • Eskridge, William N., Jr. (1984), 'One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction', 70 Virginia Law Review , 1083-1218.
  • Fisher, Timothy C.G. and Jocelyn Martel (1995), 'The Creditors Financial Reorganization Decision: New Evidence from Canadian Data', 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 112 ff.
  • Fitts, Peter, Russell Luigs, Steve Miller, Michael Price, Leonard Rosen and Wilbur Ross (1991), 'Bankruptcies, Workouts, and Turnarounds: A Roundtable Discussion', 4 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , 34-61.
  • Franks, Julian and Walter Torous (1989), 'An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization', 44 Journal of Finance , 747-769.
  • Freirman, Michael and Viswanath, P.V. (1994), 'Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy', 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 455-476.
  • French, Kenneth R. and Robert E. McCormick (1984), 'Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition', 57 Journal of Business , 417-441.
  • Frierman, Michael (1994), 'Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy', 37 Journal of Law and Economics , 455-476.
  • Gertner, Rober and David Scharfstein (1991), 'A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law', 46 Journal of Finance , 1189-1222.
  • Gilson, Stuart C. (1996), 'Transactions Costs, and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, Forthcoming', Journal of Finance .
  • Gilson, Stuart C., Kose John and Larry Lang (1990), 'Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganizations of Firms in Default', 27 Journal of Financial Economics , 315-353.
  • Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart (1982), 'Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives', in McCall, John J. (ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. and Kraakman, Reinier H. (1992), 'Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 628-655.
  • Harris, Frederick H. (1987), 'Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts: Comment', 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 168-174.
  • Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (1988), 'Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure', 20 Journal of Financial Economics , 55-86.
  • Harris, Steven L and Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (1994), 'A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors Choices Seriously', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2021-2072.
  • Haugen, Robert A.,@@Lemma W. Senbet and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1988) and Lemma W. Senbet (1, 'Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure', 23 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 27-38.
  • Hess, James D. and Knoeber, Charles R. (1987), 'Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts', 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 149-167.
  • Hotchkiss, Edith Shwalb (1995), 'Postbankruptcy Performace and Management Turnover', 50 Journal of Finance , 3-22.
  • Hudson, John (1995), 'The Case against Secured Lending', 15 International Review of Law and Economics , 47-63.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. (1982), 'Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain', 91 Yale Law Journal , 857-907.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. (1984), 'Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy', 36 Stanford Law Review , 725-787.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. (1985), 'Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum', 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 73-114.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. (1986), The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 287 p.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. and Kronman, Anthony T. (1979), 'Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors', 88 Yale Law Journal , 1143-1182.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. and Schwartz, Alan (1985), 'Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke', 133 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 987-1001.
  • Jackson, Thomas H. and Scott, Robert E. (1989), 'On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain', 75 Virginia Law Review , 155-204.
  • Jaffe, Austin J. (1992), Kreditkontrakte, Zahlungsverweigerung und Zahlungsafschub (Contracting for Housing, Mortgage Default, and Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria) , Proceedings of Systeme der Wohnungs-Finanzierung Internationale Workshop.
  • Jaffe, Austin J. and Sharp, J. (1995), 'Contract Theory and Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria', Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics .
  • Jensen, Michael C. (1986), 'Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers', 76 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 323-329.
  • Jensen, Michael C. (1993), 'Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy', 2 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , 35-44.
  • Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', 3 Journal of Financial Economics , 305-360.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce, and (1995), 'The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory', 44 Emory Law Journal , 1277 ff.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce, Habib, Michel A. and Naik, Narayan Y., 'Spin-offs and Information', Journal of Financial Intermediation .
  • Kahan, Marcel (1993), 'Sales of Corporate Control', 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 368-379.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1995), 'The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds', 89 Northwestern University Law Review , 565-622.
  • Kahn, Charles and Huberman, Guy (1989), 'Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation', 52(1) Law and Contemporary Problems , 49-61.
  • Kanda, Hideki and Saul Levmore (1994), 'Explaining Creditor Priorities', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2103-2154.
  • Keating, Daniel (1991), 'Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy, and Moral Hazard', Wisconsin Law Review , 65-108.
  • Klerman, Daniel (1991), 'Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bankruptcy', 58 University of Chicago Law Review , 795-822.
  • Korobkin, Donald R. (1991), 'Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy', 91 Columbia Law Review , 717-789.
  • Kripke, Homer (1985), 'Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact', 133 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 929-985. Reprinted in Corporate Practice Commentator, 1996, 28, 153-210.
  • Lawrence, William H. (1989), 'Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing', 62 Southern California Law Review , 1387-1447.
  • Levmore, Saul (1982), 'Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings', 92 Yale Law Journal , 49-83.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. (1982), 'A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System', Wisconsin Law Review , 311-372.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. (1992), 'Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig', 91 Michigan Law Review , 79-110.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. (1994), 'The Unsecured Creditors Bargain', 80 Virginia Law Review , 1887-1965.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. (1996), 'The Death of Liability? A Systems/Strategic Analysis', 106 Yale Law Journal , 1-92.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. and William C. Whitford (1990), 'Bargaining Over Equitys Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly-Held Companies', 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 125-196.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. and William C. Whitford (1993), 'Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizations of Large Publicly-held Companies', 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 669-800.
  • Lopucki, Lynn M. and William C. Whitford (1993), 'Patterns in Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies', 78 Cornell Law Review , 597-618.
  • Mann, Ronald J. (1996), 'The First Shall be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority', 75 Texas Law Review , 11-49.
  • Mann, Ronald J. (1997), 'Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit', 110 Harvard Law Review , 625-683.
  • McCoid, John C. II (1989), 'Setoff: Why Bankrupcty Priority', 75 Virginia Law Review , 15-43.
  • Meckling, William H. (1977), 'Financial Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State', 41(4) Law and Contemporary Problems , 13-38.
  • Merton, Robert C. (1990), 'The Financial System and Economic Performance', 4 Journal of Financial Services Research , 263 ff.
  • Mooradian, Robert M. (1994), 'The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device', 49 Journal of Finance , 1403 ff.
  • Myers, Stuart C. (1977), 'Determinants of Corporate Borrowing', 5 Journal of Financial Economics , 147-175.
  • Opler, Tim C. and Sheridan Titman (1994), 'Financial Distress and Corporate Performance', 49 Journal of Finance , 1015-1040.
  • Picker, Randal C. (1992), 'Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools', 59 University of Chicago Law Review , 645-679.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1991), 'The Efficiency of Chapter 11', 8 Bankr Dev , 319 ff.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1991), 'Bankruptcy and the Administrative State', 42 Hastings Law Journal , 1567 ff.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1992), 'Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy', 71 Texas Law Review , 51 ff.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1993), 'A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases', 71 Washington University Law Quarterly , 535 ff.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1994), 'An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice', 1994 University of Illinois Law Review , 1-43.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. (1994), 'The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 1159 ff.
  • Rasmussen, Robert K. and Skeel, David A., Jr. (1995), 'The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law', 3 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review , 85 ff.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1984), 'Arm-breaking, Consumer Credit, and Personal Bankruptcy', Economic Inquiry , 188-208.
  • Roe, Mark J. (1983), 'Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization', 83 Columbia Law Review , 527-602.
  • Roe, Mark J. (1987), 'The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts', 97 Yale Law Journal , 232-279.
  • Roe, Mark J. (1989), 'Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics', 75 Virginia Law Review , 219-240.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1991), 'Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice', 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 277-310.
  • Schumann, Jochen (1987), 'Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts: Comment', 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 175-179.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1981), 'Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories', 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 1-37.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1983), 'The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods', 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 117-162.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1984), 'The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt', 37 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1051-1069. Reprinted in 27 Corporate Practice Commentator, 1985, 294-312.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1989), 'A Theory of Loan Priorities', 18 Journal of Legal Studies , 209-261.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1993), 'Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts', 36 Journal of Law and Economics , 595-632.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1994), 'The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firms Investment Policy', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 1213-1229.
  • Schwartz, Alan (1994), 'Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2073-2087.
  • Schwartz, Alan and Wilde, Louis L. (1983), 'Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests', 69 Virginia Law Review , 1387-1485.
  • Scott, James H., Jr. (1977), 'Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure', 32 Journal of Finance , 1-19.
  • Scott, James H., Jr. (1979), 'Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Reply', 34 Journal of Finance , 253-260.
  • Scott, Robert E. (1986), 'A Relational Theory of Secured Financing', 86 Columbia Law Review , 901-977.
  • Scott, Robert E. (1994), 'The Politics of Article 9', 80 Virginia Law Review , 1783-1851.
  • Shupack, Paul M. (1989), 'Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions', 41 Rutgers Law Review , 1067-1129.
  • Skeel, David A. (1992), 'The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases', 78 Virginia Law Review , 461-533.
  • Skeel, David A. (1993), 'Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory', 1993 Wisconsin Law Review , 465-521.
  • Slain, John J. and Kripke, Homer (1973), 'The Interface between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy: Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance between Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors', 48 New York University Law Review , 261-300.
  • Smith, Clifford W., Jr. and Warner, Jerold B. (1979), 'Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment', 34 Journal of Finance , 247-251.
  • Stulz, Rene M. and Herb Johnson (1985), 'An Analysis of Secured Debt', 14 Journal of Financial Economics , 501-521.
  • Sward, Ellen E. (1987), 'Resolving Conflicts between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power', Wisconsin Law Review , 403-453.
  • Tracht, Marshall E. (1997), 'Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and the Law', 82 Cornell Law Review , 301-355.
  • Triantis, Alexander J. and George G. (1994), 'Conversion Rights and the Design of Financial Contracts', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 1231-1255.
  • Triantis, George G. (1992), 'Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information', 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-258.
  • Triantis, George G. (1993), 'The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and Adjustment', 43 University of Toronto Law Journal , 679-710.
  • Triantis, George G. (1993), 'A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing', 46 Vanderbilt Law Review , 901-935.
  • Triantis, George G. (1994), 'A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities', 80 Virginia Law Review , 2155-2168.
  • Triantis, George G. (1995), 'Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making and Security Design', 26 Canadian Business Journal , 93-105.
  • Triantis, George G. and Ronald J. Daniels (1995), 'The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance', 83 California Law Review , 1073-1113.
  • Trost, J. Ronald (1973), 'Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganization for the Benefit of Creditors or Stockholders?', 21 UCLA Law Review , 540-552.
  • Walsh, Cliff (1975), 'First-Party-Priority Revisited', 51 Economic Record , 275-277.
  • Warner, Jerold (1977), 'Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence', 32 Journal of Finance , 337-347.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1987), 'Bankruptcy Policy', 54 University of Chicago Law Review , 775-814. Reprinted in Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Papers, Bhandari (ed.) Cambridge University Press, 1994 and Reprinted in Company Law, Wheeler, S. (ed.) Dartmouth Publishing United Kingdom.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1991), 'A Theory of Absolute Priority', New York University Annual Survey of American Law , 9 ff.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1992), 'The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11', 102 Yale Law Journal , 437-479.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1992), 'Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?', 77 Cornell Law Review , 2401 ff.
  • Warren, Elizabeth (1993), 'Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World', 92 Michigan Law Review , 336 ff.
  • Warren, Elizabeth and Westbrook, Jay (1994), 'Searching for Reorganization Realities', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 3001 ff.
  • Warren, Elizabeth, Sullivan, Teresa and Westbrook, Jay (1987), 'The Role of Empirical Data in Formulating a National Bankruptcy Policy', 50 Law and Contemporary Problems , 195 ff.
  • Wassenaer Van Catwijck, A.J.O. Baron Van (1991), 'Op zeker spelen. Invloeden van zekerheden in het NBW op het financieringsbedrijf (Play it Safe. Influence of Dutch New Civil Code Se)', in Coljee, P.D., Franken, H., Heertje, A. and Kanning, W. (eds.), Law and Welfare Economics , Amsterdam, VU Amsterdam, 133-150.
  • Weiss, Lawrence W. (1990), 'Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims', 27 Journal of Financial Economics , 285-314.
  • White, James J. (1984), 'Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security', 37 Vanderbilt Law Review , 473 ff.
  • White, Michelle J. (1980), 'Public Policy toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules', 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 550-564.
  • White, Michelle J. (1989), 'The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision', 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 129-151.
  • White, Michelle J. (1994), 'Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings', 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 268-295.
  • White, Michelle J. (1994), 'Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?', 72 Washington University Law Quarterly , 1319-1340.
Copied to clipboard