Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0900 General Structure of Law

Adelstein, Richard P. (1979), ‘The Moral Costs of Crime: Prices, Information and Organization’, in Gray, Charles M. (ed.), The Costs of Crime , Beverly Hills (CA), Sage Publications, 233-252.
Adelstein, Richard P. (1981), ‘Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process’, 76 Northwestern University Law Review , 1-99.
Adelstein, Richard P. (1992), ‘Charles E. Lindblom’, in Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), New Horizons in Economic Thought: Appraisals of Leading Economists , Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar, 202-226.
Backhaus, Jrgen G. (1996), Good Economics, Bad Economics, and European Economics , Meteor Research Memorandum, Maastricht, No. RM/96/007.
Benson, Bruce L (1990), The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State , San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
Benson, Bruce L. (1990), ‘Customary Law With Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion’, 9 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 25-42. Reprinted in as “Law and Order Without State Coercion”, in Veljanovski, Cento (ed.), Regulation, Regulators and the Market, 1991, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 159-179.
Benson, Bruce L. (1991), ‘Reciprocal Exchange as the Basis for Recognition of Law: Examples from American History’, 10 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 53-82.
Benson, Bruce L. (1991), ‘An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising Under Customary American Indian Law’, 5 Review of Austrian Economics , 65-89.
Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law’, 2 Constitutional Political Economy , 1-27.
Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘The Development of Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers’, 3 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 79-108.
Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Customary Indian Law: Two Case Studies’, in Anderson, Terry L. (ed.), Property Rights and Indian Economics , Rowman and Littlefield Press.
Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘The Evolution of Values and Institutions in a Free Society: The Under-Pinnings of a Market Economy’, 5 International Journal on the Unity of Sciences , 411-442. Reprinted in Radnitzky, Gerard and Bouillon, Hardy (eds.), Values and the Social Order Vol.I, 1995, Aldershot, Avebury, 87-125.
Benson, Bruce L. (1993), ‘The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-Interest’, 6 Review of Austrian Economics , 43-80.
Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Emerging From the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights’, 5 Constitutional Political Economy , 129-158. Reprinted inTranslated into Spanish and republished (1995) Las Instituciones y Los Derechos de Propiedad al Emerger de la Jungla Hobbesiana: La Fuerza Quita los Reprinted Derechos y los Crea Libertas, 12, 35-75.
Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Are Public Goods Really Common Pools: Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England’, 39 Economic Inquiry , 249-271.
Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Legal Philosophy’, in Boettke, Peter J. (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics , London, Edward Elgar, 270-275.
Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Privatization in Criminal Justice , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.

Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘Competition Among Legal Institutions: Implications for the Evolution of Law’, in Gerken, Luden (ed.), Competition Among Institutions , London, MacMillan, 153-175.
Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States’, 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 479-501.
Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1989), ‘Prison Overcrowding and Judicial Incentives’, 3 Madison Paper Series , 1-22.
Benson, Bruce L. and Wollan, Laurin A., Jr. (1991), ‘Increasing Judicial Responsibility Can Reduce Prison Overcrowding in America’s Prisons: Opposing Viewpoints’, in Tipp, Stacey L. (ed.), San Diego, Greenhaven Press, 139-144.
Campbell, David (1993), ”, in Wacks, Raymond (ed.), Economic Ideology and Hong Kong’s Governance Structure After 1997 , Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 87-122.
Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1990), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference Shaping Policy’, Duke Law Journal , 1-38.
De Geest, Gerrit (1994), Economische analyse van het contracten- en quasi-contractenrecht: een onderzoek naar de wetenschappelijke waarde van de rechtseconomie (Economic Analysis of Contract Law and Quasi Contract Law: A Study on the Scientic Value of Law and Economics) , Antwerpen, Maklu, 568 p.
Dowd, Kevin (1996), Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics , MacMillan Press, 572 p.
Grady, Mark F. (1994), ‘Positive Theories and Grown Order Conceptions of the Law’, 23 Swedish Law Review , 461 ff.
Kitch, Edmund W. (1987), ‘Law and the Economic Order’, in Lipson, Leon and Wheeler, Stanton (eds.), Law and the Social Sciences , New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 109-149.
Krier, James E. and Schwab, Stewart J. (1995), ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light’, 70 New York University Law Review , 440 ff.
MacKaay, Ejan (1979), ‘Les notions floues ou l’conomie de l’imprcision (Fuzzy Concepts or the Economics of Imprecision)’, 12 Langages , 33-50.
MacKaay, Ejan (1980), ‘Le Nozione “Fluide” Ovvero l’Economia Dell’Imprecisione (Fuzzy Concepts or the Economics of Imprecision)’, Informatica e Diritto , 253-274.
MacKaay, Ejan (1988), ‘L’ordre spontan comme fondement du droit – un survol des modles de l’mergence des rgles dans une socit civile (Spontaneous Order as Foundation of Law – A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)’, 22 Revue Juridique Themis , 347-383.
MacKaay, Ejan (1989), ‘L ordre spontan comme fondement du droit – un survol des modles de l’mergence des rgles dans la socit civile (Spontaneous Order as the Foundation of Law – A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)’, 3 Revue internationale de Droit Economique , 247-287.
MacKaay, Ejan (1991), ‘Le droit saisi par le jeu (Game-Theory Applied to Law)’, Droit et Socit , 57-81.
MacKaay, Ejan (1992), ‘Le droit saisi par le jeu ([Game-Theory Applied to Law)’, in Ost, Franois and Van De Kerkhove, Michel (eds.), Le jeu: un paradigme pour le droit , Paris, Librairie Gnrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 81-110.
Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (1990), ‘Modelli competitivi, regole giuridiche ed analisi economica (Competitive models, legal norms and economic analysis)’, Quadrimestre , 77-102.
Mattei, Ugo and Pulitini, Francesco (1990), ‘Modelli competitivi, regole giuridiche ed analisi economica (Competitive models, legal norms and economic analysis)’, Quadrimestre , 77-120.
Miller, Jeremy M. (198), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Method and Law: The Danger in Valueless Values’, 21 Gonzaga Law Review , 425-455.
Pennings, Joost, Heijman, Willem J. M. and Meulenberg, Matthew (1997), ‘The Dimensions of Rights: A Classification of Environmental Rights and Production Rights’, 4 European Journal of Law and Economics , 55-71.
Rasmussen, David W. and Benson, Bruce L. (eds.) (1994), The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons , Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield..
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1991), ‘Regulation and the Law of Torts’, 81 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 54-58.
Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), Legal Realism & Economics as Behavior – A Scandinavian Look at the Economic Analysis of Law , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
Wiggins, Steven N. and Ringleb, Al H. (1992), ‘Adverse Selection and Long Term Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 189-215.
Wittman, Donald A. (1984), ‘Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 57-80.
Wittman, Donald A. (1984), ‘The Geometry of Justice’, Theory and Decision , 239-250.