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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0700 Fundamental Concepts: General Works

  • Akerlof, George A. (1970), ‘The Markets for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 488-500.
  • Alchian, Armen A. (1950), ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’, 58 Journal of Political Economy , 211 ff.
  • Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 American Economic Review , 777-795.
  • Appelbaum, E. and Katz, E. (1986), ‘Transfer Seeking and Avoidance: On the Full Social Costs of Rent Seeking’, 48 Public Choice , 175 ff.
  • Aranson, Peter H. (1989), ‘Rational Ignorance in Politics, Economics and Law’, 1 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 25-42.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1968), ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment’, 58 American Economic Review , 537-538.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971), Essays in the Theory of Risk- Bearing , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 278 p.
  • Baird, Douglas G. and Jackson, Thomas H. (1984), ‘Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property’, 13 Journal of Legal Studies , 299-320.
  • Baker, Tom (1996), ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’, 75 Texas Law Review , 237-292.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1977), ‘Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs’, 20 Journal of Law and Economics , 291-307.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1982), ‘Measurement Cost and the Organisation of Markets’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 27-48.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1964), Human Capital , New York, National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Bonner, John (1986), Introduction to the Theory of Social Choice , Baltimore (MD), John Hopkins University Press, 205 p.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1983), History – the Human Gamble , Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Reprinted in Spanish edition: Fondo de Cultura Economics, Mexico – Spain, 1989.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1985), Betting on Ideas , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Brenner, Reuven (1994), Labyrinths of Prosperity , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Brenner, Reuven and Brenner, Gabrielle A. (1990), Gambling and Speculation , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in French edition by Presses Universitaires de France, 1993.
  • Camerer, Colin F. (1990), ‘Comment (on Noll and Krier, “Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation”)’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 791-799.
  • Carter, R.A.L. (1986), ‘Public Policy and Insurability’, 11 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 145-156.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1974), ‘The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas’, 64 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 384-391.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1980), ‘How the Law Circumvents Starret’s Nonconvexity’, 22 Journal of Economic Theory , 499-504.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1982), ‘Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law by Reviewing Some Major Books’, 29 UCLA Law Review , 1260-1269.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1985), ‘Unity in Torts, Contracts and Property: The Model of Precaution’, 73 California Law Review , 1-51. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor (Ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Reprinted in Medema, Steven G. (Ed.), The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis. Reprinted in Craswell, Richard and Schwartz, Alan (Eds.), Readings in Contract Law, Oxford University Press, 1993.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1985), ‘Prices and Sanctions’, 84 Columbia Law Review , 1523-1560.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), ‘Laws and Prices: How Economics Contributed to Law By Misunderstanding Morality’, 3 Iuris: Quaderns de Pol’tica Jur’dica , 35-36.
  • Cooter, Robert D. (1995), ‘Law and Unified Social Theory’, 22 Law and Society , 50-67. Reprinted in Galligan, D. J. (Ed.), Socio-Legal Studies in Context: The Oxford Centre Past and Future, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1995, pp. 50-67.
  • Cooter, Robert D., Marks, Stephen V. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1982), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-251. Reprinted in Coleman, Jules and Lange, Jeffrey (Eds.), Law and Economics, Volume 2, New York, University Press, 1992.
  • Cowen, Tyler (ed.) (1988), The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination , Fairfax, George Mason University Press, 384 p.
  • Crafton, Steven M. and Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), Quantitative Methods for Lawyers , Durham (NC), Carolina Academic Press.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1969), ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’, 12 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-22.
  • Dilorenzo, T.J. (1988), ‘Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking’, 144 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 318-322.
  • Dowd, Kevin (1996), Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics , MacMillan Press, 572 p.
  • Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.) (1987), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics , London, MacMillan, 4093 p.
  • Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.) (1989), The New Palgrave: Invisible Hand , London, MacMillan, 283 p.
  • Gantner, Manfred (1984), ‘Schwierigkeiten der Verrechtlichung škonomischer TatbestŠnde (The Difficuly of Transforming Economic Issues into Law)’, 31 Wirtschaftspolitische BlŠtter , 423-430.
  • Gay, David E.R. (1976), ‘Book Review of Henry Manne, The Economics of Legal Relationships’, 42 Southern Economic Journal , 765-766.
  • Gay, David E.R. (1982), ‘Book Review of Theories of Property: From Aristotle to the Present, Anthony Parel and Thomas Flanagan’, 15 History of Political Economy , 281-283.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), ‘Competitive Bidding and the Production of Pre-contract Information’, 8 Bell Journal of Economics , 250-261.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), ‘Production Functions, Transactions, Costs, and the New Institutonalism’, in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 21-23. Reprinted in Feiwel, George (Ed.), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics Macmillan Press 395-402.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1990), ‘Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 216-222.
  • Grossman, Herschel I. (1979), ‘Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 336-343.
  • Hardy, Charles O. (1923), Risk and Risk Bearing , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Harris, Milton and Townsend, Robert M. (1981), ‘Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information’, 49 Econometrica , 33-64.
  • Hart, Oliver D. (1983), ‘The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 366-382.
  • Hatzis, Aristides N. (1996), Eisagoge sten Oikonomike Analyse tou Dikaiou (Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law) , Thessaloniki, Aristotle University, Department of History, Philosophy & Sociology.
  • Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1945), ‘The Uses of Knowledge in Society’, 35 American Economic Review , 519-530. Reprinted in Hayek, 1948, 77-99 and Hayek, 1984, 211-224.
  • Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1975), ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’, 77 Swedish Journal of Economics , 433-442.
  • Heertje, A. (1990), ‘Speltheorie als economische analyse van het recht (Game Theory as Economic Analysis of Law)’, in Maris, C.W. Et Al. (eds.), Recht, Rechtvaardigheid en Doelmatigheid , Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 90-100.
  • Heiner, Ronald A. (1990), ‘Imperfect Choice and the Origin of Institutional Rules’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 720-726.
  • Hess, James D. (1983), The Economics of Organisation , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 284 p.
  • Hirshleifer, Jack and Riley, John G. (1979), ‘The Analysis of Uncertainty and Information – An Expository Survey’, 17 Journal of Economic Literature , 1375-1421.
  • Holmstršm, Bengt (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 74-91.
  • Hurwicz, L. and Shapiro, L. (1978), ‘Incentive Structures Maxi mizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information’, 9 Bell Journal of Economics , 180-191.
  • Knetsch, Jack L. (1984), ‘Legal Rules and the Basis for Evaluating Economic Losses’, 4 International Review of Law and Economics , 5-13.
  • Koboldt, Christian (1991), ‘Kommentar on Schanze, Stellvertretung und škonomische Agentur-Theorie’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), …konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts , Berlin, Springer, 76-86.
  • Krenchel, Jens Valdemar (1996), ‘Okonomisk ret – om den rets¢konomiske analyse (Analysis of Law and Economics)’, 4 Justitia .
  • Krier, James E. (1990), ‘Risk and Design’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 781-790.
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1990), ‘Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 301-324.
  • Lande, Robert H. (1988), ‘The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust’, 33 Antitrust Bulletin , 429-466. Reprinted in 23 Revista de Direito Economico 39 (1996) (Brazil) ; Eleanor Fox and James Halverson, Collaborations Among Competitors: Antitrust Policy and Economics 105-130 (1992)
  • Lande, Robert H. (1989), ‘Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust’, 58 Antitrust Law Journal , 631 ff. F.M. Scherer, Monopoly and Competition Policy: Volume 1, 241 (1993)
  • Leland, Hayne E. (1979), ‘Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’, 87 Journal of Political Economy , 1325-1346.
  • Lempert, Richard (1985), ‘Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 1098-1116.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1982), Economics of Information and Law , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 293 p.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1987), ‘Le Juriste a-t-il le Droit d’Ignorer l’Economiste? (May Lawyers Ignore Economists?)’, Revue de la Recherche Juridique , 419-427.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1987), ‘Tableau synoptique de l’analyse Žconomique du droit (Synoptic Table of the Economic Analysis of Law)’, 1987 Revue de la Recherche Juridique Droit Perspectif , 637 ff.
  • Marshall, John M. (1976), ‘Moral Hazard’, 66 American Economic Review , 880-890.
  • Medema, Steven G. (ed.) (1995), The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysus ,.
  • Medema, Steven G. and Samuels, Warren J. (1997), ‘Ronald Coase and Coasean Economics: Some Questions, Conjectures, and Implications’, in Samuels, Warren J., Medema, Steven G. and Schmid, A. Allan (eds.), The Economy as a Process of Valuation , Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
  • Melody, William H. (1987), ‘Information: An Emerging Dimension of Institutional Analysis’, 21 Journal of Economic Issues , 1313-1339.
  • Milgrom, Paul R. and Roberts, John (1986), ‘Relying on the Information of Interested Parties’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 18-32.
  • Mishan, Ezra J. (1984), Cost-benefit Analysis. An Informal Introduction , London, Allen and Unwin, 447 p.
  • Moore, John H. (1981), ‘Agency Costs, Technological Change, and Soviet Central Planning’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 189-214.
  • Moore, Peter G. (1983), The Business of Risk , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 244 p.
  • Mueller, Dennis C. (1976), ‘Public Choice: A Survey’, 14 Journal of Economic Literature , 395-433.
  • Mueller, Dennis C. (1979), Public Choice , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Mueller, Dennis C. (1989), Public Choice II , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 518 p.
  • Nielsen, Niels Chr. (1987), ‘Okonomi, jura og markedsmekanismer (Law, Economics and the Market Mechanism)’, in Blegvad, Britt-Mari & Collin, Finn (eds.), Virksomheden mellem ¢konomi og jura .
  • Noll, Roger G. and Krier, James E. (1990), ‘Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation’, 19 Journal of Legal Studies , 747-779.
  • Pauly, Mark V. (1968), ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard’, 58 American Economic Review , 531-537. Reprinted in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.),.
  • Pauly, Mark V. and Satterthwaite, M.A. (1981), ‘Test of the Role of Consumer Information’, 12 Bell Journal of Economics , 488 ff.
  • Paz-Ares, C‡ndido (1981), ‘La econom’a pol’tica como jurisprudencia racional (Political Economy as Rational Jurisprudence)’, ADC , 601-707.
  • Phillips, A. (1962), Market Structure, Organization and Performance , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Phlips, L. (1989), The Economics of Imperfect Information , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 281 p.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1974), ‘Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law’, 87 Harvard Law Review , 1655-1681.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell A. (1974), ‘Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law’, 87 Harvard Law Review , 1655-1681.
  • Rasmusen, Eric (1987), ‘Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 428-435.
  • Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Reed, Robert W. (1989), ‘Information in Political Markets. A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing’, 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 355-374.
  • Rether, David M., Schwartz, Alan and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), ‘The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure’, 59 Southern California Law Review , 277 ff.
  • Rhoads, Steven E. (1985), The Economist’s View of the World: Governments, Markets, and Public Policy , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 331 p.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1988), ‘Progressive Law and Economics – and the New Administrative Law’, 98 Yale Law Journal , 341-368.
  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1994), ‘The Economic Analysis of Public Law’, 1 European Journal of Law and Economics , 53-70.
  • Ross, Stephen A. (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’, 63 American Economic Review , 134-139.
  • Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1985), ‘Econometrics in the Courtroom’, 85 Columbia Law Review , 1048-1097.
  • Salvador, Barbera (1989), ‘Los derechos individuales en el an‡lisis econ—mico (Individual Rights in the Economic Analysis)’, 38 Economistas .
  • SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (1991), ‘…konomische Analyse von Auf klŠrungspflichten (Economic Analysis of the Duty to Provide Informati)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), …konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts , Berlin, Springer, 117-141.
  • Schanze, Erich (1990), ‘Notes on Models of Choice, Incomplete Contracting, and the Agency Framework ,’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 684-690.
  • Schanze, Erich (1991), ‘Stellvertretung und škonomische Agentur-Theorie – Probleme und WechselbezŸge (The Law of Agency and Agency Theory – Problems and Relations)’, in Ott, Claus and SchŠfer, Hans-Bernd (eds.), …konomische Probleme des Zivilrechts , Berlin, Springer, 60-75.
  • Schmit, Joan T. (1986), ‘A New View of the Requisites of Insurability’, 53 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 320-329.
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