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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics - 0610 Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and Law & Economics

  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1991), 'Deciding for Bigness: Constitutional Choice and the Growth of Firms', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 7-30.
  • Alchian, Armen A. (1950), 'Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory', 58(3) Journal of Political Economy , 211-221. Reprinted in Alchian, Armen A., "Economic Forces at Work", Chapter 1, (1977), Indianapolis: LibertyPress.
  • Althusius, Johannes (1991), 'An Early Contractarian Constitutionalist (Excerpts from his Politica Methodice Digesta)', 2 Constitutional Political Economy .
  • Anderson, Gary M. and Tollison, Robert D. (1992), 'Morality and Monopoly: The Constitutional Political Economy of Religious Rules', 12(2) Cato Journal , 373-392.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. (1986), 'Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions', 6 Cato Journal , 317-341.
  • Apolte, T. (1995), 'Democracy, Dictatorship, and Transformation: A Proposal for a Constitution-Guided Systematic Change in Formerly Soviet Republics', 6 Constitutional Political Economy , 5-20.
  • Aranson, Peter H. (1991), 'Calhoun's Constitutional Economics', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 31-52.
  • Aranson, Peter H. (1992), 'The Common Law as Central Economic Planning', 3(3) Constitutional Political Economy , 289-319.
  • Arantes, Peter, Gellhorn, Ernest A. and Robinson, Glen O. (1983), 'A Theory of Legislative Delegation', 68 Cornell Law Review , 23-56.
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values , New York, John Wiley.
  • Axelrod, Robert (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation , New York, Basic Books.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1978), 'Pareto on Public Choice', 33 Public Choice , 5-17.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law, research memorandum , Maastricht, University of Limburg.
  • Backhaus, JŸrgen G. (1996), 'An Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law', in Buscaglia, Edgardo, Ratliff, William, and Cooter, Robert (eds.), Law and Economics of Development , Greenwood, JAI Press.
  • Baird, Charles W. (1989), 'James Buchanan and the Austrians: The Common Ground', Cato Journal , 201 ff.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economics of Constitutional Law and Public Choice , West Publishing.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1983), 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 371-383.
  • Ben-Shahar, Omri (1992), Strategic Behavior in Judicial Panels , Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, No. 107.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), 'A Note on Corruption of Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights', 5 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 305-311.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1981), 'Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by `High Demand' Legislators?', 48 Southern Economic Journal , 68-77.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), 'The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions', 28 Antitrust Bulletin , 839-862.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1983), 'High Demand Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output', 11 Public Finance Quarterly , 259-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), 'Rent Seeking as a Justification for Privatization', 7 Journal of Contemporary Studies , 5-12.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1984), 'Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective', 51 Southern Economic Journal , 388-400.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), 'An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials', 8(1) Cato Journal , 139-163.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1988), 'Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of "The Tragedy of the Commons" Arising with Public Allocation Processes', 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 73-84.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1989), 'Further Thoughts on Rent Seeking, Bureaucratic Output, and the Price of Complements', 63 Public Choice , 279-281.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1991), 'An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising Under Customary American Indian Law', 5 Review of Austrian Economics , 65-89.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), 'Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law', 2 Constitutional Political Economy , 1-27.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), 'The Development of Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers', 3 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 79-108.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), 'Third Thoughts on Contracting Out', 11 Journal of Libertarian Studies , 44-78.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Toxic Torts by Government , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Baden, John A. (1985), 'The Political Economy of Government Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government', 14 Journal of Legal Studies , 391-410.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Faminow, Merle D. (1984), 'Rent Seeking and Supply Management in Canada', 32 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics , 548-558.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Faminow, Merle D. (1986), 'Regulatory Transfers in Canadian-American Agriculture: The Case of Supply Management', 6 Cato Journal , 271-294.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Greenhut, Melvin L. (1986), 'Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox', in Grieson, Ronald E. (ed.), Antitrust and Regulation , Lexington (MA), Lexington Books, 53-90.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Johnson, Ronald N. (1986), 'Capital Formation and Interstate Tax Competition', in Lee, Dwight (ed.), Taxation and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States , Cambridge (MA), Ballinger, 407-436.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Johnson, Ronald N. (1986), 'The Lagged Impact of State and Local Taxes on Economic Activity and Political Behavior', 24 Economic Inquiry , 389-402.
  • Benson, Bruce L. and Mitchell, Jean (1988), 'Rent Seekers Who Demand Government Production: Bureaucratic Output and the Price of Complements', 56 Public Choice , 3-16.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Greenhut, Melvin L. and Holcombe, Randall (1987), 'Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox', 6 Cato Journal , 801-817.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Kim, Iljoong and Rasmussen, David W. (1994), 'Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Prospective on the Economics of Crime Literature', 61 Southern Economic Journal , 161-168.
  • Benson, Bruce L., Rasmussen, David W. and Sollars, David L. (1995), 'Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs', 83 Public Choice , 21-45.
  • Bergstrom, John C. and Centner, Terence J. (1989), 'Agricultural Nuisances and Right to Farm Laws', 19 Review of Regional Studies , 23-30.
  • Binmore, Ken (1990), 'Evolution and Utilitarianism: Social Contract III', 1(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 1-26.
  • Black, D. (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Blankart, Charles B. (1994), 'Club Governments versus Representative Governments', 5(3) Constitutional Political Economy , 273-285.
  • Blankart, Charles B. (1996), 'The European Union's Debt Question: A Conceptual Viewpoint', 7 Constitutional Political Economy , 257-265.
  • Boettke, Peter (ed.) (1994), The Elgar Company to Austrian Economics , Brookfield, Edward Elgar.
  • Boudreaux, D.J. and Pritchard, A.C. (1994), 'Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains', 5 Constitutional Political Economy , 1-21.
  • Brennan, G. and Buchanan, James M. (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Brennan, G. and Hamlin,A (1995), 'Economizing on Virtue', Constitutional Political Economy , 35-56.
  • Brennan, Geoffrey (1987), 'The Buchanan Contribution', 45 Finanzarchiv , 1-24.
  • Brennan, Geoffrey (1990), 'James Buchanan's Public Economics: One Proposition, Two Speculations and Three Queries', 1(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 113-133.
  • Brennan, Geoffrey and Kliemt, Hartmut (1990), 'Logo Logic', 1(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 125-127.
  • Brennan, Geoffrey and Pardo, Jose Casas (1991), 'A Reading of the Spanish Constitution (1978)', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 53-79.
  • Breton, Albert (1978), Le bilinguisme: une approche Žconomique (Bilingualism: An Economic Approach) , MontrŽal, Institut de recherche C.D. Howe.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1992), 'Politics, Economics and the McCarren Ferguson Act', 73 Public Choice , 371-383.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1993), 'The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce', 27 Family Law Quarterly , 453-470.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1995), 'Through a Glass Darkly, a Review of Neil Komesar's Imperfect Alternatives', 78 Public Choice , 190-194.
  • Brinig, Margaret F., Holcombe, Randall G. and Schwartzstein, Linda A. (1993), 'Public Choice and Lobbying Regulation', 74 Public Choice , 377-384.
  • Brooks, Michael (1997), 'Some Reflections on The Calculus of Consent', 8 (1) Constitutional Political Economy , 3-13.
  • Brunetti, Aymo and Weder, Beatrice (1994), 'Political Credibility and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries', 5(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 23-43.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1959), 'Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy', 2 Journal of Law and Economics , 124-138.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1962), 'Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions', in Yeager, L.B.(ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1969), Cost and Choice , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1975), The Limits of Liberty , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1977), 'Good Economics - Bad Law', in X (ed.), Freedom in Constitutional Contract, Chapter 3 , Texas, A&M University.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1984), 'Rights, Efficiency and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transaction Costs', in Neumann, M. (ed.), Ansprache, Eigentums- und VerfŸgungsrechte , Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 9-24. Reprinted in Liberty, Market and State, Harvester Press, 1986 Reprinted in Medema, S.G. (ed.), (1995), "The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis", Volume II, Chapter 8, 175-190, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1987), 'Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect', 7 Cato Journal . Reprinted in Gwartney, J.D. and Wagner, R.E. (eds.), "Public Choice and Constitutional Economics", Chapter 6, (1988), London: JAI Press.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1990), 'The Domain of Constitutional Economics', 1(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 1-18.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1991), 'The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy', in Buchanan, James M. (ed.), The economics and ethics of constitutional order. , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 3-18.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1991), 'Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 1-6.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1992), 'I Did Not Call Him "Fritz": Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek', 3(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 129-135.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1993), 'Public choice after socialism', 77 Public Choice , 67-74.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1993), 'How Can Constitutions Be Designed so That Politicians Who Seek to Serve "Public Interest" Can Survive and Prosper?', 4(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 1-6.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1996), 'Europe as Social Reality', 7 Constitutional Political Economy , 253-256.
  • Buchanan, James M. and Lee, Dwight R. (1991), 'Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics', 2(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 139-161.
  • Buchanan, James M. and Stubblebine, Wm.C. (1962), 'Externality', 29 Economica , 371-384.
  • Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon (1962), The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1990), 'Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians', 65 Washington Law Review , 1 ff.
  • Butler, Henry N. and Ribstein, Larry E. (1994), 'Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment', 43 University of Kansas Law Review , 163 ff.
  • Butos, William N. and Koppl, Roger G. (1993), 'Hayekian Expectations: Theory and Empirical Applications', 4(3) Constitutional Political Economy , 303-329.
  • Calabresi, Guido (1961), 'Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts', 70 Yale Law Journal , 499-553.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1985), 'Cooperatives: A Search for Equitable Relief from the Equity Redemption Problem', 8 Journal of Agricultural Taxation and Law , 120-144.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1993), 'Circumscribing the Reduction of Open Space by Scattered Development: Incorporating A German Concept in American Right-to-Farm Laws', 8 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law , 307-324.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1994), 'Preserving Rural-Urban Fringe Areas and Enhancing the Rural Environment: Looking at Selected German Institutional Responses', 12 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law , 27-44.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1995), 'The New Equine Liability Statutes', 62 Tennessee Law Review , 997-1039.
  • Centner, Terence J. (1995), 'Adopting Good Samaritan Immunity for Defendants in the Horse Industry', 12 Agriculture and Human Values , 69-78.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1982), 'Individual Rights, Good Consequences, and the Theory of Social Choice', 12 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour , 317-328.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1983), 'Rights As Constraints: Nozick vs Sen', 15 Theory and Decision , 1-10.
  • Chapman, Bruce (1987), 'Pensions, Sex Discrimination, and the Value of Life after Death', 7 International Review of Law and Economics , 193-214.
  • Chen, Yan and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1994), 'Constitutional Secession Clauses', 5(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 45-60.
  • Choi, Young Back (1993), 'Entrepreneurship and Envy', 4(3) Constitutional Political Economy , 331-347.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1992), 'The Institutional Structure of Production', 82(4) American Economic Review , 713-719.
  • Coleman, James S. (1991), 'Natural Persons, Corporate Actors, and Constitutions', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 81-106.
  • Coleman, Jules L. (1990), 'Constitutional Contractarianism', 1(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 135-148.
  • Congleton, Roger D. (1988), 'An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan', 16 Public Finance Quarterly , 131-157.
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  • Cooter, Robert D. (1994), 'Market Affirmative Action', 31 San Diego Law Review , 133-168.
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  • De Alessi, Louis (1992), 'Efficiency Criteria for Optimal Laws: Objective Standards or Value Judgements?', 3(3) Constitutional Political Economy , 321-342.
  • De Alessi, Louis and Staaf, Robert J. (1991), 'The Common Law Process: Efficiency or Order?', 2(1) Constitutional Political Economy , 107-126.
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  • Dnes, Antony W. (1989), 'Rent Seeking, Conflict and Property Rights', 36 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 366-374.
  • Dorn, James A. (1991), 'Madison's Constitutional Political Economy: Principles for a Liberal Order', 2(2) Constitutional Political Economy , 163-186.
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