Encyclopedia of Law & Economics - 0550 Game Theory Applied to Law

Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, Jeffrey L. (1981), 'The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core', 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 175-181.

Aivazian, Varouj A., Callen, Jeffrey L. and Lipnowski, Irwin F. (1988), 'The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability', 54 Economica , 517-520.

Ben-Shahar, Omri (1992), Strategic Behavior in Judicial Panels , Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, No. 107.

Chang, Howard F. (1997), 'Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities', 17 International Review of Law and Economics , 309-324.

Cooter, Robert D., Marks, Stephen V. and Mnookin, Robert H. (1982), 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior', 11 Journal of Legal Studies , 225-251. Reprinted in Coleman, Jules and Lange, Jeffrey (Eds.), Law and Economics, Volume 2, New York, University Press, 1992.

Curran, Christopher (1994), 'The Burden of Proof and the Liability Rule for Suppliers of Services in the EEC', 70 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance , 85-98.

Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1993), 'Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation', 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.

Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), 'Designing a Private Industry : Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure', 53 Journal of Public Economics , 127-147.

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), 'Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation', 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 314-348.

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1994), 'Settlement Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency', 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 283-298.

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), 'Keeping Society in the Dark: on the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court', 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 203-221.

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), 'Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling', 85 American Economic Review , 1187-1206.

Davis, Lee N. (1991), Patenter og innovationer: Mod et strategisk Perspektiv (Patenter og innovationer: Mod et strategisk Perspektiv. (Patents and innovations: Aiming for a Strategic Perspective)) , K¢benhavn, Blytmanns forlag.

Dawid, H. and Feichtinger, G. (1995), On the Persistence of Corruption/ Forschungsbericht , Research Memorandum, Vienna, Institute for Econometrics, Operation Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, No. 186.

De Geest, Gerrit (1995), 'Comment: Game Theory versus Law & Economics?', in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 287-293.

Garcimartin AlfŽrez and Francisco Javier (1996), 'El coste de la ley Helms-Burton para las empresas espa–olas (The Costs of Helms-Burton Rule for Spanish Companies)', Revista Derecho de los Negocios , 1 ff.

Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1992), 'An Auction - Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneer's Liability Regimes', 4 Wisconsin Law Review .

Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1993), 'Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis', Northwestern Law Review .

Hay, Bruce L. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), 'Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation : An Economic Perspective', Journal of Legal Studies .

Huang, Peter H. (1995), 'Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal Scholars to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts', 36 Jurimetrics Journal of Law, Science & Technology , 99-114.

Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), 'Emotional Responses in Litigation', 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 31-44.

Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1994), 'More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures', 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 390-406.

Kahan, Marcel (1992), 'Games, Lies and Securities Laws', 67 New York University Law Review , 750 ff. Reprinted in 26 Securities Law Review 127, 1994.

Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1993), 'Do Bondholders Lose From Junk Bond Covenant Changes', 66 Journal of Business , 499 ff.

Katz, Avery (1988), 'Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure', 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 127-143.

Katz, Avery (1990), 'The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation', 89 Michigan Law Review , 215-295.

Katz, Avery (1990), 'Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,', 21 Rand Journal of Economics , 518-537.

Katz, Avery (1996), 'The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations', 105 Yale Law Journal , 1249-1309.

Kerkmeester, Heico (1995), 'Game Theory as a Method in Law and Economics', in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 267-285.

Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1992), 'Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation for 'Unfair' Plea Bargaining', 23 Rand Journal of Economics , 507-515.

Kort, P.M., Feichtinger G., Hartl, R.F. and Haundschmied, J.L. (1995), Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) On a Drug Market , Working Paper, Maastricht, Tilburg University, Department of Economietrics and CentER.

Krauss, Michael I. (1994), 'La rŽglementation contre le marchŽ dans le dŽveloppement de normes (Regulation against the Market in Norms Formation)', 5 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 573-599.

MacKaay, Ejan (1988), 'L'ordre spontanŽ comme fondement du droit - un survol des modles de l'Žmergence des rgles dans une sociŽtŽ civile (Spontaneous Order as Foundation of Law - A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)', 22 Revue Juridique Themis , 347-383.

MacKaay, Ejan (1989), 'L ordre spontanŽ comme fondement du droit - un survol des modles de l'Žmergence des rgles dans la sociŽtŽ civile (Spontaneous Order as the Foundation of Law - A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)', 3 Revue internationale de Droit Economique , 247-287.

MacKaay, Ejan (1991), 'Le droit saisi par le jeu (Game-Theory Applied to Law)', Droit et SociŽtŽ , 57-81.

MacKaay, Ejan (1992), 'Le droit saisi par le jeu ([Game-Theory Applied to Law)', in Ost, Franois and Van De Kerkhove, Michel (eds.), Le jeu: un paradigme pour le droit , Paris, Librairie GŽnŽrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 81-110.

MacKaay, Ejan (1992), 'Rgle et dŽcision en droit (Rule and Decision in Law)', in Bourcier, Danile and Mackay, Pierre (eds.), Lire le droit - Langue, texte, cognition , Paris, Librairie GŽnŽrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 41-69.

Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), 'Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial', 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar.

Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), 'Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care', 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.

Posner, Eric A. (1998), 'Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law', (forth.) Journal of Legal Studies .

Rasmusen, Eric and Ramseyer, Mark J. (1994), 'Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators', 78 Public Choice , 305 ff.

Rasmusen, Eric B., Ramseyer, Mark J. and Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1991), 'Naked Exclusion', 81 American Economic Review , 1137 ff.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1988), 'Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion', 78 American Economic Review , 713-728.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), 'The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice', 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-134.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), 'Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs', 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 557-566.

Roin, Julie, A. (1995), 'Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems', 81 Virginia Law Review , 1753 ff.

Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.

Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), 'The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation : A Simple Model of Mechanism Design', International Review of Law and Economics .

Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), Enforcement by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production , mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department.

Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), 'Evidence Production, Adversarial Process and the Private Instigation of Suits', mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department .

Schap, David (1986), 'Executive Veto and Informational Strategy: A Structure-Induced Equilibrium Analysis', 30 American Journal of Political Science , 755-770.

Schap, David (1988), 'In Search of Efficacious Executive Veto Authority', 58 Public Choice , 247-257.

Schap, David (1990), 'Executing Veto and Spending Limitation: Positive Political Economy with Implications for Institutional Choice', 65 Public Choice , 239-256.

Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1987), 'Executive Veto, Legislative Override and Structure-Induced Equilibrium', 52 Public Choice , 227-244. Reprinted in Rowley, Charles (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Edward Elgar, 1993, vol. 3, pp. 47-64.

Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1990), 'Line-Item Veto: Where is Thy Sting?', 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 103-118.

Schap, David and Daerden, James A. (1994), 'The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities', 80 Public Choice , 35-53.

Schavell, Steven and Spier, Kathryn E. (1996), 'Threats Without Binding Commitment', 5461 National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper .

Spier, Kathryn E., 'A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Stettle Under a Negligence Rule', Journal of Legal Studies .

Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), 'The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation', 59 Review of Economic Studies , 93-108.

Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), 'Incomplete Contracts and Signalling', 23 (3) Rand Journal of Economics , 432-443.

Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), 'Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules', 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 197-214.

Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), 'Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards', 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 84-95.

Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), 'A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule', Journal of Legal Studies .

Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1993), 'Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation', 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1994), 'Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure', 53 Journal of Public Economics , 127-147.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), 'Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach', mimeo, July 1993 .

Spier, Kathryn E. and David E. Weinstein (1995), 'Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs GATT Cooperation', in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), Imperfect Competition in International Trade , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Hay, Bruce L. (1996), 'Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective', Journal of Legal Studies .

Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael Whinston (1995), 'On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, an Renegotiation', 26 (2) Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Shavell, Steven (1996), 'Threats Without Binding Commitment', National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper .

Spier, Kathryn E. and Sykes, Alan O. (1996), Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims , Mimeo, August 1996.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Weinstein, David E., 'Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation', in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), Imperfect Competition in International Trade , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Spier, Kathryn E. and Whinston, Michael D. (1995), 'On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation', 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.

Stout, Lynn A. (1996), 'Insurance Or Gambling? Derivatives Trading in A World of Risk and Uncertainty', 39 Brookings Review .

Vracar K. Stevan (1994), Preispitivanja pravne metodologije: Nagovestaji drzavno-pravnog integralizma (Reexamination of the Legal Methodology: Indications of State-Legal Integralism) , Naucna knjiga, Belgrade.

Williams, Stephen F. (1973), 'Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue', 44 University of Colorado Law Review , 301-321.