Skip to main content
Find a Lawyer

Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0530 New Institutional Economics

  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1978), ‘The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for Analysis’, 53 New York University Law Review , 783-833.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1979), ‘Informational Paradox and the Pricing of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards in Economic Perspective’, 70 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology , 281-298.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1979), ‘The Moral Costs of Crime: Prices, Information and Organization’, in Gray, Charles M. (ed.), The Costs of Crime , Beverly Hills (CA), Sage Publications, 233-252.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1981), ‘The Plea Bargain in England and America: A Comparative Institutional View’, in Burrows, Paul and Veljanovski, Cento G. (eds.), The Economic Approach to Law , London, Butterworths, 226-252.
  • Adelstein, Richard P. (1981), ‘Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process’, 76 Northwestern University Law Review , 1-99.
  • Bardhan, Pranab K. (1989), ‘The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory: A Brief Critical Assessment’, 17(9) World Development , 1389-1395.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1980), ‘Spatial Microeconomics: Implications for the Relationship Between Concentration of Ownership and Bank Performance’, in Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (ed.), Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition , Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 60-85.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1986), ‘Boom Towns in the West: Is Profit the Culprit?’, 11 Review of Regional Economics and Business , 27-38.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1992), ‘Customary Indian Law: Two Case Studies’, in Anderson, Terry L. (ed.), Property Rights and Indian Economics , Rowman and Littlefield Press.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Emerging From the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights’, 5 Constitutional Political Economy , 129-158. Reprinted inTranslated into Spanish and republished (1995) Las Instituciones y Los Derechos de Propiedad al Emerger de la Jungla Hobbesiana: La Fuerza Quita los Reprinted Derechos y los Crea Libertas, 12, 35-75.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), Toxic Torts by Government , Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1995), ‘Competition Among Legal Institutions: Implications for the Evolution of Law’, in Gerken, Luden (ed.), Competition Among Institutions , London, MacMillan, 153-175.
  • Brousseau, Eric (1993), L’economie des contrats; technologies de l’information et coordination interentreprises , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF).
  • Brousseau, Eric (1993), ‘Les Theories des Contrats: Une Revue’, 103(1) Revue d’Economie Politique , 1-82.
  • Brousseau, Eric (1995), ‘Contracts as Modular Mechanisms: Some Propositions for the Study of ‘Hybrid Forms”, 2(3) International Journal of the Economics of Business , 409-439.
  • Brousseau, Eric and Bessy, Christian (1997), ‘Brevet, Protection et Diffusion des Connaissances: une Relecture Neo-institutionnelle des Proprietes de la Regle de Droit’, 79(S) Revue d’Economie Industrielle , 233-254.
  • Brousseau, Eric and Bessy, Christian (1997), The Governance of Intellectual Property Rights: Patents and Copyrights in France and in the US , Inaugural Conference for the International Society for New Institutional Economics, The Present and Future of the New Institutional Economics, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, USA, Sept. 19-21, 1997.
  • Brousseau, Eric and Bessy, Christian (1997), Technology Licensing Contracts: Features and Diversity , 14th Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE), Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, Sept. 4-6, 1997.
  • Campbell, David (1994), ‘Ayres versus Coase: An Attempt to Recover the Issue of Equality in Law and Economics’, 21 British Journal of Law and Society , 434-463.
  • Campbell, David (1996), ‘On What is Valuable in Law and Economics’, 8 Otago Law Review , 489-514.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1984), ‘The New Institutional Economics’, 140 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 229-232.
  • Coelho Philip R. P. (1985), ‘An Examination into the Causes of Economic Growth’, 7 Research in Law and Economics , 89-116.
  • Dnes, Antony W. (1986), ‘Individualism in Contemporary Pol. Econ. : A Review Article’, 33 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 391-396.
  • Dowd, Kevin (1992), ‘Optimal Financial Contracts’, 44 Oxford Economic Papers , 672-693.
  • Dugger, William M. (1983), ‘The Transaction Cost Analysis of O.E. Williamson: A New Synthesis?’, 17 Journal of Economic Issues , 95-114.
  • Dugger, William M. (1990), ‘The New Institutionalism: New But Not Institutonalist’, 24 Journal of Economic Issues , 423-431.
  • Gemtos, Petros A. (1991), ‘Thesmikes Analyseis sten Oikonomike: E Theoria ton Praxiakon Dikaiomaton (Institutional Analyses in Economics: The Property Rights Theory)’, 4 Aissymnetes , 27-48.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), ‘Commons, Clark and the Emerging Post-Coasian Law and Economics’, 10 Journal of Economic Issues , 877-893.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), ‘Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract’, 10 Journal of Economic Issues , 45-61. Reprinted in Samuels, Warren J. (Ed.), The Chicago School of Political Reprinted inEconomy, East Lansing, Michigan: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University, l976, p. 259-75.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), ‘Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts’, 23 American Behavioral Scientist , 337-352. Reprinted in Putterman (Ed.), The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), ‘Production Functions, Transactions, Costs, and the New Institutonalism’, in Goldberg, Victor P. (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 21-23. Reprinted in Feiwel, George (Ed.), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics Macmillan Press 395-402.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1990), ‘Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 216-222.
  • Grady, Mark F. (1992), ‘Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust’, 30 Economic Inquiry , 225 ff.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce (1992), ‘The Incentive Effects of Soft Dollar Brokerage’, in Lehn, Kenneth and Kamphuis, Robert (eds.), Modernizing US Securities Regulations: Economic and Legal Perspectives , 511-519.
  • Johnsen, D. Bruce (1994), ‘Property Rigths to Investment Tesearch: The Agency Costs of Soft Dollar Brokerage’, 11 Yale Journal on Regulation , 75-113.
  • Komesar, Neil K. (1994), Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy ,, 287 p.
  • Raaschou-Nielsen, Agnete (1988), Institutionel ¾ndring og ¢konomisk teori (Institutional Change and Economic Theory) , K¢benhavn, Ph.D thesis, Det Statsvidenskablige FagrŒd.
  • Vazquez Vega, Pablo, Institutions and Postwar Economic Growth in Europe , Working Paper, Departamento de Econom’a Universidad de Cantabria, No. 95.06.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1990), ‘A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization’, 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 61-71.
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1991), ‘Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance’, 7(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 159-187.
Copied to clipboard