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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 5510 Economics of Labor Contracts

  • Abowd, John M. and Card, David (1987), ‘Intertemporal Labor Supply and Long-Term Employment Contracts’, 77 American Economic Review , 50-68.
  • Akerlof, George A. (1984), ‘Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views’, 74 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 79-83.
  • Antel, John J. (1985), ‘Costly Employment Contract Renegotiation and the Labor Mobility of Young Men’, 75 American Economic Review , 976-991.
  • Arnott, Richard J., Hosios, Arthur J. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1988), ‘Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemploy ment’, 78 American Economic Review , 1046-1066.
  • Azariadis, Costas (1987), ‘Implicit Contracts’, in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics , London, MacMillan, 733-737.
  • Ball, Laurence (1987), ‘Externalities from Contract Length’, 77 American Economic Review , 615-629.
  • Baron, David P. (1974), ‘Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Reply’, 64 American Economic Review , 1072-1073.
  • Becker, Gary S. (1964), Human Capital , New York, National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Blaydon, Colin C. and Marshall, Paul W. (1974), ‘Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Comment’, 64 American Economic Review , 1070-1071.
  • Bull, Clive (1983), ‘Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement and Risk Aversion’, 73 American Economic Review , 658-671.
  • Canes, Michael E. (1975), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting: Note’, 65 American Economic Review , 478-483.
  • Cooper, Russell (1988), ‘Will Share Contracts Increase Economic Welfare?’, 78 American Economic Review , 138-154.
  • Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1993), ‘Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.
  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1992), ‘A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace’, 91 MicGigan Law Review , 419 ff.
  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1993), ‘Bargaining Theory and Canadian Labour Law’, in Kuttner, T. (ed.), 2 The Industrial Relations System: Proceedings of the XXIXth Conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association , 753 ff.
  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1993), ‘Meeting the Demands of Workers Into the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law’, 68 Indiana Law Journal , 685 ff.
  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1995), ‘The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Workforce’, 52 Washington and Lee Law Review , 879 ff.
  • Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. (1996), ‘Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate’, Texas Law Review .
  • Dudley, Leonard (1986), ‘Implicit Labor Contracts and Public Choice: A General Equilibrium Approach’, 29 Journal of Law and Economics , 61-82.
  • Dye, Ronald A. (1985), ‘Optimal Length of Labor Contracts’, 26 International Economic Review , 251-270.
  • Flanagan, Robert J. (1984), ‘Implicit Contracts, Explicit Contracts, and Wages’, 74 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 345-349.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1985), ‘The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence form the U.S. Nursing Home Indusrty’, 141 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 146-166.
  • Frech, H. Edward III, Borjas, George J. and Ginsburg, Paul B. (1983), ‘Property Rights and Wages: The Case of Nursing Homes’, 18(2) Journal of Human Resources , 231-246.
  • Freeman, Smith (1977), ‘Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: a Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement’, 8 Bell Journal of Economics , 419-443.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1980), ‘Bridges Over Contested Terrain: Exploring the Radical Account of the Employment Relationship’, 1 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 249-274.
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1984), ‘A Relational Exchange Perspective on the Employment Relationship’, in Stephen, Frank H. (ed.), Firms, Organization and Labour: Approaches to the Economics of Work Organization , London, MacMillan, 127-145.
  • Greene, Kenneth V. and Moulton, George D. (1986), ‘Municipal Employee Residency Requirement Statutes: An Economic Analysis’, 9 Research in Law and Economics , 185-204.
  • Hall, Robert E. (1982), ‘The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy’, 72 American Economic Review , 716-724.
  • Harris, Milton and Holmstršm, Bengt (1987), ‘On the Duration of Agreements’, 28 International Economic Review , 389-406.
  • Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur (1978), ‘Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement’, 68 American Economic Review , 20-30.
  • Hashimoto, Masanori and Yu, Ben T. (1980), ‘Specific Capital, Employment Contracts, and Wage Rigidity’, 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 536-549.
  • Hertog, Johan A. and Kraamwinkel, Margriet M. (1991), ‘Pensioennadelen in Het Licht Van De Contracttheorie (Pension Disadvantages in the Light of Contract Theory)’, Economisch-Statistische Berichten , 908-912.
  • Hirsch, Werner Z. (1989), ‘The Economics of Contracting Out: The Labor Cost Fallacy’, 40 Labor Law Journal , 536-542.
  • Ichino, Pietro (1998), ‘Il diritto del lavoro e i modelli economici (Labour law and economic models)’, Lavoro e diritto , 309-322.
  • Ickes, B.W. and Samuelson, Larry (1987), ‘Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting in the Ratchet Effect’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 275-286.
  • Ioannides, Y.M. and Pissarides, C.A. (1983), ‘Wages and Employ ment with Firm-Specific Seniority’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 573-580.
  • Klein, Benjamin (1984), ‘Contract Costs and Administered Prices: An Economic Theory of Rigid Wages’, 74 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 332-338.
  • KŸbler, Dorothea (1997), ‘Auctioning Off Labor Contracts: Legal Restrictions Reconsidered’, 17 International Review of Law and Economics , 63-74.
  • Lazear, Edward P. (1984), ‘Incentives and Wage Rigidity’, 74 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 339-344.
  • Lazear, Edward P. (1987), ‘Incentive Contracts’, in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray and Newman, Peter (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics , London, MacMillan, 744-748.
  • Lemley, Mark A. and Durie, Daralyn J. (1992), ‘The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive Litigation’, 80 California Law Review , 757 ff.
  • Lewis, Tracy R. (1980), ‘Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting’, 11 Bell Journal of Economics , 292-301.
  • MacDonald, Glenn M. (1982), ‘Specific Investments and Nonlabor Income’, 13 Bell Journal of Economics , 225 ff.
  • Magee, R.P. (1978), ‘Accounting Measurement and Employment Contracts: Current Value Reporting’, 9 Bell Journal of Economics , 145-158.
  • Martin, Donald L. (1977), ‘The Economics of Employment Termination Rights’, 20 Journal of Law and Economics , 187-204.
  • McCall, John, J. (1970), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting’, 60 American Economic Review , 837-846.
  • Murphy, Kevin J. (1986), ‘Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 59-76.
  • Nogler, Luca (1992), ‘Una ventata di analisi economica del diritto in tema di contratto di lavoro a termine (Nota a Cass., sez. lav., 21 febbraio 1992, n. 2153, Matteucci c. Cassa risp. Cittˆ di Castello) (A wave of economic analysis of law on forward employment contract)’, I Giustizia civile , 2104-2105.
  • Peltzman, Sam (1987), ‘Comment (on R. B. Freeman, “How Do Public Sector Wages and Employment Respond To Economic Conditions”)’, in Wise, D. (ed.), Public Sector Payrolls , Chicago (IL), University of Chicago Press.
  • Petersen, Trond (1991), ‘Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages’, 7(S) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 130-158.
  • Plaut, Steven E. (1986), ‘Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement: Note’, 76 American Economic Review , 257-258.
  • Rasmusen, Eric and Zenger, Todd (1990), ‘Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 65-92.
  • Roemer, J. (1979), ‘Divide and Conquer Microfoundations of a Marxian Theory of Wage Discrimination’, 10 Bell Journal of Economics , 695-705.
  • Rosen, Sherwin (1982), ‘Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings’, 13 Bell Journal of Economics , 311-323.
  • Rubin, Paul H. and Shedd, Peter (1981), ‘Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 93-110.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1987), ‘Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem’, 72 Cornell Law Review , 245-287.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1992), ‘Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control’, University of Illinois Law Review , 367-416.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1994), ‘Employment Life Cycles and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine’, 20 Cornell Law Forum , 7-11.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1995), ‘The Diversity of Contingent Workers and the Need for Nuanced Policy’, 52 Washington & Lee Law Review , 915-933.
  • Schwab, Stewart J. (1996), ‘Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects’, Texas Law Review , 74 ff.
  • Shadowen, Steve D. and Voytek, Kenneth (1984), ‘Note: Economic and Critical Analyses of the Law of Covenants Not To Compete’, 72 Georgetown Law Journal , 1425-1450.
  • Simon, Herbert A. (1951), ‘A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship’, 19 Econometrica , 293-305.
  • Sklivas, S.D. (1987), ‘The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives’, 18 Rand Journal of Economics , 452-460.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1993), ‘Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.
  • Taylor, John B. (1980), ‘Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts’, 88 Journal of Political Economy , 1-23.
  • Topel, Robert H. and Welch, Finis (1986), ‘Efficient Labor Contracts with Employement Risk’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 490-507.
  • Verkerke, J. Hoult (1995), ‘An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate’, Wisconsin Law Review , 837-918.
  • Vogel, Kenneth R. (1983), ‘Analysis of Labour Contracts and their Administration Using Transaction Costs Economics’, 5 Law and Policy Quarterly , 129-152.
  • Waldman, Michael (1984), ‘Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency’, 15 Rand Journal of Economics , 255-267.
  • Weitzman, Martin L. (1980), ‘Efficient Incentive Contracts’, 94 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 719-730.
  • Weitzman, Martin L. (1984), The Share Economy. Conquering Stagflation , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 167 p.
  • Williamson, Oliver E., Wachter, Michael L. and Harris, Jeffrey F. (1975), ‘Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange’, 6 Bell Journal of Economics , 250-278.
  • Willman, Paul (1982), ‘Opportunism in Labor Contracting: An Application of the Organizational Failures’ Framework’, 3 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 83-98.
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