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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 3600 No-Fault Compensation Systems

  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1985), ‘Note: An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death’, 60 New York University Law Review , 1113-1136.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1990), ‘Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Physical Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents’, 32 William & Mary Law Review , 41-103.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1990), ‘Reexamining Liability Rules When Injurers As Well As Victims Suffer Losses’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 233-239.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1992), ‘Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers As Well As Victims Suffer Losses’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 411-426.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1992), ‘Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies , 413-429.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1992), ‘Book Review: W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability’, 30 Journal of Economic Literature , 2170-2172.
  • Arlen, Jennifer H. (1993), ‘Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence’, 52 Maryland Law Review , 1093-1136.
  • Arru–ada, Benito (1988), ‘Un an‡lisis econ—mico de la regulaci—n de la sociedad an—nima en Espa–a (An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of the Joint-Stock Society in Spain)’, 3 Anales de Estudios Econ—micos y Empresariales , 191-224.
  • Barnes, David W. and Stout, Lynn A. (1992), Economic Analysis of Tort Law , West Publishing.
  • Brainard, Calvin H. (1973), ‘Massachusetts Loss Experience Under No-Fault in 1971: Analysis and Implications’, 40(1) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 95-101.
  • Brainard, Calvin H. and Fitzgerald, John F. (1974), ‘lst Year Cost Results Under No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Comparison of the Florida and Massachusetts Experience’, 41(1) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 25-39.
  • Bruce, Christopher J. and Atkins, F. J. (1993), ‘Efficiency Effects of Premium Setting Regimes Under Workers Compensation: Canada and the United States’, 11 Journal of Labor Economics , 38-69.
  • Brunt, Maureen (1984), ‘The Economics of Law: Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No Fault Insurance, Occupational Licensing and Criminology: Comment’, 67 Australian Economic Review , 113-119.
  • Carroll, Stephen J. and Kakalik, James S. (1993), ‘No-Fault Approaches to Compensating Auto Accident Victims’, 60(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 265-287.
  • Chapman, Bruce and Trebilcock, Michael J. (1992), ‘Making Hard Choices: Lessons from the Automobile Accident Comensation Debate’, 44 Rutgers Law Review , 797-869.
  • Cummins, J. David and Weiss, Mary A. (1993), ‘The Stochastic Dominance of No-Fault Automobile Insurance’, 60(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 230-264.
  • Derrig, Richard A., Weisberg, Herbert I. and Chen, Xiu (1994), ‘Behavioral Factors and Lotteries under No-Fault with a Monetary Threshold: A Study of Massachusetts Automobile Claims’, 61(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 245-275.
  • Devlin, Rose Anne (1990), ‘Some Welfare Implications of No- Fault Automobile Insurance’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics , 193-205.
  • Devlin, Rose Anne (1993), ‘Automobile Insurance in Ontario: Public Policy and Private Interests’, 19(3) Canadian Public Policy , 298-310.
  • Dewees, Donald N. (1986), ‘Economic Incentives for Controlling Industrial Disease: The Asbestos Case’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies , 289-319.
  • Dewees, Donald N. and Daniels, Ronald J. (1986), ‘The Cost of Protecting Occupational Health: The Asbestos Case’, 21(3) Journal of Human Resources , 181-196.
  • Dewees, Donald N. and Daniels, Ronald J. (1988), ‘Prevention and Compensation of Industrial Disease’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 51-72.
  • Flanigan, George B. and others (1989), ‘Experience from Early Tort Reforms: Comparative Negligence Since 1974’, 56 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 525-534.
  • Frech, H. Edward III (1977), ‘The Economics of Medical Malpractice: Commentary’, in Rottenberg, Simon (ed.), The Economics of Medical Malpractice , Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 280-288.
  • Gaudry, Marc (1986), Un abrŽgŽ de DRAG, un modle de la Demande Routire, des Accidents et de leur GravitŽ, appliquŽ au QuŽbec de 1956 ˆ 1982 (A Summary of DRAG, a model of Road Demand and of Accidents and their Seriousness, Applied to Quebec from 1956 to 1982) , MontrŽal, Centre de recherche sur les transports.
  • Gaudry, Marc, Fournier, Franois and Simard, Robert (1995), DRAG-2, un modle ŽconomŽtrique appliquŽ au kilomŽtrage, aux accidents et ˆ leur gravitŽ au QuŽbec – Synthse des rŽsultats (DRAG-2, An Econometric Model Applied to Mileage and to Accidents and their Seriousness in Quebec – Summary of Results) , QuŽbec, SociŽte de l’assurance automobile du QuŽbec.
  • Goldberg, Leonard D. and Walters, Kenneth D. (1982), ‘No-Fault Criminal Liability for Executives’, 24(4) California Management Review , 25-32.
  • Harrington, Scott E. (1994), ‘State Decisions to Limit Tort Liability: An Empirical Analysis of No-Fault Automobile Insurance Laws’, 61(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 276-294.
  • Henderson, James A. (1981), ‘The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform’, 48 University of Chicago Law Review , 781-801. Reprinted in Rabin, Robert L. (ed.), Perspectives on Tort Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1983, 316-331.
  • Heyne, Paul (1984), ‘The Economics of Law: Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No Fault Insurance, Occupational Licensing and Criminology: Comment’, 67 Australian Economic Review , 109-112.
  • Johnson, Joseph E., Flanigan, George B. and Winkler, Daniel T. (1992), ‘Cost Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance’, 59(1) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 116-123.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1986), ‘The Vaccine Dilemma’, 2 Issues in Science and Technology , 108 ff.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. (1988), ‘American Law and Preventive Vaccination Programs’, in Plotkin, Stanley A. and Mortimer, Edward A. (eds.), Vaccines , Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders Company, 612 ff.
  • Kitch, Edmund W. and Mortimer, Edward A., Jr. (1994), ‘American Law, Preventive Vaccine Programs, and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program’, in Plotkin, Stanley A. and Mortimer, Edward A. (eds.), Vaccines , Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders Company, 93 ff.
  • Kochanowski, Paul S. and Young, Madelyn V. (1985), ‘Deterrent Aspects of No Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings’, 52 Journal of Risk and Insurance , 269-288.
  • Landes, Elisabeth M. (1982), ‘Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 49-65.
  • Levmore, Saul and O’Connell, Jeffrey (1983), ‘A Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of No-Fault’s Deterrent Effect on Fault’, 48 Missouri Law Review , 649-653.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1980), ‘Le droit relatif aux accidents – une interprŽtation Žconomique (The Law of Accidents – An Economic Approach)’, 15 Revue Juridique Themis , 383-415.
  • McEwin, R. Ian (1989), ‘No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics , 13-24.
  • Mehr, Robert I. and Eldred, Gary W. (1975), ‘Should the “No-Fault” Concept Be Applied to Automobile Property Damage?’, 42(1) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 17-33.
  • O’Connell, Jeffrey (1979), ‘No-Fault Insurance: What, Why and Where?’, 443(443) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , 72-81.
  • Outreville, Jean Francois (1984), ‘The Impact of the Government No-Fault Plan for Automobile Insurance in the Province of Quebec’, 51(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 320-335.
  • Powers, Michael R. (1992), ‘Equity in Automobile Insurance: Optional No-Fault’, 59(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 203-220.
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark (1996), ‘Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on A Japanese Experiment’, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review .
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1981), Disability Insurance and Public Policy. , Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1981), ‘Lump Sum Versus Periodic Damage Awards’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 131-154.
  • Rea, Samuel A., Jr. (1987), ‘Economic Analysis of Fault and No-Fault Liability Systems’, 12 Canadian Business Law Journal , 444-472.
  • Sappington, David E.M. (1994), ‘Designing Optional No-Fault Insurance Policies for Health Care Systems’, 3(1) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy , 113-142.
  • Sloan, Frank A., Reilly, Bridget A. and Schenzler, Christoph M. (1995), ‘Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving’, 38 Journal of Law and Economics , 49-77.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 84-95.
  • Spurr, Stephen J. (1990), ‘The Impact of Advertising and Other Factors on Referral Practices, with Special Reference to Lawyers’, 21(2) Rand Journal of Economics , 235-246.
  • Swan, Peter L. (1984), ‘The Economics of Law: Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No-Fault Insurance, Occupational Licensing and Criminology?’, 0(67) Australian Economic Review , 92-108.
  • Symposium (1985), ‘Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory’, 73(3) California Law Review , 548-1042.
  • Todd, Jerry D. (1976), ‘The Costing of No-Fault Automobile Insurance’, 43(3) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 431-443.
  • Witt, Robert C. and Urrutia, Jorge (1983), ‘A Comparative Economic Analysis of Tort Liability and No-Fault Compensation Systems in Automobile Insurance’, 50(4) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 631-669.
  • Zador, Paul L. and Lund, Adrian (1986), ‘Re Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes’, 53(2) Journal of Risk and Insurance , 226-241.
  • Zelder, Martin (1993), ‘Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 503-520.
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