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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0750 Public Goods & Club Goods

  • Adelstein, Richard P. and Edelson, Noel (1976), ‘Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities’, 5 Journal of Legal Studies , 147-163.
  • Aronson, J. Richard (1978), Public Finance , New York, McGraw-Hill.
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  • Becker, G. and Tomes, Nigel (1976), ‘Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of Children’, 84 Journal of Political Economy , 143-165.
  • Benson, Bruce L. (1994), ‘Are Public Goods Really Common Pools: Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England’, 39 Economic Inquiry , 249-271.
  • Berglas, Eitan (1976), ‘On the Theory of Clubs’, 66 American Economic Review , 116-121.
  • Berglas, Eitan and Pines, D., Clubs, Local Public Goods and Transportation Models: A Synthesis , Foerder Institute Working Paper, No. 32/78.
  • Bergstrom, T., Blume, L. and Varian, H.R. (1986), ‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods’, 29 Journal of Public Economics , 25-49.
  • Bonus, Holger (1980), ‘Offentliche GŸter Und Der …ffentlichkeitsgrad Von GŸtern (Public Goods and the Publicness of Goods)’, 136 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 50-81.
  • Borcherding, Thomas E. (1978), ‘Competition, Exclusion, and the Optimal Supply of Public Goods’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics , 111-132.
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  • Brennan, J. and Flowers, Marilyn R. (1980), ‘All Ng Up on Clubs: Some Notes on the Current Status of Club Theory’, 8(2) Public Finance Quarterly , 153-170.
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  • Brubaker, Earl D. (1975), ‘Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule ?’, 18 Journal of Law and Economics , 147-161.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1949), ‘The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach’, 57 Journal of Political Economy , 496-505.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1965), ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, 32 Economica , 1-14.
  • Buchanan, James M. (1967), ‘Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Discussion’, 10 Journal of Law and Economics , 193-197.
  • Cebula, R.J. (1979), ‘A Survey of the Literature on the Migration of State and Local Government Policies’, 34 Public Finance , 69-82.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1973), ‘The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 11-33.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-44. Reprinted in Ackermann, Bruce A., Economic Foundations of Property Law,Boston,Little Brown,1975,17-22. Reprinted in Medema, Steven G.,The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis,Vol.2,Aldershot,Edward Elgar Publishig, 1995, 5-48. Reprinted in Coase, Ronald H., The Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988.
  • Coase, Ronald H. (1974), ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics , 357-376.
  • Cohen, Lloyd R. (1991), ‘Holdouts and Free Riders’, 20 Journal of Legal Studies , 351-362.
  • Cornes, Richard and Sandler, Todd (1986), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 303 p.
  • De Geest, Gerrit (1992), ‘The Provision of Public Goods in Apartment Buildings’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 299-315.
  • De Jasay, Anthony (1989), Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study on the Public Goods Problem , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 256 p.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1970), ‘The Private Production of Public Goods’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 293-306.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1973), ‘Joint Supply and Price Discrimination’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 389-405.
  • Demsetz, Harold (1973), ‘Reply to Professor Thompson’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 413-415.
  • Dowd, Kevin (1994), ‘Competitive Banking, Bankers’ Clubs, and Bank Regulation’, 26(2) Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , 289-308.
  • Dowd, Kevin (1996), Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics , MacMillan Press, 572 p.
  • Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Navarro, Peter (1988), ‘How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 217-241.
  • Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. and Hulett, Joe R. (1973), ‘Joint Supply, the Taussig-Pigou Controversy, and the Competitive Provision of Public Goods’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 369-387.
  • Evans, Andrew (1970), ‘Private Good, Externality, Public Good’, 17 Scottish Journal of Political Economy , 79-89.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Rochlin, Clifford B. (1979), ‘Advertising as a Privately Supplied Public Good’, 27(2) Economic Inquiry , 414-418.
  • Frech, H. Edward III and Rochlin, Clifford B. (1982), ‘A New Economic View of Advertising’, 1 Journal of Advertising , 213-222.
  • Goldin, Kenneth D. (1977), ‘Equal Access versus Selective Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory’, 29 Public Choice , 53-71.
  • Green, Jerry R. (1976), Consumer Theory , London , Macmillan.
  • Hansmann, Henry B. (1986), ‘A Theory of Status Organizations’, 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 119-130.
  • Hartog, Hendrik (1981), ‘Property as Government in Eighteenth- Century America: The Case of New York City’, 10 Journal of Legal Studies , 305-341.
  • Head, John G. (1974), Public Goods and Public Policy , Durham (NC), Duke University Press.
  • Helpman, Elhanan (1979), ‘On Optimal Community Formation’, 1 Economic Letters , 289-293.
  • Helpman, Elhanan and Hillman, Arye L., On Optimal Club Size , Foerder Institute, Working Paper, No. 91/76.
  • Hillman, Arye L. (1978), ‘The Theory of Clubs: A Technological Formulation’, in Sando [ed.)), Essays in Public Economics: The Kiryat Anavim Papers , Lexington, Lexington Books.
  • Hillman, Arye L. and Swan, Peter L. (1979), ‘Club Participation Under Uncertainty’, Mimeo .
  • Holtermann, A. (1972), ‘Externalities and Public Goods’, 39 Economica .
  • Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers (1990), ‘National Goods Versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders’, 4 Review of Austrian Economics , 88-122.
  • Kaplow, Louis (1993), ‘Should the Government’s Allocation Branch Be Concerned About the Distortionary Cost of Taxation and Distributive Effects?’, Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper , 122 ff.
  • Kim, O. and Walker, Martin (1984), ‘The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence’, 43 Public Choice , 3 ff.
  • Knight, Frank H. (1924), ‘Some Fallacies in the Interpretion of Social Cost’, 38 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 582-602.
  • Kormendi, Roger C. (1979), ‘A New Remedy for the Free Rider Problem? – Flies in the Ointment’, 1 Research in Law and Economics , 115-130.
  • Kormendi, Roger C. (1980), ‘Further Thought on the Free Rider Problem and Demand Revealing Processes’, 2 Research in Law and Economics , 219-225.
  • La Croix, Sumner J. (1989), ‘Homogeneous Middleman Groups. What Determines the Homogeneity?’, 5 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 211-222.
  • Lee, Dwight R. (1977), ‘Discrimination and Efficiency in the Pricing of Public Goods’, 20 Journal of Law and Economics , 403-420.
  • Lindahl, E. (1929), ‘Just Taxation – A Positive Solution’, in Musgrave, R.A, and Peacock, A.T. (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance , Macmillan.
  • Lipsey, Richard and Lancaster, K. (1956), ‘The General Theory of the Second Best’, 24 Review of Economic Studies , 11-32.
  • Loehr,W. and Sandler, Todd (1978), Public Goods and Public Policy , New York, Sage Publications.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1995), ‘Mededinging, welvaart en federalisme (Competition, Welfare and Federalism)’, in Kanning, Walter (ed.), Liber amicorum voor Arnold Heertje , Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 93-100.
  • Marchand, James R. and Russel, Keith P. (1973), ‘Externalities, Liability and Resource Allocation’, 63 American Economic Review , 611-620.
  • McGuire, T. (1974), ‘Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdiction’, 82 Journal of Political Economy , 112-132.
  • McNutt, Patrick (1996), The Economics of Public Choice , Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
  • Meade, James E. (1952), ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation’, 62 Economic Journal , 54-67.
  • Minasian, Jora R. (1967), ‘Public Goods in Theory and Practice Revisited’, 10 Journal of Law and Economics , 205-207.
  • Minasian, Jora R. (1979), ‘Indivisibility, Decreasing Cost, and Excess Capacity: The Bridge’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 385-397.
  • Mishan, Ezra J. (1969), ‘The Relationship Between Joint Products, Collective Goods and External Effects’, 77 Journal of Political Economy , 329-348.
  • Mishan, Ezra J. (1971), ‘The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay’, 9 Journal of Economic Literature , 329-348.
  • Moffit, Robert (1990), ‘The Econometrics of Kinked Budget Constraints’, 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 119-139.
  • Mueller, D. (1979), Public Choice , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Mueller, D. (1989), Public Choice II , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Musgrave, Richard A. (1938), ‘The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy’, 35 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 213-237.
  • Ng, Yew Kwang (1973), ‘Optimal Club Size: A Reply’, 45 Economica , 407-410.
  • Ng, Yew Kwang (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions’, 40 Economica , 291-298.
  • Ng, Yew Kwang (1979), Welfare Economics, Introduction and Development of Basic Concepts , London, MacMillan.
  • O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. (1976), ‘The American Express Case: Public Good or Monopoly ?’, 19 Journal of Law and Economics , 163-175.
  • Oakland, W.H. (1972), ‘Congestion, Public Goods and Welfare’, 1 Journal of Public Economics , 339-357.
  • Oates,W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism , London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
  • Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 186 p.
  • Pauly, Martin (1967), ‘Clubs, Commonality and the Core’, 34 Economica , 314-324.
  • Pauly, Martin (1970), ‘Cores and Clubs’, 9 Public Choice , 53-65.
  • Pauly, Martin (1970), ‘Optimality, Public Goods and Local Government’, 78 Journal of Political Economy , 572-586.
  • Pearce, David W. (1977), Environmental Economics , London, Longman.
  • Pigou, A.C. (1920), The Economics of Welfare , London, MacMillan.
  • Porter, R. (1977), ‘On the Optimal Size of Underpriced Facilites’, 67 American Economic Review , 753-760.
  • Posner, Eric A. (1995), ‘The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Santions on Collective Action’, 63 University of Chicago Law Review , 113-197.
  • Rothenberg, Jerome (1970), ‘The Economics of Congestion and Pollution: An Integrated View’, 60 American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings , 114-121.
  • Samuelson, Paul A. (1954), ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, 36 Review of Economic Statistics , 387-389.
  • Samuelson, Paul A. (1967), ‘Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods’, 10 Journal of Law and Economics , 199-204.
  • Sanchez, Isabel (1991), ‘Provisi—n voluntaria de bienes pœblicos: resultados experimentales (Volutantary contributions to Public Goods: experimental results)’, 11 Revista de Econom’a Pœblica , 2 ff.
  • Sandler, Todd (1977), ‘Impunity of Defence: An Application to the Economics of Alliances’, 30 Kyklos , 443-460.
  • Sandler, Todd (1978), ‘Public Goods and the Theory of the Second Best’, 33 Public Finance , 331-343.
  • Sandler, Todd and Posnett, J.W. (1991), ‘The Private Provision of Public Goods: A Perspective on Neutrality’, 19 Public Finance Quarterly , 22-42.
  • Sandler, Todd and Tschirhart, John (1980), ‘The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey’, 18 Journal of Economic Literature , 1481-1521.
  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1969), ‘Models of Segregation’, may American Economic Review , 488-494.
  • Scotchmer, Suzanne (1985), ‘Profit Maximising Clubs’, 27 Journal of Public Economics , 25-45.
  • Seldon, Anthony (1986), The Riddle of the Education Voucher , London, Institute of Economic Affairs.
  • Shoup, D. Carl (1971), ‘Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control: Comment’, 9 Western Economic Journal , 310-313.
  • Starrett, David A. (1988), Foundations of Public Economics , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1977), ‘The Theory of Local Public Goods’, in Feldstein and Inman [ed.), The Economics of Public Services , London, MacMillan.
  • Tanzi, V. (1972), ‘A Note on Exclusion, Pure Public Goods and Pareto Optimality’, 27 Public Finance , 75-79.
  • Thompson, Earl A. (1973), ‘The Private Production of Public Goods: A Comment’, 16 Journal of Law and Economics , 407-412.
  • Tideman, T. Nicolaus (1980), ‘The Evaluation of Rules for Making Collective Decisions: A Reply to Kormendi’, 2 Research in Law and Economics , 213-217.
  • Tiebout, Charles M. (1956), ‘A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures’, 64 Journal of Political Economy , 416-424. Reprinted in Cowen,T. (ed.), (1992), “Public Goods and Market Failures”, Chapter 9, London: Transaction Publishers.
  • Turvey, Ralph (1971), Demand and Supply , London, Allen and Unwin.
  • Van Zandt, David E. (1993), ‘The Lessons of the Lighthouse: “Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods’, 22 Journal of Legal Studies , 47-72.
  • Vasic B. Vukasin (1986), ‘Makroekonomska politika kao javno dobro (Macroeconomic Policy as a Public Good)’, 3 Ekonomist , 429-430.
  • Williams, Stephen F. (1978), ‘Running Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources’, 7 Journal of Legal Studies , 165-199.
  • Wolf, Charles, Jr. (1979), ‘A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis’, 22 Journal of Law and Economics , 107-139.
  • Wooders, M. (1980), ‘The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies’, 48 Econometrica , 1467-1485.
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