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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0740 Transaction Costs

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  • Allen, Douglas W. (1990), ‘In Inquiry Into the State’s Role in Marriage’, 13 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 171-191.
  • Allen, Douglas W. (1991), ‘What are Transaction Costs?’, 14 Research in Law and Economics , 1-18.
  • Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, D. (1992), ‘The Back-Forty on a handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts’, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 366-377.
  • Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, D. (1993), ‘Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts’, 24 Rand Journal of Economics , 78-100.
  • Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, Dean (1992), ‘Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 397-426.
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  • Alston, L., Datta, S. and Nugent, J. (1984), ‘Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transaction Costs’, 92 Journal of Political Economy , 1121-1133.
  • Andersen, E. (1988), ‘Transaction Costs as Determinants of Opportunism in Integrated and Independent Sales Forces’, 9 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 242-264.
  • Anderson, Terry L. and Lueck, Dean (1992), ‘Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations’, 35 Journal of Law and Economics , 427-454.
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  • Barzel, Yoram (1976), ‘An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation’, 84 Journal of Political Economy , 1177-1197.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1977), ‘Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs’, 20 Journal of Law and Economics , 291-307.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1982), ‘Measurement Cost and the Organisation of Markets’, 25 Journal of Law and Economics , 27-48.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1985), ‘Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?’, 141 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 4-16.
  • Barzel, Yoram (1989), Economic Analysis of Property Rights , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 122 p.
  • Barzel, Yoram and Kochin, L. (1992), ‘Ronald Coase on the Nature of Social Cost as a Key to the Problem of the Firm’, 94 Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 19-31.
  • Baumol, William J. (1952), ‘The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach’, 66 Quarterly Journal of Economics , 545-556.
  • Bensaid, B., Lesne, J.P. and Pages, H. (1992), ‘Derivative Asset Pricing with Transaction Costs’, 2 Mathematical Finance , 63-86.
  • Bergstrom, T. (ed.) (1976), ‘How to Discard “Free Disposability” – At No Cost’, 3 Journal of Mathematical Economics , 131-134.
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  • Boyle, P.P. and Vorst, Ton (1992), ‘Option Replication in Discrete Time with Transaction Costs’, 47 Journal of Finance , 271-293.
  • Breeden, Charles H. and Toumanoff, Peter G. (1984), ‘Transaction Costs and Economic Institutions’, in Leube, K.R. and Zlabinger, A.H. (eds.), The Political Economy of Freedom , MŸnchen, Philosophia Verlag, 161-177.
  • Brennan, Michael J. (1975), ‘The Optimal Number of Securities in a Risky Asset Portfolio When There Are Fixed Costs of Transaction: Theory and Some Empirical Results’, 10 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 483-496.
  • Brennan, Michael J. and Copeland, T.E. (1988), ‘Stock Splits, Stock Prices and Transaction Costs’, 22 Journal of Financial Economics , 83-101.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1990), ‘Rings and Promises’, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 203-215.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1993), ‘The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce’, 27 Family Law Quarterly , 453-470.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. (1994), ‘The Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for Babies’, 18 Seton Hall Journal on Legislation , 553-579.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1991), ‘Legal Rules, Bargaining and Transactions Costs: The Case of Divorce’, in Nagel, Stuart and Mills, Miriam K. (eds.), Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution , New York, Quorum Books, 91-105.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1993), ‘Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs’, 8 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution , 279-297.
  • Brinig, Margaret F. and Alexeev, Michael V. (1995), ‘Fraud in Courtship: Annulment and Divorce’, 2 European Journal of Law and Economics , 45-63.
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  • Brousseau, Eric and Bessy, Christian (1997), Technology Licensing Contracts: Features and Diversity , 14th Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE), Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, Sept. 4-6, 1997.
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  • Centner, Terence J. and Wetzstein, Michael E. (1988), ‘Reducing Moral Hazard Associated With Implied Warranties of Animal Health: Reply’, 70 American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 413-414.
  • Centner, Terence J. and White, F.C. (1987), ‘FmHA’s Efforts Against Delinquent Borrowers: Property Interests and Transaction Costs.’, 12 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics , 35-41.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1969), A Theory of Share Tenancy , Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 188 p.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1970), ‘The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource’, 13 Journal of Law and Economics , 49-70.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1974), ‘A Theory of Price Control’, 17 Journal of Law and Economics , 53-71.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1978), The Myth of Social Costs: A Critique of Welfare Economics and the Implications for Public Policy , London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 93 p.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1983), ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics , 1-21.
  • Cheung, Steven N.S. (1992), ‘On the New Institutional Economics’, in Werin, Lars and Wijkander, Hans (eds.), Contract Economics , Oxford, Blackwell, 48-65.
  • Chianale, Angelo (1992), L’atto pubblico: contributo allo studio dei costi transattivi (The document under the seal of a public officer: contribution to the study of transaction costs) , Torino, Giappichelli.
  • Chianale, Angelo (1992), L’atto pubblico: contributo allo studio dei costi transattivi (The document under the seal of a public officer: contribution to the study of transaction costs) , Torino, Giappichelli.
  • Chisholm, Darlene C. (1997), ‘Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-Payment Contracts: Evidence From the Motion Pictures Industry’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 169-201.
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