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Encyclopedia of Law & Economics – 0550 Game Theory Applied to Law

  • Aivazian, Varouj A. and Callen, Jeffrey L. (1981), ‘The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core’, 24 Journal of Law and Economics , 175-181.
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  • Ben-Shahar, Omri (1992), Strategic Behavior in Judicial Panels , Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, No. 107.
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  • Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1993), ‘Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.
  • Dana, James D., Jr. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Designing a Private Industry : Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure’, 53 Journal of Public Economics , 127-147.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), ‘Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 314-348.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1994), ‘Settlement Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency’, 14 International Review of Law and Economics , 283-298.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), ‘Keeping Society in the Dark: on the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court’, 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 203-221.
  • Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1995), ‘Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling’, 85 American Economic Review , 1187-1206.
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  • Dawid, H. and Feichtinger, G. (1995), On the Persistence of Corruption/ Forschungsbericht , Research Memorandum, Vienna, Institute for Econometrics, Operation Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, No. 186.
  • De Geest, Gerrit (1995), ‘Comment: Game Theory versus Law & Economics?’, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 287-293.
  • Garcimartin AlfŽrez and Francisco Javier (1996), ‘El coste de la ley Helms-Burton para las empresas espa–olas (The Costs of Helms-Burton Rule for Spanish Companies)’, Revista Derecho de los Negocios , 1 ff.
  • Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1992), ‘An Auction – Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneer’s Liability Regimes’, 4 Wisconsin Law Review .
  • Hansen, Robert G. and Thomas, Randall S. (1993), ‘Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis’, Northwestern Law Review .
  • Hay, Bruce L. and Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), ‘Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation : An Economic Perspective’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Huang, Peter H. (1995), ‘Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal Scholars to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts’, 36 Jurimetrics Journal of Law, Science & Technology , 99-114.
  • Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1992), ‘Emotional Responses in Litigation’, 12 International Review of Law and Economics , 31-44.
  • Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou (1994), ‘More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 390-406.
  • Kahan, Marcel (1992), ‘Games, Lies and Securities Laws’, 67 New York University Law Review , 750 ff. Reprinted in 26 Securities Law Review 127, 1994.
  • Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce (1993), ‘Do Bondholders Lose From Junk Bond Covenant Changes’, 66 Journal of Business , 499 ff.
  • Katz, Avery (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’, 8 International Review of Law and Economics , 127-143.
  • Katz, Avery (1990), ‘The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation’, 89 Michigan Law Review , 215-295.
  • Katz, Avery (1990), ‘Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,’, 21 Rand Journal of Economics , 518-537.
  • Katz, Avery (1996), ‘The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations’, 105 Yale Law Journal , 1249-1309.
  • Kerkmeester, Heico (1995), ‘Game Theory as a Method in Law and Economics’, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law & Economics , Antwerpen, Maklu, 267-285.
  • Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1992), ‘Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation for ‘Unfair’ Plea Bargaining’, 23 Rand Journal of Economics , 507-515.
  • Kort, P.M., Feichtinger G., Hartl, R.F. and Haundschmied, J.L. (1995), Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) On a Drug Market , Working Paper, Maastricht, Tilburg University, Department of Economietrics and CentER.
  • Krauss, Michael I. (1994), ‘La rŽglementation contre le marchŽ dans le dŽveloppement de normes (Regulation against the Market in Norms Formation)’, 5 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines , 573-599.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1988), ‘L’ordre spontanŽ comme fondement du droit – un survol des modles de l’Žmergence des rgles dans une sociŽtŽ civile (Spontaneous Order as Foundation of Law – A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)’, 22 Revue Juridique Themis , 347-383.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1989), ‘L ordre spontanŽ comme fondement du droit – un survol des modles de l’Žmergence des rgles dans la sociŽtŽ civile (Spontaneous Order as the Foundation of Law – A Survey of Models of the Emergence of Rules in Civil Society)’, 3 Revue internationale de Droit Economique , 247-287.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1991), ‘Le droit saisi par le jeu (Game-Theory Applied to Law)’, Droit et SociŽtŽ , 57-81.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1992), ‘Le droit saisi par le jeu ([Game-Theory Applied to Law)’, in Ost, Franois and Van De Kerkhove, Michel (eds.), Le jeu: un paradigme pour le droit , Paris, Librairie GŽnŽrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 81-110.
  • MacKaay, Ejan (1992), ‘Rgle et dŽcision en droit (Rule and Decision in Law)’, in Bourcier, Danile and Mackay, Pierre (eds.), Lire le droit – Langue, texte, cognition , Paris, Librairie GŽnŽrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 41-69.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial’, 14 Bell Journal of Economics , 539-550. Reprinted in D.K. Levine and S.A. Lippman, Eds, The Economics Of Information, Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Elgar.
  • Png, Ivan Paak-Liang (1987), ‘Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care’, 34 Journal of Public Economics , 61-85.
  • Posner, Eric A. (1998), ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’, (forth.) Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Rasmusen, Eric and Ramseyer, Mark J. (1994), ‘Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators’, 78 Public Choice , 305 ff.
  • Rasmusen, Eric B., Ramseyer, Mark J. and Wiley, John Shepard, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’, 81 American Economic Review , 1137 ff.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’, 78 American Economic Review , 713-728.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1993), ‘The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice’, 13 International Review of Law and Economics , 115-134.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’, 17 Rand Journal of Economics , 557-566.
  • Roin, Julie, A. (1995), ‘Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems’, 81 Virginia Law Review , 1753 ff.
  • Ryssdal, Stray A.C. (1995), An Economic Analysis of Civil Suits and Appels , Oslo, Juridisk Forlag.
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), ‘The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation : A Simple Model of Mechanism Design’, International Review of Law and Economics .
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), Enforcement by Hearing: An Integrated Model of Evidence Production , mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department.
  • Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), ‘Evidence Production, Adversarial Process and the Private Instigation of Suits’, mimeo, Columbia University Economics Department .
  • Schap, David (1986), ‘Executive Veto and Informational Strategy: A Structure-Induced Equilibrium Analysis’, 30 American Journal of Political Science , 755-770.
  • Schap, David (1988), ‘In Search of Efficacious Executive Veto Authority’, 58 Public Choice , 247-257.
  • Schap, David (1990), ‘Executing Veto and Spending Limitation: Positive Political Economy with Implications for Institutional Choice’, 65 Public Choice , 239-256.
  • Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1987), ‘Executive Veto, Legislative Override and Structure-Induced Equilibrium’, 52 Public Choice , 227-244. Reprinted in Rowley, Charles (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Edward Elgar, 1993, vol. 3, pp. 47-64.
  • Schap, David and Carter, John R. (1990), ‘Line-Item Veto: Where is Thy Sting?’, 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives , 103-118.
  • Schap, David and Daerden, James A. (1994), ‘The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities’, 80 Public Choice , 35-53.
  • Schavell, Steven and Spier, Kathryn E. (1996), ‘Threats Without Binding Commitment’, 5461 National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper .
  • Spier, Kathryn E., ‘A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Stettle Under a Negligence Rule’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’, 59 Review of Economic Studies , 93-108.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1992), ‘Incomplete Contracts and Signalling’, 23 (3) Rand Journal of Economics , 432-443.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules’, 25 Rand Journal of Economics , 197-214.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1994), ‘Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards’, 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 84-95.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. (1997), ‘A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1993), ‘Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation’, 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 349-367.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Dana, James D., Jr. (1994), ‘Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure’, 53 Journal of Public Economics , 127-147.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Daniel Spulber (1993), ‘Pretrial Bargaining and Asymmetric Information : The Mechanism-Design Approach’, mimeo, July 1993 .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and David E. Weinstein (1995), ‘Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs GATT Cooperation’, in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), Imperfect Competition in International Trade , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Hay, Bruce L. (1996), ‘Burdens of Production in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective’, Journal of Legal Studies .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael Whinston (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, an Renegotiation’, 26 (2) Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Shavell, Steven (1996), ‘Threats Without Binding Commitment’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper .
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Sykes, Alan O. (1996), Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims , Mimeo, August 1996.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Weinstein, David E., ‘Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation’, in Chang, Winston W. and Katayama, Seiichi (eds.), Imperfect Competition in International Trade , Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Spier, Kathryn E. and Whinston, Michael D. (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation’, 26 Rand Journal of Economics , 180-202.
  • Stout, Lynn A. (1996), ‘Insurance Or Gambling? Derivatives Trading in A World of Risk and Uncertainty’, 39 Brookings Review .
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  • Williams, Stephen F. (1973), ‘Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue’, 44 University of Colorado Law Review , 301-321.
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